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Development: On 17 March Argentina's largest labour union, Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), announced   a general strike beginning 21 March.
 
Significance: The CGT called the strike a day after it was revealed that Argentine authorities had received a formal request from Switzerland's public ministry to provide information on judicial cases against the CGT's secretary general, Hugo Moyano and his son Pablo Moyano.

Moyano, a powerful political ally of former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), and president of the ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) in Buenos Aires province, has fallen out of favour with the ruling Frente Para la Victoria (FPV) faction of the PJ led by President Cristina Fernández, amid corruption allegations. The request submitted by the Swiss authorities is in relation to a money laundering case, involving a refuse collection company, Covelia, with a Swiss bank account linked to Moyano.  
 
Key points:
 
Moyano is currently being investigated in Argentina by Federal judges Norberto Oyarbide and Claudio Bonadí­o, for his alleged involvement in the so-called 'medicines mafia' case. He denies his involvement and argues that his political enemies in government are behind the latest accusations. According to Moyano, Judge Oyarbide, who is also investigating President Fernández's former superintendent of health services, Héctor Capaccioli, for misappropriation of public funds, answers to the opposing faction of the PJ.

The CGT's press secretary Eduardo Altamirano was clear: “We are tired of so many lies. We are tired of this mediatic war against comrade Hugo Moyano. We are tired of all these false accusations.   And that is why will launch a national wide strike". According to Altamirano, it is “no coincidence" that these accusations emerged just before talks on a new minimum wage are set to begin. Asked about the state of relations between the CGT and the government, Altamirano answered, “for now it is fine, but no one will convince us to stop this".

Worryingly, Altamirano also referred to the local media and their role in exposing the cases brought against Moyano, “if they continue publishing we are going to go to their doors_with a thousand, ten thousand, twenty thousand comrades, as many as required" he warned.

Development: On 9 May a Guatemala City court acquitted former president Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) on charges of embezzling US$15m in defence funds during his 2000-2004 term of office.

Significance: The acquittal is a major disappointment for the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity (Cicig) which had been heavily involved in efforts to bring Portillo to justice. However, the court's ruling does not mean Portillo walks free. He will remain in prison pending a US extradition request on money laundering charges.

Key points:
The court voted two to one to absolve Portillo, along with his former defence minister, Eduardo Arévalo Lacs, and former finance minister Manuel Maza Castellanos. As well as dismissing as “insufficient" the evidence provided by the attorney general's office (MP), the court also rejected testimonies from two key witnesses provided by the MP and Cicig on the grounds that they were “fraudulent". The witnesses were José Armando Llort Quiteño and Salomón Abraham Molina Girón, a former director and deputy financial director of the national mortgage bank Crédito Hipotecario Nacional (CHN).

Attorney general, Claudia Paz y Paz has said she will appeal the verdict while Cicig has yet to comment.

While Arévalo and Maza will be released, Portillo remains in prison after a local appeals court rejected his plea on 30 April against an extradition request from the US in relation to money laundering charges first announced in January 2010.

Guatemala has yet to convict any of former president charged with corruption and other crimes: those accused include Romeo Lucas (1978-1982), who recently died in exile in Venezuela, and Jorge Serrano (1990-1993), who is in Panama.

Taiwan's key band of supporters in Latin America is dwindling. In mid June Guatemala announced that it would establish commercial relations with China. Guatemala stressed that it did not want to break with Taiwan, but China has a habit of forcing small countries to choose between it and Taiwan.

The Guatemalan vice-president, Eduardo Stein, announced the mission but instead of leading as he said he would, he sent the finance minister, Marcio Cuevas. The mission arrived in Beijing on 20 June. The Guatemalans say that China will shortly open an "office" in Guatemala City. Stein said, before he left for Beijing, that Guatemala did not want to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Guatemala is currently negotiating a free-trade deal with Taiwan. The Taiwanese expect President Oscar Berger to visit Taipei in August to sign the deal. The Guatemalan foreign minister, Jorge Briz, claimed that Guatemala would not sacrifice diplomatic relations with Taiwan for the chance of more trade with China. Beijing made it clear, however, that Guatemala will have to break with Taipei if its wants to do more trade with mainland China.

The Chinese foreign ministry said that it understood that Guatemala wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Taiwan is putting a brave face on Guatemala's defection. It denied that relations between the two countries had cooled because of Guatemala's overture to Beijing. Taiwan and Guatemala have had diplomatic relations for 70 years. Taiwan said that it accepted that the Guatemalan government only intends to try to boost trade with the People's Republic and that diplomatic relations between Guatemala and Taiwan should not be affected. 

Guatemala is interested in exporting raw materials and food to China. In 2004 Guatemala reckoned that it shipped US$20m worth of goods to China through third parties. It said initially that it had imported US$104m worth of stuff from China. When Cuevas arrived in Beijing the trade figures suddenly increased dramatically. The official line, from both the Guatemalans and the Chinese was that trade between the two countries has increased by 42% in 2004 and was now worth US$436m. 

Guatemala's exports to Taiwan were worth US$1.6m in 2004. Its imports from Taiwan came to US$125m. Over half of the 26 countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan are Latin American. 

St Kitts & Nevis: Taiwan's president, Chen Shui-bian, hopes to visit another of his country's faltering allies in September. He announced this intention while receiving the prime minister of the islands, Denzil Douglas, in his office in Taipei. St Kitts & Nevis has had diplomatic relations with Taipei for 22 years, but no Taiwanese president has yet paid a visit. St Kitts & Nevis has yet to establish an embassy in Taipei.

Haiti: The mandate for the UN's stabilisation force in the country ended on 1 June. Initially, the UN Security Council was only able to agree to extend for a further 24 days; China pushed hard for an extension of only six months, while the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, and Haiti wanted the mission extended for a full year. On 22 June the mandate was extended by eight months, to 1 February 2006. UN diplomats said that China was throwing its weight around at the UN Security Council in order to weaken Haiti's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China is particularly annoyed that President Alexandre Boniface is planning to visit Taipei in July. Taiwan is heavily involved in development projects in Haiti and paid for the work on the national stadium in Port-au-Prince which was then used for a soccer match involving Brazil. The prime minister, Gerard Latortue, is offering to visit Beijing before the first round of this year's scheduled elections in October, but is refusing to cancel Boniface's trip to Taipei. 

