Courcy's Intelligence Brief

Netanyahu's coup steps up pressure on Iran

LatinNews 09 May 2012 Hits: 902

There has been much astonishment about the formation of a grand coalition government by Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, into which he has co-opted Kadima, the largest party in the Knesset with 28 seats to the ruling Likud’s 27, to give the ruling coalition 94 out of the Knesset’s total of 120 seats. Before the announcement of the deal, everyone was certain that Netanyahu was heading for an early election in September. This is an extraordinary turnaround that cannot be explained simply by the fact that Kadima faced being reduced to 10 seats or less in the early September election that Netanyahu was threatening. It would appear that something much bigger is afoot, and that something much bigger can only be Iran.

On occasions like this, when speculation is being piled upon speculation, it pays to focus on the fundamentals. These are:

* Neutralizing Iran’s nuclear programme, preferably by negotiation but by force if necessary, is an obsession for Netanyahu. In that sense, former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin’s taunt that Netanyahu is guided by “messianic” impulses is not entirely wide of the mark.

* Although there is a fierce debate in Israel and elsewhere as to whether an Israeli military strike could secure a worthwhile delay in Iran’s nuclear plans, there is universal acceptance in Israel that the longer such a strike is delayed the less likely it is to be effective. At some point soon, Iran’s nuclear programme will move into the “zone of immunity”, and this point was made once again on 4 May by Defence Minister Ehud Barak. He said that Iran is prevaricating until it can harden its defences sufficiently to withstand an Israeli attack and that it was aiming to arrive at “a threshold status” after which it would be able to manufacture a nuclear bomb within 60 days.

* While the US, with its greater capabilities, is not under the same time pressures as Israel, Netanyahu is extremely reluctant to leave Israel’s fate in the hands of President Barack Obama. In that sense, Obama’s 1 May speech promising that “the time of war” is over will not have helped.

* Arguments advanced by many strategists in the US and elsewhere that a nuclear Iran could be contained miss the essential point. Although it would never admit to this publicly, Israel needs to maintain a monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East so that, in extremis, it can use nuclear weapons to defend against an overwhelming conventional attack. A nuclear-armed Iran would remove that option – or at least render it suicidal. The debate about whether or not Iran’s leaders are rational is irrelevant to this point.

* The prospect of Israel facing an overwhelming conventional attack in the next 10-15 years is a realistic one given the direction in which the Arab Awakening is taking Egypt and could in due course take Jordan. Furthermore, the last time Israel faced a major conventional attack, in 1973, Iran and Turkey were friendly, Jordan held back, and the Palestinians were powerless. All of those positives have been or could be reversed.

These are the fundamental reasons why Netanyahu is “messianic” about Iran, and now he has pulled off a political coup that can only strengthen his position. Kadima’s leader, former chief of staff Shaul Mofaz, is known as a sceptic about a military strike on Iran. But Netanyahu’s bargaining position was exceptionally strong and it is certain that he would not have made the deal with Mofaz without reassurances about his support on Iran. The opinion polls were showing that Netanyahu would comfortably win an early election, and Kadima was facing a collapse from 28 seats to 10 or under. And, indeed, the strength of Netanyahu’s negotiating position with Mofaz can be seen in the fact that while the Kadima leader will become vice-premier, he will gain no other cabinet seats for his party and he has had to eat his 3 March pronouncement that “I won’t join Bibi’s government, not today, not tomorrow, and not after I head Kadima on 28 March”. Mofaz’s predecessor as Kadima leader, Tzipi Livni, had demanded a rotating premiership and five cabinet posts as her price for joining a coalition.

During the short time that everyone was expecting a September election, many observers were saying that this would not greatly affect the decision-making on whether or not to attack Iran. Maybe that would have been so, but it is now unquestionable that Netanyahu has secured his home base. The pressure on the international community to force Iran into an acceptable deal when talks resume on 23 May has been increased significantly. JdeC.

Note: There are now three former chiefs of staff in the Israeli cabinet - Ehud Barak, Moshe Yaalon, and Shaul Mofaz. This is an extraordinary state of affairs for a democracy and illustrates perfectly the exceptional nature of the Israeli predicament.

Japan and Philippines continue to react to unbending China

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In last week’s briefing we drew attention to China’s furious rejection of the suggestion by the Philippines that the dispute over the Scarborough Reef should be arbitrated by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. During the past week there has been further evidence of how China’s unbending intransigence on territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas is pushing its neighbours into exactly the type of insurance policies to which Beijing equally furiously objects.

