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Even the organisation that collected signatures to endorse the petition for a referendum against Chávez admits that a large number were invalid. What the CNE, the national electoral council, has been turning up in the last week or so suggests that the irregularities may be far more than the opposition is willing to acknowledge — which might explain why the opposition wants to abbreviate the verification process.

Roberto Abdul, one of the directors of Súmate, the organisation that ran the signature collection drive between 28 November and 1 December, says that their own checks have turned up at least 265,000 invalid signatures (some duplicated, some from people not on the electoral roll, some containing `errors'). He argues, though, that this still leaves many more than necessary to meet the requirement of 2.4m valid signatures.

Catalogue of irregularities
What CNE officials say they have been finding over the past week casts doubts on this claim. Among the additional irregularities listed by CNE director Jorge Rodrí­guez are the substitution of what appeared to be elbow and fingertip prints for the required clear thumbprints, and sheet after petition sheet clearly filled in — with the exception of the signatures — by the same hand. Opposition spokesman have tried to explain this away by saying that these were cases when the petitioners were infirm or otherwise incapable of filling the forms. This did not quite jibe with the number of instances turned up by the verification teams: 35,000 and rising.

All told, the number of irregularities have forced the CNE to review about 90,000 petition sheets — with perhaps as many as 1m signatures, which could affect the outcome of the validation process, and consequently the celebration of the referendum.

The opposition has also deployed another argument: that the bulk of the objections are mere technicalities. As put by Abdul, `The excuses are banal, insignificant and unsupported by law.' This overlooks the fact that, for example, the rules laid down by the CNE demanded that each petition be filled in by the petitioner. Still, the CNE is not rushing to confirm President Hugo Chávez 's claim that the opposition committed a `mega-fraud' with the signatures. On 13 February, CNE director Oscar Battaglini said, `Up to now, we're not yet in a position to make a statement of that nature [...] If we effectively conclude that there was cheating, we will say so.'

Keeping tensions high
The observers of the Carter Center and the OAS, who have been urging both opposition and pro-government camps to remain calm and place their trust in the CNE, have confirmed neither the existence of fraud nor the alleged frivolity of the CNE's objections. Neither side seems willing to heed this. The opposition staged a protest march when the original deadline for the verification passed, last Friday, and continued to press for the process to be wrapped up quickly. It also urged OAS secretary-general César Gaviria to whip his observers into shape.

Chávez has engaged in almost non-stop ranting. He said the opposition protest had been no more than a cover for a US-backed coup attempt (somehow `foiled'), `discovered' that the opposition had been receiving funds from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and announced that if the CNE decision validated the call for a referendum, he would appeal to the supreme court.

Officials in the Mesa administration did not hide their relief at the collapse of the first breach of the truce granted by the social organisations that had taken part in last year's wave of protests. A strike last week by public transport workers was widely observed but made little impact, while an accompanying rally by the umbrella labour confederation, COB, fizzled out for lack of support.

The transport workers' strike was against two things: proposed increases in fuel prices (in a process designed to align them with world oil prices) and plans to force the conversion of vehicles to natural gas, a fuel which is super-abundant in Bolivia. There has been more than a sneaking suspicion that the strike was supported, if not engineered, by owners of transport firms. The action did bring public transport to a halt, but most activities seemed unaffected.

The COB's parallel action was seen as more significant politically, especially after the confederation had proclaimed its intention to `shut down congress' as a first step towards installing a new, more representative system of government. Its failure suggests that President Carlos Mesa's credit has not yet run out.

VENEZUELA | New `maximising' oil policy. Alí­ Rodrí­guez, president of the state oil company, PDVSA, announced last week that the firm would be trying to achieve an annual production level of more than 5m barrels of crude by 2009. The government claims that since mid-2003 it has recovered its pre-crisis production level of 3.1m bpd (though former PDVSA employees say that it only occasionally reaches peaks of about 2.6m bpd). In any case, the target set by Rodrí­guez appears to entail switching from the current policy of accompanying Opec's line of curbing output to maintain world prices, to one of seeking to maximise output.

Rodrí­guez said that achieving the new target would demand investments of about US$37bn, of which PDVSA would put up US$27bn, with the rest expected to come from foreign firms engaging in exploration and extraction in Venezuela.

COLOMBIA | Gearing up again for tax reform. Finance minister Alberto Carrasquilla has started preparing the ground for a new attempt to push through congress a sweeping tax reform. Last week he told bankers that the country had `not yet solved structurally its fiscal problem.' Crisis areas, he said, were pensions, where reserves to meet obligations `have run out', and the public debt, which rose from 23% of GDP in 1996 to 54% in 2002, and since then has only been brought down to 50.6%.

