China reaps what it sows
The past 10 days has seen a sharp refocusing of US attention on Asia beginning with the 12-13 Apec (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Honolulu, the 16-17 November visit to the Philippines by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the 16-17 November visit to Australia by President Barack Obama, and the 17-19 November Asean (Association of South-East Asian Nations) and East Asian summits in Bali. In addition, on 16 November the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) issued its 2011 annual report to Congress. The key points to emerge from this blizzard of Asia-related activity can be summarized as follows:
- US engagement in Asia is being driven by two contradictory forces: Recognition that in economic terms the 21st century will be the Asia-Pacific century, on the one hand; deep mistrust of China’s goals and the means by which it is prepared to pursue them, on the other hand.
- The US’s recommitment to Asia is strongly supported by key allies in the region, and reticence about being seen to choose between the US and China appears to be fading as a result of China’s arrogance over territorial disputes in the past two years or so.
- Although Philippines President Benigno Aquino avoided the opening of the Asean summit because the organization had apparently rejected his proposal that the group unite in facing down China over its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the subsequent East Asia summit did see key Asian nations raising the issue despite China’s objections.
On 15 November, China’s Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said: ''We hope the South China Sea will not be discussed at the East Asia Summit.'' In the event, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong made the decisive move to raise the issue and his example was followed by the leaders of Australia, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand, with US President Barack Obama saying: ''While we are not a claimant in the South China Sea dispute and while we do not take sides, we have a powerful stake in maritime security in general and in the resolution of the South China Sea issue specifically, as a resident Pacific power, as a maritime nation, as a trading nation and as a guarantor of security in the Asia-Pacific region.''
- The one important country that remains cautious about being seen to side with the US against China is Indonesia. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has warned against provoking “a reaction and counter-reaction that could create a vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust”. He warned Asean against allowing the region to “become a competition arena for countries who consider themselves as big powers”.
Indonesia’s concern is undoubtedly based in part on a desire to keep close to China, which has been promising Jakarta huge support for infrastructure development. The two countries have pledged to increase cooperation in energy and industry and even defence, and to develop a China-Indonesia strategic partnership.
But Indonesia also has more esoteric concerns about the announcement that the US is to base troops in the northern Australian city of Darwin. People’s Representative Council (DPR) Chairman Mahfudz Siddik speculated on 21 November that the stationing of US troops in Darwin “is a US manoeuvre in response to...the situation in the eastern part of Indonesia, particularly the situation in Papua and security concerns at Freeport [a US mining company operating in Papua]...” Another CPR member, Ahmad Muzani, warned: “The deployment of US troops in Darwin is a real threat to the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.”
The background
The background to the US’s strong restatement of its interests in Asia can be found in the USCC’s annual report to Congress. That the US harbours enormous concerns about China’s rise and trajectory has been a given for many years. But amongst the familiar litany of complaints in the 2011 USCC report, such as currency under-valuation, unfair government-subsidised competition, intellectual property theft, and opaque intentions surrounding its military advancement, three points in particular stand out.
The first is confirmation of a subtle shift in the way that the US is presenting the China challenge, away from seeing it just in terms of a threat to the US and more as something that threatens the whole region. When discussing China’s increasing military capabilities, the report says: “The Commission prefers to use the term ‘area control’ for China’s regional strategy, because the terms ‘anti-access’ and ‘area denial’ foster a US-centric view that downplays the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army’s] ability to easily conduct operations against regional states. While US bases in East Asia are vulnerable to PLA air and missile attacks, Japanese, Philippine, and Vietnamese bases are just as vulnerable, if not more so.” Judging by the strong regional support for the US’s re-engagement with Asia seen during the past week, this change of emphasis in the presentation of the China threat is having its desired effect.
The second stand-out point is the expressed concern that there has been a proliferation of key players contributing to Chinese foreign policy and that this makes understanding China’s true intentions more difficult than ever. The USCC report says: “Actors with increasing influence on China’s foreign policies include the PLA, large state-owned enterprises, and academics and think tanks...The plethora of new and emerging voices in China’s foreign policy-making process makes it more challenging for foreign countries to interact effectively with China.” This same point has been made recently by Japan in relation to attempts to resume stalled talks with China on a treaty for the joint development of gas projects in the East China Sea.
The USCC report goes on to say that “the emergence of a more outspoken field of PRC foreign policy actors has produced messages that are sometimes at variance with official government narratives”. That may be so, but in our view Chinese foreign policy remains very tightly controlled and Beijing is simply using these alternative voices as a means of trying to intimidate its neighbours in a marginally deniable fashion. It is a tactic that gives more clarity, not less clarity to China’s intentions.
We reported an example of this in our 26 October issue, when the Communist Party-controlled tabloid The Global Times warned in connection with territorial disputes in the South China Sea: “If these countries don’t want to change their ways with China, they will need to mentally prepare for the sounds of cannons.” Another recent example was an interview with two senior army officers that briefly appeared on the People’s Daily website last week before being removed. The officers were reported as saying that China may have to exercise self-restraint for another decade while it built up its military, but then it could make pre-emptive strikes against its challengers.
The message we read into these episodes, as into China’s actions in disputed waters all through this year, is not that there is a raging debate about foreign policy in China that should baffle America’s China-watchers, but that as China’s confidence increases so it is more openly prepared to use intimidatory tactics in an attempt to cow its neighbours. Beijing seems to have definitively passed through the phase described by Deng Xiaoping as “hiding one’s capacities and biding one’s time”.
The final point that stands out from the USCC annual report is the most worrying, and it is the assessment that China could in due course launch a pre-emptive strike against the United States or its allies – a view that can only have been reinforced by the People’s Daily interview quoted above.
The report says that the PLA is acquiring specific means to counter US military capabilities and to exploit US weaknesses and that it is developing a strategy to defeat a technologically superior opponent such as the US. As such, it is focusing on controlling the western Pacific and “striking first in order to gain surprise over an enemy in the event of a conflict”. The PLA, the report emphasizes, “is acquiring capabilities to allow it to conduct surprise attacks aimed at degrading a superior military’s advantages and preventing an opponent from effectively operating along China’s periphery”.
This could hardly be more alarming. Genuine fear of a pre-emptive strike is the ultimate destabilizer, yet Beijing seems oblivious to the dangers created by its intimidatory words, actions, and preparations. JdeC.