Mideast balance shifting strongly against Israel
It is still too early tell how the Mideast strategic landscape will be permanently altered by the Arab revolutions that began in Tunisia in January. However, it is possible to produce an interim balance sheet, and at the moment it does not look favourable to Western interests.
Egypt is the most important Arab country; and if you take the view, as we do, that Islamist radicalism is a response to long-term Arab failure, then political and economic progress in Egypt is a vital prerequisite for defusing the threat from Islamist radicalism. The Israeli-Palestinian struggle plays its part in fomenting Arab anger, but it is not the only factor and possibly not even the most important. The key factor is the long-term failure of the Arab world to keep up with the progress of the West and Asia. Nasserist Arab nationalism failed to provide a panacea, and Islamist radicalism has ducked the challenge by a retreat into resentment and obscurantism. If Egypt were able to modernize, economically and politically, it could provide a beacon for the rest of the Arab world to follow.
That Egypt’s middle class youth would like to begin this process seems indisputable, but whether they can take their countrymen with them is far less certain. First of all, it is not the youthful revolutionaries of Tahrir Square who have taken charge of the transition, but the Egyptian military. Secondly, Egypt remains a deeply conservative and largely (57%) rural country, and the elements that brought about the revolution will be a small minority in any electoral process. Thirdly, by far the most organized political movement is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the short transition period to elections in September will favour the MB.
The 19 March referendum on proposed amendments to the Egyptian constitution was instructive. The democracy movement lobbied against the amendments, arguing for an entirely new constitution, but the Egyptian electorate supported the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), presided over by an elderly Soviet-trained field marshal (Hussein Muhammad Tantawi), and voted 77.2% in favour of the amendments.
Other warning signals include a rapprochement between Egypt and the Palestinian Hamas movement and even with Iran. At a meeting on 30 March between senior Hamas figure Dr Mahmud al-Zahhar and secular opposition figures in Egypt, strong support was expressed for the Palestinian cause. Egypt’s secular Al-Wafd Party leader Dr Al-Sayyid al-Badawi said that he was the first party leader to declare his party’s stance on the Camp David treaty. According to the Palestinian Information Centre, he said that Israel was violating its terms and that “treaties do not last forever”. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the 25 January Revolution movement who “affirmed that Egypt’s youth support the people of Gaza and the whole of Palestine with their entire hearts and souls, until liberation”.
On the Iranian front, on 30 March Egypt’s Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi said that Cairo wanted to restore diplomatic relations with Iran (which were severed in 1980). This move would have stood out at any time, but given the current tension between Iran and the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, it is even more startling.
Five struggles
Away from Egypt, there are five main struggles taking place: in Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and the Gulf States. The easiest of these to deal with are Libya and Yemen where it can safely be assumed that instability will prevail for the foreseeable future, and that this will be exploited to one degree or another by al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
Syria remains the key battleground as it is here that Iran’s influence will be countered or entrenched. If President Bashar al-Assad manages to stabilize his regime, it will be a major setback for Western interests and a major gain for Iran - and our sources continue to say that Assad is more likely to survive than to be toppled. There are multiple reasons for this assessment, including the need of the minority Alawite ruling elite to maintain their dominance or face marginalization of their community; the complex calculations of the opposition Sunnis; Turkey’s support; and the possibility of striking a deal with Syria’s Kurdish minority, who make up 10%-15% of the population.
In the Mideast turmoil, Jordan’s position is doubly significant because of its intertwining with the Palestinian issue. King Abdullah’s Bedouin-supported Hashemite monarchy rules over a population in which the majority is of Palestinian origin, and the opposition is being spearheaded by the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, predicting the outcome of this struggle is exceptionally difficult, not least because, as in the Palestinian territories, the Jordanian Palestinians are split between Islamists and secularists.
A final complication is that while Israel has long had good relations with Hashemite-ruled Jordan, there are at least some influential voices in Israel who see this as an opportunity to revive the old ‘Jordan-is-Palestine’ argument. And this, unsurprisingly, is something that Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has been talking up, saying on 4 April that the West was trying to divide Jordan and annex part of it to the West Bank “in an attempt to create the Palestinian state with the aim to save the Zionist regime”. On balance, it seems likely that the present dispensation will survive, but with modifications including increased influence for the IAF.
Iran and the Gulf States
Which brings us to Iran and the Gulf States, in particular Bahrain. A war of words is escalating between Iran and Saudi Arabia over interference in Bahrain, where the pro-Iranian majority Shia population is seeking to overthrow the minority Sunni-dominated regime. A statement issued by the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on 3 April “severely condemned Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Bahrain, which is in violation of international pacts. Pro-Iranian Hezbollah militants from Lebanon have been accused of helping Bahraini Shias.
Nor has the discovery of an Iranian spy network in Kuwait improved tempers. There are some 1m citizens of Iranian origins in the Gulf states, and estimates put the Shia population of Kuwait at one-third of the total.
So the balance sheet as matters stand today engenders far more pessimism than seemed justified at the time of the original pro-democracy successes in Tunisia and Egypt. It is all too easy to foresee an eventual outcome in which Libya and Yemen become havens for al-Qaeda, Egypt and Jordan are dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Assad regime in Syria survives, and in the Gulf states either the West is left in the embarrassing position of supporting increased repression by dictatorial Sunni rulers or Iranian influence is greatly increased through the empowerment of the disenfranchised Shia.
From Israel’s point of view, the balance sheet is even more negative. When Egypt and Syria attacked on Yom Kippur in 1973, Jordan was a late and unenthusiastic participant and Iran was ruled by the pro-Western Shah. Israeli’s planning must now factor in the possibility of facing a hostile Egypt for the first time in 40 years, coupled with a more enthusiastically anti-Israel Jordan and a Syria still under Assad – all aided and abetted by a nuclear-armed Iran.
On 4 April, President Ahmadinejad said: “Israel has no chance of surviving in the Middle East region.” He believes it, and current events will have strengthened Ahmadinejad’s conviction. What he doesn’t factor in, however, is the possibility that his own regime could fall. For the moment there is no sign of it, but a revolution (or, more accurately, a counter-revolution) in Iran would change everything. JdeC.