China has sent two detachments of policemen to serve with the Minustah force of UN peacekeepers. China is planning to send a third detachment for the municipal elections due in October and it will remain for legislative and presidential elections in November and December. 

VENEZUELA: US walks a narrow course

US IN LATIN AMERICA: More involvement wanted in Bush II

FREE TRADE: Agreements almost reached

BRAZIL: Seeks to free itself of dependency on US trade

CUBA: Rice reaffirms US interest in peaceful transition to democracy

VENEZUELA
The US Secretary of State elect, Condoleezza Rice, illustrated the dilemma of US relations with Venezuela during her confirmation hearings on 18 January in front of the senate foreign relations committee. Her words about Venezuela were harsh, but they did not promise any action. The senate foreign relations committee itself is alarmed by the threat that Venezuela may switch its oil exports away from the US.

Rice said that the way the government of President Hugo Chávez acted was "unacceptable". She accused the Chávez government of interfering in the affairs of other countries in the region. She added that she was unhappy at Chávez 's continuing friendship with President Fidel Castro of Cuba. All in all, she concluded, "I think that currently we should regard the Venezuelan government as a negative force in the region. Negative because of the effects it has on its neighbours; negative because of its closeness to the only non-democratic country in the region [Cuba] and negative because of what it is doing in its own country, suppressing the opposition." She added that the issue of US-Venezuelan relations was "very, very delicate."

On the other hand, Rice specifically recognised that Chávez was democratically elected "even though he governs in way that is hardly democratic, for the steps he has taken against the media and the opposition. The [situation] is very worrying." The senators themselves confessed to a range of concerns about Venezuela, which each month vies with Saudi Arabia as the US third-biggest oil supplier. Venezuela provides about 15% of the oil the US imports every day. Senator Mel Martí­nez, a Republican from Florida, said that he was worried about an arms race developing in the region following President Chávez 's trip to Russia during which he spent, according to the senator, US$5bn on weapons. Bill Nelson, a Democrat, who has travelled to Venezuela several times in the past 18 months, most recently between 8 and 10 January 2005, advised the administration to diversify away from Venezuelan oil.

Richard Lugar, the chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, echoed Nelson saying that the US should draw up contingency plans. On 14 January, Lugar was reported in the 'Financial Times' to have commissioned a report from the Government Accountability Office to look at the impact on the US of the loss of Venezuelan oil supplies. One problem Venezuela faces in diversifying its oil markets is geographic. During his Christmas visit to China President Chávez spoke of increasing exports there, but getting oil across the Pacific poses a problem. One idea is to use the Colombian pipeline system. Another is to take the oil to Panama and then use the transisthmian pipeline. An unnamed US official was quoted by the FT on 14 January as saying: "The US will not look favourably on Panama aiding Venezuela to sell its oil to a competitor of the US." Another problem Venezuela faces in diversifying its oil markets is that its oil is heavy, with a high sulphur content. Chinese oil refineries are used to dealing with lighter oil.

Two senators on the foreign relations committee took a pro-Chávez line: Christopher Dodd, who travelled to Venezuela with Nelson at the beginning of 2005 reported that "even President Chávez wanted to have better relations with the US." Dodd noted that in some countries criticising the US played well domestically. Dodd was supported by a Republican, Lincoln Chafee, who accompanied Nelson and Dodd on their recent trip. Chafee said that other countries did other unconstructive things, but the US should "recognise that the Venezuelans have made their decision and we should respect this."

US IN LATIN AMERICA
Two US senators sitting on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are making a concerted effort to get Latin America back on to Washington's foreign-policy agenda. "The United States has been all too absent in Latin America, and I think we can energize that," Mel Martinez, a Republican senator for Florida said. "We only have a few countries in Latin America where we have Peace Corps volunteers. That's one of the best programs where Americans go as ambassadors. It all has to start with a commitment," Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat from Florida, said. He said he would bring the issue up this week during Senate confirmation hearings for Condoleezza Rice. Nelson said that the way to get Latin America recognised by the Bush administration as an important region was to talk about security. "Where there is poverty, where there is a lack of enforcement of the law, where there is corruption, where there is not the enhancement of the rule of law, terrorism will incubate," he said. Nelson visited the tri-border area between Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina last week. The first Bush administration registered concern that the area was being used to raise funds for terrorist groups.

FREE TRADE
The US and Panama will hold an eighth round of trade negotiations between 23 and 31 January in Washington after the seventh 'final' round proved to be inconclusive. No agreement was reached in the seventh round on market access for sensitive agricultural products, such as poultry, pork, beef, dairy, corn and rice. Panama is also sensitive about potatoes and onions while the US is concerned about protecting its sugar industry. Unsurprisingly, government procurement issues relating to the Panama Canal Authority are highly sensitive. Separately, the free trade agreement between the US and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru will head into a penultimate round in Cartagena, Colombia on 7 February. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 18 January, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said that she wanted to see the free trade agreements with Central America and the Dominican Republic (Cafta) and with the Andean countries sent to congress and approved as soon as possible.

BRAZIL
President Lula da Silva said to journalists on 18 January that Brazil was not 'at odds' with the US over its search for new trade partners. According to Lula, that 'would be like tearing a US$100 note'. The president, however, defended the government's policy of establishing alternative trade partnerships with developing nations 'to show Brazil is not as dependent as [the US] had imagined'. Meanwhile, the future US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rica, said Brazil was a 'great partner of the US'. Rice was answering questions posed by the US senate foreign relations committee regarding the Bush administration's plans for Latin America during the next four-year term. According to Rice, the US will continue to work with Brazil as co-president in the FTAA negotiations. Rice said Brazil was 'key' for the future of the region.

CUBA
In her testimony to the US senate foreign relations committee, Condoleezza Rice said that the US government was committed to a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba and would be paying close attention to this issue. "The only empty seat at the OAS is Cuba's," said Rice, referring to Cuba's ejection from that body in 1962. The secretary of state elect said that the Castro regime fought to prevent the Cuban people from gaining access to information and that consequently the second Bush administration would be committed to supporting and amplifying TV and radio broadcasts directed towards Cuba, such as those provided by 'Comando Solo', the aircraft service that flies near the island, on the edge of American airspace, transmitting anti-Castro information. "The day when the people of Cuba are finally free will be one of the greatest days for the Western hemisphere," Rice said.