The executive has started discussions with the various blocs in congress, seeking to build a consensus around a reform package including: taxing pensions and eliminating special retirement schemes; lowering the rates of value-added and income taxes while extending the coverage of the former and removing exemptions to both; and doing away with `distorting' taxes such as those on assets and financial transactions, and stamp duty.

PERU | Fishing revenues on the rise. Last year Peru's earnings from exports of fish and seafood reached US$202m, or 22% more than in 2002. Sales of frozen products, which expanded by 16%, accounted for 75% of total earnings. Worth noting: China was the leading market, thanks mainly to its purchases of fishmeal and frozen pota (giant squid).

Friday the 13th would not be an unlucky day in most of Latin America, but Brazilians are as paraskevidekatriaphobics as the Nordic peoples, and superstitious members of the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), whose 24th anniversary fell last Friday, will have been confirmed in their phobia. That day their party, and its government, were hit by the second scandal involving shady financing to have emerged since end-2003.

The person directly involved was Waldomiro Diniz, the presidency's deputy chief of parliamentary affairs. The newsmagazine Epoca hit the streets with the transcript of a video-recorded conversation between him, in 2002, and Carlos Augusto Ramos (Carlinhos Cachoeira), reputedly one of the chief bankers in Rio of the popular illegal lottery known as jogo do bicho. Diniz was asking for money for the campaign of Gerardo Magela (PT) to the governorship of Brasí­lia. He promised Carlinhos that he would be rewarded with a contract with the government of Rio de Janeiro state, which raised the stakes from questionable solicitation to corruption.

At the time, Diniz was the manager of Rio's legal lottery, reporting to state governor Benedita da Silva (PT). According to Epoca, the funds from Carlinhos were also meant to finance the campaigns of da Silva's allies in the legislative elections held in October 2002. Come 2003, da Silva was appointed minister of social welfare in the government of President Lula da Silva, a post she held until the recent reshuffle [WR-04-04]. Diniz was taken to the Planalto palace by his mentor, José Dirceu, who was appointed Lula's chief of staff.

Diniz admitted to Epoca that he had received money from Carlinhos and delivered it to those managing the PT's gubernatorial campaign in Brasí­lia — but no more. Publication of the charges against him was swiftly followed by his dismissal and a formal request from Lula to the justice ministry to `clear up the episode thoroughly.'

Calling for more blood
The opposition was not satisfied (it is, after all, an electoral year). Artur Virgí­lio Carmo Riveira Neto, spokesman in the senate for the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), said, `President Lula's defensive attitude has somewhat disappointed me. I hope the pro-government legislators will support the establishment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry to investigate the charges.' Such a commission of inquiry, or CPI, would enjoy full powers to subpoena records and testimonies from anyone; it was a CPI that pursued corruption charges against President Fernando Collor de Melo, which led to his resignation to avoid impeachment. The government has already been dodging demands for a CPI to look into the shady PT funding allegations arising out of the reopening of a notorious two-year-old murder case (WR-04-05).

Senator Efraim Morais, of the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), takes matters further. `We hope,' he says, `that José Dirceu will also be dismissed, so that there may be an impartial investigation of the accusations.' Dirceu has also been targeted as the alleged controller of the PT slush fund cited in the call for the other CPI.

Hardline piqueteros have announced for this week a wave of protest marches and roadblocks, in another bid to persuade the government to reinstate some of the subsidies it eliminated in July last year. The government has said it will not tolerate any violent actions and will keep the highways clear — and has reiterated that the subsidy cuts were a legitimate response to abuses.

Last week the leaders of two of the most radical piquetero movements — Raúl Castells of the Movimiento Independiente de Jubilados y Desocupados (MIJD) and Gustavo Giménez of the Movimiento Sin Trabajo-Teresa Vive (MST-TV) — headed an occupation of the labour ministry and a seven-day hunger strike, accompanied outside by an encampment of followers that blocked all traffic along the Avenida Leandro Alem, one of the main thoroughfares of central Buenos Aires.

When they ended their action on Thursday 12, Castells proclaimed victory. `We have stopped the government in its tracks,' he said. `With this patriotic action, Kirchner's honeymoon with the people has come to an end.' He admitted, however, that there had been no contact with the government since the beginning of the hunger strike (the authorities had refused to negotiate while the ministry was occupied), and that the subsidies had not been reinstated.

Instead, what the government had done was to make public, in detail, the reasons behind the suspension since last July of 250,500 heads-of-family subsidies (out of a total 2m or so). What emerged was a picture of people continuing to collect the subsidy after having returned to work, and of households claiming more than the single authorised benefit.

What Castells was able to do was show that the radical wing of the piqueteros still had a substantial following. After leaving the labour ministry and lifting the encampment, the protesters staged a march through downtown Buenos Aires to congress, where the call for this week's protests was issued. The march, perhaps 2,000 strong, filled four city blocks. Though the event was mainly peaceful, it included a menacing twist: the reappearance of piqueteros with their faces masked, usually the sign of rioting to come.

