Courcy's Intelligence Brief - 7 September 2011

Items

• Further deterioration in Israel's strategic position

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  No subscriber to this service will have been surprised by this week’s further sharp deterioration in relations between Israel and Turkey.  Since the outset of the Arab Spring we have been drawing attention to Israel’s deteriorating strategic position, including its worsening relations with Turkey.  For those who believe in the importance of the balance of power for regional stability, these are troubling times.

  David Ben Gurion, one of the founding fathers of Israel, believed in an ‘alliance of the periphery’ with the non-Arab states of the Middle East, principally Turkey and Iran.  The Iranian element fell by the wayside after the Islamic revolution of 1979, but Turkey remained a firm ally of Israel until the advent of the Islam-based Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which in June won its third term in power under Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan.

  The loss of Iran to Israel was serious, but it was more than compensated for by the Camp David accords with Egypt, signed just months before the fall of the Shah of Iran.  What is so significant now is that Egypt appears to be joining Turkey in growing hostility to Israel at a time when Iran remains irreconcilable.  There are still those in Israel who harbour hopes for solidarity with non-Arab elements in the Middle East, but the stateless Kurds and the newly established South Sudan hardly compensate for Turkey and Iran.

  There are also those who subscribe to the view, prevalent in the West, that Turkish-style democracy is precisely what the Arab Middle East needs and that it poses no threat to regional peace.  But this optimism is being tested to the limit by the recent actions of Turkey and because an Egyptian administration that takes more account of public opinion will in all likelihood be less not more friendly towards Israel.

  When the AKP won the Turkish elections in June for the third successive time, we made a lot of Erdogan’s victory speech in which he declared: “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.”  The intention to make Turkey a regional power focusing on Islamic causes was clear.

  Now, in the past week, Erdogan has said that Turkey is suspending military and commercial ties with Israel, downgrading diplomatic relations to second secretary level, and will impose sanctions on the Jewish state because of its refusal to apologize for the killing of nine Turkish citizens last year during the attack on the Mavi Marmara.  The Turkish ship was attempting to run the Israeli-imposed blockade on the Gaza Strip, but Erdogan has now announced Turkey’s intention to increase its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to ensure freedom of navigation.  The Turkish prime minister has called Israel’s 30 May 2010 assault on the Mavi Marmara, which took place in international waters, “an act of state terror and savagery”.

  A Turkish diplomat explained the move to boost Turkey’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in this way:  “For us the most important thing is that the attack [on the Mavi Marmara] took place in the open Eastern Mediterranean, a place of strategic importance to us.  This puts Israel in the position of doing what it wants scot-free in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is simply unacceptable.  Unrestricted navigation in the Mediterranean cannot be left to Israel’s pleasure.”  At the moment Turkey only has one frigate on patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean, but this is now likely to increase to three or four.  Even more directly, the diplomat warned: “If something similar to the Mavi Marmara incident occurs again this time our warships will be there.  If Israel opens fire on the ship or our warships, we shall respond in kind.”

  Also, in response to the publication of the Palmer Report on the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey’s President Abdullah Gul echoed the election victory sentiments of Prime Minister Erdogan about Turkey supporting downtrodden Muslims in the region.  He said that Turkey as “the most influential state in the region” will “not only uphold its own citizens’ rights but those of all nations that need it – and the international community should realize this”.

  To make matters worse for Israel, there is a suspicion in policymaking circles that Washington has acquiesced in Turkey’s hardening attitude towards Israel.  On 6 September, Udi Segal, the diplomatic correspondent of Israeli Channel 2 TV, reported: “Israeli sources are basically blaming the United States for giving Erdogan’s rampages and attacks the green light.”  Israel believes that Washington stopped pressuring Ankara on Israel in return for Turkish agreement to station anti-ballistic missile radar in Turkey and for modifying its policy on Syria and Iran.

  In a move that few believe is a coincidence, on 4 September Israel signed a security cooperation agreement with Greece.  Then, adding to the growing unease about regional stability, the following day the chief of Israel’s Home Front Command, Major-General Eyal Eisenberg, made a speech in which he said that the risk of all-out war in the region had increased.

  For the time being, our own sources say, the risks are containable.  For instance, they point out, Egypt still has a long way to go in reversing the Mubarak legacy, and in this regard it is worth recalling how long it has taken the AKP to move Turkey away from its former pro-Israeli orientation.  The path was not really clear for Erdogan to move strongly against Israel until he completed his “anti-military coup” this July, yet the AKP first came to power in 2002, nearly 10 years ago.