Region: On 7 June the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, visited Lima, Peru, to attend the annual summit of the Organization of American States (OAS). At the summit, Clinton stated that the OAS “suffers from a proliferation of priorities and mandates that dilute its efforts, drain its budget, and diminish its capacity". She warned that the OAS needed greater focus or it could risk losing 60% of its annual budget of US$178m funded by the US. Clinton set a deadline of September 2011 for progress to be made on the implementation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC). In the US view, implementing the IADC would “tackle regional challenges and prevent crises before they arise".

Ecuador: On 8 June the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, paid her first visit to Ecuador. During the post-meeting press conference both President Rafael Correa and Clinton said that whilst there were many difference between the styles of their governments, the relationship between the two countries was set to improve. The agenda for the meeting included a longer extension of the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act (Atpdea), which eases access for Ecuadorean exports to the US. According to Ricardo Patiño, Ecuador's foreign minister, Clinton said that she would examine Ecuador's request for a four-year extension.

Region: After her 8 June summit with Ecuador's President Rafael Correa, Clinton gave a speech entitled "Opportunity in The Americas" setting out US policy towards Latin America. She began with compliments on Latin America's return to democracy and its successful economic management, which she said provided the basis for a new relationship. The US has four pillars for its relations with Latin America: (a) effective and accountable institutions of democratic governance; (b) security; (c) energy and climate change and; (d) equality. Her speech focused on this fourth pillar. Greater equality and fairness, she argued, would improve the region's economic performance and reduce poverty. She praised a host of Latin American governmental initiatives for reducing poverty. Her speech was an emphatic rejection of the 'trickle down' economic theory which argues that governments should not intervene in the economy and allow the markets to operate with utmost freedom; economic advancements in the top would then be expected to 'trickle down' towards the bottom. She noted that Brazil's high-tax, high-growth economic model was delivering results.

Bolivia: On 9 June President Evo Morales announced that a meeting had taken place between the Bolivian foreign minister, David Choquehuanca, and Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, during her trip to the OAS meeting in Lima on 7 June. The meeting was mediated by the Peruvian foreign minister, José Garcí­a Belaúnde. Choquehuanca claimed “positive advances" in the efforts to normalise relations between the US and Bolivia following the expulsion of the US ambassador from La Paz in September 2008. The Bolivian minister said he hoped this would be the first step, over the coming months, towards better diplomatic relations.

FRIDAY

Brazil: Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom will visit Brazil.

Bolivia: Brazil's foreign minister Celso Amorim will arrive in Bolivia to join diplomats from Colombia and Argentina mediating in the country's political crisis.

Argentina: Argentina's Minister of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation Lino Barañao, ends his visit to the UK.

Chile: Chilean President Michelle Bachelet will give a lecture at the London School of Economics (LSE) as part of her visit to the UK.

Region: The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) will hold its Annual Assembly in Miami (until 8 April).

Argentina: A Buenos Aires court will deliver its verdict on the first case in which a woman whose parents disappeared during military rule in Argentina (1976-83) wants her adoptive parents couple to be jailed for kidnap and concealment.

Colombia: The deputy United States Trade Representative, Susan Schwab, and a delegation of US Congress members will visit Colombia. They will meet President Álvaro Uribe, union representatives and business leaders to discuss the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between both countries.

SATURDAY

Paraguay: Deadline for publishing voting polls for the 20 April general elections.

SUNDAY

Chile: The Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile (PDC) will hold party leadership elections.

Region: A special meeting of the IADB governors will be held to present the representatives of Venezuela and Argentina.

TUESDAY

Costa Rica: President of El Salvador Tony Saca will meet his Costa Rican counterpart Oscar Arias.

The violent 'uprising' staged by the PCC in São Paulo in May, and its sequels, may have created the impression that the country's industrial hub is also its most violent area. The 'Map of Violence' just released by the federal security secretariat shows that nothing could be further from the truth: not only has São Paulo's murder rate been falling, but the state ranks as Brazil's fourth-least violent.

São Paulo is Brazil's most populous state. Last year it recorded 7,640 murders, down from 9,366 in 2004. In 2005 its murder rate was 18.9 per 100,000 inhabitants, less than a third of that of the most violent state, Rio de Janeiro (61.5) and considerably lower than the national average of 30 per 100,000.

Rio is followed in the murder league by Pernambuco (58.2), Paraná (57.4), and Goiás (46). It is worth mentioning that the number of murders in Rio also fell between 2004 and 2005, from 9,859 to 9,467. When the 'map' zooms in on individual municipalities, it is Camaragibe, in the metropolitan region of Recife, Pernambuco, that emerges as the lost violent, with a rate of 180.9 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. It is followed by Duque de Caxias, in Rio, with 120.7.

Countrywide, the number of murders rose from 54,696 in 2004 to 55,312 in 2005, a figure dramatised by the media by working out that it was tantamount to an average 150 murders per day — or, as put by the newspaper Correio Braziliense, that 'it exceeded the number of civilians exterminated in three years of war in Iraq.'

The security secretariat also reported that the number of drug-related crimes in Brazil rose by almost 6% in 2005, to 89,261, and that in that year, 'the chances of a Brazilian becoming a victim of robbery were 23 times greater than those of becoming a victim of murder.'

Violent crime: the two extremes Murders per 100,000 inhabitants, 2005
Most violent		Least violent
State	Rate	State	Rate
Rio de Janeiro	61.5	Piauí­	9.7
Pernambuco	58.2	Santa Catarina	11.5
Paraná	57.4	Minas Gerais	18.5
Goiás	46.0	São Paulo	18.9
Source: Mapa da Violencia.

President-elect Tabaré Vázquez revealed his full cabinet in early December. The big question was whether he would stick to his principles, appoint the best man for the job and break the mould of political patronage. There was a nod to independents but positions were predominantly apportioned to different factions of the ruling coalition Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA). 

Of the 13 posts in the cabinet, three went to Vázquez's own Partido Socialista (PS), two to the former Tupamaros, the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP), two to the Vertiente Artiguista faction (led by the incumbent mayor of Montevideo, Mariano Arana), and one each to the Alianza Progresista and Asamblea Uruguay.

