Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

The internal row in South Korea over a military pact with Japan is noteworthy in so far as it shows fear of China competing with historical animosity towards former colonial overlord Japan, which ruled the Korean peninsula from 1910-45.

Japan and South Korea had been due to sign a “non-combat military pact” that would encompass the sharing of military intelligence. Last week it appeared that Seoul had completed its necessary domestic political procedures for signing the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). In the event, on 29 June Seoul announced that it was postponing the signing of the agreement because of a major political backlash. The announcement came less than an hour before the deal was due to be signed in Tokyo.

The pact had been presented as needed primarily for countering North Korea, and critics were able to question if it were necessary given that South Korea has better information on what is happening in South Korea than any other country. Military officials countered by saying that South Korea needs the pact on sharing military intelligence with Japan because it needs to use Japan’s intelligence assets, including its spy satellites and high-end surveillance aircraft.

It is inconceivable that officials were not aware of the political difficulties in signing such a deal with Japan. The significance is that they felt it was sufficiently important to proceed anyway and to try to keep the agreement below the political radar, and it is not necessary to look far to understand why.  Senior officials from South Korea’s foreign ministry have been briefing anonymously that the collaboration is as much about China as North Korea.

One official was quoted by the Yonhap news agency as saying: “To cope with the rise of China, the military-intelligence pact with Japan is needed to boost our intelligence capability.”

The agreement was initialled in April without any notificaton being given to the National Assembly. An amended version of the pact was then initialled again on 1 May, and this version was given secretive approval by the cabinet on 26 July.

On 2 July, a senior official at the presidential palace said: “We plan to enter into the signing procedure after completing a report to the National Assembly.” Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan has apologized for the confusion, but not for the policy.

On 3 July, he said: “I sincerely apologize to our people for failing to smoothly proceed with the planned signing of a military agreement with Japan. I humbly accept criticism that our ministry didn’t make efforts to seek people’s understanding and support for the pact.”

However, there are doubts as to whether the agreement can now be signed ahead of the December presidential election. Another casualty may be a proposed military logistics accord with Japan. On 3 July, sources in Seoul were saying that officials were “building consensus” towards halting the talks on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).

As one official put it: “With the public so against the government for some procedural issues over the GSOMIA, I think it’s difficult to discuss the ACSA.”  One particulalry sensitive problem with the ACSA is that it could allow Japanese troops to enter South Korean territory.

Whatever happens with the proposed South Korean-Japan agreements, it is not just South Korea that sees closer ties with Japan as a necessary balance to the challenge of a rising China. On 2 July, for instance, Japan and the Philippines signed an agreement to reinforce cooperation in maritime security.

China, unsurprisingly, remains unbending in its opposition to all such moves and continues to urge its neighbours not to oppose China’s territorial claims. On 2 July, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman urged Vietnam not to “aggravate” the situation after a group of Vietnamese protested on 1 July against China’s claims in the South China Sea.

China’s spokesman Liu Weiman said: “China always opposes countries’ moves to aggravate and complicate the situation in the South China Sea.

On the same day, China told the Philippines to stop making provocative remarks about the disputed Scarborough Reef. The same foreign ministry spokesman, Liu Weimin, said: “We hope the Philippine side will stop making provocative comments time and again to proud public opinion, and avoid complicating the situation.” The rebuke came after Philippine Senate president Juan Ponce Enrile had said that China’s claims to Scarborough Reef were “legally weak”.

A discussion on China’s CCTV-4 ‘Focus Today’ programme on 2 July concerning US-Philippines joint naval exercises provided an interesting insight into the way Chinese policymakers and academics view the US’s policies in the region.

First of all they made the point that military strength is all that the US now has given its economic problems. Secondly, there was an attempt to get across the idea that the US is using “little brother allies” like the Philippines and Vietnam to anger China and to maintain tension in the region. These views reflect the official line that the US reinforcement of its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific is not conducive to security and mutual trust in the region.

But as the attempt by South Korea’s policymaking elite to sign an unpopular pact with Japan shows, even long-standing hatreds such as those harboured by South Koreans towards Japan are being trumped by the fear of China.

Note: South Korea’s defence ministry announced on 2 July a 7.6% rise in its budget for 2013. The defence ministry’s demand, submitted to the finance ministry on 20 June, was for US$31.1bn (35.5trn won, up from 32.9trn for 2012).