Iran turns to Russia
These are exceptionally nervous times for Iran. On the one hand, it could be on the verge of its most significant strategic breakthrough since the Islamic revolution in 1979, with the consolidation of its influence through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; but it is equally possible that it could suffer a major setback with the loss of Syria, increased US-Turkish collaboration, and increasing internal threats to the regime. It is not surprising, therefore, that the past week has seen Iran turn to Russia for external support while, domestically, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has redoubled his efforts to defuse political discontent.
The difficulties faced by Iran’s ally, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, need little elaborating. He is hanging on to power through brutal repression, but the Syrian opposition is gaining increasing support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Western powers. Although the fall of Assad would not necessarily be the boon for the West that some imagine ( post-Assad Syria would likely be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood), it would undoubtedly be a blow to Iran’s dream of a Shia crescent stretching from Iran to Lebanon.
With Turkey, as we highlighted last week, Iran has three complaints. The first is, of course, Ankara’s support for the Syrian opposition; the second is the decision by Ankara to host elements of the Nato anti-missile shield on Turkish soil; and the third is Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s advice to Egypt that it should embed secularism into its post-Mubarak political system. Hopes in Tehran that Erdogan’s turn away from the West would include a rapprochement with Iran seem to have been dashed. From Iran’s point of view, this is clearly a blow, although, as with a post-Assad Syria, it is not necessarily as positive for the West as some suppose. On the contrary, Erdogan may simply have calculated that if he is seen as being helpful on Iran, this will give him some immunity from US retaliation for his strongly anti-Israel policies.
Added to these negatives (for Iran), as we reported last week, there has been a sudden renewal of speculation about a possible Israeli military strike against its nuclear facilities. There has also been the strident US response to Iranian implication in a plot against the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington. And, of course, the threat of domestic unrest remains.
Ayatollah Khameinei’s concern about the domestic situation was apparent in a public address he made to an audience of 55,000 people on 12 October in the western city of Kermanshah. An analysis of the speech shows that 85% of it was dedicated to domestic issues, and this domestic section of his speech was overwhelmingly (65%) dedicated to the importance of the ‘people’ and their political role. He mentioned ‘the people’ no less than 147 times, which was a great deal more than the 27 mentions of ‘Islam’.
Khamenei’s primary intention seems to have been to persuade the electorate, ahead of the 2012 Majlis elections, that the regime is overwhelmingly focused on the wellbeing of the people. He said that the people should have a greater role in the running of the country, and he encouraged them to have “strong, warm, and friendly relations” with the state. He said the people should see themselves as the “owners of the country”, and he was particularly keen to emphasize the importance of a high turnout for the elections – which could mean that he is preparing to do a deal with the reformists in order to encourage them to persuade their supporters to participate.
Also, in a clear dig at hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khamenei said: "The president is elected by direct vote of the people, which is a good and effective method, but if someday, probably in the distant future, it is felt that a parliamentary system is better...there will be no problem to change the current structure."
But if Khamenei’s primary target was domestic public opinion, his speech was also clearly intended for outside consumption, to dispel any sense that the Iranian political system is under threat from a spillover of the Arab Spring. He said: “Our Western enemies should know that this system is firm and powerful because people are present. Western politicians should not make the mistake here [of comparing Iran to] several other countries which have had revolutions but changed their course as the West wished...”
In the small section of his speech dedicated to external affairs, Khamenei continued to interpret the Arab Spring as being in Iran’s favour, saying that the region had opened up a new chapter in which the influence of the capitalist world would be weakened and that there was an opportunity for Iran to advance its own alternative for Muslim people. In a recent speech, Khamenei said: “The Americans are doing their best to control the situation, but their efforts are useless. Nations have awakened now. Nations have found courage. No-one can fight their will.”
Enter the Russians
But it is precisely this interpretation of the Arab Spring as being in Iran’s interests that is being challenged by the threat to Assad’s regime in Syria, by the alignment of Turkey with the US on Iranian matters, and by US pressure on Egypt not to conclude a rapprochement with Tehran. And that is why it is little surprise to see Tehran renewing its efforts to engage with Russia.
In recent times, Moscow has been only intermittently supportive of Iran. In September 2010, for instance, it cancelled the supply of the high-precision S-300 air defence system to Iran on the grounds that it would violate expanded UN sanctions imposed over Iran's refusal to curb its nuclear programme. On the other hand,Tehran will have been encouraged by Moscow’s strong line at the UN against imposing sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria fearing that it could be a prelude to military intervention.
Russia will also be nervous about Turkey’s neo-Ottomanism under Erdogan. It seems that a resurgent Turkey could end up with more influence in former Soviet allies such as Egypt and Syria than will Russia. A resurgent Turkey will also try to expand its influence into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and it will provide more active support for Muslims in the Balkans, the historic enemies of the Russian-allied Serbs. Then there are Moscow’s wider – and longer-term – insecurities about the rise of China and Russia’s position in the world which we analysed in our 5 October issue.
It was not surprising, therefore, to receive reports of a recent meeting between Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi and Russia’s ambassador in Tehran, Aleksandr Sadovnikov, in which a rebuilding of close Iranian-Russian ties were discussed. The most intriguing point, however, is not that Iran wants closer ties with Russia but that the appeal was made in terms of opposition to Turkey.
According to Radzhab Safarov, the director-general of the Russian Centre for the Study of Modern Iran, while an overtly anti-Turkish alliance might be going too far, Russia and Iran could build an alliance around their shared interest in the Caspian Sea. According to Safarov: “Both countries are extremely interested in having the Caspian accessible only to the countries that surround it. Russia and Iran are the two biggest powers in this region, and they must help young states not to give in to persuasion and not to give Nato access to the shores of the inland sea.” The other littoral countries are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – countries in which Turkey is looking to expand its influence. Another factor for Moscow is Turkey’s agreement to station Nato’s anti-missile defence system on its soil. Safarov says: “The rapprochement of Tehran and Moscow will make it possible to hinder the short-sighted policy of Turkey.”
The indications are that this appeal by Tehran to Moscow for closer ties, based on the need to counter a resurgent Turkey, is well-judged. JdeC.