The most interesting of Vázquez's final appointments are Azucena Berruti, who picks up the defence portfolio and Jorge Lepra, an independent who will be the new industry, energy and mining minister. Lepra, a former manager of Texaco for Uruguay and Paraguay, was a controversial choice among the more leftist elements of the EP-FA. Lepra is cut from the same cloth as Henrique Meirelles, a former FleetBoston executive, who was chosen by Brazil's President Lula da Silva as president of the central bank to appease the markets. Lepra's priority will be to reform the country's biggest company, the Administración Nacional de Combustible, Alcohol y Portland (Ancap). In December 2003, the Batlle government suffered a heavy defeat in a referendum on the privatisation of Ancap. 

Berruti, 75, will be the first woman to serve as defence minister. A human rights lawyer during the military dictatorship (1973-1985), Berruti has also served as secretary-general of the Intendency of Montevideo. Berruti said that she would concentrate on human rights and investigate the fate of the `disappeared', a comment that has not exactly allayed fears, stirred up in the press, that an EP-FA government might purge the armed forces. Berruti said she would hold talks with relatives of the disappeared and the military top brass. 'The president-elect knows all about my work in this sphere, my concerns and my efforts on behalf of relatives of the disappeared,' she said. The 1986 law (ratified by referendum) shields the military from prosecution for crimes committed while in power.

Vázquez's full cabinet
Danilo Astori*	Economy
Azucena Berrutti**	Defence
José Mujica***	Livestock, agriculture and fishing
Jose Diaz**	Interior
Jorge Lepra (independent)	Industry, energy and mining
Jorge Brovetto (independent)	Education
Reynaldo Gargano**	Foreign affairs
Eduardo Bonomi***	Labour and social security
Victor Rossi****	Transport and public works
María Julia Muñoz*****	Health
Héctor Lezcano****	Tourism
Mariano Arana*****	Housing, territorial planning and environment
* Asamblea Uruguay ** Partido Socialista *** Movimiento de Participacion Particular **** Alianza Progresista ***** Vertiente Artiguista

PEOPLE PROFILE is published every Tuesday and describes the professional background of key people emerging in the political and economic scenario.

Who is Tabaré Vázquez?
He is the leader of the leftist opposition coalition Frente Amplio de Uruguay, which includes under its umbrella Socialists, Communists, former tupamaro guerrillas, and independents. Vázquez is the presidential candidate of the Frente for the elections in October this year.

Why watch him?
The successive economic and financial crises borne by the Uruguayan government, in addition to contretemps with Brazil and Argentina, have strengthened the position of Vázquez ahead of the elections. Analysts predict that he will capitalise on the disastrous performance of incumbent President Jorge Batlle to win the elections after two previous failures. A Vázquez victory should result in a rapprochement with Brazil as Vázquez, with his willingness to question neoliberal policies, is far more in tune with Brazilian President Lula than is Batlle.

The file

Date of birth: 17 January 1940

Place of birth: Montevideo, Uruguay

Education: Graduated from medical school in December 1969. Specialised in oncology and radiotherapy. In 1985, he became a doctor of oncology and radiotherapy.

Public life: Married to María Auxiliadora Delgado, he has three sons, Ignacio, Alvaro and Javier. In the mid-1990s Vázquez became the first leftist mayor of Montevideo.

Timeline

1972-1985: Produces hundreds of articles for national and international medical publications.

1990: Frente Amplio chooses him to run as its candidate for mayor of Montevideo. He wins and takes over on 15 February 1990.

1994: Runs in presidential elections for the Frente. Loses out to Luis Alberto Lacalle.

1994-1996: Proclaimed president of the Frente Amplio and coalition partner Encuentro Progresista.

2000: Wins the first round of presidential elections but loses the second round to Jorge Batlle, when Uruguay’s traditional parties, the Blancos and the Colorados, form an alliance to keep him out of power.

2003: Nominated as presidential candidate for the third time.

February 2004: Vázquez is the frontrunner in all of the polls and widely tipped to win October’s elections, with the alliance of the Blancos and Colorados ruptured following the financial debacle in 2001.

Strong points:
Vázquez is widely respected in Latin America. In Uruguay he is admired for his practice of oncology, his unswerving loyalty to his political roots, and his stint as mayor of Montevideo. Like Brazil’s Lula, he has popular appeal but he is distrusted by the economic élite.

Weak points:
His two previous defeats count against him in the eyes of some Uruguayans, but then Lula lost three consecutive presidential contests before he came to power. The traditional parties say that the disparate composition of the Frente means that it will not be able to govern successfully. It has compared the Frente to Argentina’s failed ruling coalition Alianza (1999-2001), which collapsed after former President Fernando de la Rúa resigned in the face of a massive economic and financial crisis.

Prospects:
Vázquez should win the presidential elections. His main campaign support comes from President Batlle, whose mishandling of the economy and fractious relationships with Brazil and Argentina boost Vázquez’s chances by the day.

Patricia Isabel Rodas Baca, Honduras

Who is she? Rodas is the foreign minister of President Manuel Zelaya's toppled government. She was formerly head of the leadership committee of the ruling Partido Liberal (PL) one of the two traditional parties of the Honduras oligarchy. The other is the opposition Partido Nacional.

Why watch her? Rodas is Zelaya's righthand (wo)man and was instrumental in his increasing alignment with radical leftists such as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez . This move alienated the ruling elite and ultimately led to the 28 June ouster of Zelaya. Rodas was bundled out of the country along with Zelaya but went initially to Mexico, rather than Costa Rica.

Born: Honduras.

Education: Rodas claims to have a doctorate in history.

Public life:

Rodas is the youngest daughter of Margarita Baca Saravia, a Nicaraguan and Modesto Rodas Alvarado, a deceased Partido Liberal (PL) caudillo, known as the “Lion of Liberalism". She spent most of her childhood in Nicaragua and Costa Rica after her father, who had been picked by the PL to run in the 1963 presidential elections, was forced to leave the country after a coup d'etat led by Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano days before the election, which Modesto was expected to win. Following her father's death in 1979, she returned to Nicaragua to spend time with her mother and witnessed the Sandinista Revolution. Rodas's links with Nicaragua remain strong; she married a Sandinista, Rodolfo Gutiérrez and, on various occasions, has expressed admiration for Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega, participating in the recent 19 July celebrations commemorating 30 years of the Sandinista Revolution. Rodas has been an active member of the PL and in 2005, was picked to head the PL leadership committee, assembling a group known as the “Los Patricios" within the party, aimed at generating grass roots support - which met with suspicion from the PL's traditional elite. Rodas was named foreign minister in January 2009 following a minor cabinet reshuffle.

