Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

No subscriber to this service will have been surprised by this week’s further sharp deterioration in relations between Israel and Turkey.  Since the outset of the Arab Spring we have been drawing attention to Israel’s deteriorating strategic position, including its worsening relations with Turkey.  For those who believe in the importance of the balance of power for regional stability, these are troubling times.

David Ben Gurion, one of the founding fathers of Israel, believed in an ‘alliance of the periphery’ with the non-Arab states of the Middle East, principally Turkey and Iran.  The Iranian element fell by the wayside after the Islamic revolution of 1979, but Turkey remained a firm ally of Israel until the advent of the Islam-based Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which in June won its third term in power under Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan.

The loss of Iran to Israel was serious, but it was more than compensated for by the Camp David accords with Egypt, signed just months before the fall of the Shah of Iran.  What is so significant now is that Egypt appears to be joining Turkey in growing hostility to Israel at a time when Iran remains irreconcilable.  There are still those in Israel who harbour hopes for solidarity with non-Arab elements in the Middle East, but the stateless Kurds and the newly established South Sudan hardly compensate for Turkey and Iran.

There are also those who subscribe to the view, prevalent in the West, that Turkish-style democracy is precisely what the Arab Middle East needs and that it poses no threat to regional peace.  But this optimism is being tested to the limit by the recent actions of Turkey and because an Egyptian administration that takes more account of public opinion will in all likelihood be less not more friendly towards Israel.

When the AKP won the Turkish elections in June for the third successive time, we made a lot of Erdogan’s victory speech in which he declared: “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.”  The intention to make Turkey a regional power focusing on Islamic causes was clear.

Now, in the past week, Erdogan has said that Turkey is suspending military and commercial ties with Israel, downgrading diplomatic relations to second secretary level, and will impose sanctions on the Jewish state because of its refusal to apologize for the killing of nine Turkish citizens last year during the attack on the Mavi Marmara.  The Turkish ship was attempting to run the Israeli-imposed blockade on the Gaza Strip, but Erdogan has now announced Turkey’s intention to increase its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to ensure freedom of navigation.  The Turkish prime minister has called Israel’s 30 May 2010 assault on the Mavi Marmara, which took place in international waters, “an act of state terror and savagery”.

A Turkish diplomat explained the move to boost Turkey’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in this way:  “For us the most important thing is that the attack [on the Mavi Marmara] took place in the open Eastern Mediterranean, a place of strategic importance to us.  This puts Israel in the position of doing what it wants scot-free in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is simply unacceptable.  Unrestricted navigation in the Mediterranean cannot be left to Israel’s pleasure.”  At the moment Turkey only has one frigate on patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean, but this is now likely to increase to three or four.  Even more directly, the diplomat warned: “If something similar to the Mavi Marmara incident occurs again this time our warships will be there.  If Israel opens fire on the ship or our warships, we shall respond in kind.”

Also, in response to the publication of the Palmer Report on the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey’s President Abdullah Gul echoed the election victory sentiments of Prime Minister Erdogan about Turkey supporting downtrodden Muslims in the region.  He said that Turkey as “the most influential state in the region” will “not only uphold its own citizens’ rights but those of all nations that need it – and the international community should realize this”.

To make matters worse for Israel, there is a suspicion in policymaking circles that Washington has acquiesced in Turkey’s hardening attitude towards Israel.  On 6 September, Udi Segal, the diplomatic correspondent of Israeli Channel 2 TV, reported: “Israeli sources are basically blaming the United States for giving Erdogan’s rampages and attacks the green light.”  Israel believes that Washington stopped pressuring Ankara on Israel in return for Turkish agreement to station anti-ballistic missile radar in Turkey and for modifying its policy on Syria and Iran.

In a move that few believe is a coincidence, on 4 September Israel signed a security cooperation agreement with Greece.  Then, adding to the growing unease about regional stability, the following day the chief of Israel’s Home Front Command, Major-General Eyal Eisenberg, made a speech in which he said that the risk of all-out war in the region had increased.

For the time being, our own sources say, the risks are containable.  For instance, they point out, Egypt still has a long way to go in reversing the Mubarak legacy, and in this regard it is worth recalling how long it has taken the AKP to move Turkey away from its former pro-Israeli orientation.  The path was not really clear for Erdogan to move strongly against Israel until he completed his “anti-military coup” this July, yet the AKP first came to power in 2002, nearly 10 years ago.

Egypt is still ruled by the Supreme Military Council, and the military’s continuing addiction to US military support - which Israeli intelligence officials see as a key moderating influence - can be taken as read.  Nevertheless, the direction of change is clear and it frightens Israel.  It is all very well keeping Egypt sweet with American weapons - in the first deal since the fall of Mubarak, in July the Pentagon approved a $1.3bn sale of 125 Abrams tanks to Egypt, to add to the 1,000 it already has - but Israeli officials continue to worry about what will happen after the elections.  That the Muslim Brotherhood will be more influential in post-election Egypt is certain, and popular opinion is flowing strongly against Israel.

An increasingly fearful Israel in itself is a destabilizing factor.  The arguments in favour of major territorial concessions to the Palestinians in order to secure peace are becoming harder to sell to a sceptical and fearful Israeli electorate.  Equally, more and more one can hear influential Israelis talking the language of divide-and-rule.  One commentator in an influential Israeli daily wrote this week: “The Arab Spring is in fact the start of an internal Arab winter: 20 to 40 years of fighting over who will run each country.  While they fritter away money, resources, and energy, Israel will continue to advance economically and militarily.”  The implication was clear: Israel should be encouraging this outcome by fomenting the Sunni-Shia and secular/Islamist rifts to keep the Arab states disunited and weak (and, of course, using the Kurds to weaken and distract Turkey).  This is not the post-Arab Spring future that the Western powers have envisaged for the Middle East.  JdeC.