Courcy’s Intelligence Brief

As any subscriber to this service will know, we have long been of the view that the Arab Spring has provided the Kurds with an historic opportunity to advance of their cause to the maximum possible extent, and that they will not miss it.  Turkey’s response to this has been to befriend the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Masoud Barzani in northern Iraq and to make overtures for peace towards the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrilla group in Turkey.  This is not a bad policy, but our sources have been warning for some time that it is unlikely to prove sufficient as the Turkish Kurds will not settle for any less than the high degree of autonomy achieved by the Iraqi Kurds and now on the way to being achieved by the Syrian Kurds. 

The PKK is split on tactics, and perhaps even goals, but that there is widespread scepticism about the chances of a comprehensive settlement with Ankara is beyond doubt.  The latest PKK figure to express his doubts is Zagros Hiwa, who is based in Kandil in northern Iraq and heads up the information office of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan. 

Speaking on 15 August from Kandil, Hiwa said that he felt Erdogan’s push for peace was an election ploy and that “as soon as these elections are over, Erdogan will renege on all his pledges and calls for opening up and resolving the Kurdish issue by democratic and peaceful means”.  He added: “Also, he will involve the country again in a bloody conflict from which Turkey suffered for more than four decades and which left thousands of victims in the country.”

Erdogan has told parliament that he intends to introduce laws to meet part of the Kurds’ cultural and political demands “in response to initiatives and stands taken by the PKK, which stopped fighting more than five months ago, withdrew its fighters from Turkish territories, and released the Turkish soldiers it had held”.

Hiwa’s view, however, is that developments on the ground suggest that Erdogan has no intention of meeting Kurdish aspirations.  He says: “The Turkish army takes advantage of the vacuum left by our forces’ withdrawal from Turkish territories to bring in additional reinforcements, rebuild and modernize military camps and positions, and recruit Kurdish mercenaries in large numbers.”

According to Hiwa: “There are definite indications that the Turkish government has no intention of pressing ahead with the peace process that our detained leader Abdullah Ocalan launched.  These measures serve as sure signals of war and renewal of military attacks against us.  They do not show good intentions towards the peace process.”

The line put by Hiwa is that the PKK has honoured all the commitments it has made but that the government “has not thus far taken any tangible step to respond to our initiatives”.  The government, however, says that the PKK has only withdrawn 20% of its people from Turkey and that these have mostly been women and children.  Erdogan has also tacitly admitted that there are limits as to how far he can go, saying last week that any measures to placate the PKK would “not disturb the Turkish public”.

For its part, according to Hiwa, the PKK has “warned Erdogan and his government that if he does not take positive, effective, and tangible steps by October we will give up the peace process”.   Hiwa is saying that more than window dressing is needed.  He says: “The Kurdish issue cannot be reduced to the appointment of Kurdish governors, recognition of some cultural rights, or permission for television and radio broadcasting.  The issue is much bigger and involves more than 20m citizens who are deprived of their most basic political, national, and cultural rights.”

Hiwa warns: “Our patience has run out, and we cannot wait and tolerate persistent procrastination any longer.  Practical steps to establish peace must be announced.  If such steps are not taken, the peace process will be cancelled and the war will be resumed again.”

But whatever difficulties Turkey faces with the PKK, on the face of it its policy of befriending the KRG continues and continues successfully.  In one of the most significant developments, a new oil pipeline to enable the KRG to market its oil via Turkey and bypass Baghdad is due to come on stream by the end of the year.   The Kurdish region is estimated to have oil reserves of 45m barrels and natural gas reserves of up to 200 trillion cubic metres.

Ankara’s calculation is that by facilitating the KRG’s desire not to be beholden to Baghdad for its access to energy markets it will itself develop a powerful hold over the KRG.  But this could be a two-edged sword.  Turkey’s increased reliance on Kurdish oil exports also gives additional power over Ankara to the KRG.

NOTE:  On 19 August, the Reuters news agency quoted ‘an adviser’ to Barzani as saying that the sudden influx of Kurdish refugees from Syria into Iraq, perhaps numbering 30,000, increased the chances of an intervention by the KRG.  Earlier in the month, on 10 August, Barzani pubished comments on his website warning that if innocent Kurds in Syria were under threat then the KRG would “use all of its capabilities to defend women and children and innocent civilians”. 

Although denying that military action was likely, in a reference to the sudden influx of refugees Barzani’s adviser said on 19 August: “Barzani’s intervention has become more likely after what has happened in the last few days.”  He talked about the Kurdish people “facing semi-genocide”.