Timeline:

1963: Leaves Honduras with her family after her father is forced into exile.

1979: Witnesses firsthand the Sandinista revolution which saw the end of the Somoza dictatorship.

2003: Encourages presidential hopeful Manuel Zelaya to foment ties with Venezuela.

2005: Named head of the PL leadership committee (CCEPL) for a four year period.

December 2007: Government pursues deal with Venezuela to take advantage of the preferential terms provided to Caribbean countries under its Petrocaribe initiative (after idea was first mooted in 2005).

August 2008: Zelaya announces plans to join Alba.

January 2009: Named foreign minister following a cabinet reshuffle.

28 June 2009: Kidnapped by the military and taken to Mexico following the ouster of President Manuel Zelaya.

Strengths: Minimal, even though Rodas wields considerable influence over Zelaya. Her political fate is inextricably linked to that of Zelaya.

Weaknesses: Zelaya prospects are deteriorating thanks to his swaggering rhetoric and “reckless" behaviour. Although the coupsters have showed some signs of wavering, especially over the peace proposals drawn up by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, they have held together and show every sign of outmanoeuvring the Zelaya government. Zelaya and Rodas lack support from Honduras's main institutions - congress, the judiciary, the Roman Catholic Church; the local private sector, as well as the military. The common perception that Rodas is responsible for Zelaya's shift to the Left, which she has encouraged of late with her recent appearances with leaders such as Chávez and Ortega - has led to her vilification by the Right (who nickname her “Comandante Patty", leaving her the main target of anti-communist scaremongering.

Prospects: Bleak. She is almost certain to be a casualty of any government of national unity.

President Rafael Correa is no stranger to power clashes. He took on the national assembly when he came to power in 2007 and won. He is now taking on the judiciary. The conviction last week of six police officers involved in the infamous police mutiny on 30 September 2010 has been the catalyst for a remarkable internal judicial dispute. These are the first men to be found guilty of participation in what Correa insists was a coup attempt. Their convictions released months of latent tension over the Correa administration's sweeping judicial reform proposal, which was approved in a national referendum on 7 May [WR-11-19]. Correa is calling for a swift resolution of the "chaos".

The six police officers comprised the security detail for the national assembly. They were found guilty of conspiring against state security by preventing deputies from entering the building on 30 September last year, even using tear gas on the elected officials they were paid to protect, the government claimed. Five people have gone on trial in the last three months, including retired Major Fidel Araujo, an associate of former president Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005), the leader of the main opposition Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), which Correa alleges was behind the uprising, but they were all found innocent.

The president of the Consejo de la Judicatura (CJ), Benjamín Cevallos, reacted to the sentences by firing the judges who delivered them. The government immediately denounced the CJ as "corrupt and politicised" and claimed that its action underlined the need for the profound judicial reform envisaged in the referendum. The CJ accuses the government of seeking to wrest control of the judiciary. The referendum it should be noted allows for the creation of a three-member commission to assume the full powers of the CJ for 18 months. The main role of the CJ is to hire and fire judges. This commission, which will also reshape the CJ, will be dominated by the executive.

On his weekend broadcast Correa claimed that the partidocracia, his pejorative term for Ecuador's traditional political parties, was deliberately trying to delay the publication of the final results of May's referendum by lodging appeals with the electoral authorities. Correa argues they want to hold up the results in order to preserve the current CJ and the reigning state of impunity in the country's judicial system. He said this might provide time, for instance, for the trial of the leader of the right-of-centre Prian, Alvaro Noboa, the banana magnate, for tax evasion, to be completed. "Why else would Vicente Taiano (a Prian deputy) appeal against the (referendum) results?" he asked rhetorically. The opposition claims that after Correa conducts his judicial reform, he will ensure judges are appointed to carry out political persecution of rivals such as Noboa.

Shortly after Correa's broadcast, a young judge, Santiago Coba, announced that he was dismissing Cevallos for failing to reinstate a third judge, Juan Pablo Hernández, he had suspended without due process. The supreme court then replaced Cevallos as head of the CJ with his deputy, Hernán Jaramillo. Cevallos insisted his dismissal was illegal and that only the constitutional court could remove him: he filed two suits against Coba for defamation and perverting the course of justice. Even Correa expressed his bemusement that a regular judge was able to dismiss the president of the CJ, whose role it is to fire judges, "but this is another sign of the chaos in the justice system". There is no question that the myriad suits and countersuits underpin the state of flux in the justice system, before the referendum was approved and Correa's reform begins. The big question is whether the judiciary will be less "corrupt and politicised" post-reform.

Who is he? Adán Chávez is the elder brother of President Hugo Chávez (by just 15 months) and the governor of the Chávez family's home state, Barinas, in the western plains (‘los llanos') of Venezuela.

Why watch him? A former ambassador to Cuba (2004-2006), who then served a brief high profile stint as education minister, Adán Chávez had maintained a fairly low profile in recent years. But he has suddenly re-emerged front and centre amidst President Hugo Chávez's extended stay in a Cuban hospital, where, officially, he has been recovering since 10 June from emergency surgery to remove a pelvic abscess. After days of silence from the government, he was one of the first to put a timeline on the president's return to Venezuela, suggesting after a visit to his brother in Havana that he would be back within a fortnight. The president, he said, was recovering "satisfactorily".

Adán, whose radical left-wing ideology and early guerrilla activism against the government of the time is said to have attracted his disillusioned younger army officer brother Hugo in the late 1970s, has long been considered more of a hard-liner than his brother. He has previously been described as Hugo's ‘alter ego' or as the Bolivarian Revolution's Raúl Castro, the hard-line ideologue behind a charismatic and electorally magnetic younger brother. In the early days, Adán was Hugo's private secretary and a very close advisor, though in recent years their relationship has been the subject of some rumour.

Right-wingers in Venezuela are now enthusiastically peddling the notion that Adán could be lined up (or is perhaps lining himself up) to replace his ailing brother, who is due to bid for his third consecutive re-election in late 2012. According to these, Adán may first seek the vice-presidency, currently in the hands of the young ‘Chavista' Elías Jaua, who has risen rapidly through the ranks in the past two years to become the president's number two. Others have it that Jaua is part of Adán's complot. Both are said to be close to Cuba, fuelling this sort of gossip, (though it's also been suggested that the ever-pragmatic and calculating Cuban hierarchy is none too keen on either, trusting only Hugo Chávez). Caracas is heavy on hearsay and speculation but low on facts these days and there isn't a shred of evidence for any of these increasingly wild rumours.

