Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

The fundamental point about the North Korea regime headed by the late Kim Jong-il is that its sole purpose was regime survival.  It had no interest in improving the lot of the North Korean people, but nor did it have any serious interest in jeopardising its existence through war with its far-more powerful neighbours and their US patron.  In that sense, it was more predictable and less dangerous than most Western commentators accepted.  However, the death of Kim Jong-il raises questions about the future determination of the regime to maintain its brutal internal supremacy.  It is theoretically possible that a weakening of resolve or a split in the leadership could produce a crisis with unpredictable results, but China’s swift response to the change in leadership suggests not, or at least not in the near future.

According to US diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks last year, the US embassy in Seoul said that experts doubted that " Kim Jong-un would be able to succeed his father without sparking instability in the North".  The same experts were quoted as saying that Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek, would prove a strong rival for the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge him.  However, we have consulted sources in South Korea, Japan, and Russia about the likely consequences of the demise of Kim Jong-il, and one of the points that all are agreed upon is the significance of the speed with which China moved to acknowledge Kim Jong-un as North Korea’s new leader.  As one South Korean China expert, Professor Kim Heung-kyu, notes: “Unlike previous occasions in which it responded cautiously and slowly to an emergency situation, China’s responses after the announcement of Kim’s death felt swift and even bold.” 

The implication is that China will ensure that there are no undue surprises during the transfer of power – or at least no surprises that are not at China’s bidding.  On 20 December, the Communist Party’s Global Times called for an increase in China’s influence over Pyongyang and for the swift despatch of high-level officials to guide North Korea’s new leadership.

The view of Russian experts is that North Korea will initially be ruled collectively by Kim Jong-un, his aunt, Kim Kyong-hui, and her husband, Jang Song-taek, but that a debilitating struggle for power is unlikely – partly because of the guiding hand of Beijing but also because Pyongyang has been preparing for this eventuality for some time.  The Russians also say that just because Kim Jong-un was educated in Switzerland should not be taken as an indication that he will be reformist.  The influence of his education on the conduct of his leadership of North Korea is likely, the Kremlin believes, to be limited.  Seoul appears to agree with this assessment and ranks as highly unlikely the idea that the new North Korean leadership will move to abandon its nuclear weapons programme.

A return to a confrontational stance with the outside world may follow once Kim Jong-un has solidified his leadership, but the same imperative of not going so far as to risk the regime’s survival will pertain.  In the meantime, there are two relatively imminent dates to watch.  The first is the late-March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit scheduled to be held in Seoul.  The second, also in March, is a scheduled annual joint military drill to be held by the US and South Korea.  The latter, in particular, could spark some form of assertive action by the new leadership in Pyongyang.  Some Japanese experts have even gone so far as to suggest it could carry out a nuclear test.  This goes against the views of Russia and South Korea which believe increased Chinese influence will ensure a more cautious approach by Kim Jong-un, but it is worth noting nonetheless.  Japan watches North Korea very closely.

Kim Jong-un’s inheritance includes an economy that has shrunk for the second year in a row following the botched currency reform of November 2009, and some sources say that the rationing system has all-but collapsed.  According to South Korea’s Bank of Korea, the North had GDP growth of 3.1% in 2008.  It then shrank by 0.9% in 2009 and by 0.5% in 2010.  The North’s gross national income is about 1/40th of South Korea’s and its GNI per capita is about 1/20th.