  Egypt is still ruled by the Supreme Military Council, and the military’s continuing addiction to US military support - which Israeli intelligence officials see as a key moderating influence - can be taken as read.  Nevertheless, the direction of change is clear and it frightens Israel.  It is all very well keeping Egypt sweet with American weapons - in the first deal since the fall of Mubarak, in July the Pentagon approved a $1.3bn sale of 125 Abrams tanks to Egypt, to add to the 1,000 it already has - but Israeli officials continue to worry about what will happen after the elections.  That the Muslim Brotherhood will be more influential in post-election Egypt is certain, and popular opinion is flowing strongly against Israel.

  An increasingly fearful Israel in itself is a destabilizing factor.  The arguments in favour of major territorial concessions to the Palestinians in order to secure peace are becoming harder to sell to a sceptical and fearful Israeli electorate.  Equally, more and more one can hear influential Israelis talking the language of divide-and-rule.  One commentator in an influential Israeli daily wrote this week: “The Arab Spring is in fact the start of an internal Arab winter: 20 to 40 years of fighting over who will run each country.  While they fritter away money, resources, and energy, Israel will continue to advance economically and militarily.”  The implication was clear: Israel should be encouraging this outcome by fomenting the Sunni-Shia and secular/Islamist rifts to keep the Arab states disunited and weak (and, of course, using the Kurds to weaken and distract Turkey).  This is not the post-Arab Spring future that the Western powers have envisaged for the Middle East.  JdeC.

• Sinai and the limitations of demilitarization

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  In two weeks time, the Palestinian Authority will seek formal recognition of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations as a means of pushing Israel towards a peace agreement based on the 1967 border.

  Any conceivable agreement with the Palestinians would have to include demilitarization, but opponents have long argued that any demilitarization agreement for the West Bank would face unique practical diffulties.  For instance, opponents argue, in time of crisis a strong Palestinian police force in cooperation with irregular forces would have little difficulty in seizing key dominating positions, and these could be quickly reinforced from across the Jordan River or Golan Heights by helicopter-borne commando units.

  The other argument against relying upon demilitarization for security is the poor track record of previous demilitarization agreements, and the present situation in the Sinai (where Israel is faced with continuing instability or modifying the demilitarization provisions of the Camp David accords in favour of Egypt) is sure to bolster Israeli scepticism.

  Unsuccessful demilitarizations include:

  1.  The League of Nations mandates and the Naval Armament Limitation Treaty of 1922, which were breached by Japan and failed to prevent the gathering in the Kurile Islands of the forces that struck Pearl Harbour or the battle of Iwo Jima.

  2.  The Straits Convention of 1923, demilitarizing the Turkish-controlled entrance to the Black Sea.  This was sought by Britain to ensure Royal Navy access to the Black Sea, but when Turkey demanded remilitarization, Britain had to acquiesce in 1936 out of fear that Turkey would join the German axis.

  3.  The 1923 demilitarization of the Thracian frontier between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria.  The zone was remilitarized with the Balkan Entente 15 years later.

  4.  The Treaty of Versailles and the Rhineland.  The German army marched into the Rhineland only 17 years after it had been demilitarized.

  5.  Soviet agreements with Finland, in 1920 and 1922, and with Estonia in 1920.  The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939 (and again in 1941) and annexed Estonia in 1940.

  6.  The Uqair protocol and the Haada agreement of 1922 and 1925.  The demilitarization clauses of the British-sponsored agreements between Iraq, Transjordan, and Nejd (later Saudi Arabia) were total failures.

  Truly successful demilitarizations are hard to come by.  The Convention of Karlsbad of 1905 demilitarizing 200 miles of the Norwegian-Swedish border cannot really be described as a success as there was no prospect of war between the two countries in any case.

  The demilitarizations of Aland Islands is also sometimes cited as successful, but the Russian violated the 1856 treaty by refortifying the islands at the outbreak of World War 1.  The British also breached provisions against naval establishments by basing submarines there, and the Finns built defences on the islands in 1939 and 1940 during the Winter War with the Soviet Union in contravention of the 1921 convention forbidding fortification.

  That leaves the Sinai peninsula, demilitarized under the provisions of the Camp David Accord which returned the peninsula to Egypt.  Thirty-three years on, it is these provisions that are now under discussion, with Israel facing the Catch-22 of either allowing a modification of the demilitarization provisions or accepting continuing instability and lack of security in the Sinai.