However, Adán's curiously-timed (and rather sinister) recent comments (on 26 June) certainly won him further attention.  At a regional meeting (in Barinas) of the ruling Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV) he appeared to support armed battle as a legitimate tool of the Bolivarian Revolution, equating it with the ballot box.

"No one will stop the Bolivarian Revolution", he declared, before quoting Ernesto ‘Che' Guevara in noting that though the Revolution aimed to retain power via the electoral route, "it would be unforgivable to limit oneself only to the electoral and to forget other methods, including the armed battle, as a means to obtain power."

Hugo Chávez, though the leader of a failed coup d'état in 1992, was  subsequently elected president by a large majority (in late 1998) and has since sought to underline his democratic credentials, returning to the ballot box again and again since taking office in 1999 in an effort to legitimize his ‘21st Century Socialist Revolution'.

Hugo Chávez's unprecedented absence has created a very real leadership vacuum in Venezuela. The Venezuelan opposition has seized upon Adán's comments to warn of a dangerous power struggle in the PSUV.

Born: 11 April 1953.

Place of birth: Sabaneta, Barinas. Adán and his younger brother Hugo were sent at a young age by their impoverished parents, both teachers, to live with their grandmother in the state capital (Barinas), and were closely bonded by that experience.

Marital status: Married with two children, both children were university-educated in Cuba.

Education: A physicist. Previously tenured at Los Andes University (Mérida), he also taught mathematics at Universidad de los Llanos Occidentales Ezequiel Zamora (Unellez), Barinas and at a local secondary school, Albert Arvelo Torrealba, purportedly a cradle of the Venezuelan Left.

Public life: A radical from early on, Adán was first linked (aged just 16) to the Venezuelan Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), which was associated with the Chilean Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). As a university student, he was allegedly involved in clandestine activity as part of the radical left-wing Partido de la Revolución Venezolana, led by the prominent Venezuelan leftist, Douglas Bravo, who is often cited as the original source of the Bolivarian Revolution. Bravo sought a coup to topple the-then government with the help of sympathetic left-wing military officers. He also proposed the use of the country's oil wealth as a political weapon – hardly a new idea – but more notably, he also touted the idea of forging a new Venezuelan nationalism based on the ideas of the (Venezuelan) Latin American liberator, Simón Bolivar.  Bravo, it seems, first recruited Hugo Chávez, via Adán, in the early 1980s. (According to some biographical accounts, Hugo first joined the army to avail of its sports facilities/trainers, with the aim of becoming a professional baseball player; he only became politicized after taking part in army crackdowns against rebels in the countryside).

It's alleged that Adán continued background clandestine activities in support of the failed coup led by Hugo in 1992.

He was one of the founders of the PSUV, a broad umbrella party grouping together the various ‘Chavista' factions into one disciplined political output under the centralised control of the president.  Adán's stint as education minister coincided with the initial phase of more radical reforms to institutionalize socialism. He oversaw the controversial introduction of socialist ideology to the national schools' curriculum.

Timeline:

1999: Appointed private secretary to the newly elected President Hugo Chávez.

2004-2006: Ambassador to Cuba, where he fine-tuned Venezuela's generous cooperation agreements with Cuba.  Cuban advisors become more active in Caracas.

2007-2008: Education minister.

2008: Elected state governor of Barinas, taking over from Hugo Chávez senior, who had suffered a stroke. Another brother, Argenis, is the mayor of the state capital.

Strengths: Adán's credentials as a left-winger and his party roots are impeccable. He is loyal and discreet.

Weaknesses: He is a hard-liner and likely more polarizing, even within the PSUV, than his younger brother.  He has next to no political or electoral charisma and is an improbable 2012 presidential candidate should his brother be unable to stand.  The opposition would likely welcome him as an electoral rival. Although Hugo Chávez has stacked the military hierarchy with loyalists that seem every bit as hard-line as Adán – in November 2010, General Henry Rangel Silva caused ripples with a suggestion that the military would have trouble accepting an opposition government —, it's not entirely clear if Adán has the full support of the Venezuelan army.

Prospects: The government insists that President Chávez is recovering and will return to Caracas shortly. Opponents of the Chávez brothers have deliberately sought to play up Adán's ‘bid for power'.

Development: On 2 May, only 16 out of Haiti's 30 senators and 53 deputies (out of a total 99) sat for the inaugural session of the 49th legislature.

Significance: The incomplete state of the legislature -17 congress seats and 2 senate seats are still be contested with remaining legislators refusing to attend in protest at the final legislative results- points to ongoing electoral chaos and uncertainty caused by the provisional electoral council (CEP)'s last minute reversal of 19 legislative results. These gave the ruling Inité of outgoing President René Préval a much greater presence than the preliminary count suggested.

Key points:

• With the new president Michel Martelly due to take office on 14 May, there is no end in sight to the chaos in the legislature (in which his party, Repons Pezyizan, has a total of three seats). On 29 April the Organization of American States (OAS)-Caricom joint Electoral Observation Mission (JEOM) issued a statement recommending a return to the preliminary results after "analysis of the eighteen [sic.] cases of reversal of ranking of legislative candidates". The JEOM statement also blasted Haiti's national electoral complaints and challenges bureau (BCEN) saying its judges "did not display the necessary serenity and patience to draft their decisions with the thoroughness required… In general, the decisions merely proclaim the winner without setting out the arguments or the reasoning that led to the decision".

• This call by the OAS and the international community for the authorities to provide reasons for the reversals bears marked contrast to its willingness to turn a blind eye to the CEP's failure to provide any breakdown of the controversial 28 November first round results when, under heavy international pressure, it reversed its rankings of the second and third placed presidential contenders to give Martelly a place in the second round runoff at the expense of the Inité candidate, Jude Célestin.

• The chaos aside, the influence of the Inité in the legislature was confirmed with Inité Senator Rodolphe Joazile taking over the presidency of the senate and Deputy Sorel Jacinthe as leader of the lower house. While Préval's party looks set to retain 17 seats in the senate, it was granted 46 seats in the lower chamber according to final results, up from an initial 33 it was thought to have won.

