Courcy's Intelligence Brief - 29 February 2012

Multiple complications with Egypt

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The row between the United States and Egypt over the treatment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has confirmed how fragile the US-Egypt alliance now is, and in particular it has undermined the conceit that the need for American aid will automatically ensure the acquiescence of any new Egyptian government.

The NGO affair began in December when Egyptian security officials raided the offices of 10 pro-democracy and human rights groups, confiscating documents and equipment. These raids led to charges that NGOs have been financing popular protests on the basis of illegal funding. The controversy has been made worse by the fact that of the 43 defendants in the case, 16 are US citizens of whom seven have been prevented from leaving Egypt. One of those restricted is Sam LaHood, who is son of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. Not surprisingly, US anger has led to threats to restrict the $1.3bn in military aid due this year along with another $250m in economic assistance.

The interesting point for us is how counter-productive the threat to cut off aid has been in Egypt. Rather than bringing Cairo immediately into line it has provided sustenance to those who argue that Egypt should no longer be so beholden to the US. With the Islamist tendency winning a clear majority in the first free post-revolution elections, Friday sermons in the main mosques have taken on added significance. Last Friday, the sermon at Al-Sultan Abu-al-‘lla Mosque in Cairo was delivered by Sheikh Abd-al-Hakam Salih Salamah who condemned those countries that provide aid for other nations in order to “impose their hegemony on other people”. He added that such donors (by which of course he meant the United States) “leave agents and spies [in our countries] under the name of NGOs, giving them free rein to spread havoc and corruption and cause confusion and complexity among people”. The sheikh concluded by saying that “dignity and honour” are more important than such aid.

In this, the sheikh was only mirroring public opinion. Opinion polls show that 71% of Egyptians believe Egypt does not need American money and that, in any event, they could get the same amount from Arab states. This is a position that is apparently supported by Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri.

The Muslim Brotherhood has not yet said that it does not want American aid. It has, after all, to deliver some material advancement to the people who voted so overwhelmingly for it. However, the deputy head of the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Essam al-Aryan, has said that the ending of American aid would lead to a review of the Camp David accords with Israel, which is presumably an outcome he would welcome. Gamal Hishmat, a Brotherhood parliamentarian who sits on the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs says: “Even with the threat to the US aid, we are not intimidated in the way the previous regime used to be.”

In the meantime, Israel has said that it fears the Islamization of the Sinai Bedouin under the influence of Egypt’s Salafi movement. The danger here is with links to the Salafist groups in the Gaza Strip, in particular the groups seeking to implement their Islamic agenda by violent means. There are said to be up to a “few thousand” Gazan Salafists linked with five armed groups: Jund Ansar Allah, Jaysh-Al-Islam, Tawhid Wal Jihad, Ansar Al-Sunna, and Jaljalat. These groups seem to be responsible for most of the current rocket attacks on Israel, ignoring ceasefires agreed by Hamas.

One Salafist cleric in Gaza has told a Courcy’s Intelligence Brief source: “They [Egyptian Salafists] have come to visit us, they’ve financed projects for the poor.” The Egyptian Salafist al-Nour party was the unexpected success of the Egyptian election, taking 27% of the vote and coming second to the FJP. For some jihadist Salafis from Gaza, al-Qaeda is the inspiration. One young Gazan Salafist, Abu Hass al-Maqdisi, speaking in late February, said: “[Al-Qaeda’s] is the path of justice, the right path of Islam, and the way back to the days of the Salafs [the prophet Mohammed’s companions]. Another - Abu Mohammad - added: “We have international contacts with al-Qaeda. They train us, particularly teaching us to organize ourselves, and of course they finance us.” Then, emphasizing the importance of the Sinai, Abu Mohammad said: “For us and for al-Qaeda, Sinai is an objective.”

A complicating factor is that since Hamas has expressed its support for the rebellion in Syria, ostensibly re-orienting itself towards its Muslim Brotherhood roots and away from Iran, it is possible that Iran is now encouraging (and financing) the connection between al-Qaeda and the Gazan jihadi Salafists. The complications in, and with Egypt continue to multiply. JdeC.

A challenge for Iran's hardliners

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The 2 March election for Iran’s 290-seat legislative chamber, the Majlis, will provide some important pointers. For all its faults, Iran is not quite a totalitarian state. There are distinct factions contesting the election, and the result will more or less accurately reflect the state of opinion on those factions. As importantly, three years after the huge public protests staged by the pro-reform movement following the disputed 2009 presidential election, the level of abstentions will give an indication of support for those trends not contesting (or not allowed to contest) the election.