Other groups
The radicals led by Castells were not the only piqueteros on the move on 13 February. The Bloque Piquetero Nacional staged its own march on congress, along a route carefully picked to avoid risky overlaps, to demand the repeal of the labour reform law (the government has negotiated a new version to replace the one approved during the de la Rúa administration, tainted by the senate bribery scandal).

A third group, the Movimiento Barrios de Pie (more sympathetic towards the Kirchner government), roamed the streets of the city conducting symbolic `people's embargoes' of US-owned firms, in response to the court actions taken in the US at the behest of holders of defaulted Argentine bonds. Their targets: Citibank, McDonald's, Shell and the Sheraton hotel.

Protests on the consumer front
The Kirchner government is also facing protest this week from irate consumer associations. Sixteen of them have joined forces to demand a reversal of the authorisation granted to power utilities to increase their rates by 15% to 35% — the first such increase since rates were frozen at the time of the devaluation in early 2002. This move had long been demanded by the IMF.

Though the government has authorised the increases for the bigger consumers, the protesting associations say that the text of the decree does not guarantee that small business and residential users will remain unaffected. This protest does not look likely to be taken to the streets right now. Instead, the organisers are talking about resorting to the courts.

The UN report on extrajudicial executions in Brazil was, if anything, harsher than special rapporteur Asma Jahangir had suggested during her fact-finding visit last year. It paints a picture of hundreds of such killings by police, mainly in the shantytowns, and of great reluctance of the judiciary to prosecute those responsible.

According to the report, Jahangir was `overwhelmed with information about human rights violations perpetrated by security forces, in particular the military police, in total impunity [and] appalled [...] by the overall situation of the population living in the [shantytowns], where innocent citizens are trapped in a cycle of violence fostered by heavily armed drugs gangs or indiscriminate repressive police operations.'

As a result of this, Jahangir found a widespread conviction that the police, at both federal and state level, were corrupt and untrustworthy — and enjoy impunity. The report notes that the prosecutors rarely proceed against police accused of wrongful killings, and that `the military justice system [applicable to the states' military police corps] is administered in a way to make conviction of police for violence against civilians almost impossible.'

The report recommends that the government arrange independent investigations of killings by police, suspending those accused from active duty, and strengthening witness protection so as to encourage more people to testify. It also calls for a reform of the judiciary and the strengthening of the prosecution services.

The governments of Chile and Bolivia (particularly the former) are making an effort to cool down the tension over the revival of Bolivia's oceanic access claims. On 16-17 February, Santiago became the venue for the resumption of regular bilateral meetings between deputy foreign ministers. Kept off the official agenda was Bolivia's core demand, but the Chileans were at pains to assure their visitors that their plans to privatise the port of Arica would in no way abrogate the 1904 treaty, which guarantees Bolivian goods free access to Chilean ports and storage facilities. 

(The Chileans are actually keen to underline the validity of that treaty: it is the instrument under which Bolivia ceded its coastal territory after the War of the Pacific in exchange for compensation, a railway and free access to Chilean ports).

The Bolivians are keen to raise another of their demands, namely, the payment of royalties by Chile for its use of the Silala river waters. Chile insists that as it is an international river, no royalties are due. Bolivia says the Silala is actually not a river at all, just a series of springs in the department of Potosí­ linked by canals that have been carrying water to Chile since 1904. Hence, they argue, it is clearly a Bolivian resource for which the Chileans must pay.

This has been a bad summer for forest fires in south-central Chile. Most have been attributed to human agency, and now the association of the timber industry is suggesting that many of them, in the eighth and ninth regions, may have been started deliberately by militant Mapuche groups.

José Ignacio Letamendi, president of the Corporación Chilena de la Madera (Corma), says that the appearance of 80 new fires in only 48 hours is strongly suggestive of militant action. `This is happening,' he says, `in an area in which traditionally we have had attacks by the more radical Mapuche groups, so it is only natural that the inclination should be to suspect this kind of group.'

Letamendi says the authorities reckon that there are fewer than 100 families of radicalised Mapuche, in a community of 2,500 peaceable Mapuche families. He says he fears the recent fires are a warning that the radicals remain in business even after many of their leaders have been arrested and put on trial. As recently as early February, fires affecting some 1,940 hectares in the Bí­o Bí­o area — the traditional northern boundary of Mapuche territory — were still being fought.