% variation
Country	June	Last 12m	2002
Argentina	-0.1	10.2	41
Bolivia	0.2	3.23	2.45
Brazil	-0.7	26.94	26.41
Chile	0	3.6	2.8
Colombia	-0.05	7.21	6.99
Costa Rica	0.67	10.21	9.68
Ecuador	-0.21	7.61	9.36
El Salvador	-0.1	1.6	2.8
Guatemala	0.22	5.24	6.33
Honduras	0.3	8	8.1
Mexico	0.08	4.27	5.7
Paraguay	-1.5	15.7	14.6
Peru	-0.47	2.17	1.52
Uruguay	0.16	24.64	25.94
Venezuela	1.4	34.2	31.2
US	0.1	2.1	1.6

 

It would appear that Mexican voters do not believe that Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the opposition Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and Marta Sahagún, President Fox's wife, are in earnest about not running for the presidency in 2006 [WR-03-34]. An opinion survey conducted by Indemerc and released last week shows both of them still among the top three attractors of voting preferences. 

López Obrador still enjoys a substantial lead, with 27% of preferences. Second comes PRI leader Roberto Madrazo, with 12% - followed closely by Sahagún, with 10%. When set against his two closest rivals, in whichever combination, López Obrador scores twice as high as them. This said, 33.9% of the respondents said they would vote for the PRI, 30.5% for the PRD, and just under 30% for the PAN.

So what do they see in their choices? Those who picked López Obrador did so because he delivers on his promises (36%), is honest (32%) and works hard (25%). Madrazo is picked for his honesty (26%), hard work (19%) and qualifications (19%). Sahagún, because she is honest (22%) and helps the poor (16%). What do they want solved? Top of the list is unemployment (32%), followed by personal insecurity (21%) and corruption (12%).

Exchange rates
Local currency per US$1
COUNTRY	CURRENCY	Year ago	Previous	Current
		22.11.02	14.11.03	21.11.03
Argentina	peso	3.48	2.87	2.90
Barbados	dollar	2.00	2.00	2.00
Belize	dollar	2.00	2.00	2.00
Bolivia	boliviano	7.44	7.77	7.80
Brazil	real	3.56	2.93	2.92
Chile	peso	710.00	626.00	630.00
Colombia	peso	2,666.56	-2,666.56	2,831.15
Costa Rica	colón	374.93	413.81	414.98
Cuba	peso	1.00	1.00	1.00
Dominican Rep.	peso	20.81	39.24	40.95
Ecuador	dollar	1.00	1.00	1.00
El Salvador	colón	8.75	8.75	8.75
Grenada	EC dollar	2.70	2.70	2.70
Guatemala	quetzal	7.62	8.04	8.06
Honduras	lempira	17.01	17.77	17.90
Mexico	nuevo peso	10.22	11.10	11.28
Nicaragua	córdoba oro	14.58	15.47	15.65
Panama	balboa	1.00	1.00	1.00
Paraguay	guaraní­	6,680.00	6,150.00	6,160.00
Peru	nuevo sol	3.59	3.46	3.48
Uruguay	nuevo peso	28.50	28.23	29.65
Venezuela	bolí­var	1,350.00	1,600.00	1,600.00
Sources: EFE; Bank of America.

Inflation in the region
Country	Source	August	September	October	Last 12m	Jan-Dec 2002
Argentina	Indec	0.00	0.00	0.6	3.90	41.00
Bolivia	INE	0.64	0.23	1.25	4.35	2.45
Brazil	FGV	0.62	1.05	0.29	13.98	26.41
Chile	INE	0.20	0.20	-0.2	1.20	2.80
Colombia	Dane	0.31	0.22	0.06	6.58	6.99
Costa Rica	DGEC	0.70	0.13	1.17	8.91	9.68
Ecuador	Inec	0.06	0.73	0.01	6.86	9.36
El Salvador	Min.Ec.	0.30	0.10	0.31	2.30	2.80
Guatemala	BCG	0.28	0.42	_	5.68	6.33
Honduras	BCH	0.90	0.40	_	7.90	8.10
Mexico	Bco.Mx.	-0.07	0.60	0.37	3.96	5.70
Nicaragua	BCN	0.30	0.22	_	4.97	3.87
Paraguay	BCP	-0.20	0.20	2.1	9.90	14.60
Peru	INE	0.01	0.56	0.05	1.30	1.52
Uruguay	DGEC	1.16	0.80	0.52	11.14	25.94
Venezuela	BCV	1.30	1.30	1.5	25.70	31.20
US	DOL	0.40	0.30	_	2.30	1.60
Previous: WR-03-42

The stockmarket in figures
Market	Index	14.11.03	21.11.03	Variation (%)
Buenos Aires	Merval	932.21	945.02	1.37
São Paulo	Bovespa	18985.87	19248.39	1.38
Santiago	IPSA	1469.60	1414.19	-3.77
Bogotá	IGBC	2206.03	2230.71	1.12
San José	BCT	12276.09	12201.32	-0.61
Quito & Guayaquil	Interinvest	67.47	67.56	0.13
Mexico	BMV	8606.03	8335.12	-3.15
Lima	ISVBL	2111.67	2116.22	0.22
Caracas	BC	20811.72	20925.96	0.55
Source: Daily market reports.

Congress has given President Carlos Mesa a helping hand, rushing through the constitutional amendments that allow him to hold referendums on such matters as the future of Bolivia's gas, and to convoke a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. It is now expected that the referendum on the gas sector may be held as soon as May. The more complex election of a constituent assembly may be held in early 2005.

Political analyst Humberto Vacaflor, editor of the influential newsletter Siglo 21, writes, `The consensus, achieved around a proposal made by Mesa when he took office, ends the divorce between the executive, formed by officials who are independent of the traditional political parties, and the parliament, recently criticised because of the prominence of personages linked to the previous government.'

Not everyone was happy with the outcome, however. Former President Jaime Paz Zamora, leader of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) was conspicuously absent from the ceremony of promulgation of the amendments. So was Manfred Reyes Villa, leader of the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), an ally of the previous government.

End of party monopoly
Unusually chipper was Evo Morales, leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), who said that the day of the promulgation was of paramount importance, `because it ends the monopoly enjoyed by the political parties.' He added that he found in Mesa a president `more willing to engage in dialogue'.

Morales was alluding to the new text of Article 22, which says that `the representation of the people is exercised through the political parties and associations of citizens.' This is reinforced by Article 61, on the requisites for becoming a legislator, which says that the aspirant must be put forward `by a political party or directly by associations of citizens or indigenous peoples.'

