Courcy's Intelligence Brief

Iran in push to co-opt Muslim Brotherhood

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Sources with inside knowledge of the Iranian regime say that Iran is working furiously to capitalize on the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) regime in Egypt. Ever since the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Tehran had hopes that it could forge an alliance with an MB-ruled Egypt regardless of the obvious sectarian divide. Despite a great deal of Iranian persistence, this never quite happened; but now the downfall of the MB is opening up new opportunities and Tehran is moving swiftly to exploit them.

Well-connected Iraqi Shia figures confirm that the driving force behind Iran’s policy on post-coup Egypt is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei, we are told, has instructed senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards official Qasim Sulaymani to provide intelligence and other support to the MB’s military wing in Egypt.

Khamenei’s motive for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood is (above all) to prevent the extension of Saudi Arabian influence – and Saudi influence in Egypt will certainly increase strongly for as long as the putschists retain power. Speaking on 19 August, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, argued that what had happened in Egypt “reflects the will of 30m Egyptians”, and he castigated the Muslim Brotherhood for fomenting “war in the streets, the destruction of public and private property, terrorization of citizens, loss of innocent lives, burning of whole governorates…[and refusing] to respond to the Egyptian popular will as well as the rejection of all reconciliation initiatives”.

In slightly apocalyptic terms, the prince then warned those Western countries which were less than enthusiastic about the coup and the restoration of order that “the blaze and ruin will not be limited to Egypt alone, but they will be reflected on all those who have contributed or stood by problems and disorders taking place in Egypt today”.

The prince also said that Saudi Arabia would support the new Egyptian regime financially and fill any gaps left by Western countries withdrawing aid over the bloody crackdown against MB protesters. On this, as on so much else, Saudi Arabia is aligned with Israel. Speaking on the same day as Prince Saud Al-Faisal, ‘a senior Israeli official’ was quoted locally as saying that Israel believes that restoring stability is the priority and that “the army is the only player than can restore law and order”.

Of course this alignment of Israel with the Egyptian army, and with Saudi Arabia, greatly aids Iran in its drive to co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood. Capitalizing on this point, on 21 August the hard-line Iranian daily Keyhan accused Saudi Arabia of “implementing an American-Zionist scenario” and acting “in complete coordination with the West and the Zionist regime”.

Iran has now indicated to Hamas (the Palestinian wing of the MB) that it is open to a rapprochement and will overlook the fact that Hamas has sided with the Syrian rebels against its erstwhile patron Bashar al-Assad, who is strongly backed by Iran.

One difficulty for Iran is that it is not the only game in town. Even though it has been deserted by the United States, the Muslim Brotherhood can still count on the support of Turkey which has virulently condemned the Egyptian coup as well as the ties between the Egyptian military and Israel. But Iran has one key advantage: it can go much further in its support of the MB and Hamas than Nato-member Turkey can.

In particular, we are told that Khamenei has ordered the IRG to step up its support for Hamas’s military wing, the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and to encourage it to engage in military action in the Sinai Peninsula against the Egyptian military. The Muslim Brotherhood is to be supplied with arms via Yemen, the Red Sea, Sudan, and Libya.

The Syrian question remains a problem, but Tehran apparently believes that it can reach an accommodation with the MB over Assad, encouraging it to support a negotiated settlement. Tehran also believes that it can forge an alliance with the MB and Hamas to oppose the takfiri Salafist trends, including Al-Qaeda, although it recognizes that some tactical alliances may be necessary and/or desirable in the fight against the Egyptian army and Saudi influence.

What all this suggests is that a sectarian explanation for everything that is happening in the Middle East is not sufficient. The situation is more complex, and it has been made immeasurably more so by the collapse of MB rule in Egypt. JdeC.

Kurdish sceptics raise their voices

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As any subscriber to this service will know, we have long been of the view that the Arab Spring has provided the Kurds with an historic opportunity to advance of their cause to the maximum possible extent, and that they will not miss it. Turkey’s response to this has been to befriend the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Masoud Barzani in northern Iraq and to make overtures for peace towards the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrilla group in Turkey. This is not a bad policy, but our sources have been warning for some time that it is unlikely to prove sufficient as the Turkish Kurds will not settle for any less than the high degree of autonomy achieved by the Iraqi Kurds and now on the way to being achieved by the Syrian Kurds.

