Courcy's Intelligence Brief

Turkey's popularity in decline

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In last week’s issue we argued that Turkey had a great opportunity in the Middle East, if only Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan could recognize it. Now a survey of Middle East and North African (Mena) countries has shown exactly how far Turkey’s popularity has declined in the past three years. However, as we argued last week, the survey also shows that the position is not irretreivable. Even if the trend is clearly, worryingly, and (we would argue) justifiably negative, Turkey’s position is still relatively good. Across the Mena region, the United Arab Emirates is rated first in terms of positive perceptions, followed by Saudi Arabia and then Turkey.

In 2011, 78% of respondents in 16 countries had a positive image of Turkey; in 2013 the proportion is down to 59%. The decline was most precipitous in Egypt, where Turkey has been a strong backer of the Muslim Brotherhood and has opposed its ouster. In 2011, 86% expressed their approval of Turkey; in 2013 the proportion is 38%.

A director of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Tesev) noted: “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East Survey has been conducted for the past five years. Popularity of Turkey was very high in 2009. The decline recorded in the last three years is due to the turmoil in the region and Turkey’s related policies.”

The proportion of people believing that Ankara should play a larger role in the region has decreased from 71% in 2011 to 60% in 2013, and fewer people see Turkey as a model for the region. In 2011, 61% saw Turkey as a model, in 2013 the proportion is 51%, with a particularly low rate in Syria, Egypt, and Iran.

Other interesting findings include the fact that only 37% now see the Arab Spring as being positive for their countries, as against 52% in 2011. Also interesting is the fact that while economic problems topped the list of concerns in all countries except Iraq in 2012, in 2013 political and security issues were top of the list in Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, while in Iraq and Libya the Western presence was seen as the most important issue.

Finally, and again of key interest, is the fact that in Iran 86% list economic issues as their main concern. It is that finding that explains Iran’s most recent diplomatic moves, but it is also a finding that strengthens the arguments of those in the West who say this is no time to go soft on Iran. JdeC.

Libya's struggle to establish security

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Libya has been held up as a model for modern interventionism, but the kidnapping in October of Prime Minister Ali Zaydan, along with the clashes between protesters and militias in Tripoli in November, has focused attention on how far there is still to go before Libya is a normal state. The current focus is on rebuilding the army and other elements of a democratic security apparatus. The following provides a guide to the elements that need reforming and/or taming, and an indication as to the size of the task.

Starting at the top, there is the Libyan army itself. Local sources say that the army is slowly beginning to emerge as a viable force, and since the November violence it has been deployed on the streets of Tripoli for the first time. But sources also confirm that the army has a dire lack of experienced soldiers. Officials say that the army has 5,000 troops in training overseas and 10,000 locally. Most of these training initiatives are in their infancy. Britain, for instance, is to begin training 2,000 infantry troops early in 2014, while the US is still considering proposals for cooperation, including a plan to rotate groups of Libyan soldiers through Bulgaria for training.

The very fact that so much of the training is to take place overseas is indicative of the problem: partner countries are not prepared to send trainers to Libya.

Within the army is the elite Al-Saiqah Forces, but although it is made up in part of paratroopers and commandos it in fact emerged from a militia of the same name in 2010. It has been deployed in Benghazi where it has been attacked regularly, losing a number of officers. However, it is popular in Benghazi for the way it has taken on the Islamist Ansar al-Sharia group.

Also under the Ministry of Defence is the Libya Shield Force (LSF), which was set up in 2012 as a means of bringing former rebel fighters into the armed forces. Among its ranks are smaller militia groups from Khums in the west and Misrata and other towns in the centre. During the past year it has been involved in a number of clashes with other official units of the Libyan army.

Then there is the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which was set up in 2012 to do what its name suggests. It is officially controlled by the Oil Ministry, but it is paid for by the Ministry of Defence. Armed protesters at oil ports and production facilities have cut Libya’s oil exports to just 10% of the usual 1.4m barrels per day output, forcing the government to import fuel and ration electricity in the capital.

Until recently, the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) was designated to provide protection in Tripoli, but parliament removed its mandate following the kidnapping of the prime minister. However, a branch of the LROR was set up in late September by the Interior Ministry to provide security in Benghazi. There are rumours that LROR has connections with some of the smaller militias from the south of the country.