Popular deliberation, previously confined to the three powers of the state, is now extended in Article 4 to the constituent assembly, citizens' legislative initiatives and the referendum.

Consensus on coca?
Mesa now has to try and forge another consensus — with the coca growers led by Evo Morales. He has agreed to hold talks with the coca growers in March, which means that by then he will have had to define his policy on eradication. His officials, following on from a decision taken by the previous government, have said the emphasis will be shifted from coca eradication to eliminating the traffic in drugs. Beyond indicating that total eradication of coca (in excess of the 12,000 hectares of legal cultivation for traditional use) will no longer be pursued, this is too vague to satisfy the cocaleros. They want no more eradication in the Chapare region, and no attempt to eradicate `excess' coca in areas traditionally devoted to legal cultivation (chiefly the Yungas valleys).

The US government has let it be known that it is opposed to anything but the previous `zero coca' target. And even among Bolivians who do not favour this approach, the alternative of concentrating on the drug traffickers is not considered viable: success in this area, they note, would eliminate demand for coca and thus affect the livelihood of the cocaleros just as effectively as eradication, creating a new conflict.

The first of this year's long round of state elections, held in Yucatán on 16 May, came as a nasty shock to the opposition Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which had expected to wrest from the ruling Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), if not the governorship, at least many of its seats in the state legislature and the mayoralty of the state capital, Mérida. Instead, the PAN emerged as the clear winner.

Provisional results show that the PAN retained the governorship and the mayoralty of Mérida (home to 40% of Yucatán's electorate), and won 10 of the 15 congressional seats at stake, as well as 24 of the other 105 mayoralties in contest (four of them wrested from the PRI). This left the PRI with 80 municipal governments - mainly the smaller ones.

All told, the PRI appears to have lost about 12% of its previous electoral support. The Yucatán result also carried a message to the PRI about the relative appeal of its internal factions. Its defeated candidate for the mayoralty of Mérida, Ví­ctor Cervera (twice state governor, former congressman and senator, former agrarian reform minister), is representative of the old-guard `dinosaurs'. The Yucatán elections were also a disappointment to the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), which far from making substantial gains, ended up with only 9% of the statewide vote.

The outcome in Yucatán is noteworthy because it has not altered the existing overall balance of power, the most important feature of which is the PRI's control of 17 of Mexico's 32 states. Still to come this year are another 13 bouts of state and municipal elections [SR-04-01].

John Kerry has promised that, if elected, he will devote the first 120 days of his administration to reviewing all existing trade agreements to verify compliance with labour and environmental obligations. The Council for Hemispheric Affairs (Coha), which has constantly criticised the Bush administration for failing to ensure this, believes that little actual change can be expected.

Kerry said he would seek to 'ensure that trade partners are living up to their labor and environmental obligations and that trade agreements are enforceable and are balanced for American workers'. Coha, in an analysis pegged on the imminent (and long-delayed) freeing of US roads to Mexican trucks, says, 'If John Kerry wins in November, we should expect US trade policy to shift back to Clinton's rhetorical sympathies for the left, while simultaneously pushing to expand global trade to the pleasure of the Bush constituency.' Coha notes an irony in Kerry's pledge: 'Kerry's primary concern is ostensibly that US trading partners are not living up to their commitments, while in fact the US has also flagrantly violated Nafta provisions concerning Mexican truckers for the past four years.'

Its conclusion regarding Kerry's promised review is partly based on precedent. For example, it recalls that when he was on the campaign trail, Canada's Jean Chrétien (prime minister from 1993 to 2003) pledged to renegotiate NAFTA in order to protect Canada's cultural industries and limit the effects of the treaty's subsidy provisions. Indeed, he said that if prevented from renegotiating, he would abrogate the agreement. What happened was that Nafta went into effect in 1994 without any amendments from Canada.

Coha also recalls that Kerry has voted in favor of all free-trade agreements put before the US senate, though it admits that his campaign rhetoric has become increasingly protectionist in tone. 'It remains unclear,' says Coha, 'how Kerry will juggle the interests of labor and the environment - primary bastions of Democratic support - with his apparent commitment to furthering free trade. Clearly, however, like Clinton and Bush before him, Kerry is using Nafta to bolster his political standing among his supporters. The prosperity of Mexico's trucking industry and the US Nafta commitments remain little more than an afterthought to party politics.'

• Caveat on Mexican trucks. On the specific question of the imminent opening of US roads to Mexican trucks, Coha says that one thing still not reflected in US policy is a clear methodology to prevent an influx of contraband and immigrants across the border. It ventures, that, 'Because excessive inspection by US officials searching for drugs, illegal immigrants and various contraband shipments could be interpreted by a Nafta or World Trade Organization panel as a constraint of trade, such inspections cannot be counted on as a first line of defense.'
  
  The Bush administration, Coha notes, 'is understating the huge potential for such illegal shipments, particularly of drugs, as trucks could become the favored conveyance for introducing such illegal cargos to the US'. Several years ago, it recalls, when a trial period was introduced allowing Mexican trucks limited access to the US, the DEA charted a huge surge in drug shipments. More of the same, says Coha, is anticipated once the Nafta trucking provisions are fully implemented.
  
  Coha goes as far as to state that 'drug and human trafficking are expected to spike to unprecedented levels once the trucks begin to roll'.

COLOMBIA | Suing over the budget. Two opposition parties, the Partido Liberal (PL) and the Polo Democrático Independiente (PDI) have announced that they will file a suit before the constitutional court to block the implementation of next year's budget, approved last week just before the legal deadline. Their case is based on procedural, formal and substantial arguments - one of the latter being that a big portion of the revenues are far from secure. This is because they assume the approval of a fiscal reform that congress has not even started to debate.

The largest chunk of the US$33.8bn budget, just under 52%, goes to servicing the debt, recently the target of harsh criticism from the comptroller-general's office and an official consultative body. The next biggest portion, 17.2%, goes to pensions (following the government's takeover of the social security institute's commitments to its 605,000 beneficiaries). Defence gets just over 10%, education 6.6%.

Current revenues are expected to cover 43.5% of the outlays. Finance minister Alberto Carrasquilla has said that fuel prices will be raised by 25% to cover any shortfall - but mining & energy minister Luis Ernesto Mejí­a (responsible for setting such prices) has said that he does not know where that figure comes from.