Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

On 24 October, Israel’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Major-General Yair Naveh, publicly aired the very point that this service was emphasizing last week, namely that Israel must now plan for an attack on multiple fronts. This is the key to understanding Israel’s attitude towards Iran.

Speaking at a ceremony for new officers in the Israel Defence Force (IDF), Naveh said: “The IDF…must be alert and prepared on a number of fronts simultaneously.  We will have to be flexible and responsible in following changes in the entire area.”  He described Israel’s border with Egypt as one of “active terrorism”, while the border with Syria, he said, is being transformed from one with a stable ceasefire to a frontier with “jihad and terrorism elements from the whole world”.

According to Naveh, the IDF now faces live threats from Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Egypt’s Sinai.  What he didn’t mention was the additional fear that a fourth intifada could break out in the West Bank, possibly over the renewed bid at the UN in November for Palestinian recognition as a non-member observer state.  Israeli diplomats note with alarm that the bid will coincide with Israel's election campaign getting into full swing, with several parties holding primaries in late November.  This is likely, say the diplomats, to lead to an ‘arms race’ in tough responses.  A ‘former senior official’ has been quoted in the local media as saying: “Likud ministers will pressure him [Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu], the polls will scare him.  And from there it's not far from a response that would bring about a violent conflagration or the collapse of the Palestinian Authority.”

The first opinion poll published after the announcement that the ruling Likud party is to merge with the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu, led by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, supports this fear of a close contest (and hence an ‘arms race’ in tough responses).  It showed the rightist and the centre-left blocs running neck and neck, with each bloc winning 60 seats in the elections.  On the right side of the map, the joint Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu would win 33 seats, the joint National Union-Jewish Home 13 seats, Shas nine seats, and United Torah Judaism five.  On the other side of the map, the Labor party was shown as winning 27 seats, Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid party 18 seats, Arab parties 10 seats and Meretz five.  The poll found that both Kadima, as well as Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s Atzmaut party, would not pass the electoral threshold.

But there is more to Netanyahu’s alliance with Lieberman than raw electoral politics.  There is also a sense that Netanyahu is forming a domestic front that will sustain Israel in a war against Iran and overcome the opposition of sceptical security chiefs.

We have argued many times that Netanyahu is serious about attacking Iran.  Our sources describe him as being almost messianic on this issue, and the reason – again as we have argued many times – lies in the point suggested by Naveh’s comments above, namely that Israel may within the next 15-20 years face an overwhelming 1973-style multi-front attack.  It is for this reason that Israel believes that it must retain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East.  Once it loses this monopoly, it will be unable to use nuclear weapons to defend against an overwhelming conventional attack, as it came close to doing in 1973.

In the meantime, Defence Minister Ehud Barak has been explaining during a visit this week to London why the pressure for an early attack on Iran, that was on display during the summer, dissipated.  According to Barak, Iran has delayed the “moment of truth” by “eight to 10 months” by diverting 38% of its medium-enriched uranium to civilian use.

It will be recalled that in Netanyahu’s 30 September speech to the UN General Assembly, he articulated Israel’s red line on Iran.  He said: “The relevant question is not when Iran will get the bomb.  The relevant question is at what stage can we no longer stop Iran from getting the bomb.  The red line must be drawn on Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme because these enrichment facilities are the only nuclear installations that we can definitely see and credibly target.”

Having articulated this red line, the key question became how much enriched uranium is too much.  In order to manufacture a nuclear weapon, Iran needs to have 25 kg of uranium enriched to 90%.  To achieve this, it first needs 250 kg of uranium enriched to 20%.  At the moment it is believed to have around 190 kg of 20% enriched uranium.  Given that Iran is currently enriching 15 kg per month to 20%, it could theoretically have enough medium-enriched uranium to move on to the final stage within as little as four months.  However, if over a third of this has been diverted to civilian use, then this extends the timescale by the 8-10 months mentioned in London by Barak.

His comments, along with the attack last week on the munitions factory in Sudan, assumed to be by Israel, are intended as warnings to Tehran that the lack of an overt Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities should not be seen as weakness, or as proof that it will not attack.  Barak still insisted that Israel has the right to launch a unilateral military strike and that doing so would be less risky that allowing Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon.

But if the intention has been to make Iran believe the threat of military action is real, it appears not to be working.  On 30 October, Iran’s Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi reiterated the much-stated Iranian view that Israel is bluffing.  He said: “The Zionist regime has seen various aspects of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s power and thus is aware of them.  So it realizes that it is not powerful enough to do any folly against our country.”  So, although the diversion of enriched uranium to civilian uses by Iran can be taken as good news, it would appear that both sides remain firmly on a collision course.  JdeC.