Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

Syrian-Kurdish sources say that attempts to unify Kurdish forces in Syria are being intensified.  The aim, according to one local source, is “to establish a popular army as an alternative to the armed militias”.  The spur is the need to confront the Salafi groups that have been challenging the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (DYP) in Syria’s Kurdish cities.  The new force will combine those elements that were previously loyal to the DYP with “650 young Syrians who were previously trained in Iraqi Kurdistan”.

The plan was agreed at a recent meeting in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Irbil and drew on the work of the earlier meeting in Irbil in the second week of July at which it was agreed to set up a Kurdish Supreme Committee and to form “popular defence forces” to control the Kurdish regions of Syria.  The leader of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Masoud Barzani played an important part in bridging the differences between the PYD and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), much to the concern of Turkey.

At the latest meeting in Irbil, it was agreed that the activities of the radical Salafi forces in Syria required an accelerated implementation of the earlier Irbil agreement.  The new force, it is said, will “fill the vacuum that is left after the fall of the ruling regime in Damascus”.

A source at the meeting, quoted by the Saudi-owned daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat, added: “The latest Irbil meeting raised democratic slogans for an independent Syria and for federalism in West Kurdistan.  Furthermore, the Kurdish Supreme Committee, consisting of the People’s Council of West Kurdistan, the Kurdish National Council, and local coordinating bodies should be the sole legitimate representative of the Kurdish people in Syria.”

Meanwhile, back in Iraq the complications are intensifying.  There is a suspicion that the pro-Iranian Shia government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is trying to ratchet up tension with the Kurds of the KRG in order to break the Sunni Arab-Kurdish alignment.  Notwithstanding the recent agreement for both sides to withdraw their forces in the disputed areas to their former positions, Al-Maliki appears to believe that it is in his interests to foment Arab-Kurdish rivalry as this might bring the Sunni Arabs more into alignment with Baghdad.  The Kurdish-Arab fault-line is mostly one between Kurds and Sunni Arabs not the Shia Arabs.  Al-Maliki would prefer an ethnic conflict to a sectarian one.

But an indication of how complex the situation is becoming is provided by the increased Iranian support for the anti-Turkey Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  On 26 November, Turkey’s Interior Minister Idris Naim Sahin confirmed these fears, saying: “We are quite aware of Iran’s support for the PKK.  We know that PKK members that are wounded during clashes against the Turkish army are treated in Iranian hospitals.”  This is something that has been expected given that Iran is so at odds with Turkey over Syria.