CourcyInt

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service subscribers

Date: 4 April 2003

From: Joe de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: SYRIAN MISJUDGEMENTS OVER IRAQ

DEVELOPMENT:

There has been a barrage of reports in recent days, many originating in Israel, about Syrian support for Saddam Hussein's regime.

ANALYSIS:

In our analysis of the likely shape of the world after Saddam Hussein published in the 12 February issue of Courcy's Intelligence Review - http://www.courcyint.com/crl/crl1700.asp - we talked in particular about the emergence of a strong Iran/Syria-Lebanon axis, linked by the strengthened Iraqi Shi'ites and in all likelihood backed by a Russia no longer having to juggle its support for Iran with its support for Iraq.

Nothing that has happened since has altered this analysis.  However, particularly given the recent reports about Syrian support for Saddam Hussein, it is now important to elaborate a bit further on the position of Syria.

The first point to make is that Syria, since the death of Hafez al-Assad and the succession of his son Bashar, has in recent years become even closer to Iran than was previously the case.  Assad senior might have backed Iran in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, but he was careful to limit the extent of Iranian influence within Syria (in particular keeping Iranian Shi'ite clerics out of the country).  Assad junior on the other hand, who amongst other things reportedly views Iranian-backed Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah as something of a guru, has allowed Iran to increase its influence within Syria.  For instance, there are now said to be some 30 or more Iranian-influenced religious schools within the country.

When put alongside intelligence about the possible transfer of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to Syria, this supports our projections about the likely potency of the post-Saddam Iran-Syria alliance - a potency that will increase in proportion to the amount of influence secured by the Shi'ites in post-Saddam Iraq.

However, Assad appears to be misjudging the situation and jeopardising the potential gains.  Syria's best interests would be served by accepting whatever weapons Iraq wishes to transfer to safe keeping (like Iran did with the Iraqi fighters during the first Gulf War) and paying lip service to Arab solidarity with the Iraqi people while providing as little as possible by way of direct help or succour to the beleaguered and sure-to-be-defeated Saddam regime.  Instead Damascus has supported the dying regime too openly, giving Israel the evidence it needs to ensure that the Syrian danger looms large on America's radar screen.  And in this Israel has clearly been successful judging by the recent warnings issued to Damascus by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

So while the threat of a much strengthened (and radicalized) post-Saddam Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon axis clearly exists and is likely to grow (particularly if the Shi'ites gain the ascendancy in Iraq), a combination of Israeli lobbying and Syrian misjudgement is combining to ensure full American recognition of the threat.

Interestingly, this habit of misjudging crucial moments appears to be an Assad family trait.  Assad senior had a reputation in the West as being a cunning leader of exceptional guile, but his record never supported such an assessment.  It is worth recalling, for instance, that:

- he failed to regain the Golan Heights by war in 1973

- he failed to stop Egypt making separate peace with Israel in 1979

- he failed to prevent Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982

- he failed to adjust to the collapse of the Soviet Union

- he failed to turn the post-Gulf War Damascus Declaration into a genuine tool for influence over Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states

- he failed to see that Shimon Peres really wanted to return the Golan Heights

- he failed to prevent the Palestinians and Jordan from making separate peace with Israel, and

- he failed to stand up to Turkey over water and over Syrian support for the Kurdish PKK guerrilla group

The one genuine success that can be attributed to Assad senior was keeping Islamist militancy at bay, but this was achieved only by dint of extreme brutality and ruthlessness - and, as noted above, that success is being jeopardised by his son.

Now, following in the solid tradition of his father, it seems that Bashar is misjudging how to act at another crucial historical turning point, and this misjudgement must surely limit to one degree or another the considerable gains that Syria looked certain to make from Saddam's demise.

END