The Majlis passes laws, ratifies treaties, and approves the national budget. It is also a reflection to one degree or another of popular opinion. Out of Iran’s 75m population, just over 48m are on the electoral role, and in the 2000 election the turnout was as high as 67%. It may have fallen to just 51% in 2004, but it was up again to 61% in 2008. And although there is strict vetting of candidates, the conduct of elections is reasonably straight.

Given that the reformists have for the most part decided not to participate, the main contest is between various conservative factions with a few centrists thrown in who could appeal to those pro-reformist voters who do not abstain.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s supporters are standing under the banner of the Islamic Government Supporters Front (IGSF). Their platform is one of social justice and class struggle, and they are opposed by the conservative establishment as being ‘deviant’ secular nationalists. Their activists are generally younger, and their appeal is to the poor.

Against the president’s IGSF are the United Principlist Front (UPF), representing the traditionalist and conservative establishment, and the Steadfastness Front (SF) representing the hardline far-right supporters of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The UPF is more rationalist that the SF, and its leading figure is Gholam Ali Hadad Adel, Majlis Speaker from 2004-2008, who is standing in Tehran. The SF is made up of former Ahmadinejad supporters who oppose ‘deviant tendencies’ but support the president’s policies on social justice.

The reformists have mostly decided not to take part following the refusal of the regime to meet their demands ahead of the election, including the release of political prisoners and the liberalization of political discourse. However they have been careful not to align themselves with those seeking to overthrow the regime and thus have avoided announcing that they are boycotting the election. The reformist factions include the Participation Front, the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, the Clerics Association, the Coordination Council of the Reformist Front, and the Coordination Council of the Green Path of Hope. Leading figures in the reformist movement include former Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karrubi and former president Mohammad Khatami.

A number of small centre parties which are participating are hoping to pick up the pro-reformist vote. These are the Mardomsalari Democracy Party, the House of Labour, the Islamic Labour Party, the Popular Reformist Front, and the Resistance Front. The leading centrist politician is former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is a particular bugbear of the SF.

So there is no shortage of choice, even if the vetting process weeded out some 36% of prospective candidates, and the reformists are for the most part not participating.

The conservatives of various hues have an in-built advantage in that 70% of the seats in the Majlis will be for small towns (40%) and villages (30%). However, the 10 largest cities, where the reformist trend is strongest, will return 20% of the deputies, and the key point to watch will be the turnout. It is significant that the highest turnout in recent years, the 67% in the 2000 election, was a consequence of a high reformist participation which led to them gaining full control of parliament. Even more significant is the fact that the disputed 2009 presidential election, which led to the most concerted political challenge to the Islamic Republic since 1979, with huge street demonstrations followed by a severe backlash from the regime, attracted a turnout of 85%.

A low turnout on 2 March would be a danger signal to the regime, whichever faction emerged strongest from the contest. It would be a clear indictment of the policy of excluding reformist candidates, and it would point to dangers ahead in the 2013 presidential election.

Previous parliamentary elections held towards the end of a second presidential term, as is the case on this occasion, have provided important pointers to the following presidential election. The parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2004 both accurately forecast the emergence of new forces at the end of Rafsanjani’s presidency in 1997 (which was followed by that of Mohammad Khatami) and in turn at the end of Khatami’s in 2005, which was followed by the election of Ahmadinejad. On this occasion, the reformists are hoping that a low turnout in the large cities will give them the leverage to argue – and win - the case for allowing a wide range of candidates to contest the 2013 presidential election.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is very conscious of the dangers. On 29 February he told a meeting of veterans’ families that a high turnout was essential to “give the arrogant ones a slap in the face and show [the Iranian nation’s] determination to the enemy”.

NUCLEAR NOTE: Analysis of the 24 February International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear programme has led to a reassessment of the timelines for an Iranian nuclear-weapon capability. The latest assessment is that if Iran continues to operate its Natanz and Fordow facilities at current rates and under current conditions (ie with no further sabotage or military action), it will have 85kg of uranium enriched to 20% in April. This would be enough to produce the 15kg of weapons-grade uranium needed for one bomb within three months. However, under one possible, but unlikely, scenario, it is calculated that Iran could require enough weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb within three weeks of making the decision to break out. There are thought to be no continuing side-effects from the 2009 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s enrichment capabilities. Iran is said to have recovered its capabilities by mid-2010 and there have been no further setbacks.

