Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

North Korea’s 12 February nuclear test, its third after earlier ones in 2006 and 2009, has no doubt had a profound effect on Japan, but the latest opinion surveys show that – despite this - it is China that now worries Japan the most.  This is a significant change from previous years, and this new perception in Japan that China poses the greatest military threat, not North Korea, is likely to persist.

The latest snapshot of Japanese opinion was provided by a Gallup poll published by the Yomiuri Shimbun on 15 February.  It shows that 79% of Japanese view China as a military threat to the country, against 77% who view North Korea as a military threat, 45% who fear Russia, 39% who see the Middle East as a military danger, and a surprisingly high 37% who cite South Korea (up from 23% last year due to the dispute over the Dokdo or Liancourt Rocks) as a military threat to Japan.

This is the first time since the annual survey began in 2000 that China has outranked North Korea in threat perception, and the main reason is undoubtedly China’s increasing belligerence in the East China Sea over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  As of Monday, for instance, Japanese sources were reporting that there were three Chinese maritime surveillance boats operating within Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, one of which had sailed within 1km of the disputed islands, which is the closest that a Chinese government vessel has so far ventured.

Tokyo also clearly sees China as being implicated, by sins of omission if not by sins of commission, in the North Korean escalation.  Speaking on 15 February, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga indicated clearly that Japan feels that China has sufficient influence in Pyongyang to stop any further escalation.

Suga said: “China is the country with the most influence on North Korea so it is extremely important that it takes a stern response.”  This is not quite the same as saying that China was responsible for allowing North Korea to proceed with its nuclear test in the first place, but Suga is definitely saying that China needs to put a stop to things before they get out of hand.

It is possible that China is feeling the heat from all this because it agreed for a senior Japanese foreign ministry official (the director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the foreign affairs ministry, Shinsuke Sugiyama) to visit Beijing from 19-21 February to discuss both the North Korea situation and the recent incident near the disputed islands in which a Chinese naval frigate locked its radar onto a Japanese destroyer.  A planned visit to China by the same official in December was cancelled.

Meanwhile, on North Korea, influential Japanese experts believe (as do many American experts) that deterrence will work.  History suggests that nuclear weapons will only be used against those who cannot retaliate in kind, and there is no reason to suppose that North Korea is immune to this logic.  And, if that is so, then behind the scenes there will be Japanese policymakers who will even see positives in North Korea’s latest nuclear test.  Indeed, they will see it as a triple boon as, first of all, it provides an alibi for Japanese rearmament and for re-interpretation of the pacifist provisions of the constitution; secondly, it gives Japan an opportunity to point to China’s irresponsibility in foreign affairs; and, thirdly, it reinforces for the American public the importance of the US’s ‘pivot’ to Asia.

Those who take this view will also be arguing that tensions on the Korean Peninsula may not be quite as bad as the nuclear test implies.  It can be taken as a relatively positive sign, for instance, that the North Korean nuclear test on 12 February took place before the inauguration of South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye.  Although elected in December, her inauguration does not take place until 25 February, so technically the North’s nuclear test did not take place on her watch.

Also, the signals from the incoming Park administration suggest that Seoul may be prepared to go some way to avoid any further escalation.  Park herself has been indicating a willingness to be flexible towards the North.  In mid-January, for instance, while signalling her determination to be tough on the nuclear issue, she also indicated her flexibility, telling a visiting US delegation: “North Korea’s nuclear development is unpardonable and [I] will react sternly to it, but the window for talks, including on humanitarian aid, [will remain open].”

Also dovish is Park’s nomination of Ryoo Kihl-jae as head of inter-Korean affairs.  The appointment of Ryoo, a moderately conservative academic, is in line with Park’s statement that the window for talks will “remain open”, given his repeated emphasis on the importance of maintaining contact with Pyongyang.  After his appointment, Ryoo said: “I will make efforts to strengthen national security and build trust on the Korean Peninsula at the same time.”

Of course, there are also signals of a different nature coming out of Pyongyang, with indications that the 12 February test may be followed up by further testing – and, indeed, that may be what happens.  Nevertheless, it is important not to overlook the tentative signs of progress that have been emanating from Pyongyang during the past year.

Back in July 2012, for instance, we pointed to the unusual coverage of economic news by Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the ruling Worker’s Party of Korea.  There was a similar emphasis in Kim Jong un’s New Year address, during which he stressed that “building an economic giant” was the most important task.  He also said that “all economic undertakings this year should be geared to effecting a radical increase in production and stabilizing and improving the people’s living standards”.

All of this suggests that the Japanese public is right in its assessment of the relative dangers to Japan of China and North Korea, but none of it will prevent Tokyo from exploiting the North Korean menace as an excuse for bolstering its armed forces.