Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

In last week’s briefing we drew attention to China’s furious rejection of the suggestion by the Philippines that the dispute over the Scarborough Reef should be arbitrated by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.  During the past week there has been further evidence of how China’s unbending intransigence on territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas is pushing its neighbours into exactly the type of insurance policies to which Beijing equally furiously objects.

The current escalation between China and the Philippines began on 8 April when eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside Scarborough Reef (known by China as Huangyan Island), prompting Manila to send a warship to the area, and, on 10 April, to board and inspect the fishing boats.  China responded by sending surveillance ships to support the fishermen.  This week, on 8 May, the Philippines Charge d’Affaires in Beijing was summoned for the third time in a month for a dressing down.

Following the meeting, China’s Vice-Foreign Minister Fu Ying said: “It is obvious that the Philippine side has not realized that it is making serious mistakes and, instead, is stepping up efforts to escalate tensions.”  She said: “It is hard to be optimistic about the situation...It is hoped that the Philippine side will not misjudge the situation and not escalate tensions without considering the consequences.”  Fu added: “The Chinese side has made preparations to respond to any escalation of the situation by the Philippine side.”

The Philippines has responded to China’s threats by saying that it is stepping up efforts to “build a credible territorial defence”.  On 8 May, the Department of National Defence spokesman Peter Paul Galvez said: “With the full backing of the president and with the assistance coming from friendly states, we will be able to achieve...a credible territorial defence.”  As part of these efforts, Galvez said, there are “ongoing acquisition efforts” for fighter jets and naval vessels from France, Italy, the UK, and South Korea.  In addition, the US is to double its military aid to the Philippines during 2012, to US$30m.

Perhaps it is this that prompted an intemperate broadcast by China’s CCTV-4 on the eve of the visit to Washington by China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie, the first visit to the US by a Chinese defence minister since 2003.  In its Focus Today programme on 6 May, CCTV-4 broadcast a commentary in which it claimed that the US’s proclaimed neutral stance on territorial disputes in the South China Sea was a sham.  Its commentator accused the US of “supporting and conniving, both openly and clandestinely” with those countries with territorial disputes with China.

Last week also saw further signs of Japan responding to China’s increasing assertiveness.  On 2 May it was announced that Japan and India would conduct their first joint naval exercise in June.  This exercise off the coast of Japan will inevitably be seen as a response to the six-day naval manoeuvres conducted last month by China and Russia in the Yellow Sea.

That India is a willing recruit to the ‘contain-China’ camp is clear.  On 8 May, India’s Defence Minister AK Antony told India’s parliament that he was seeking an increase in India’s $39bn defence budget because of the “gravity” of the “growing proximity of China and Pakistan”.  This follows a warning from Army Chief VK Singh that India faces two “inimical neighbours”.

Japan has also said that it hopes to conclude two bilateral military agreements with South Korea later this month.  There will be a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).  The ACSA is intended to provide for the reciprocal provision of supplies such as food, water, fuel, and medical supplies during joint activities such as during UN peacekeeping operations.  For the moment the agreement will not include contingencies in areas around the two countries, but there is little doubt about the direction of travel in South Korean-Japanese military cooperation.

Japan also seems to be making yet another attempt at improving relations with Russia.  In our 4 April issue, we looked at Japan’s just-published East Asian Strategic Review 2012 and we drew attention to an intriguing observation about Russia.  According to the NIDS report, “a turnaround is being observed in Russia’s policy vis-a-vis East Asia as a result of the rise of China”.  The Japanese view is that Russia is now moving away from its former close relationship with Beijing and must be encouraged in this direction.

An alignment between Japan and Russia to balance China has been forecast by many observers since the fall of the Soviet Union, but Russia-Japan relations have continued to be debilitated by the dispute over the Kurile Islands (occupied by Russia since the end of World War II), and by Russia’s desire to stay close to Beijing.  These remarks in the East Asian Strategic Review 2012 suggested that Tokyo had not yet lost hope of such a development.  Now we hear that Japan’s Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba is trying to recruit the help of former prime minister Yoshiro Mori (who is from the opposition Liberal Democratic Party) to try to revive negotiations with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin over the territorial dispute and a peace treaty to formally close World War II.  When Mori was prime minister from April 2000 to April 2001 he proposed to Putin the return of two of the four disputed Kurile Islands to Japan, leaving the fate of the other two to later negotiations.

All this makes sense for Japan, but the trouble is that Russia – or, rather, Putin – is not biting.  His clear strategy is to keep Russia as close to China as possible, as he made clear immediately after his inauguration.  He has instructed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “to deepen equal trust-based partnership and strategic collaboration with China, India, Vietnam [and] to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and other key Asia-Pacific states”.  The difference between “strategic collaboration” with China and “mutually beneficial cooperation” with Japan suggests that Tokyo is wrong in its assessment that “a turnaround is being observed in Russia’s policy vis-a-vis East Asia as a result of the rise of China”.

And certainly China’s welcome to Putin’s return to the presidency could hardly have been more effusive.  Commentaries in the official Xinhua news agency were sycophantic in their praise of Putin, and President Hu Jintao welcomed Putin’s inauguration by saying that he would work with Putin “to push China-Russia relations to new levels”.