CourcyInt

COURCYINT SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service members

Date: 21 November 2003

From: Joe de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: AL-QAIDA MAKES STRATEGIC GAIN

SUMMARY

On Thursday 20 November, al-Qaida inspired (and a local affiliate carried out) twin bomb attacks on the British consulate and the London-based HSBC bank in Istanbul.

ANALYSIS

The twin attacks in Istanbul have confirmed a trend in post-9/11 al-Qaida tactics that has been apparent for some time, namely the launching of attacks on Western and Israeli interests mostly in Muslim countries and with the help of local affiliates.

Major al-Qaida-inspired attacks since 9/11 which conform to this pattern include the following:

* 11 April 2002. A truck bombing in Djerba, Tunisia, near a synagogue, killing 20.

* 8 May 2002. A car bomb attack on a bus carrying French defence technicians in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 14.

* 14 June 2002. A car bomb attack on the US consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 11 and wounding 45.

* 12 October 2002. Bomb attacks on a nightclub district and outside the US consulate in Bali, Indonesia, killing 202.

* 28 November 2002. A failed missile attack on an Israeli airliner and a car bomb attack on a hotel frequented by Israelis in Mombassa, Kenya, killing 15.

* 12 May 2003. Four suicide bombs detonated in an expatriate residential area in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 35.

* 16 May 2003. Five bomb attacks on Jewish and Western targets in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 45 and wounding 60.

* 7 June 2003. A car bomb attack on a busload of German peacekeepers in Kabul, Afghanistan, killing five.

* 5 August 2003. A car bomb attack on the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 10 and wounding 150.

* 19 August 2003. A truck bomb attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq, killing 22.

* 9 November 2003. A suicide bomb attack on a residential compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 17.

* 15 November 2003. Car bomb attacks on two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey, killing 24 and wounding 300.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the supposedly fatal setback suffered by al-Qaida in Afghanistan in November 2001, when the Taleban regime was driven from Kabul and the group’s bases were destroyed by US military power, was only temporary.

The group’s leaders and many key operatives survived and continue to find refuge in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has also re-established its network of affiliated groups throughout the Muslim world, while the US-led attack on Iraq has provided it with a potent new cause and a boost to recruitment. An additional bonus for al-Qaida has been the split in the Western alliance produced by the Iraq war.

On the other hand, it is still the case that since the Iranian revolution of 1979 only two countries (Sudan and Afghanistan) have succumbed to Islamic fundamentalism and that the position has now been reversed in both countries. Elsewhere, the Islamist assault on Algeria and Egypt has long since been seen off and has not been rekindled, while in Indonesia, the world's most-populous Muslim country, only this week Amien Rais, one-time leader of Indonesia’s 30m-strong Muhammadiyah Muslim group, declared: “Political Islam is not selling in this country. If I based my political support only on Muslims, there is a foregone conclusion that I would lose [next year’s presidential election].”

It might, therefore, be concluded that while al-Qaida has shown remarkable resilience over the past two years, it has not actually made any strategic advances - but for at least two good reasons we are not so sure.

First, the present al-Qaida assault on Turkey could set back Turkey’s drive to become a member of the European Union, either because it could reinforce the European view that Turkey is just too different from the rest of Europe to be allowed in as a full member and/or because it will spark a draconian crackdown by Turkey’s secularist army on the country’s Islamist tendency thus restoring to the EU its longstanding let-out on Turkey, namely Turkey’s less-than-pristine human-rights record. The effects of a final rejection of Turkey by the European Union should not be underestimated.

Second, there is the question of Israel. The one incontestable fact about Israel is that the Arab states are unable to defeat it militarily. But Israel is nevertheless vulnerable to external pressure from the West, and al-Qaida’s hope is that its terrorist campaign against Western interests will increase Western pressure on Israel to give up the fruits of its 1967 military victory.

This is an entirely rational strategy for al-Qaida to follow, and there is evidence that it is working. In Europe anti-Israeli sentiment is reaching heights unknown in recent times; in America the usually pro-Israel Bush administration is beginning to show its frustration with the Sharon government; and even in Israel itself influential calls for a unilateral retreat are increasing.

If al-Qaida's strategy is rational, and if it is working, then it stands to reason that there will be more of the same.

END