Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

The 2 March election for Iran’s 290-seat legislative chamber, the Majlis, will provide some important pointers.  For all its faults, Iran is not quite a totalitarian state.  There are distinct factions contesting the election, and the result will more or less accurately reflect the state of opinion on those factions.  As importantly, three years after the huge public protests staged by the pro-reform movement following the disputed 2009 presidential election, the level of abstentions will give an indication of support for those trends not contesting (or not allowed to contest) the election.

The Majlis passes laws, ratifies treaties, and approves the national budget.  It is also a reflection to one degree or another of popular opinion.  Out of Iran’s 75m population, just over 48m are on the electoral role, and in the 2000 election the turnout was as high as 67%.  It may have fallen to just 51% in 2004, but it was up again to 61% in 2008.  And although there is strict vetting of candidates, the conduct of elections is reasonably straight.

Given that the reformists have for the most part decided not to participate, the main contest is between various conservative factions with a few centrists thrown in who could appeal to those pro-reformist voters who do not abstain.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s supporters are standing under the banner of the Islamic Government Supporters Front (IGSF).  Their platform is one of social justice and class struggle, and they are opposed by the conservative establishment as being ‘deviant’ secular nationalists.  Their activists are generally younger, and their appeal is to the poor.

Against the president’s IGSF are the United Principlist Front (UPF), representing the traditionalist and conservative establishment, and the Steadfastness Front (SF) representing the hardline far-right supporters of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  The UPF is more rationalist that the SF, and its leading figure is Gholam Ali Hadad Adel, Majlis Speaker from 2004-2008, who is standing in Tehran.  The SF is made up of former Ahmadinejad supporters who oppose ‘deviant tendencies’ but support the president’s policies on social justice.

The reformists have mostly decided not to take part following the refusal of the regime to meet their demands ahead of the election, including the release of political prisoners and the liberalization of political discourse.  However they have been careful not to align themselves with those seeking to overthrow the regime and thus have avoided announcing that they are boycotting the election.  The reformist factions include the Participation Front, the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, the Clerics Association, the Coordination Council of the Reformist Front, and the Coordination Council of the Green Path of Hope.  Leading figures in the reformist movement include former Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karrubi and former president Mohammad Khatami.

A number of small centre parties which are participating are hoping to pick up the pro-reformist vote.  These are the Mardomsalari Democracy Party, the House of Labour, the Islamic Labour Party, the Popular Reformist Front, and the Resistance Front.  The leading centrist politician is former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is a particular bugbear of the SF.

So there is no shortage of choice, even if the vetting process weeded out some 36% of prospective candidates, and the reformists are for the most part not participating.

The conservatives of various hues have an in-built advantage in that 70% of the seats in the Majlis will be for small towns (40%) and villages (30%).  However, the 10 largest cities, where the reformist trend is strongest, will return 20% of the deputies, and the key point to watch will be the turnout.  It is significant that the highest turnout in recent years, the 67% in the 2000 election, was a consequence of a high reformist participation which led to them gaining full control of parliament.   Even more significant is the fact that the disputed 2009 presidential election, which led to the most concerted political challenge to the Islamic Republic since 1979, with huge street demonstrations followed by a severe backlash from the regime, attracted a turnout of 85%.

A low turnout on 2 March would be a danger signal to the regime, whichever faction emerged strongest from the contest.  It would be a clear indictment of the policy of excluding reformist candidates, and it would point to dangers ahead in the 2013 presidential election.

Previous parliamentary elections held towards the end of a second presidential term, as is the case on this occasion, have provided important pointers to the following presidential election.  The parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2004 both accurately forecast the emergence of new forces at the end of Rafsanjani’s presidency in 1997 (which was followed by that of Mohammad Khatami) and in turn at the end of Khatami’s in 2005, which was followed by the election of Ahmadinejad.  On this occasion, the reformists are hoping that a low turnout in the large cities will give them the leverage to argue – and win - the case for allowing a wide range of candidates to contest the 2013 presidential election.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is very conscious of the dangers.  On 29 February he told a meeting of veterans’ families that a high turnout was essential to “give the arrogant ones a slap in the face and show [the Iranian nation’s] determination to the enemy”.

NUCLEAR NOTE: Analysis of the 24 February International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear programme has led to a reassessment of the timelines for an Iranian nuclear-weapon capability.  The latest assessment is that if Iran continues to operate its Natanz and Fordow facilities at current rates and under current conditions (ie with no further sabotage or military action), it will have 85kg of uranium enriched to 20% in April.  This would be enough to produce the 15kg of weapons-grade uranium needed for one bomb within three months.  However, under one possible, but unlikely, scenario, it is calculated that Iran could require enough weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb within three weeks of making the decision to break out.  There are thought to be no continuing side-effects from the 2009 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s enrichment capabilities.  Iran is said to have recovered its capabilities by mid-2010 and there have been no further setbacks.