ARGENTINA | Movement on the debt front. Last week economy minister Roberto Lavagna appointed Merrill Lynch, UBS and Barclays Capital to handle the international portion of the slow-moving debt-restructuring operation. Bondholders say they are unsure whether this marks the beginning of a more `flexible' approach by Buenos Aires (meaning willingness to offer a smaller `haircut'). Lavagna has yet to reply to an invitation to meet the Global Argentina Bondholders' Committee (which the government has refused to recognise) on 24 February in New York. Three local banks (Francés, Galicia and Nación) had previously been selected to manage the domestic portion of the operation.

World bank president James Wolfensohn, whose institution has been holding up a US$5bn lending package for Argentina since the IMF dragged out the first review of its standby deal, told the press last week, `All the signs are there will be an agreement with the Fund but it is important that there be that agreement before we proceed. 

The IMF's chief spokesman, Thomas Dawson, said later that it was too soon to judge whether the second review of the programme can be completed in time for the government to avoid having to make a large upcoming payment out of reserves (which it has vowed not to do). He said that the IMF review mission will not arrive in Argentina until this week.

BRAZIL | Enlarging the budget cuts. The government's adjustment to the more cautious policy adopted by the central bank will be more energetic than at first anticipated. Last week planning minister Guido Mantega announced that spending cuts this year would reach US$2.4bn. Two weeks ago finance minister Antônio Palocci had announced cuts of US$1bn. 

Mantega did his best to minimise the effect of the greater cuts, noting that the government would still be spending `98% of what congress authorised' and claiming that the shortfall `will not cause any practical consequence in the execution of the budget.' Mantega said that investment in infrastructure would reach US$5.17bn, and that US$14.6bn would go to the social area (with health taking 68% of that).

Marta Sahagún, wife of President Vicente Fox, has finally confirmed that she does aspire to succeed her husband. This has triggered a frenzied reaction in some opposition quarters, which may end up providing her with more exposure than even her husband could provide. Calls have been issued for Fox to resign before the end of his term, and to legislate a bar on incumbents' relatives running for election.

Only hours after she had told a radio audience that it would be hugely irresponsible to make up her mind now on whether she would run for President in 2006, she told a television interviewer who popped the question, `Speaking as we say we should speak, with the truth: yes, yes.'

Mexico's constitution establishes an absolute bar on reelection, ever. It says nothing, however, about spouses or relatives of elected officials — though the law does bar the use of a public position or public resources to support an electoral campaign, whosoever the beneficiary may be.

Diego Valadés, director of the institute of juridical research at the Universidad de México, while conceding that point, argues, `The constitution has a letter but also a logic, and the logic is that positions of power should not be used to remain in power.' Hence, he says, if Sahagún is a candidate, Fox should resign in January 2006, six months before the elections. This is the legal provision for any government official who wants to run for elected office.

Another prominent jurist, Ignacio Burgoa, says that Valadés may well be right about the spirit of the constitution, but the fact is that it does not prevent Sahagún from running: `The constitution has nothing to say about this; it does not talk about relinquishing posts due to the aspirations of relatives.' The conclusion he draws is that the legislation on eligibility as a presidential candidate should be `urgently modified' — and that the change should be in place before 2006.

Legal bars & other objections
One small opposition party, Convergencia, took up that suggestion with great alacrity, and within two days of Sahagún's announcement five of its legislators had drafted and submitted a bill barring from the presidency the spouse and any blood relative up to the fourth degree, or in-laws up to the second degree, of someone holding the post of President, or having held it in the year prior to the elections.

Not to be left behind, a congressman of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), announced that his bloc was working on a similar initiative which, he claimed, had the support of the main opposition parties `and even one or two of the [ruling] PAN.' 

This may have been a premature announcement. PRI spokesman Oscar González adopted an entirely different tack to oppose Sahagún's `political aspirations', which sounded very much like the objections the leadership of her own party have been raising: her candidacy is causing confrontations within the PAN and the cabinet, and is weakening the image and effectiveness of President Fox. More in line with the stance expected from the opposition, he also added that Sahagún `is making [Fox] look like her adviser and even her campaign coordinator.'

PRI president Roberto Madrazo appeared to be taking Sahagún's candidacy for granted when he told party members that the people they had to concentrate on beating were Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) — and Sahagún.

Why PRD stands apart
López Obrador, frontrunner in the opinion polls (and not yet a declared aspirant to his party's candidacy), did not only steer well clear of the stances adopted by the rest of the opposition: he came out strongly against any attempt to impose a legal bar on Sahagún. He said he was in disagreement with any law `with a dedication on it', designed solely to prevent one specific person from aspiring to the presidency. Congress, he said, cannot be used to restrict anyone's right to take part in the electoral process: `That would be insane, inappropriate to a democracy.'

Principled as this position may be, it is also a logical one for the PRD, which has a situation analogous to that of Sahagún, which had so far received only limited attention even though it is an imminent one. In the central state of Tlaxcala, senator Maricarmen Ramí­rez of the PRD is running for governor in the elections scheduled for 14 November. The current governor is her husband, Alfonso Sánchez Anaya.