Libya’s police force is called the National Security Directorate (NSD), but although under the aegis of the Interior Ministry its origins are not purely official as it seems to incorporate a number of militias. The weakness of the NSD has been exposed recently by the attacks it has suffered in Benghazi, Darnah in the east, and Sabha in the south.

Last February, 800 police recruits graduated after training by Turkey; but Libya has been unable to send a second batch because of a lack of recruits. One diplomat notes: “We set up training. On day one, no one shows up. The second day, they promise us eight recruits and only two show up. It’s frustrating.”

Also under the Interior Ministry is the Anti-Crime Unit, which carries out police investigations, particularly for drug offences. Alarmingly, however, it has been accused of being involved in the kidnapping of the prime minister. The specialist drug-trafficking unit within the Interior Ministry is the Special Deterrence Force (SDF).

At the centre of the security dilemma are the militias, their rivalries, and citizen frustrations. The clashes in November in Tripoli were set off when angry residents marched on the base of a militia from Misrata to demand they leave the capital. The protests worked in that the Misratans and rival Zintani brigades did pull out of their bases, to be replaced by army and police units. Furthermore, some militiamen signed up for the regular forces while others abandoned their heavy weaponry.

The following is a guide to the main militias, based on research conducted by the excellent BBC Monitoring Service:

Al-Zintan Revolutionaries' Military Council

The military council of the Zintan area is best known for detaining Sayf al-Islam Al-Qadhafi after his capture in November 2011. The council was formed in May 2011 as an umbrella for 23 militias in Zintan and the Nafusah Mountains in western Libya. It has five brigades, the most prominent of which is the Martyr Muhammad al-Madani Brigade, which boasts about 4,000 fighters. The council is currently led by Mukhtar Khalifah Shahub, a former Libyan navy officer. The group has various Arabic-language media outlets. These include a satellite channel called Libya al-Watan and several websites and pages on Facebook.

Al-Qa'qa' Brigade

The Al-Qa'qa' Brigade was formed by a group of Libyans from the west of the country who trained in the Zintan area during the 2011 conflict. It is commanded by Uthman Mulayqithah who defected from Colonel Gaddafi's regime after the 17 February revolt. The militia is tasked with providing law and order and protecting senior officials and government ministers. It is officially under the authority of the Defence Ministry.

The brigade is often associated with Mahmud Jibril, the former prime minister and leader of the liberal National Forces Alliance. On 21 November it was reported that the Al-Qa'qa' Brigade had left Tripoli, along with the Provisional Supreme Security Committee, which is now part of the police force (also known as the National Security Directorate).

Al-Sawa'iq Brigade

Originally from Zintan in the Nafusah Mountains, Al-Sawa'iq was formed on the opening of the western front in the 2011 conflict. It took part in the assault on Tripoli in September 2011. Since then, it has been tasked with providing personal protection for senior figures at the National Transitional Council, changing its name to Al-Sawa'iq Brigade for Protection. Al-Sawa'iq came under the authority of the Ministry of Defence in October 2012 and is now led by Isam al-Trabulsi.

After recent clashes in Gharghur in Tripoli, Al-Sawa'iq began to hand over some of the public buildings it controlled to the Ministry of Defence, and it started to redeploy outside the capital. Misratah brigades

In the immediate aftermath of the ouster of the Gaddafi regime, more than 200 militias, or "revolutionary brigades", were registered with the Misratan Union of Revolutionaries, comprising about 40,000 members. In addition, there are between six and nine "unregulated brigades". All these brigades are thought to control a large number of tanks - some estimates put this as high as more than 800 - dozens of heavy artillery pieces, and at least 2,000 vehicles mounted with machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons.

Although based in the central city of Misratah, many of the brigades are deployed elsewhere in the centre and west of Libya, including until recently the capital, Tripoli.

Egypt's less-Islamic constitution

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Egypt’s 50-member constitutional panel approved a new draft constitution on 1 December. Not surprisingly there are significant differences with the 2012 constitution because the group devising it is so different.

The 2012 document was drafted by a Constituent Assembly (CA) of 100 members who had been elected by the two houses of parliament. As about 75% of parliament comprised Islamists, it is not surprising that Islamists formed a high proportion of the CA, about 48% according to the Muslim Brotherhood. The present panel has just two Islamists amongst its 50 members.