The current escalation between China and the Philippines began on 8 April when eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside Scarborough Reef (known by China as Huangyan Island), prompting Manila to send a warship to the area, and, on 10 April, to board and inspect the fishing boats. China responded by sending surveillance ships to support the fishermen. This week, on 8 May, the Philippines Charge d’Affaires in Beijing was summoned for the third time in a month for a dressing down.

Following the meeting, China’s Vice-Foreign Minister Fu Ying said: “It is obvious that the Philippine side has not realized that it is making serious mistakes and, instead, is stepping up efforts to escalate tensions.” She said: “It is hard to be optimistic about the situation...It is hoped that the Philippine side will not misjudge the situation and not escalate tensions without considering the consequences.” Fu added: “The Chinese side has made preparations to respond to any escalation of the situation by the Philippine side.”

The Philippines has responded to China’s threats by saying that it is stepping up efforts to “build a credible territorial defence”. On 8 May, the Department of National Defence spokesman Peter Paul Galvez said: “With the full backing of the president and with the assistance coming from friendly states, we will be able to achieve...a credible territorial defence.” As part of these efforts, Galvez said, there are “ongoing acquisition efforts” for fighter jets and naval vessels from France, Italy, the UK, and South Korea. In addition, the US is to double its military aid to the Philippines during 2012, to US$30m.

Perhaps it is this that prompted an intemperate broadcast by China’s CCTV-4 on the eve of the visit to Washington by China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie, the first visit to the US by a Chinese defence minister since 2003. In its Focus Today programme on 6 May, CCTV-4 broadcast a commentary in which it claimed that the US’s proclaimed neutral stance on territorial disputes in the South China Sea was a sham. Its commentator accused the US of “supporting and conniving, both openly and clandestinely” with those countries with territorial disputes with China.

Last week also saw further signs of Japan responding to China’s increasing assertiveness. On 2 May it was announced that Japan and India would conduct their first joint naval exercise in June. This exercise off the coast of Japan will inevitably be seen as a response to the six-day naval manoeuvres conducted last month by China and Russia in the Yellow Sea.

That India is a willing recruit to the ‘contain-China’ camp is clear. On 8 May, India’s Defence Minister AK Antony told India’s parliament that he was seeking an increase in India’s $39bn defence budget because of the “gravity” of the “growing proximity of China and Pakistan”. This follows a warning from Army Chief VK Singh that India faces two “inimical neighbours”.

Japan has also said that it hopes to conclude two bilateral military agreements with South Korea later this month. There will be a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The ACSA is intended to provide for the reciprocal provision of supplies such as food, water, fuel, and medical supplies during joint activities such as during UN peacekeeping operations. For the moment the agreement will not include contingencies in areas around the two countries, but there is little doubt about the direction of travel in South Korean-Japanese military cooperation.

Japan also seems to be making yet another attempt at improving relations with Russia. In our 4 April issue, we looked at Japan’s just-published East Asian Strategic Review 2012 and we drew attention to an intriguing observation about Russia. According to the NIDS report, “a turnaround is being observed in Russia’s policy vis-a-vis East Asia as a result of the rise of China”. The Japanese view is that Russia is now moving away from its former close relationship with Beijing and must be encouraged in this direction.

An alignment between Japan and Russia to balance China has been forecast by many observers since the fall of the Soviet Union, but Russia-Japan relations have continued to be debilitated by the dispute over the Kurile Islands (occupied by Russia since the end of World War II), and by Russia’s desire to stay close to Beijing. These remarks in the East Asian Strategic Review 2012 suggested that Tokyo had not yet lost hope of such a development. Now we hear that Japan’s Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba is trying to recruit the help of former prime minister Yoshiro Mori (who is from the opposition Liberal Democratic Party) to try to revive negotiations with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin over the territorial dispute and a peace treaty to formally close World War II. When Mori was prime minister from April 2000 to April 2001 he proposed to Putin the return of two of the four disputed Kurile Islands to Japan, leaving the fate of the other two to later negotiations.

All this makes sense for Japan, but the trouble is that Russia – or, rather, Putin – is not biting. His clear strategy is to keep Russia as close to China as possible, as he made clear immediately after his inauguration. He has instructed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “to deepen equal trust-based partnership and strategic collaboration with China, India, Vietnam [and] to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and other key Asia-Pacific states”. The difference between “strategic collaboration” with China and “mutually beneficial cooperation” with Japan suggests that Tokyo is wrong in its assessment that “a turnaround is being observed in Russia’s policy vis-a-vis East Asia as a result of the rise of China”.

And certainly China’s welcome to Putin’s return to the presidency could hardly have been more effusive. Commentaries in the official Xinhua news agency were sycophantic in their praise of Putin, and President Hu Jintao welcomed Putin’s inauguration by saying that he would work with Putin “to push China-Russia relations to new levels”.