Lending Sahagún a hand
President Fox is already being accused of having allowed his wife to use public resources, including personnel, for her charity, Vamos México, which has come under close scrutiny due to charges of at least careless accounting [WR-04-06]. Last week congress decided to audit the accounts of the presidential office to determine whether resources had been diverted to Vamos México or Sahagún's non-official business. The charity has announced full disclosure of its accounts, and Fox has insisted that it has been given no government funding.

This affair, however, has not made Fox shy. Much to the contrary, last week he signed an order amending the brief of the presidential general staff, charging it with providing his wife with `the human and material resources required in support of her activities.' The press, which had frequently criticised Sahagún for her use of general staff personnel and resources for her travels, will now have an interesting time trying to determine the dividing line between the duties of the `first lady' — specified nowhere, since formally the position does not exist — and the activities of an aspirant to the presidency.

The Zapatistas have created a stir with a claim, a decade after the event, that at least five of its fighters were summarily executed by the army during the 1994 uprising, and that soldiers sent to repress it had also mistakenly killed eight members of the state police. 

A 14 February communiqué of the EZLN's Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indí­gena, couched in a tribute to the fallen in the uprising, says that the executions were ordered by General Luis Humberto Portillo and carried out by Major Adalberto Pérez Nava and Captain Lodegario Salvador Estrada. `Portillo's orders,' says the communiqué, `were to take no prisoners and kill everyone, armed or not.'

According to the Zapatista tally, 34 of their fighters were killed and another 32 went missing in action. They also report that they killed 27 soldiers, injured 40 and captured 180, who were later released.

The US has been pressing Nicaragua to destroy its stocks of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on the grounds that they could end up in the hands of terrorists — the implication being that Nicaraguan security is too lax to be trusted. Days ago a rocket launcher was discovered in Colonia Rancho Escondido, a district on the eastern side of Tijuana. This one was US-made, and in the hands of drug traffickers.

Agents of the AFI, Mexico's new federal investigations agency, found the weapon when they raided a house in front of which they had seized a cargo of marihuana. It was a shoulder-fired, single-use AT-4 launcher, currently in use in Iraq, which means that it most likely came from a US arsenal. Though designed as an anti-tank weapon, some US police sources have said it could be used against helicopters or slow-moving aircraft. Mexican authorities are still trying to determine whether it is spent or still active. This is not the first discovery of its kind: another shoulder-held launcher was found in 2002 in Mexicali, on a ranch where the body of a state policeman was found.

TOURISM | Reaching a new peak. Mexico's earnings from tourism last year reached a new record of US$9.46bn, or 6.8% more than in 2002. This, says tourism minister Rodolfo Elizondo, raised Mexico from 13th to 10th place in the world ranking of tourism revenues. Mexico has been achieving the tourist industry's dream: a substantial increase in spending per visitor. Last year, as earnings shot up, arrivals actually declined by 5.1%, to 18.6m.

As an extra bonus, Mexico is managing to keep more of the money generated by tourism. Last year its tourism balance left a surplus of US$3.2bn, which was 14.5% higher than that of 2002. Worth noting: 79% of the country's investment in tourism is made by Mexicans.

VULNERABILITY | Becoming more oil-reliant. The leading private-sector think-tank, Centro de Estudios Económicos del Sector Privado (Ceesp), has drawn attention to the fact that Mexico last year increased its dependence on oil revenues. The contribution of oil exports to fiscal revenues amounted to M$534bn (US$48.6bn at the present exchange rate): this was 24.6% more than in 2002 — and actually 15% higher than the government had calculated in the budget. Non-oil revenues, meanwhile, grew by only 4.3%; those coming from taxes, by 5.3%. This, says Ceesp, is highly risky, because `there is no certainty that the oil market will maintain its dynamism over the medium and long terms.'

Another risk was highlighted by energy minister Felipe Calderón. `The fact that Pemex is sustaining the bulk of public spending,' he said last week, `implies that it can't devote as much as it needs to exploration for new reserves.' And, he added, as things stand right now Mexico's reserves will last for only 13 years more.

EMPLOYMENT | Winners & losers. Inegi, the official statistical institute, reports that the number of people in employment in the last quarter of last year reached 41.4m, or 1.53m more than a year earlier. It also said that employment in the services increased by 1.3m, and in industry by only 129,000, while the primary sector shed 373,000 jobs. The number of people employed in the informal sector, meanwhile, rose to 11.2m. Just over 1m people were officially regarded as unemployed.

Outspoken TV journalist Carlos José Guadamuz was shot dead as he arrived at work on 10 February. The event has been described as having had a greater impact than any such incident since the 1978 murder of newspaper editor Pedro Joaquí­n Chamorro, on the orders of the dictator Tachito Somoza. The police claim to have identified Guadamuz's killer, but one of the journalist's sons has accused Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega of being the `principal suspect'.

