Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

There is a deep concern in Cairo that the main beneficiaries of the dispute over President Muhammad Mursi’s new powers could be the remnants of the old regime.  The fears may be exaggerated, but it is certain that those remnants are far from displeased with this turn of events.

Whatever the uncertainties, one thing is certain: the constitutional powers that President Mursi has sought to arrogate to himself in the past week are truly extraordinary.  His declaration of 22 November stated, in part:

"We have decided the following:

“Article one: All investigation and trials into crimes pertaining to killing and injuring protesters as well as terror crimes committed against revolutionaries under the former regime will be re-conducted.  Political and executive officials from the former regime who are implicated in these cases will be retried, according to the Law on the Protection of the Revolution and other laws.

“Article two: All constitutional declarations, laws and decrees issued by the president since coming to office on 30 June 2012 are final and unchallengeable by any individual or body until a new constitution has been ratified and a new parliament has been elected. His decisions cannot be appealed or cancelled.  All pending lawsuits against them are void.

“Article three: A new prosecutor general, from members of the judiciary, will be appointed by president for a four-year term, starting from the day of the appointment.  The prosecutor should meet the general conditions required for appointment in the judiciary.  He must be aged at least 40.  This article comes into effect on the current incumbent prosecutor general immediately.

“Article four: Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration of 30 March [which] declared that the assembly would finalize the draft within six months of its formation will be changed to eight months.

“Article five: No judicial authority is entitled to dissolve the Constituent Assembly or the Shura Council.

“Article six: The president is authorized to take any measures he sees fit in order to face any threats posed to the January revolution, national unity or national security in accordance with the law.”

That Mursi miscalculated with this declaration is now clear.  He seems to have thought that conceding to popular demands for the retrial of former regime figures would provide the necessary cover for the clauses giving himself virtually unlimited powers and those which protect the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Constituent Assembly and Shura Council.

In part, this calculation was based on Mursi’s belief that the opposition was too divided to mount an effective challenge.  However, he missed the fact that this has been changing gradually with the creation a number of new political parties led by influential figures.

There are three main forces at work in Egypt today.  The secular revolutionaries who wish to see a genuine democracy established; the Muslim Brotherhood and the other elements of political Islam that want to control the revolution for the benefit of their particular vision of society; and the remnants of the old regime looking for a comeback.

It is not easy to judge exactly how potent the challenge from the old regime loyalists might be, but some well-placed observers, at least, view it as the most serious challenge for Egypt.  As the leading Egyptian commentator Hassan Nafa put it in al-Masri al-Yawm on 27 November: “In my view, the main conflict remains that between the forces of revolution and the remnants of the old regime against which these forces rebelled.  As for the conflict with political Islam and its various factions, and especially with the Brotherhood, this remains a secondary matter, despite the fact that this current has staged a coup against the revolution or even committed an act of treason against it.”