The PKK is split on tactics, and perhaps even goals, but that there is widespread scepticism about the chances of a comprehensive settlement with Ankara is beyond doubt. The latest PKK figure to express his doubts is Zagros Hiwa, who is based in Kandil in northern Iraq and heads up the information office of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan.

Speaking on 15 August from Kandil, Hiwa said that he felt Erdogan’s push for peace was an election ploy and that “as soon as these elections are over, Erdogan will renege on all his pledges and calls for opening up and resolving the Kurdish issue by democratic and peaceful means”. He added: “Also, he will involve the country again in a bloody conflict from which Turkey suffered for more than four decades and which left thousands of victims in the country.”

Erdogan has told parliament that he intends to introduce laws to meet part of the Kurds’ cultural and political demands “in response to initiatives and stands taken by the PKK, which stopped fighting more than five months ago, withdrew its fighters from Turkish territories, and released the Turkish soldiers it had held”.

Hiwa’s view, however, is that developments on the ground suggest that Erdogan has no intention of meeting Kurdish aspirations. He says: “The Turkish army takes advantage of the vacuum left by our forces’ withdrawal from Turkish territories to bring in additional reinforcements, rebuild and modernize military camps and positions, and recruit Kurdish mercenaries in large numbers.”

According to Hiwa: “There are definite indications that the Turkish government has no intention of pressing ahead with the peace process that our detained leader Abdullah Ocalan launched. These measures serve as sure signals of war and renewal of military attacks against us. They do not show good intentions towards the peace process.”

The line put by Hiwa is that the PKK has honoured all the commitments it has made but that the government “has not thus far taken any tangible step to respond to our initiatives”. The government, however, says that the PKK has only withdrawn 20% of its people from Turkey and that these have mostly been women and children. Erdogan has also tacitly admitted that there are limits as to how far he can go, saying last week that any measures to placate the PKK would “not disturb the Turkish public”.

For its part, according to Hiwa, the PKK has “warned Erdogan and his government that if he does not take positive, effective, and tangible steps by October we will give up the peace process”. Hiwa is saying that more than window dressing is needed. He says: “The Kurdish issue cannot be reduced to the appointment of Kurdish governors, recognition of some cultural rights, or permission for television and radio broadcasting. The issue is much bigger and involves more than 20m citizens who are deprived of their most basic political, national, and cultural rights.”

Hiwa warns: “Our patience has run out, and we cannot wait and tolerate persistent procrastination any longer. Practical steps to establish peace must be announced. If such steps are not taken, the peace process will be cancelled and the war will be resumed again.”

But whatever difficulties Turkey faces with the PKK, on the face of it its policy of befriending the KRG continues and continues successfully. In one of the most significant developments, a new oil pipeline to enable the KRG to market its oil via Turkey and bypass Baghdad is due to come on stream by the end of the year. The Kurdish region is estimated to have oil reserves of 45m barrels and natural gas reserves of up to 200 trillion cubic metres.

Ankara’s calculation is that by facilitating the KRG’s desire not to be beholden to Baghdad for its access to energy markets it will itself develop a powerful hold over the KRG. But this could be a two-edged sword. Turkey’s increased reliance on Kurdish oil exports also gives additional power over Ankara to the KRG.

NOTE: On 19 August, the Reuters news agency quoted ‘an adviser’ to Barzani as saying that the sudden influx of Kurdish refugees from Syria into Iraq, perhaps numbering 30,000, increased the chances of an intervention by the KRG. Earlier in the month, on 10 August, Barzani pubished comments on his website warning that if innocent Kurds in Syria were under threat then the KRG would “use all of its capabilities to defend women and children and innocent civilians”.

Although denying that military action was likely, in a reference to the sudden influx of refugees Barzani’s adviser said on 19 August: “Barzani’s intervention has become more likely after what has happened in the last few days.” He talked about the Kurdish people “facing semi-genocide”.

Iran's new cabinet less threatening but still conservative

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Our Iranian sources say that the cabinet assembled by Iran’s new President Hassan Rowhani does contain some ‘moderates’, but few of the new ministers can be exactly pigeonholed. Moreover, three of Rowhani’s moderate selections were rejected by parliament.

The most obviously unequivocally conservative appointment is that of Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli as interior minister. He is close to Ali Larijani, the hard-line speaker of Iran’s parliament. Rahmani-Fazli owes his rise to Larijani, who appointed him head of the state broadcaster IRIB. He has previously worked at the National Security Council, the Interior Ministry, and on the nuclear negotiating team. The optimists say Rahmani-Fazli’s appointment is a sop to the conservatives and not that important; the reformist camp just thinks it is a bad appointment.

Another indication that domestic affairs will remain under conservative domination is the appointment of Mostafa Purmohammadi as justice minister. Purmohammadi is the only survivor from Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s cabinet, and his early career is no more encouraging. He was at one time a prosecutor in the Intelligence Ministry, rising to deputy intelligence minister in 1987. According to Human Rights Watch, Purmohammadi was a member of the committee that ordered the summary execution of inmates in Evin Prison in 1988. He was at one time an adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Equally the new intelligence minister, Seyyed Mahmud Alavi, is a conservative with impeccable revolutionary credentials. He is a cleric who led protests and a militia group before the 1979 revolution.

The main relief for the reformists on the home front comes in the shape of Ali Jannati, who is seen to be close to former President Rafsanjani. But Jannati, despite his moderate image, is a part of the revolutionary establishment (he was involved in the armed struggle against the Shah) and is the son of the notable hard-line cleric, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.

Also seemingly encouraging for the reformists is the appointment of Bizhan Namdar-Zanganeh as oil minister. He was energy minister from 1988-97 and oil minister for eight years in Mohammad Khatami’s administration. Most obviously he supported the reformist Mir Hoseyn Musavi in the disputed 2009 election, but he has most likely been appointed for his undoubted technocratic skills rather than for his reformist credentials. He is there to provide stability (Ahmadinejad managed to have four oil ministers), not reformist zeal beyond his portfolio.

In the defence sphere the new minister, Hoseyn Dehqan, is seen as a conservative although he did serve six years in the reformist Khatami administration as deputy defence minister. His conservative credentials come from his background as a member of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) after the 1979 revolution and his eventual promotion to command the IRGC’s air force and acting chief of staff. He served in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and he led a deployment of IRGC forces to Lebanon and Syria during the First Lebanon War. Since 2010 he has served on the Expediency Council as head of the political, defence, and security committee.

Then there is foreign affairs where the smooth Mohammad Javad Zarif is the new minister. His is one of those appointments that could confuse Western observers. He has spent many years in the United States, speaks fluent English with an American accent, and hobnobs with establishment American figures such as former secretary of state James Baker. Yet, we are told, he is close to Iran’s hard-line Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In other words, it’s much too early to get excited - but, and this is the important thing, there is just enough hope there for the US and the EU to justify continuing to stay Israel’s hand on the nuclear question.

Risk pointers

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*** Israelis remain sceptical about peace process. Given that Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is a reluctant peace maker, the fact that the Israeli public appears lukewarm at best adds to the feeling that the renewed peace process will not go anywhere fast.

A poll published in Maariv on 16 August showed that 57% of Israelis believe they were harmed by the Oslo Accords, and most significantly 53% say that they object to withdrawing from any part of the West Bank in return for recognition of Israel by the Palestinians and a waiving of the right of return for refugees.

*** China sees lessons in Egypt. Many Chinese commentators have been drawing predictable lessons for China from the turmoil in Egypt, but the PRC-owned Hong Kong daily Ta Kung Pao has even seen lessons for Hong Kong in the unrest. A commentary published on 19 August said that the chaos in Egypt proved that Hong Kong should not “indiscriminately copy the Western democratic model” as it could “bring economic development to a standstill and put society into chaos”.

The commentary added: “The democratic tragedy in Egypt has shown that large-scale street protests easily give rise to confrontations and bloodshed. Hong Kong should draw on the tragic experience of Egypt so as to prevent society from running into chaos.”

*** Japan will still avoid the overseas deployment of troops. On 17 August, Japan’s Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera said that the lifting of the ban on participating in collective self-defence would not entail the overseas deployment of troops.

The minister said: “We will never go to other countries for military actions.” He added that Japan “will also determine by itself if it should exercise the right to collective self-defence”.

However, Onodera did stress the importance of lifting the ban on collective self-defence, saying: “It would be extremely difficult under the current interpretation to address a case in which a US warship deployed to protect Japan were to come under attack on the high seas.”

Onodera’s remarks appeared to be aimed at the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s coalition partner, New Komeito. New Komeito has joined the Social Democratic party and the Japanese Communist Party in opposing the plan specifically on the grounds that it could lead to the use of force overseas by Japan.

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