• Russia gathering allies to oppose Nato unilateralism

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  Over the past few weeks we have been highlighting Russia’s criticisms of Nato’s actions in Libya, which it sees as a “gross violation” of UN Security Council Resolution 1973.  Last week Russia’s Nato envoy Dmitriy Rogozin complained that Nato is “placing itself on the same level” as the UN when it comes to deciding “when to start a war and when to end it”.  During the past week, Rogozin has continued with his criticisms, and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used a joint press conference with Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota to associate the Bric countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) with the criticisms.

  Rogozin’s latest outburst came in an interview with the EU Observer published online on 2 September.  Interestingly, though, Rogozin did see a silver lining for Russia, saying that the war in Libya “marks the end of Nato’s eastwards expansion”.  He said: “From now on, Nato will expand its southern borders and will direct its efforts to the south, to traditional Islamic societies.”  He added that this was “an oil war” and that Libya was just the first country in what has become a “new crusade” for Nato.  For Rogozin, the reason is that the West has failed to find a solution to the economic crisis and “is trying to procure cheap hydrocarbons for its economy”.  Any other explanation, he said, was “laughable”.

  The key point is that Rogozin, and other influential Russian policymakers, clearly believe this - and what people believe to be true is as important as what is actually true.  For Rogozin, Russia “cannot trust Nato now”.

  As an aside, it is also Rogozin’s view that the Libyan intervention will increase anti-Western Islamic radicalism in the Middle East and in Europe itself.  This is, of course, the exact opposite of the Western hope that intervention on behalf of popular uprisings will lance the anti-Western boil.

  Foreign Minister Lavrov’s comments, made on 4 September at a joint press conference in Moscow with his Brazilian counterpart, reflect Russia’s attempt to rally opposition to Nato.  He prefaced his remarks by saying the Russia and Brazil are “actively involved in the formation of a new polycentric world order”.  Then, more specifically, he reiterated Rogozin’s criticisms of the way in which Nato has unilaterally widened the scope of UN Resolution 1973 authorizing the protection of civilians in Libya by way of a no-fly zone.  He said: “If everything depends on the Brics countries, there will be no repetition of the Libyan scenario [in Syria].  I do not think the UN Security Council will be watching so indifferently what is happening to its resolutions.”

  Interestingly, in China there has been some domestic criticism of Beijing’s slowness in recognizing Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC).  There is a fear that Chinese investments in Libya could be at risk because it is seen to have been sympathetic to the losing side, and that it will miss out on reconstruction opportunities.  However, the tabloid mouthpiece of the Communist Party, the Global Times, has written openly what is no doubt being communicated more subtly in private, namely that if the NTC “fails to protect Chinese interests in Libya...it is bound to pay a price”.

• Risk pointers

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  *** Israeli space fears.  Brigadier-General Hayim Eshed, who founded Israel’s Defence Ministry Space Division 30 years ago, stepped down last week.  On retiring he issued a warning about Israel being in danger of losing its qualitative edge in space.  Eshed said: “Today, we have a qualitative edge over the rest of the region and parts of the world in certain space capabilities, some of which other countries are trying to copy.  If, however, we do not increase our investments in the next two years we stand the risk of losing our edge”.  Eshed said the government had refused to release funds pledged last year and intended to turn Israel into a space superpower.

  *** India worries about Chinese projects in Pakistani Kashmir.  On 5 September, India’s Defence Minister AK Antony voiced fears about China’s activities in Paksitani-occupied Kashmir (PoK).  He told parliament: “The government is aware that China is undertaking infrastructure projects in PoK.  We have conveyed our concerns to China about their activities in PoK and asked them to cease such activities.”
  Antony compared China’s projects in PoK with similar infrastructural developments in Tibet.  He said: “China is carrying out construction of strategic roads, railway lines, and airfields close to the LAC, which has improved its military capability.”

  The defence minister added: “Necessary steps have been initiated for ensuring that national security concerns are adequately addressed through development of infrastructure, including rail, roads, and forward airfields, as well as operational capabilities of the armed forces to secure desired national security objectives.”

  *** New Japanese foreign minister begins with a warning on China.  On 3 September, Japan’s new Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba expressed concern about China’s activities in the East and South China Seas.  He said: “We all know that China’s maritime expansion is becoming visible.  It is important to ask China to improve transparency.”

  Interestingly, while Gemba said that the US would remain at the core of Japan’s defence policy, among the countries he listed for better relations was Russia.

  Analysts have long thought that Russia and Japan would make natural allies, but progress in this direction has always been stymied by the ongoing dispute over the Kurile Islands, seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.  The other country Gemba specifically mentioned for improved ties was South Korea.
  Before becoming foreign minister, Gemba was national strategy minister.