Guadamuz, 59 when murdered, had as a youth been an active opponent of the Somoza régime. He was in prison with Daniel Ortega for almost eight years, from where he emerged as a staunch Sandinista. Guadamuz became head of the state-owned Voz de Nicaragua and the Sandinista's Radio Ya. In 1996, though, he had a falling out with Ortega, and became one of his strongest critics.

Jointly with Miguel Angel Casco, a former member of the Sandinista directorate, in 2000 Guadamuz filed a suit against Ortega accusing him of having threatened their lives. Apparently, Ortega held Guadamuz's broadcasts responsible for the Sandinistas' declining popularity. It is worth noting, though, that after the murder a judge reopened this dormant suit, to find that it had prescribed. The police say they do not consider Ortega a suspect.

The man held by the police as Guadamuz's killer (he was actually captured by the victim's son as he tried to flee the scene) is William Augusto Hurtado Garcí­a, a former lieutenant in the now defunct DGSE, the Sandinista secret police.

Since Guadamuz was killed, two other journalists have received anonymous death threats: Miguel Mora, editor of Canal 100% Noticias, and Fabián Medina, head of information at the newspaper La Prensa.

The insurrection in Haiti appears to have changed in nature over the past weekend. Until then, the driving force had been the Gonaí¯ves-based Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front, a formerly pro-Aristide gang of political `enforcers', emulated by disparate groups, some of the same kind, in a few other parts of Haiti. Now a new force has come onstage: former elements of the disbanded Haitian army and of paramilitary squads that operated during the period of military rule.

Early last week, the national police were able to recapture St Marc, a town lying almost halfway between Port-au-Prince and Gonaí¯ves. The rebels there, a small group known as Ramicos, had previously engaged in non-violent protests. They did not offer much resistance, and the police, accompanied by armed pro-Aristide chimí¨re members, are said to have conducted a massacre. The central government later announced that it had reestablished control of Grand-Goave, southwest of the capital. In northern Cap Haí¯tien, the country's second-largest city, as in Port-au-Prince, pro- and anti-Aristide mobs engaged in arson attacks against prominent members of the opposing camps.

As the days passed, however, it became evident that other armed men were acting against the government. Raiders based in north-central St Michel de l'Atalaye began to strike out in the direction of Cap Haí¯tien, and were said to have taken control of St Raphael and Dondon.

The new allies
At the weekend, listeners tuning in to Radio Signal FM heard that Buteur Métayer, leader of the Artibonite Front, had struck an alliance with Guy Philippe (a former soldier and later, in the US-trained police, chief of police in Cap Haí¯tien) and Louis Jodel Chamblain, prominent in the paramilitary squads that operated under General Raoul Cedras when he ruled Haiti in 1991-94. They have contributed a force, recruited mainly among former members of the army, claimed to be about 500 strong. Metayer's group numbered fewer than 70.

The new anti-Aristide fighters were soon in action: a group of 50 overran the police station at Hinche, on the central plateau not far from the border with the Dominican Republic. Whether connected or not, a group calling itself the Armée Kosovo claimed to have taken control of Trou du Nord, in the northeastern department, close to Cap Haí¯tien.

At the beginning of the week, a former army colonel who opposes Aristide, Himmler Rebu, was saying of the Gonaí¯ves-based revolt, that it did not have the features of a national rebellion; rather, it could be better described as a rebellion `within the Aristide camp'. This no longer seems to be the case. Nor is the government's version accurate: that the rebels are acting as the `armed wing' of the mulatto business and political élite represented by the Groupe 184 of business associations led by André Apaid and the Convergence Démocratique, the broad political and civic alliance fronted by Evans Paul, former mayor of Port-au-Prince. With the incorporation of people like Philippe and Chamblain, who clearly outweigh the former Armée Cannibale, what might be brewing now is a bid to regress to before Aristide's reinstatement by US intervention.

President Hipólito Mejí­a has had his way: he is now the sole registered presidential candidate of his Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) — a party whose statutes bar standing for reelection, even in the law allows it. The question is whether it was worth the effort: the latest opinion poll shows the frontrunner, Leonel Fernández of the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD), even further ahead than before.

The poll, conducted by Penn, Schoen & Berland, shows that Fernández has increased his support from 58% last September to 65% in late January — far more than enough to sweep the floor in the first round. Mejí­a, on the other hand, has seen his backing decline from 20% to 13%, which has left him a poor third, after Eduardo Estrella, of the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC), who has risen from 14% to 16%.

Though the current level of support for Fernández would preclude it, the pollsters tested reactions to two second round scenarios. Against Mejí­a, Fernández would win 73:16; against Estrella, 67:23.

