CourcyInt

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

DATE: 9 October 2006

SUBJECT: North Korea's first nuclear test

DEVELOPMENT: On 9 October North Korea carried out its first nuclear test. South Korea and US confirmed the test on the basis of seismic activity at the believed test-site, a mountain in the remote northern province of North Hamgyong. South Korea says that at 10.36am local time it detected a tremor inconsistent with natural phenomena. The detonation, measuring 3.6 on the Richter scale, was equivalent to roughly 550 tonnes of TNT.

ANALYSIS: North Korea has become the world's eighth nuclear power and is the least predictable of the octet. Very little is known about the workings of the North's military government, which is still technically at war with South Korea and the US. On a daily basis Pyongyang's propaganda promises the annihilation of the North's enemies, chief among them the US and Japan.

Although alarming, North Korea's emergence as a nuclear power is no surprise. Its government has publicly committed itself to nuclear weapons, and a test is a necessary step in the process. North Korea stresses its pursuit of such weapons is for defensive and deterrent purposes only. On 3 October, when Pyongyang confirmed speculation that it intended to carry out a test, its foreign ministry pledged no first use of a nuclear missile.

But North Korean pledges are not taken very seriously, and a regional arms race could now ensue. Japan can rely on the US to pulverise North Korea should the North attack Tokyo or Seoul, but nevertheless it might now seek a nuclear capacity of its own. Any suggestion of Japanese rearmament enrages China and South Korea, but in the light of the North's test such opprobrium becomes less justifiable or important.

The test could thus reverse a new, positive trend in neighbourly relations. On 8 October Prime Minister Shinzo Abe became the first Japanese leader to travel to Beijing in five years, as he attempted to repair the damage done to ties by his predecessor Junichiro Koizumi. Abe and China's President Hu Jintao agreed that a North Korean nuclear test would be intolerable.

This consensus will not last. Both countries have condemned the test but they will diverge when the matter goes to an emergency UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting later today. Japan will join the US in pressing for a resolution based on to Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which would facilitate sanctions and even force against North Korea. China will oppose this.

The UNSC has to pass something stronger than Resolution 1695, which it ratified in July after the North's missile tests and from which China successfully purged any mention of Chapter 7. If Japan and the US refuse to let Beijing again excise Chapter 7 deep divisions will appear in the UNSC and the resolution might be vetoed altogether.

Beijing, which described the nuclear test as "flagrant", would take no pleasure in vetoing a Chapter 7 resolution but realpolitik demands it do so. If a UN resolution paved the way for the overthrow of President Kim Jong-il then the 30,000 US troops currently defending South Korea would be free to focus on Washington's major rival in the region: China. The US would be much better placed to defend Taiwan, for example.

China is more likely to impose other forms of punishment on Pyongyang. North Korea relies on China for fuel and food, and Beijing will almost certainly restrict supplies of both unless the North returns promptly to six-way talks on its nuclear programme (with South Korea, China, the US, Japan, and Russia).

Less likely, though still possible, is that China might seek some regime change. Rumours suggest that Kim is losing influence to military hardliners, who successfully pressured the president to sanction the missile and nuclear tests. Beijing could exploit these divisions (the Chinese and North Korean militaries have close ties) to reassert its influence over Pyongyang. The only proviso is that the changes should not create mass upheavals: Beijing is fearful of what might ensue should thousands of North Korean refugees head for the Chinese border.

Whatever the UNSC decides, North Korea is more vulnerable economically and politically than it was before the test. But the North now boasts the ultimate bargaining chip: the power to destroy Tokyo or Seoul in a matter of minutes. Recent stories from Pakistan suggest the US does not necessarily object to attacking nuclear powers, but Pyongyang will feel that a proven nuclear capacity makes it safer from attack than, say, Iraq.

Whoever is in charge of North Korea believes that the short-term pain of economic sanctions, the brunt of which is borne by a long-suffering people, is worth enduring for the longevity of the regime. Ultimately, the international community has no choice but to engage with North Korea. When it does so, Pyongyang will be in a stronger position.

END