Turkey edges towards intervention in Syria

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As the campaign in the West intensifies for something to be done to stop the brutal suppression of the Syrian rebellion by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, we have been receiving indications of a greater willingness in Turkey to intervene. If these indications are accurate, it is a significant development.

The talk in Ankara is that Turkey is preparing to lead the setting up of a humanitarian corridor into Syria without the backing of the UN, as happened in Kosovo in 1999. The trigger, a Turkish official says, would be if the humanitarian problems in Syria were to reach “unbearable dimensions”, and on 27 February Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) issued a statement saying that the international community should not remain indifferent to “mass massacres” in Syria. It is thought in Ankara (and, as it happens, in Beijing) that Russia may weaken its opposition to an intervention once its 4 March presidential election is over. Such a move would have the strong support of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states as well as of the West.

It is important to note, however, that there is also strong opposition within Turkey to an intervention. The idea of Turkey putting itself forward as a power “that establishes order” is considered by some, including some close to the government, as a dangerous development that could undermine the careful building of Turkish ‘soft power’ since the Arab Awakening – in which Turkey is advancing itself as the model to be emulated. Opponents say that the fact that any intervention would be carried out under a banner of humanitarianism rather than regime change would count for little in the long-term.

Then there is the problem of falling out with Iran, and here there are real dangers too. Iran has been making a concerted effort to establish its presence in Turkey in order to help with sanctions-busting, but this could equally be turned into destabilization efforts. For instance, as of 31 December 2011, there were 2,140 Iranian-funded companies operating in Turkey, 590 of which (nearly 30%) were set up in 2011 alone. The presence of many of these companies is not innocent.

It is also doubtful that Russia will significantly change its tune following the election. If anything its fears about war in the Middle East have been rising since the escalation in the spat between Iran and Azerbaijan. On 12 February, Iran accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use its territory in its campaign of assassinations against Iranian nuclear scientists. A week later, police in Azerbaijan said that they had arrested people linked to Iran and Hezbollah planning attacks in the country. Then, on 28 February, Iran issued furious complaints about a $1.6bn Israeli arms sale to Azerbaijan, railing against “the creeping influence of Zionists and foreigners in the South Caucasus region”.

On 29 February, the head of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States anti-terrorism centre, Andrey Novikov, warned specifically about “destabilization in the Caspian Sea area and in the South Caucasus” as an inevitable consequence of war with Iran. And given Iran’s strong backing for Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, a military intervention in Syria cannot be isolated from the threat of war with Iran.

Risk pointers

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*** Turkey’s Islamic arms sales. It is noteworthy that eight out of 10 top countries to which Turkey exports weapons are Muslim countries at a time when Turkey’s total annual defence sales have reached $1bn. According to the Union of Turkish Defence Exporters, all the top 10 buyers are Islamic countries except for the US and Italy. The Islamic nations in the list are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Lebanon. The prospective buyers list can be extended to include Indonesia, Malaysia, and Qatar.

A Turkish official says: “Being Muslim makes a difference. The Muslim buyers see that you are Muslim and take up a better attitude. In the coming years we expect better prospects to sell our products.”

*** Turkey calls for liberation of Jerusalem. Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay attended the International Conference on the Defence of Jerusalem in Doha on 26 February.

He said: “Without the liberation of Jerusalem, no real peace and stability can be achieved in the Middle East or farther afield.” He called Jerusalem “a captive city in the hands of Israel” and said that “Turkey will not allow...Israel’s oppressive attempt...at changing Jerusalem’s historic fabric by intimidating Palestinians.”

*** China keeps warning its neighbours. During the past week China has complained to Japan about its marine research activities in the East China Sea and to the Philippines about its plans to explore for oil and gas in the Spratly (Nansha) Islands. China told the Philippines: “It is unlawful for any country or company to explore oil and gas in seas under Chinese jurisdiction without the permission of the Chinese government.”

China has also been involved in a row with India over the visit of India’s Defence Minister AK Antony to the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Antony visited the state for its silver jubilee statehood celebrations on 25 February. China responded by saying that India should not take any actions that could “complicate” the border issue. The Chinese foreign ministry asked India “to work with China to maintain peace and stability in the border areas”.

India responded through External Affairs Minister SM Krishna, who said: “All seven states in north-eastern parts of India are part and parcel of India, and China has no rights to make adverse remarks on Antony’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh.”

China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of southern Tibet and regularly complains about high-level visits by Indian officials to the region.

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