No `ley de lemas'
The last chance Mejí­a's PRD rivals seemed to have to test relative strengths before the electorate, fizzled out when the chamber of deputies decided to shelve the ley de lemas (the bill authorising the fielding of several candidates per party) that had been approved by the senate. The lower chamber gave up on it after the electoral council had said it simply did not have the time to make the necessary changes to accommodate a new system.

Few doubt that Mejí­a will make full use of his position of power to try to catch up with and overtake Fernández. The strategic director of Fernández's campaign, Danilo Medina, while admitting that the effort is likely, dismisses its chances of succeeding: `They say that they have the government and all the money in the world to buy the votes of the poor. This is true, and they are indeed unscrupulous, but they forget that the hearts of the people are with Leonel [...] There is no possibility that they can steal victory from Leonel Fernández, because the country has never seen such a bad government as the one led by Hipólito Mejí­a.'

Medina has a special incentive to see his candidate through: in 2000 he was the PLD's candidate, and after being defeated by Mejí­a in the first round made the unusual gesture of bowing out of the run-off.

Starting-line outlook
% of voter preferences
First round
Candidate	Party	Sep	Jan
Eduardo Estrella	PRSC	14	16
Leonel Fernández	PLD	65	58
Hipólito Mejía	PRD	20	13
Runoff option I	Fernández	Mejía
	73	16
Runoff option II	Fernández	Estrella
	67	23
Source: Penn, Schoen & Berland.

The pro-Alemán faction of the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) has come up with a new attempt to get their leader, imprisoned on corruption charges, set free: an amnesty law, which would not only benefit former President Arnoldo Alemán but also any other former member of his administration facing corruption charges.

A bill, backed by 20 of the 45 pro-Alemán Liberals in the national assembly, was smuggled in on 10 February, when the attention of most Nicaraguans was focused on the shocking murder of a leading TV journalist (see page 16). It went straight into the justice committee, which is chaired by one of the bill's authors, Donald Lacayo, and where the Liberals are in a majority. The manoeuvre was made possible by the `unification' deal brokered by US ambassador Barbara Moore [WR-03-49], which gave the pro-Alemán Liberals control of the legislature's top offices.

Apparently, the intention was to seek a deal with the Sandinistas, offering them a way out of their own old corruption dilemma, the so-called piñata, under which state-owned properties were distributed among the party faithful as their régime came to an end. The Sandinistas have denied even discussing this with the pro-Alemán Liberals. These are just short of the majority needed to pass the amnesty.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | Funds & power flow again. The IMF approved last week the Dominican Republic's economic performance in its first review of the US$657m standby agreement signed last August. Consequently, it has cleared the disbursement of a second tranche of US$66m.

On the power front it is the pesos rather than the generals that are doing the trick. Following part payment of the government's overdue debt with the generating companies [WR-04-06], several of these have resumed normal operation, more than halving the electricity deficit to 200-300MW in peak hours. This has translated into fewer and shorter blackouts.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | Tourism on sharp upswing. Central bank figures show that last year the number of tourist arrivals increased by 19.5%, to 3.2m (of which 523,000 were Dominicans resident abroad). Per capita they seem to be spending less: revenues from tourism were up only 14%, to US$3.1bn. Both figures, incidentally, were new records; they overtook the previous peak year of 2000, when 2.9m visitors generated revenues of US$2.86bn.

The Dominican Republic registered the highest growth rate in the Caribbean last year, followed by Cuba (up 13%), Jamaica (+7%) and Puerto Rico (+5%) — according to the World Tourism Organisation (WTO). The Dominican upswing is continuing into this year: arrivals in January were 7.7% higher than a year earlier. For this year the WTO has forecast a 3.9% expansion of tourism in the Caribbean as a whole.

CENTRAL AMERICA | First steps towards customs union. Guatemalan President Oscar Berger is predicting that his country will be able to agree to establish a customs union with neighbouring El Salvador `within 90 days'. Honduras, he said last week, has asked for a bit more time. Berger will be broaching the subject with his Salvadorean peer Francisco Flores at the summit he will be hosting on 27 February.

There may be irony lurking somewhere behind the fact that France has become the first country to discuss openly the prospect of military intervention in Haiti, in the wake of the uprising launched almost two weeks ago in Gonaí¯ves. It was in Gonaí¯ves that, after defeating the French, Jean-Jacques Dessalines proclaimed the independence of Haiti in January 1804.

On 17 February, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin announced that the French government had set up a `crisis cell' to monitor developments in Haiti and `reflect upon what can be done urgently.' He said that one of the options under consideration was to deploy a peace force, drawn from the units stationed nearby, in the `overseas departments' of the Antilles and Guyane.