Nevertheless, the new draft constitution does keep the 2012 provision that says that “Islam is the religion of the state. Principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation.” However, left out is Article 219 which defined the principles of Sharia as “general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community”. The problem with this article, complained liberals, is that it seemed to allow for the annulling of any existing laws that might contradict Sharia. The 2013 draft holds that “verdicts of the Supreme Constitutional Court represent the reference when interpreting the principles of Sharia”.

Not surprisingly, the Salafists are unhappy about the change of emphasis. The deputy chief of the country’s largest Salafist group, Yasir Burhami of Salafist Call, described the new constitution as the “worst in Egypt’s history”. He also confirmed that Salafists would not vote for it.

Another cause of concern for the Islamists is the article which “bans the formation of political parties along religious lines”, which is a considerable strengthening of the rather weak provision in the 2012 constitution which said that “political parties that discriminate on the basis of gender, origin, or religion are not allowed to be formed”.

Another area of controversy is a provision that seems to tie the president’s hands on the appointment of the defence minister. The new document says: “Defence Minister is appointed after the approval of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the provisions of this article are valid through two consecutive presidential terms after the constitution is put into effect.”

There has also been a widening of the conditions under which a civilian might be tried by a military court. The new constitution says: “Civilians must not stand trial before military courts except for crimes that constitute direct assault on military facilities, camps of the armed forces military equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, secrets, money, military factories, or crimes that involve direct assaults on men of the armed forces while performing their tasks.”

Quotas for the representation of farmers and workers in the House of Representatives (HR) have been removed, and unlike in the 2012 version there seems to be better provision for women who will be “properly represented in legislative bodies, in a way defined by law”. The new constitution also says that the state will work “to make youth, Christians, handicapped, and Egyptian expatriates properly represented in the HR in the first election that follows the passage of this constitution”.

This latter provision apparently had difficulty achieving the required 75% majority in constitutional panel, but was eventually passed under pressure from panel chairman Amr Musa. However, Musa was unable to achieve the same result with the provisions for the electoral system, which envisaged that two-thirds of the HR’s seats would be elected on the basis of individual candidates and one-third via electoral lists. The issue is now to be resolved by the interim president in his current role as the legislative authority.

The next step is for the constitution to be approved by a referendum 30 days after being presented to the president, which it was on 3 December.

Risk pointers

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*** Australia rallies to Japan. Commonsense tells one it would be the case (as we argued last week), but high-level sources have since confirmed that China’s unilateral action to declare an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) that covers the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has strengthened both Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s resolve and case for boosting Japan’s defence capabilities, including by changing the constitution.

As regards wider reactions, it has been interesting in particular to see Australia providing such strong support for Japan given its past proclivity for hedging.

Beijing’s ambassador to Canberra was called in to explain what China thought it was up to with its provocative move, and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop issued a statement saying that Australia “has made clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea”.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott, for his part, described Australia as a “strong ally” of Japan. The best that former prime minister Kevin Rudd could do in 2009 was to refer to Japan as “a critical strategic partner”. Now Abbott has called Japan a “strong ally”.

As one Australian expert noted: “Australia is injecting some much needed clarity about its strategic priorities. Australia strongly believes that US primacy in Asia is vital both to its own interests and to the regional order more generally, and that any effort by China to change that setting will be destabilizing.”

And it was a reasonably brave move given Australia’s former proclivity for hedging. It prompted China to respond by saying: “China urges the Australian side to immediately correct its mistakes so as to avoid hurting the cooperative relationship between China and Australia.”

There are, of course, many influential voices in Australia and elsewhere urging their governments not to fall out with China in the interests of business, trade, and economic growth, but these voices are not currently in the ascendancy.

*** Mending fences with Hezbollah. In what will be taken as further bad news by Saudi Arabia and Israel, Lebanese sources have been reporting increased European interest in improving ties with Hezbollah despite the categorization of Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist group by the EU. Sources in Lebanon say that the Europeans, led by France, wish to rebuild contacts with the political wing of the group in part because of the growing threat from Sunni takfiri and fundamentalist groups.

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