CourcyInt

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

DATE: 2 November 2006

SUBJECT: Somalia at centre of regional power struggle

Members of the Strategic Intelligence Forum will be fully aware of our concerns about Somalia.  Most recently we looked at the regional rivalries fuelling the conflict in a briefing in the 26 October issue of Strategic Intelligence Review - "Deterioration in the Horn of Africa".

Earlier this week, the BBC Monitoring Service's research department produced an analysis entitled "The Arabs and the Great Game in Somalia", which in turn draws heavily on a report prepared for the US State Department by the former US ambassador to Ethiopia and Somalia, Professor David Shinn entitled "Somalia: Regional involvement and implications for US policy".  It provides many of the details that space precluded us from including in our 26 October briefing.

The key points are:

* Somalia is at the epicentre of a regional power struggle, fuelled by a complex mix of political, geostrategic, and religious rivalries, that threatens to spark a war that could involve as many as 12 countries.

* The principal actors in the regional rivalry are Ethiopia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - each of which wants to ensure that Somalia is an obedient satellite state. A supplementary role is being played by Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Yemen, Iran, Libya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

* Egypt's interest in Somalia is part of its national security strategy to gain influence over Ethiopia, one of the principle sources of the Nile. Relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa have been worsening in recent years, mainly because of the dispute over how the Nile waters should be utilized more equitably between the Nile Basin states.  Ethiopian officials have gone so far as to claim recently that the Egyptian armed forces are being trained in jungle warfare in preparation for a possible future military intervention in the Nile Basin.

Egypt on the other hand suspects Ethiopia of being behind the regional campaign to renegotiate the treaty on the usage of the Nile waters drawn up in the late 1950s. The campaign has attracted support in the Great Lakes region and in east Africa, forcing an increasingly isolated Cairo to abandon its hard line stance.

To rally wider Pan-Arab support for its policies, Egypt has sought to portray Ethiopia as a threat to Arab national security intent on undermining any peace effort in Somalia by encouraging regionalism and arming the warlords.

An editorial by the semi-official Egyptian daily Al-Ahram on 14 June entitled "Next Stop Somalia" called on Arabs not to forget the conflict unfolding in the "southern front".  It warned: "It is high time the Arabs start focusing on the southern front, not just the eastern one [Iraq]."

* Although Egypt says it recognizes the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), it is opposed to the TFG's pro-Ethiopian president, Abdullahi Yusuf. The TFG president is largely viewed in Arab circles as an Ethiopian puppet - a perception that was enhanced by a recent speech to the parliament in Baidoa in which Abdullahi Yusuf dismissed the Islamists in Mogadishu as "Arabophiles frothing at the mouth".

* It was reported on 29 October that Cairo had officially invited the de facto head of the Somali Islamist movement, Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys, for talks. Aweys frequently visits Arab states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia despite the fact he is on the UN Security Council's targeted sanctions list in accordance with Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999.

* Egypt was unhappy with the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) process that led to the creation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Kenya in October 2004 because of the influence wielded over the process by Ethiopia. It now wants to ensure the Arab League keeps a control of the talks in Khartoum so that any deal struck between the Islamists and the TFG is one that would not disadvantage Egypt's geostrategic interests in Somalia.

* Egypt is also opposed to the recognition of the breakaway state of Somaliland, and there have been suggestions that Egypt is behind the move by Saudi Arabia to maintain the debilitating ban on the import of livestock from Somaliland. The ruling elite of Somaliland is strongly pro-Addis Ababa and is thought to have conducted secret negotiations with Israel.  They may even have signed a secret military pact with the Jewish state according to local reports.

* Saudi Arabia has two primary geostrategic interests in Somalia. One of the consequences of Saudi financial and educational aid to Somalia following the oil boom of the 1970s was the rapid growth of Wahhabism, which in pre Al-Qaeda days the Saudi authorities encouraged.  Now Saudi Arabia is engaged in a bitter struggle with "the deviant group" and fears that Somalia may become a haven for Saudi Wahhabi militants who could use it as a base for anti-regime activity.  The respected Middle East commentator, Adel Darwish, in a commentary published by Al-Sharq al-Awsat on 12 August warned about the "Afghanization of Somalia".

* The other Saudi Arabian objective is to counter the growing influence of Iran in the Horn and the Red Sea regions, particularly given Iran's already strong influence in Sudan. Comoros, a traditional Saudi ally, is now ruled by a cleric trained in Iran and could also be moving towards the Iran camp. Saudi Arabia's current strategy is to support the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys is a regular visitor to the Kingdom. Aweys is thought to have established links with prominent Saudi business leaders and officials.

* Libya, the UAE, and Yemen each have their own reasons for involvement in Somalia.

* Yemen is said to be currently backing the TFG, largely because of its concern over Eritrean influence over the UIC. Eritrea and Yemen fought a brief border war over the disputed Hanish Islands in December 1995, and though the dispute was settled after arbitration in The Hague the enmity remains. Yemen's formation of the Sanaa Cooperation Forum with Ethiopia and Sudan in 2002 was seen in Asmara as intended to further isolate Eritrea.

* The UAE is primarily motivated by money. It is the main hub for Somali-run telecom and money transfer businesses, and many of the profitable telecom and money transfer agencies with offices in Dubai and the other emirates are run by supporters of the UIC. UAE investors are also keen on Somalia's untapped oil and mineral potential and to invest in the country's infrastructure like the main port of Mogadishu.

* Libya's alleged support for the UIC appears to owe less to genuine strategic calculations that to Colonel Gaddafi's predilection for backing militants groups overseas irrespective of their ideological leanings.

END