He suggested that France would not be acting unilaterally. `There are many countries willing to act,' he said. `The international community is willing to mobilise.' De Villepin suggested that intervention would require two things: a real commitment by Aristide to `respect the civil peace' and a parallel one by the opposition to abandon its `strategy of rejection.'

The signals from Washington, meanwhile, have been equivocal. On 10 February it seemed ready to jettison Aristide. The State Department's lively spokesman, Richard Boucher, said that `a political settlement will require some fairly thorough changes in the way Haiti is governed, and how the security situation is maintained.' Another source, whom protocol demands to be identified only as `a senior State Department official', spelt this out: `When we talk about undergoing change in the way Haiti is governed [...] that could indeed involve changes in Aristide's position.'

The next day, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated baldly that the US had `no plans to do anything'. Back at State, `an official' said the government was still trying to assess what the response should be. On 13 February, Secretary of State Colin Powell got together with representatives of Caricom, Canada and the OAS to assert that they supported a `peaceful, negotiated, democratic and constitutional solution' to the Haitian crisis, based on the Caricom proposals. Speaking on behalf of Caricom, Trinidadian prime minister Patrick Manning added, `We will not support any unconstitutional measures to overthrow or support the Aristide government.' In Powell's rendition, `régime change' is not on the agenda for Haiti.

Another nugget from `an official' at State: US policy is to `exhaust every diplomatic option available, before moving on to another level.'

As Marta Sahagún embarks on a new gambit — ostensibly withdrawing from the `party-political' fray — the latest opinion poll shows her still running a distant second to Mexico city mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the leftist Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). This is when people are asked about individual candidates; when the pollsters delve into party preferences, they find little difference between the big three.

The survey, conducted by Indemerc, shows López Obrador still way in the lead with 57.3% of voter preferences, followed by Sahagún with 38%. A sizable gap further down is Roberto Madrazo, president of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), with 26.4%. Fourth appears the other aspirant of the ruling Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), interior minister Santiago Creel, with 22.1%. Worth mentioning is the fact that Elba Esther Gordillo, the PRI's secretary-general and former congressional leader, almost falls of the scale, ranking 29th among the 30 potential candidates listed by Indemerc.

This year's contests
Two reasons make it relevant to focus on the public standing of the political parties. One is that none of the individual potential candidates listed by the pollsters have yet been formally nominated by their parties. The other is that party strengths will count in this year's electoral contests.

Ten states will be choosing new governors in 2004. Of these, seven are currently ruled by the PRI, two by the PRD, and one by the PAN. [Actually, other states will also be holding minor — not gubernatorial — elections: Yucatán, Baja California Norte, Chiapas and Michoacán.]

The gubernatorial contests will come in four lots, the later ones feeding to some extent on the results of the earlier ones. First, in July, come Chihuahua (PRI), Durango (PRI) and Zacatecas (PRD). Next, in August, come Aguascalientes (PAN), Oaxaca (PRI) and Chiapas (PRD-PAN-PT-PVEM). Tamaulipas (PRI) stands alone in October. In November: Puebla (PRI), Sinaloa (PRI) and Tlaxcala (PRD-PT). If past performance is a good guide, these will be party hard-core elections, with low overall turnouts.

What the Indemerc poll shows is that preferences for the three main parties are `a virtual tie', with only the slightest of advantages for the PRI. The party with most to prove is the PRD, which is widely seen as really strong only in Mexico city. Elsewhere, it rules alone in three of Mexico's 31 states, and in coalitions with others in another four — while the PAN runs six states on its own and two in coalitions (with the PRD, actually).

Sahagún's new tack
On 16 February, a week after having announced that she intended to run for the presidency, Marta Sahagún's office put out a communiqué informing that she had decided to withdraw from `party-political work' and concentrate on the `social' pursuits of her charity Vamos México and on supporting the `national project' of her husband, President Vicente Fox.

The communiqué also said that in the light of this decision she would no longer be seeking a seat on the national council of the PAN, for which she had recently sat a set of examinations that she passed with flying colours. Her joining the council had been seen as a first step towards seeking the PAN's presidential nomination; the other aspirants, Santiago Creel prominent among them, had taken the same step.

What the communiqué did not say is that Sahagún was giving up her presidential aspirations. The text says, `Señora Sahagún has indicated that for now she will not devote a single minute of her time to engage in party-political work' [our emphasis]. This move may have been designed to take at least some of the heat off her husband, in that he will be able to claim that he is not using his position to promote her candidacy (for now).  

It does, however, mean taking distance from the forum in which much of the PAN's policy will be debated and alliances will be forged, but in this regard also the communiqué hints at what her line may be. `Over and above the confusions and expressions that provoke divisions,' she is quoted as saying, `is unity.' In other words, she will build up a broad constituency on the strength of her social pursuits, and in the name of that constituency present herself as the standard-bearer of `unity'.