European Union displaying signs of despair

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In our 25 April briefing we said that the 2012 French presidential election could prove to be about a far more significant shift in French political forces than just a surge in support for the National Front, and that it reinforced our view that European integration has passed its high-water mark. That view has been further reinforced by the outcome of the Greek general election. However, even before these results were known, the depth of the pessimism within the European Union could be seen in the recently published Global Trends 2030 report, produced for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) by the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

The Global Trends 2030 report was an attempt to identify key factors that should inform EU strategic decision making over the next two decades. There are some interesting bits about the expanding global middle class (expected to number 4.9bn by 2030); the empowerment of individuals through technology; resource scarcity; and the emergence of a more polycentric world. The end of superpower hegemony, the report points out, is having a ‘decompression effect’, giving “all states of all dimensions greater freedom of manoeuvre in the international arena”. This, the report says, will create new opportunities for middle powers to play a greater role globally and at the regional level in particular.

Some of these are valuable insights, but what caught our attention most was the pessimism that permeated the sections about the EU itself. The report called the future of the EU “uncertain” because of structural problems, particularly the shrinking demographics; the difficulties with facilitating economic governance and achieving “policy-making coherence and consensus”; and the shift in trade and economic flows from the Atlantic to the Pacific which “may contribute to the relative marginalization of the EU”. The EU, which is today the world’s primary economic entity, will slip to third place by 2030, and for it to remain in the ranks of the top powers the report says “its member states must join forces (and unite voices) effectively and coherently” - which is, of course, exactly what is not happening.

In another sign of pessimism, the report says that in a more polycentric world, the EU’s middle powers such as Germany, France, and Britain, may be tempted “to play a global role of their own”. It notes that China and Brazil are both already making it clear that Germany rather than the EU is a more effective strategic partner, and that the EU “is a key market but not a relevant strategic actor”. The report also notes that “the image of the EU as a political actor is also eroding in India”. And the report raises the spectre of extremist nationalism, to which it says “Europe in particular is vulnerable” because of fears about the future among the middle classes, the demographic transition, and difficulties in adapting to more multicultural societies.

According to the report, a final, and again intensely interesting cause for growing pessimism in Europe relates to Russia. It notes that the main strategic aims of China, India, Brazil, and most middle powers will be “peaceful accumulation of power and economic development”. However, it says, “the exception may be Russia if nationalistic trends prevail” – and this danger is compounded by US withdrawal from Europe and European defence cuts.

Risk pointers

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*** Clinton explains Israel’s stance on Iran to India. It would be going much too far to say that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has given support to the idea of an Israeli strike against Iran, but comments she made in India on 7 May were understanding of Israel’s position.

Speaking in Calcutta about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran, she said: “India knows from its own experience that you have to pay attention to threat and that you have to be prepared for them in your own neighbourhood. So I think that Israel is very worried that if Iran gets a nuclear weapon there might be a decision by some future leader to actually use it, and that would be devastating.”

*** Iran trying to bolster Hezbollah support. On 7 February, the leader of the Lebanese-based Hezbollah movement, Hassan Nasrallah, pronounced “Iran does not command us” in an apparent attempt to put some distance between his group and Iran as the controversy over the Iranian nuclear programme escalated.

In Israel this comment was taken as a sign that Hezbollah was running scared and would not launch a retaliatory attack in response to an Israeli strike against Iran. Then again, on 16 February, Nasrallah denied a Hezbollah role in the attempted attacks against Israeli targets in Georgia, India, and Thailand in what was seen in intelligence circles as another signal from Nasrallah that he does not want to get involved in the looming confrontation between Israel and Iran.

Now Iran’s Vice-President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi has been in Lebanon to see Nasrallah and to stiffen his support for Iran. They met on 3 May to discuss “the political situation in the region and Israel’s threats to the region’s states and peoples”. It is not known what was said in private, but Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah was ready to confront “all forthcoming challenges” and that it “remains steadfast in its policy and path”.

*** China first deep-water drilling rig becomes operational. On 9 May, China’s first deep-water drilling rig was due to become operational, operating 320km southeast of Hong Kong in 1,500 metres of water. Making the announcement, the official Xinhua news agency noted that about 70% of the oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea are contained in deep-water regions with depths over 300 metres.

Xinhua said that the South China Sea is estimated to have 23bn-30bn tonnes of oil and 16trn cubic metres of natural gas – which it said amounted to one-third of China’s total oil and gas resources. It did not mention that China’s right to these resources is disputed.

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