CourcyInt

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

FROM: JKC de Courcy, Chairman, Strategic Intelligence Forum

DATE: 7 December 2006

SUBJECT: Catastrophic scenarios for the Middle East

The Iraq Study Group Report, published earlier this week, is both an astounding mea culpa by the US and an exercise in fantastic wishful thinking.  Nevertheless, it does represent a necessary last-ditch attempt to mitigate a catastrophic situation.

With regard to the motives for going into Iraq, we have always argued that nations, no less than individuals, do from time to time act irrationally, and the US's decision to invade Iraq was an irrational lashing out in the aftermath of 9/11. Nonetheless, the Bush administration did try to rationalize the invasion, and it did so on the following grounds:

1.  Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which he might either use or pass on to terrorists for their use.  This threat had to be neutralized.

2.  Saddam Hussein was either an ally or would become an ally of al-Qaeda.

3.  Removing a brutal dictator and introducing free-market democracy would be salutary for the whole of the Middle East.

Everyone now knows that the weapons of mass destruction did not exist.  Nor did any serious link to al-Qaeda exist before the invasion.  As for post-Saddam Iraq providing a beacon of political and economic advancement for the rest of the Middle East to follow, precisely the opposite has occurred.  Iraq has been fractured, and whether or not it is in a state of civil war, more than 3,000 civilians are being killed each month.  According to the ISG: "Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality.  There are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni insurgency, al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality."  Some 1.6m people are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8m have fled the country.

This is bad, but it could get worse, and so frightened has the US become of a further downward spiral in and around Iraq that it will now support any regime throughout the region that provides stability, signalling a region-wide retreat from not an advance towards democracy.

THE SOLUTION?

The ISG knows that there is no miracle cure to hand, but what it does propose at least has the merit of being sensible if it is achievable.  Its key recommendations are to hasten national reconciliation through the establishment of provincial democracy and good governance; to counter centrifugal forces by ensuring that oil revenue remains a central government asset, the benefits of which would be distributed on a per capita basis; to enlist the good offices of all Iraq's neighbours, including Syria and Iran, and other interested parties; and to start a renewed push for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

The ISG report specifically eschews "devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central control", but in reality that is where the suggested policies seem to be heading, with the proviso that control of oil revenues remains with Baghdad as this would provide a means of holding the disparate parts of Iraq together.

In our view, the ISG is correct in seeing Iraq's neighbours as the key to the crisis, but the problems are enormous and include:

1.  Turkey has to be persuaded that strong autonomy for Kurdistan (and possibly letting the Kurds take control of Kirkuk) is not a danger to Turkey's own stability.  This is probably the easiest of the neighbourly concerns to allay in that an Iraqi Kurdish (and US) commitment not to tolerate Turkish PKK guerrillas operating from Kurdistan would go a long way towards appeasing Ankara.

2.  Iran needs to be persuaded that trying to tie down the US indefinitely in Iraq is not in its best interests.  This won't be easy.  Iran's current government is arguably the least pragmatic since the revolution, and it is virulently anti-US.  Besides, not only is the US losing global credibility on a daily basis due to its blunderings in Iraq (which benefits Tehran as it tries to divide international opposition to its nuclear programme), it is also doing Iran's dirty work for it in fighting the Sunni insurgents.  The ISG seems to think that Iran could be persuaded to ease the US's pain in Iraq in return for a deeper US commitment to fight the Taleban in Afghanistan, but this is unlikely.  There is also a tacit threat within the ISG report, where it says: "Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of US policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state.  Iran's population is slightly more than 50% Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24% of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities.  Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for Iranian national security interests."  Tehran is unlikely to be persuaded by this implied threat.

3.  Syria provides the most interesting case.  There is undoubtedly an opportunity - and an imperative - to separate Syria from Iran.  That way, at least, whatever additional influence Iran acquires in Iraq will not extend through Syria to Lebanon.  But the price may be too high for the US to pay.  It would include the continuing power of the minority Alawite regime in Damascus (ie no democracy), a return of Syrian influence to Lebanon, and (above all) a return of the Golan Heights - which may not be within the US's power to deliver, certainly not quickly.  Another potential problem is Syria's perennial habit of missing opportunities.

4.  The Sunni Gulf States all share concerns over the rise of Shia power in Iraq and will not be happy with any new constitutional settlement that would lead to the persecution of Sunnis or an unfavourable distribution of oil revenues.  Squaring the Gulf States, therefore, is dependent on the acquiescence of Iran and the Iraqi Shias in a settlement that is fair to Iraq's Sunni Arabs - but see point 2 above.

CONCLUSION

The ISG report is brutally honest in its assessment of the current position, which is a good start.  Its proposals are also as sensible as can be expected in the circumstances.  There is no magic wand.

The keys are establishing responsible provincial government (while containing centrifugal forces through the control and distribution of oil revenues from the centre) and enlisting the support of Iraq's neighbours.  If both things can be achieved, then a positive outcome is indeed possible.  But there must be the gravest doubts - some of which we have outlined above - as to whether these things can be achieved.

And if they are not?  In the ISG's assessment, the dangers that now face the region, the US, and the wider international community are as follows:

"Continuing violence could lead to greater chaos...A humanitarian catastrophe could follow...

"Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders.  Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war...[There would be] the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world...Such a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora's Box of problems - including radicalization of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes - that might take decades to play out.  If the instability in Iraq spreads to other Gulf states, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy...

"Terrorism could grow...The global standing of the United States could suffer...at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention and strong US leadership of international alliances..."

These are frightening scenarios, but they are by no means unthinkable - and it would not be difficult to articulate further catastrophic escalations.  The only positive is that the US now recognizes this.  It is something at least.

JdeC

The full report can be downloaded from: http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf