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HAITI: Rumsfeld praises Minustah

JAMAICA: US to help reconstruction after Hurricane Ivan

NICARAGUA: Washington fears Sandinista revival

ROCKETS: Bolaños promises to destroy more SAMs

RICE APPOINTMENT: New secretary of state has 'little interest' in Latin America

ECUADOR: Rumsfeld seeks regional cooperation

HAITI
The US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, discussed Haiti and other regional security issues in bilateral meetings with officials from Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina, on the fringe of a meeting of hemispheric defense ministers in Quito. Rumsfeld praised the Brazil-led peacekeeping mission in Haiti, Minustah, and encouraged the region to come together to cooperate on a range of security issues including fighting terror and drug-trafficking. Rumsfeld said he was opposed to the restoration of the army in Haiti. This is the principal demand of the rebel army that ousted former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February. Rumsfeld said he thought the reestablishment of the army was 'a bad idea'. He also questioned the government's decision to draft some soldiers into the Haitian police force. The interim government has recruited about 100 of the rebels into the police force in a bid to appease the leaders of the rebel army.

JAMAICA
The US signed a grant agreement with the government of Jamaica to release J$1.1bn (US$18m) in funds to assist the country's reconstruction efforts in the wake of the devastation caused by Hurricane Ivan in September. The US Ambassador to Jamaica, Sue Cobb, said 'This J$1.1bn infusion of funds granted today will be focused on rebuilding homes, schools and community centres and will provide assistance for small business enterprises.' The funds will be administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and will be implemented over a 12- month period.

NICARAGUA
Washington has once again made a vocal intervention in Nicaragua's domestic politics, recommending that the conservative Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) and the Alianza por la República (Apre) join forces to defeat the leftwing opposition Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional in the presidential elections in 2006. The warning comes after the Sandinistas recorded a decisive victory in the municipal elections on 7 November, winning 91 of the 152 municipalities and replacing the PLC as the biggest party in the country. Dan Fisk, the deputy assistant secretary of state, met senior figures in the PLC at the US embassy in Managua on 15 November to express his disquiet at the gains made by the Sandinistas. Fisk is believed to have aired his concerns to Bolaños and Apre members that the rupture with the PLC was undermining the right's grip on power in Nicaragua.

ROCKETS
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thanked Nicaragua's President Enrique Bolaños for being 'a strong and resolute partner in the global struggle against terrorism,' during a visit to Managua on 12 November. 'I am told that the Nicaraguan military has confiscated over 6,000 kilograms of cocaine this year alone,' Rumsfeld said. 'We applaud and encourage these efforts.' President Enrique Bolaños also promised Rumsfeld that Nicaragua would destroy a stockpile of hundreds of surface-to-air missiles with no expectation of compensation from the US, which fears they could fall into the hands of terrorists and be used against airliners or military aircraft.

RICE APPOINTMENT
The Washington think tank, the Council On Hemispheric Affairs (Coha) has criticised the appointment of Condoleezza Rice as secretary of state. Coha said that 'A search of her (Rice's) public statements on Latin American issues produces very thin gruel' before concluding that 'Be it extending the perimeter of the White House's anti-terrorism war or upgrading the US Southern Command's sphere of operations, under Rice's jurisdiction, the Cold War will soon be brought to Latin America'. Julia Sweig, senior fellow in the Latin America program of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, also saw little hope for Rice devoting much attention to Latin America: 'Condi has shown no interest in Latin America so far, and I don't really see that changing,' she said. Rice has, however, had a major input into Washington's current Cuba policy. Not that this is likely to endear her to many in the region. As national security adviser, Rice was instrumental in drawing up tough new measures calculated to hasten the democratic transition in Cuba, such as tighter restrictions on travel to Cuba and remittances to relatives of Cuban expatriates still living on the island. An editorial in the Miami Herald this week urged Rice to improve relations with Latin America: 'We hope that Rice, once confirmed, will give more attention to Latin America, where the agenda includes the unfinished Free Trade Area of the Americas and a growing alienation from the United States. Our nation's closest friends, geographically and otherwise, are in the Western Hemisphere. Our mutual interests should be at the top of the foreign-policy agenda.' Otto Reich, a former White House special envoy to Latin America, suggested that the US is likely to reward the 'good'- outward-looking developing countries such as the Central American Republics - and penalise the 'bad', such as Cuba and Venezuela: 'A second Bush administration is likely to increase support and attention to countries that follow the right economic policies, promote civil liberties internally, and don't interfere in the internal affairs of neighbours,' he said.

ECUADOR
On 16 November the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, met his Ecuadorean counterpart, Nelson Herrera, President Lucio Gutiérrez and the foreign minister, Patricio Zuquilanda, to discuss regional security, and in particular, Ecuador's support for the US-backed Plan Colombia. Rumsfeld said that Ecuador had to define its own role in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and guerrillas, but that whatever strategy it decided upon had to adjust to regional and hemispheric requirements. 'In the 21st century, these problems have become more and more globalised and regionalised, they are not problems that affect only one country and they cannot be resolved by only one country. This means that countries that want to be free and prosperous have to cooperate,' said Rumsfeld. He added that the fruits of economic cooperation within the regional are already visible, but are still lacking in the area of security. The US currently occupies a military base in Manta, in the north-east of Ecuador, from where it launches surveillance operations on suspected drug routes in the region.

Brazil: On 12 April US and Brazilian defence chiefs, Robert Gates and his counterpart Nelson Jobim signed a military cooperation agreement designed to bolster security ties. The accord promotes collaboration in military research and development, training, joint exercises, and commercial projects. "The agreement is a formal acknowledgement of the many security interests and values we share as the two most populous democracies in the Americas," Gates told a news conference with his Brazilian counterpart. US and Brazilian leaders disagree, however, over the best diplomatic strategy towards Iran. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva warns against piling pressure on Tehran through fresh sanctions. Although Gates spoke of cooperation between the countries' defence industries, the deal comes amid expectations US aviation giant Boeing will lose out on a major contract to supply fighter jets to Brazil. Gates also praised Brazil's contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, saying it "ably took the lead in the UN forces' relief and recovery efforts" after the January 12 earthquake.

Mexico: On 12 April the US announced that it was shutting its consulate in Nuevo Laredo, “until further notice". It then reopened it on 13 April. The consulate had been attacked with a grenade on 9 April, which the local police erroneously identified as a bomb. The US has also warned its citizens to avoid the states of Durango, Coahuila and Cihualpa. The families of US employees of the consulates in Tijuana, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Monterrey and Matamoros have also been sent home to the US.

Peru: On 14 April the US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates arrived in Peru to meet President Alan Garcí­a, his Peruvian counterpart, Rafael Reyes and José Antonio Garcia Belaunde, minister for foreign affairs. During an in-bound flight briefing Gates stated that "Peru has been a constructive influence in South America in terms of countering the propaganda of Venezuela." In relation to Peru's regional role, Gates said that the US does not see Venezuela as a military challenge, and played down the threat that Iran might pose in the region through its ties with Venezuela and Bolivia. Because the meetings will be largely security based, the issues of Sendero Luminoso (SL)'s resurgence and the need for greater regional integration on security are on the agenda. Gates praised those countries that have adopted security policies which are in line with the foreign policy of the US, "We rely a lot and are ready to facilitate greater regional cooperation that occurs between different countries, Peru and Colombia, and _ Mexico as well." He added that there was still room for greater cooperation highlighting the similarities, and therefore useful areas of coordination, for Peru and Colombia to undertake. “They face the same problems with terrorists, drug trafficking and crime. Find out how we can help them in their own efforts and in cooperation with others is an important opportunity."

Region: On 9 April the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, expressed concerns over the “aggressive rhetoric" and “excessive militarism" in the region. These comments came as the US was about to host the landmark Nuclear Security Summit, which took place this week (12-13 April). Valenzuela's comments are in response to the recent increase in military arsenal seen across many countries in Latin America including Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia. In a speech given in Colombia on 7 April Valenzuela was clear that what the US wants is not to encroach on sovereignty, "Any sovereign country has the right to seek improvements to their armaments and modernizing them. This is obvious and it respects sovereignty."

The Week Ahead

FRIDAY

Venezuela: The summit of the Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas (ALBA) will take place in Caracas. Dominica Prime Minister, Roosevelt Skerrit, is expected to formalise Dominica's entry into the ALBA.

Bolivia: Secretary General of the Organisation of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza, will meet deputy Foreign Minister Hugo Fernández as part of a two-day trip to the country.

Argentina: Bolivian President Evo Morales will make an official visit to Argentina and meet President Cristina Fernández.

Panama. The final day of the 13th Ordinary Meeting hosted by the Ministerial Council of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) will take place in Panama City.

SUNDAY

Cuba: The traditional Antorchas march celebration will take place to commemorate Cuba's national hero José Martí­.

TUESDAY

Bolivia: The government and country's prefects will resume talks over the government proposal to use profits from the direct hydrocarbons tax (IDH) to provide a new pension plan for senior citizens.

Since late July Argentine indigenous communities have staged two major protest actions in different parts of the country, both over their rights to ancestral land, guaranteed in the 1994 constitution but systematically ignored by the authorities, particularly at provincial level. These two incidents are symptomatic of a ferment which has been spreading through the pockets of territory where Argentina's aboriginal people are concentrated.

The first episode took place in the heartland of the Mapuche: the west-central province of Neuquén, which borders on Chile, precisely adjacent to the area where most of the Chilean Mapuche communities are concentrated. On 30 July members of four Mapuche communities of Neuquén moved into land they have been claiming as their own for years, currently administered by a joint federal-provincial corporation set up a decade ago, and by the defence ministry.

Members of the Mapuche communities of Catalán, Currumil, Salazar and Wiñoy Tayiñ Rakizuan set up camps in lands close to Lake Aluminé, demanding that the government recognise their title to it. Verónica Huilipán, leader of the Confederación Mapuche Neuquina, said, 'The decision to recover these lands was the result of the lack of response [from the government] over the past two years.

A survey conducted in 2004-05 to supplement the 2001 census, which included up to first-generation descendants, counted 76,423 Mapuche in Argentina's Patagonian provinces, but Mapuche organisations say the real figure is close to 300,000. The largest concentration (about 61% of the survey's total) is in Neuquén, where they account for about 10% of the population.

Almost as soon as the land invasion took place, the defence ministry announced that it was willing to negotiate.

The second episode took place on 8 August in the extreme north-western province of Jujuy, which borders on Bolivia and Chile. About 1,200 Quechua-speaking Colla people marched upon key junctions on the two main highways which lead, respectively, into Bolivia and Chile. 

They dubbed their action the 'Second Malón for Peace' — malón being the term that designated the armed Indian raids which for the better part of 300 years had kept at bay the authorities of Buenos Aires. The first 'Malón for Peace' had taken place in 1946: it involved a march from Jujuy to Buenos Aires, 1,600 kilometres away, and it succeeded in persuading the government of Juan Domingo Perón to sign a decree expropriating ancestral indigenous land for redistribution among the Indians. That decree, however, remained only minimally implemented.

In May this year, a court ordered the government of Jujuy to deliver, within 15 months, land titles to indigenous communities in 10 departments. The provincial government, however, appealed the ruling, claiming that it was unconstitutional. This prompted the Colla communities to take action. Prominent among the organisers was the Fundación Warmis Sayajsungo (whose name in Quechua means 'perseverant women').

With a nudge from the federal government, the provincial governor, Eduardo Fellner, to meet the presidents of 115 Colla communities and sign an agreement to open a register of all privately held land which is ancestral indigenous territory, review the provisional land titles handed out by the province in 1963, and condition all mining activity to environmental impact studies and mitigation plans agreed with the communities. As a token of good faith, the governor promised to hand out 29 land titles to indigenous communities before the end of the year.

The protesters, while welcoming this move, say they will wait to see how much of it materialises before they celebrate. They are well aware of similar promises made to the Wichí­ people in the neighbouring province of Salta, which were only partially fulfilled.

It is roughly estimated that there are about 70,000 local speakers of Quechua (of what is known as the southern Bolivian version) in Jujuy, and about as many again in Salta. All told, though, some 700,000 Bolivian immigrants (of which almost 200,000 are seasonal workers and the rest are mainly in the Greater Buenos Aires area), greatly boost their numbers. There are also some 150,000 speakers of another dialect of Quechua in the central province of Santiago del Estero.

With under a week to go to Chile's municipal elections (on 31 October), President Lagos has entered the fray, backing government candidates in various regions across the country. On 19 October Lagos travelled north to lend his support, via radio interviews, to would-be Concertación mayors and councillors in Arica, Ovalle, La Serena and Coyhaique. The president knows, however, that the real political battle will be fought over the mayoralty of Santiago, and could give a strong indication of the way the wind is blowing ahead of the presidential elections in 2005.  

Joaquin Laví­n, leader of the opposition rightwing Alianza por Chile, is stepping down as mayor of Santiago. The two men competing for the position are Raúl Alcaino, a charismatic businessman of little political experience from the Unión Democrata Independiente (UDI) part of the APC coalition, and Jorge Schaulsohn Brodsky, an experienced politician from the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), part of Concertación. What makes the race interesting is that this year, unlike in 2000 or 1996, the municipal elections are only one year away from the presidential vote.

An opinion poll conducted by El Mercurio and Opina SA, published on 10 October, showed Laví­n as the man most Chileans expected to be the next president. Confusingly, however, when those polled were asked who they would actually vote for, 45.7% chose the leftwing candidate Michelle Bachelet ahead of Laví­n (43.7%). Soledad Alvear, another possible Concertación hopeful, trailed both by some distance.

If Raúl Alcaino does not win in Santiago, he could return to his business interests, having enjoyed his experiences and come off none the worse. For Laví­n, however, it would be a major blow to his hopes for the presidency as many could interpret an APC failure as a verdict on Laví­n's mayoralty. It would also catapault Schaulsohn into the higher echelons of the Concertación coalition. Failure for Schaulsohn would also be tough: his party, the PPD, has always been a minor player within the coalition and the mayoralty of Santiago would provide a major boost to its standing.

PEOPLE PROFILE is published every Tuesday and describes the professional background of key people emerging in the political and economic scenario.

Who is Lucho Garzón?
He is the mayor-elect of Bogotá. He is a former presidential candidate for the Polo Democrático. His career was forged with the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT)

Why watch him?
Garzón is a high charisma politician and the mayorship of Bogotá is a good base camp for an effort at the national presidency. He is a conciliator rather than a confronter on the issue of how the guerrilla groups operating in the country should be tackled.

Born: 15 February 1951

Place of birth: Bogotá, Colombia

Education:
He comes from a poor family and only achieved his high school diploma at night school. He then went to the Universidad Libre to study law, again after doing a day's work.

Public life:
His political involvement started with the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), where he moved up the ranks to become vice-president. His first job was as a golf caddie at a country club. Then as an apprentice he learnt carpentry before helping a street vendor who worked door to door in poor parts of town. He later became a porter for the Congreso Eucarí­stico del 68 and then a adman selling space in the first guide to Bogotá's nightlife.

Timeline:

1970-2000: Union leader, focusing on welfare activities.
1995-2001: President of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores.
1996-2002: He worked on trying to achieve a political solution to the conflict with various guerrilla groups as a member of: (variously) the Consejo Nacional de Paz; the Comisión de Conciliación Nacional; the Comité de Búsqueda de la Paz, and the Comisión Facilitadora para los diálogos con el ELN.
2001: While president of the CUT, he was awarded the George Meany-Lane Kirkland human rights prize by the AFL-CIO, the main union in the US.
2002: Presidential candidate for Polo Democrático, a coalition of new parties. He lost to the current president, Alvaro Uribe.
2003: President and candidate for mayor of Bogotá for Polo Democrático Independiente (PDI). This was a party specifically set up to compete with the two traditional parties which dominate Colombian politics.
2003: Elected mayor of Bogotá.

Strong points:
He was elected with broad support from a lot of interest groups which had not been represented by the traditional parties. This sent a clear message to President Uribe, who has been accused of running an exclusive, rather than inclusive, government. Lucho Garzón, with his proven political charisma, represents the main opposition to the president. He has close links with the unions, which make him the fulcrum of the opposition.

Weak points:
He has no experience of running an administration. The risk is that by taking unpopular, but correct, decisions, he will lose support. He is sometimes belittled by traditional politicians, which could make running the biggest urban district in the country more difficult for him.

Prospects:
Lucho Garzón clearly wants to use his position as mayor to play in the big league. He will not focus just on street cleaning and traffic lights, but aims to make a contribution to the big issues facing the country, notably negotiating with the guerrillas. His party, the PDI, is setting itself up as an alternative administration. He has to show that it is capable.

Who is he? An economist, Segovia will serve as technical secretary to the presidency under the new left-wing Frente Farabundo Martí­ para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) government of President Mauricio Funes, which took office on 1 June 2009. Segovia is not a cardholding member of the FMLN but is one of the founders of the pro-business Amigos de Mauricio Funes (AMF). These are a mixture of left-wing and right-wing figures who provided financial support to Funes during his campaign

Why watch him? Segovia is one of Funes's closest aides. He encouraged Funes to dispense with former FMLN tenets (such as reversing dollarisation and pulling out of the Cafta-DR trade treaty with the US). As technical secretary to the presidency, he is expected to wield considerable influence in devising economic policy - the economy is undoubtedly the biggest challenge facing Funes, with remittances and exports down by 7.5% and 8%, respectively, in the first quarter of 2009 and GDP likely to contract by at least 1% this year.

Born: El Salvador.

Education: Segovia has a degree in economics from El Salvador's Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA), a masters specialising in public policy in Latin America from Oxford University, and a doctorate in economics from London University.

Public Life: Segovia built up his public profile as an academic and consultant, working for a string  of international organisations such as: the Inter-American development bank (IDB); the UN development program (UNDP); the UN Commission on Latin America & the Caribbean (Cepal). He also worked for the Salvadorean government, advising then treasury minister, Guillermo López Suárez (2004-6), under the previous Tony Saca administration.

While not a member of the FMLN, he has shown himself to be sympathetic to its concerns for social justice; as well as working as an economic analyst for the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (Minugua), an organisation which played a key role in Guatemala's peace process, he also collaborated with the New York-based International Center for Transitional justice (ICTJ), an organisation which assists countries pursuing accountability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse.

Currently, he is on the advisory council to the Central American institute for fiscal studies (ICEFI); a consultant for the Salvadorean development and environmental research program (Prisma) and is an advisor on a UNDP and government-sponsored project aimed at reducing urban poverty in El Salvador.

A personal friend of Funes, Segovia was one of the founders of the AMF, back in November 2007, when Funes, a TV journalist, was named official candidate for the FMLN. He played a crucial role in Funes's campaign, stressing the need to reassure the private sector and the influential Salvadorean expatriate community in the US that an FMLN government would not mean mass nationalisations and a narrow foreign policy focused on Venezuela, still less restrictions imposed on remittances by the US. In the election build-up he also accompanied Funes on his visits to business magnates such as Mexico's Carlos Slim and Raúl Salinas Pliego, aimed at cementing decent business links. At the same time he insists that any economic plan must tackle the causes of the civil war (1980-92) - exclusion, poverty and inequality, which the FMLN claims Arena neglected to address following the peace accords.

Following Funes's victory on 15 March, Segovia formed part of his transition team responsible for negotiating the hand-over of power from the outgoing rightwing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena). He was officially named technical secretary to the presidency on 26 May and took up his position on 1 June.

Time Line:

1985: Worked as a researcher and lecturer at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA).

1997-2000: Worked as an economic analyst for the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (Minugua) in Guatemala

2001: Collaborated with the ICTJ in New York.

2004-2006: Advisor to treasury minister, Guillermo López Suárez under the Saca administration.

November 2007: Helps founds “Amigos de Mauricio Funes".

May 2009: Named technical secretary to the presidency.

Strengths: With a solid reputation and extensive experience, Segovia's appointment was welcomed by both the public and private sectors - including the chamber of commerce and rightwing think-tank Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Fusades). His skill and political acumen is evident in the vote-winning electoral platform he helped devise for Funes, in which he managed to both reassure big business without completely alienating traditional FMLN supporters.

He heads a capable team of experienced technocrats - including the economy minister, Héctor Dada Hirezi, of the moderate left-wing Cambio Democrático - which has received the endorsement of the private sector. The public is also behind the new Funes administration - a UCA poll conducted between 27 April and 6 May showed 81% of those questioned considered the new government was well placed to address the current economic crisis.

Weaknesses: As a member of the AMF, Segovia has attracted criticism from FMLN hardliners. He also has a huge job to prevent the economic difficulties becoming a crisis. The outgoing Arena government maintained during the election campaign that that public finances were “stable" and there was “nothing to worry about". The assurances proved hollow - Segovia has since said that the country already has a US$500m fiscal deficit. The new head of the central bank (BCR), Carlos Acevedo, is predicting that the deficit will reach US$1.2bn by the end of the year.

Prospects: With only 35 of the 84 seats in congress, Funes lacks a majority.  Segovia and his team could well encounter opposition not only from the rightwing Arena but also FMLN hardliners. Segovia has ruled out introducing new taxes or raising rates to deal with the deficit. He promises, however, to clamp down on tax evasion (which Funes claims is running at US$500m a year) and to try to broaden the tax base by attracting foreign investment.
Initially at least, Segovia will try to borrow his way out of trouble. Two weeks ago congress approved initiatives which free up an additional US$2.7bn through issuing US$1.8m in global bonds and redirecting two loans from the World Bank and IDB worth in total US$950m towards debt payments.

On 1 June, Funes announced a US$474m “anti-crisis" plan aimed at addressing the immediate effects of the current economic crisis. Among other components, the plan aims to generate 100,000 direct jobs over the next 18 months; improve infrastructure and basic services and build and repair 25,000 low-income housing units in urban areas and create a new state bank which would guarantee loans for private business.

The UN-backed international commission against impunity in Guatemala, (Cicig) made clear its opinion that two successive court sentences in major trials exemplified the entrenched impunity that it had been set up to eradicate. One sentence absolved former president Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) and two of his ministers, accused of having appropriated large sums of public monies. The other acquitted former presidential candidate Alejandro Giammattei, accused of having been a key figure, back when he was head of the prison service under the administration of President Oscar Berger (2004-2008) , in a network devoted to extrajudicial executions.

Portillo and his former ministers of defence and finance, Eduardo Arévalo and Manuel Maza, had been accused by Cicig and the public prosecution service of having diverted US$15m of defence ministry funds into private bank accounts, using the state-owned mortgage bank Crédito Hipotecario Nacional (CHN) as a conduit. Portillo was the first Guatemalan president to have been brought to trial for criminal offences allegedly committed while in office.

Two key pieces of evidence, the audit conducted by the Contraloría General de Cuentas (comptroller-general's office) and the testimony of CHN president José Llort, were thrown out on 9 May as lacking probative value by two of the three judges on the panel of the 11th penal court, who consequently voted to acquit the three defendants and set them free. This decision was opposed by the presiding judge, Morelia Ríos.

Arévalo and Maza were immediately released (on parole until the sentence is firm), but Portillo remained in custody awaiting extradition to the US, where he is wanted by a New York court to answer charges of money laundering involving a sum of  US$70m. The court order authorising Portillo's extradition was ratified on 30 April by the injunctions panel of the supreme court, but Portillo's lawyers have said they will challenge that decision before the constitutional court, on the grounds that his acquittal affects the basis on which the extradition was granted.

Chief public prosecutor Claudia Paz y Paz has announced that she will immediately appeal the acquittals. Cicig issued on 10 May a communiqué saying that the acquittal embodies ‘the true state of justice in Guatemala and confirms Cicig's mission to fight against impunity'.

That same day a judge at the major risk court dismissed the case brought against former prison service director Alejandro Giammattei, who had been charged with criminal conspiracy to murder seven inmates in September 2006, on the grounds that the prosecution service had failed to prove his participation in this event. Giammattei, who had run as presidential candidate of the Gran Alianza Nacional (Gana) in 2007, had initially sought asylum in the Honduran embassy, claiming that he was the victim of political persecution, but later surrendered to the authorities in 2010.

Judge Patricia Flores ordered the immediate release of Giammattei and three other defendants, but ordered the prosecution of five others, among them the former head of the police's criminal investigations division, Víctor Soto, also accused of having murdered three inmates who escaped from a prison in the south of the country.

Cicig reacted with the statement that Giammattei should be prosecuted on the charge of carrying out extrajudicial executions. Arrest warrants have been issued against other officials accused of having formed a criminal organisation within the interior ministry and the national police which ordered and carried out extrajudicial executions.

Prominent among these are former interior minister Carlos Vielmann (currently free on bail in Spain, awaiting extradition), former national police director Erwin Sperisen (currently residing in Switzerland) and former deputy chief of criminal investigations Javier Figueroa (currently under arrest in Austria while Guatemala challenges the political asylum granted him by the Austrian government in 2007).

Cicig has said it will resort to all avenues available in Guatemala's judicial system to have these setbacks reversed. It maintains that the evidence against Portillo and his two alleged associates is conclusive enough for an appeal to succeed. In the case involving Giammattei it points to ‘evident incongruities' in the decision to free some of the defendants and order the prosecution of others.

Cicig's opinion of the judges' performance emerged obliquely in a communiqué urging Guatemalan society to ‘demand an impartial, equitable and independent judicial system [that will guarantee] the administration of justice according to law, prompt and transparent to all citizens.' Cicig, established in December 2006, began to act in September 2007.

The case against Portillo and his ministers was the showpiece of Cicig's efforts to root out corruption from the public administration while the case against Vielmann and his subordinate was also key to its campaign against the ‘hidden powers' ensconced in the government and law enforcement agencies that engage in criminal activities, often in collusion with organised crime.

After the Portillo and Giammattei setbacks, Cicig was able to enjoy at least one success: the arrest of Juan Carlos Leal, who served under Berger as head of the Secretaría de Asuntos Administrativos y Seguridad (SAAS; the presidency's own security apparatus), accused of having participated in the embezzlement of about US$5.3m of funds earmarked for the purchase of fuel for the police.

Cicig's investigation of this case has already led to the prosecution and conviction of former police director Baltazar Gómez and the former deputy head of the police's logistics department, Héctor Lapoyeu. Under arrest in connection with this case is former interior minister Raúl Velásquez, who in late May had separate charges of abuse of authority and dereliction of duty, in connection with another corruption case, dismissed at the request of the prosecution.

[Los Zetas & violence in Guatemala, pages 3-6.]

Development: On 5 June local authorities in Alto Paraná declared a state of emergency, following a recent bout of land occupations in the department's southern region.

Significance: Land reform was one of President Fernando Lugo's major campaign promises in 2008. Three years on, the landless farmers' movement, which supported Lugo, is getting restless. Moreover, the occupations are spreading to new areas of the country, including the most productive, owned by powerful agricultural producers. This not only highlights the Lugo government's difficulty with the complex problem of land reform; but it also has the potential to create problems for the key agri-sector, which the main motor of economic growth (and investment) in the country.

Key points:

• The measure, adopted for an indefinite period, was adopted by Alto Paraná's Governor Nelson Aguinagalde following a meeting with local mayors and agricultural producers. The producers say that some 600 landless families have occupied 12,000 hectares in the Ñacunday area belonging to 60 Brazilian-Paraguayan (Brasiguayo) settlers, including Paraguay's largest soya producer, Tranquilo Favero.

• Héctor Cristaldo, the leader of the associated producers union (UGP), explained that the situation has put the area's production in "check" just 60 days before the next planting season is set to begin, warning this could affect next year's crop. Cristaldo claimed that the squatters enjoyed support from influential members of government such as the governor of San Pedro, José "Pakova" Ledesma, and Senator Sixto Perreira, both close Lugo aides. Cristaldo said it was "surprising" that the occupiers, many of whom had come from other departments, including San Pedro, had been able to arrange for electricity and public lighting in their illegal settlements.

• Cristaldo argued that the government is being "ñembotavy", or basically adopting a policy of deliberate disengagement, in an attempt to disguise the political aspect of the occupations. Menacingly, he warned that if the government does not guarantee private property, producers would turn to "other institutional and legal mechanisms" to protect it. The regional association of soya producers (APS) will meet today (6 June) to discuss the issue. 

• The mayor of Santa Rita, Concepción Rodríguez, claims that the situation has forced the suspension of two large agro-industrial investment projects in a new local industrial park in his municipality — the construction of a wheat processing plant and a poultry abattoir. He complained that work on the poultry plant by a Brazilian firm, Globoaves, has been suspended for two months as a result of the current "climate of uncertainly". The Globoaves project, expected to process 180,000 chickens daily, is a US$90m investment expected to create 3,000 jobs. Problematically, Rodríguez, from the opposition Partido Colorado, accused the national land development institute (Indert) of backing the occupations.

Development: On 9 May the latest count of votes in the 10 question national referendum suggested that the government has probably lost on at least two issues.

Significance: The problem areas are the two most controversial: judicial reform and control of the media. Just as importantly, even where the government appears to be winning, it is doing so only narrowly. Furthermore, if blanks and spoilt ballots are included, a clear majority of voters is in favour of only four of the government's 10 proposals. This effective defeat means that President Rafael Correa's use of populist votes to steam-roller his opponents has come to an end. Rashly, President Correa had threatened during the campaign to resign if voters rejected his 10 proposed reforms. Technically, they may not have done so, but the public has signalled that it wants a change in the way Correa governs.

Key points:

• The government appears to be preparing to accept its defeat, though it's grumbling about the slow count. President Correa argues, correctly, that the opposition media is jumping the gun by claiming that he has been defeated on at least two questions; pointing out that a majority of votes has not yet even been counted. Embarrassingly for the government however, it's clear that the exit poll it used to claim victory immediately after the polls closed on 7 May was badly wrong.

• Correa's defeat has implications for both Venezuela and Bolivia, whose controversial and charismatic leaders also use national referenda to give them the political and moral authority to push through radical change. In 2007 President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela accepted defeat in a national referendum on constitutional reform, including a proposal for indefinite re-election, but went back to the voters in 2009 and got the result he wanted. The scale and complexity of Correa's May 2011 referendum means that it would be difficult for him to do what Chávez did. 

• So far, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) has counted 47.5% of the ballot boxes. Strangely, the count has been fastest in opposition areas, but in the heavily populated states like Guayas, Pichincha, Los Ríos, Manabí and Esmeraldas, fewer than a third of the boxes have been counted. The opposition and the government are complaining about the CNE's scrupulous refusal to include ballot boxes in the count where it has found anomalies. In Guayas, where the opposition mayor of Guayaquil, Jaime Nebot, claims that the "No" campaign defeated the government on at least five questions, the count is only up to 30% of ballot boxes.

• Nationally, the government is losing on Question Four, which would effectively have given the government 18 months of complete power over the appointment and sacking of judges. It is narrowly behind on question nine, which assigns the government the power to regulate the media.

• The surprising success of the opposition is prompting opposition leaders to compete for the credit. On 8 May Gustavo Larrea, who was formerly Correa's security minister but opposed the changes the president advocated, argued that a narrow victory for the government was as good as a defeat. Larrea, who headed the ‘Esta Vez No' (‘This time no') campaign, said that the referendum had weakened the government and compromised its mandate to push through reform.

Pointer: The four questions on which the government has clearly won are the first two (which, taken together, would end automatic release of suspects accused of serious crimes from prison after 12 months if they have not been convicted); question six (which calls for a new criminal category of ‘non-justified enrichment') and question 10, which would have criminalised employers who fail to make social security payments.

The knee-jerk reaction to President Vicente Fox's cabinet changes was 'too little, too late'. That was missing the point: Fox is working with his own agenda, not that of the opposition. 

On 29 July Fox announced two cabinet changes. He moved Rodolfo Elizondo, hitherto his spokesman, to the tourism ministry, replacing Leticia Navarro, who resigned saying she wanted to return to private activity. He then appointed Alfonso Durazo, hitherto his private secretary, to Elizondo's position - with a twist: he also expanded Durazo's role, so that he is not only his private secretary and spokesman, but also head of the presidency's social communications area and coordinator of the information offices of all government agencies. In other words, Durazo has become the government's information czar. 

Reactions with a subtext 

The influential columnist Manuel Jáuregui sentenced, 'The cabinet changes, if that is what they can be called, come late and, moreover, are insufficient.' The opposition Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which had been clamouring for a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle as a public recognition by the government of the adverse verdict it had received from voters in the midterm legislative elections (WR-03-26), downplayed the importance of the changes in similar terms. Party spokesman Carlos Jiménez said, 'The President really took a long time to react to the message sent by the voters in the last election. We think the decision should have been taken immediately, and should have gone much deeper.' 

The President's own Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) was visibly cool towards the reshuffle. PAN chairman Luis Felipe Bravo Mena confined himself to saying, 'I think that if the President has considered these changes opportune, they will be positive, and we hope they will be for the good of service to the country and the efficiency and efficacy of the government.' Translated, this means that he suspects the changes will not do any such thing, at least as the PAN understands them. 

The reason for this was hinted at by newly elected PAN congressman Federico Doring. 'Durazo cannot be considered a panista,' he said. Indeed, for 27 long years Durazo was a member of the PRI - whereas Elizondo, shunted away from the centre of power, has been a loyal panista for the last two decades. In the same vein as Doring, Javier Livas - a member of the Amigos de Fox, the organisation that raised funds for the President's campaign - suggested that the concentration of so much power in Durazo's hands will be negative. 'The problems,' he said, 'far from being solved, will stagnate, because absolute power corrupts absolutely.' 

What appears to be happening is that Fox is preparing the ground for his wife, Marta Sahagún, to mount her bid for the presidency in 2006, a prospect which does not particularly please the PAN. In this light, the changes make sense: with Elizondo's removal, panista influence over the President diminishes; with Durazo in control of the government's information output, a formidable propaganda machine is placed at Marta Sahagún's disposal.

It is not often that one finds Colombians suggesting that they should emulate Bolivia, but that is precisely what Camilo González Posso, candidate to the governorship of Cauca and former health minister, is recommending regarding his department's coca plantations. He wants to industrialise the coca leaf, much as Bolivia does with its legal `traditional-use' plantations of the Yungas. This, he says, would provide a good living for Cauca's Páez and Guambiano indigenous peoples, who form a substantial segment of the local population.

Report by the official human rights commission catalogues shortcomings ranging from the careless to the illegal.

The `case' of the Ciudad Juárez women's murders [WR-03-43] has been taken a step further with the release of a report by the national human rights commission (CNDH), based on a review of 62,000 pages of related files and 650 interviews. What has attracted most attention is its condemnation of police mishandling of the investigations.

The shortcomings identified by the CNDH range from simple carelessness, through sloppy investigative procedures to the use of torture and forged evidence. CNDH spokesman Federico Gómez makes the point that the report `provides evidence of everything said so far by international and local groups regarding negligence and carelessness in the conduct of the investigations.'

The report does not, however, corroborate the claims that patterns common to many of the 263-290 murders point to the work of one or more serial killers. The one crucial common feature in such a pattern would be evidence of rape or serious sexual assault. This, according to the special prosecutor for women's crimes, applies to 76 cases; according to the most active Mexican NGO in this matter, Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa (NHRC), to 95.

Questions are beginning to be raised about the role of the special commissioner appointed by President Vicente Fox, Guadalupe Morfí­n [WR-03-41]. It now appears that she will not have access to the dossiers on the investigations into the Juárez murders. The local bureau of the chief prosecutor's office said that Morfí­n's job was one `of coordination, not investigation' — and focused chiefly on devising preventive measures so that no further crimes of the same kind occur in the future.

The past is beginning to catch up with those responsible for Mexico's dirty war. On 19 February the chief prosecutor's office (PGR) announced the arrest of Miguel Nazar Haro, who had been head of the Dirección General de Seguridad (DGS, secret police) in the 1970s, wanted in connection with the April 1975 `disappearance' of leftwing activist Jesús Piedra Ibarra.

An arrest warrant for Nazar had been issued two months ago, after the supreme court had ruled that `disappearances' are deemed `continuing' crimes until the persons abducted, or their bodies, are produced. Still on the run are two others facing charges for Piedra Ibarra's `disappearance': Luis de la Barreda (another DGS chief) and Juventino Romero (former officer in the police of Nuevo León state).

The big question is whether the prosecution will also press charges against former President Luis Echeverrí­a (1970-76). The office of the special prosecutor for `social and political movements of the past' (FEMSPP) has determined that in the 1970s the chief of the DGS reported directly to the President on all actions targeting political dissidents. PGR head Rafael Macedo has dodged this issue, saying that it is entirely up to the FEMSPP. The mother of the victim, rights activist and former presidential candidate Rosario Ibarra, said of Nazar's arrest, `In this country it is one thing to arrest a person, and quite another to get full justice.'

ARGENTINA | New taxes to fund energy rescue. The government has announced a series of increases in taxes on exports of oil and gas, plus the introduction of a new tax on refined fuels, in order to fund a scheme to rescue Argentina from its current energy squeeze. Exports of crude will now pay 25% (up five points) and those of liquefied gas, 20% (up 15 points). Exports of fuels, hitherto untaxed, will pay 5%. President Néstor Kirchner described this as `an act of justice' since the crisis was due to the energy companies `preferring to export [in the 1990s] rather than invest, because it was more profitable'.

 

The five-year energy plan has been costed at US$3.8bn. In the very short term, it covers buying 4m cubic metres of gas a day from Bolivia for six months; 8m barrels of oil from Venezuela in May-October; and 500 MWh of electricity from Brazil in June-November.

For the longer run, it envisages increasing generating capacity, enlarging the Argentine-Paraguayan Yacyretá hydro complex and completing by 2009 the Atucha II nuclear power plant. The plan also includes the creation of a new energy company, Enarsa, which will be 65% state-owned (53% federal, 12% provincial), with the rest floated on the Buenos Aires stockmarket.

The umbrella industrialists' association, UIA, calculates that the energy crisis could cause losses of up to US$3bn. Provincial government's are up in arms over what they consider a haphazard system of power rationing imposed by the federal authorities. The province of Neuquén is seeking compensation through the courts.

BRAZIL | Push to raise oil output. The state oil company, Petrobrás, has announced that it will be raising production from the current 1.6m barrels per day to 1.8m bpd by the end of 2005, on the strength of projects currently under way. The company has seen its production fall by 1% due to technical difficulties in the first quarter (though it is still up 2% on the same period last year) and its profits fall in that period due to a combination of adverse factors. The first-quarter decline in output forced Brazil to imports 491,000bpd, or 35% more than a year earlier. Its exports were down 27%, adding to the adverse impact.

COLOMBIA | Growth forecast upgraded. The government has slightly upgraded its economic growth forecast for this year, from 3.8% to 4% (2.2% per capita). The planning department (DNP) has underlined that the expected rate is well above the 2.4% average recorded in the past four years. DNP director Santiago Montenegro said, 'We want to grow at 5%-6%, but prefer to be cautious, so we are keeping the target for next year at 4% despite the fact that we see a better horizon due to the FTA [with the US] and the inherent dynamics of the productive sectors'.

 

COLOMBIA | Decentralisation 'now viable'. Thanks to the fiscal adjustment carried out in the departments and municipalities over the past three years, the decentralisation introduced in the 1991 constitution is now a viable proposition, says the DNP in a review of fiscal performance in 2000-03. The DNP says there is still plenty of leeway to improve revenues at municipal level, since taxes on real estate, currently at 0.3%, could be raised to 1.6%. The departmental blackspot is Chocó, which borders Panama, where the central government must transfer three times as many resources as the average for the rest of the country.

VENEZUELA | Taxes slashed to encourage growth. Last week the Venezuelan national assembly speedily approved a reduction in the rate of the value-added tax (IVA) from 16% to 15%, as had been requested by the government. The move will cost Bs347bn (US$181m) in lost receipts, but the government expects this to be recovered via the growth it will stimulate. Tax receipts in the first half of the year totalled US$5.16bn, twice as much as in the same period of 2003. The IVA is the highest-yielding tax, accounting for just over 60% of total tax receipts.

President Hugo Chávez has announced that he will soon send to the assembly another tax-cutting bill. This one will do away with the 1% tax on business assets. These initiatives have been linked by many commentators with the impending referendum on Chávez 's permanence in office.

Local currency per US$1
COUNTRY	CURRENCY	Year ago	Previous	Current
		02.01.04	15.10.04	22.10.04
Argentina	peso	2.95	2.98	2.97
Barbados	dollar	2.00	2.00	2.00
Belize	dollar	2.00	2.00	2.00
Bolivia	boliviano	7.86	8.02	8.02
Brazil	real	2.87	2.85	2.87
Chile	peso	588.00	609.00	608.00
Colombia	peso	2,779.08	2,549.01	2,555.26
Costa Rica	colón	418.74	449.61	450.22
Cuba	peso	1.00	1.00	1.00
Dominican Rep.	peso	35.00	32.79	32.92
Ecuador	dollar	1.00	1.00	1.00
El Salvador	colón	8.75	8.75	8.75
Grenada	EC dollar	2.70	2.70	2.70
Guatemala	quetzal	8.03	7.84	7.81
Guyana	dollar	180.50	_	_
Haiti	gourde	28.00	_	_
Honduras	lempira	17.97	18.60	18.62
Jamaica	dollar	48.70	_	_
Mexico	nuevo peso	11.17	11.40	11.45
Nicaragua	córdoba oro	15.75	16.23	16.24
Panama	balboa	1.00	1.00	1.00
Paraguay	guaraní­	6,100.00	6,000.00	6,040.00
Peru	nuevo sol	3.48	3.31	3.31
Suriname	guilder	2,178.50	_	_
Trinidad & Tobago	dollar	6.07	_	_
Uruguay	nuevo peso	29.80	27.10	26.85
Venezuela	bolí­var	1,600.00	1,917.60	1,917.60
Sources: EFE; Bank of America.

TOURISM | Steady growth in 2004. Mexico's earnings from tourism in January-November last year reached US$9.68bn, or 14% more than in the comparable period of 2003. This was the result of a 10.4% increase in the number of visitors, to 18.2m, who spent on average US$678 each, 4.5% more than in the previous year.

Tourism is Mexico's third-biggest source of hard currency, after oil exports and remittances by expatriates.

INVESTMENT | Accelerating towards year-end. Gross fixed investment in the first 10 months of 2004 was up 6.3% on the same period of 2003, and with an upturn in October. Investment in machinery and equipment (an indicator of preparation for future expansion) was up 7.7% - with imported equipment up 10%.

GROWTH | Industry clocks under-average growth. Industrial activity in November was up 0.24% on October, taking the 11-month total to a level 3.9% higher than that of the same period in 2003. Though this was lower than the 4.5% growth estimated for the economy as a whole, November marked the 12th successive month of expansion. In November construction recorded 5.3% year-on-year growth, manufacturing 3.9%, mining 3.2%, and electricity, gas and water, 1.9%.

AUTO INDUSTRY | Home sales up, output and exports down. Last year sales of cars on the domestic market reached an unprecedented 10.9m, 12% more than in 2003. Production, however, was down by 2.2% to 1.5m units, and exports by 6.5% to just over 1m.

“The trend is clearly towards the improverishment of Paraguayan society."

Guillermo Stanley, president of Paraguay's association of industrialists, presenting a study on the country's inability to benefit from its membership of Mercosur.

“There is no leader of the opposition."

Eduardo Duhalde, former president of Argentina, sidestepping calls for him to assume that role.

“They can't go on eternally dependent on the national treasury [or] on social assistance. It is necessary for the settlements to emancipate themselves."

José Dirceu, Brazil's presidential chief of staff, on the settlements of landless peasants under the agrarian reform programme.

As this issue is going to press, the political committee of the opposition Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) will be holding a crucial meeting to determine who will take over the reins of the party when the current leader, Roberto Madrazo, steps down to seek nomination as the PRI's presidential candidate. According to the statutes, it should be Secretary-General Elba Esther Gordillo, Madrazo's arch-enemy. The Madrazo camp wants to avoid this at all costs, as it means allowing her to preside over the candidate selection process.

Not surprisingly, the madracistas have been racking their brains trying to find ways around the statutes. Some are hoping Gordillo will not turn up at the meeting, so they can argue that she cannot be elevated in absentia to the presidency. Many more, accepting the inevitable, hope to limit Gordillo's tenure, underlining that the statutes oblige her to call for leadership elections within 60 days. This would at least give the madracistas - confident that they will get their man nominated in any case - control of the party during the election campaign.

The pro-Gordillo camp argues that she must stay on as party president until after the 2006 elections because another clause in the statutes bans any change in the leadership during an electoral process, and this is deemed to begin the moment the PRI decides on the manner in which its candidate will be selected. This step has already been taken by the political committee: it will be an 'open consultation' with party members and sympathisers (mechanics yet to be defined).

Actually, Gordillo accession to the presidency would not give her overarching power. To start with, the political committee is likely to appoint as her successor in the post of secretary-general a staunch madracista, José Ramón Martell, currently the party's organisation secretary. This leaves the pro-Madrazo camp in control of much of the party machinery.

Those who want to confine Gordillo to a 60-day tenure are hardly united. Several among them want to be the next party president. Manuel Angel Núñez , former governor of Hidalgo, is much mentioned, but there is also talk of tempting former Tamaulipas governor Tomás Yarrington, as a means of breaking the unity of the anti-Madrazo 'barons' of Unidad Democrática. There is even talk of congressman Emilio Chuayffet setting aside his plan to run for the senate if he is assured the top job. Manlio Fabio Beltrones, at one point cited as an aspirant, may instead become Madrazo's campaign manager.

In the PRD
While the nomination process in the PRI remains cloudy, in the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) it was greatly simplified last week when party co-founder Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas announced that he was withdrawing from the contest for the nomination. This leaves Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador as the sole, unopposed aspirant - virtually already the PRD's presidential candidate. 

The only doubt left is what Cárdenas meant when he vowed to remain active in politics: he could yet detract from López Obrador's chances if he were to adopt a 'principled' leftwing stance against him.