Rafael Rey was Peru's defence minister under Alan García (in 2009-2010) and minister
for production (in 2006-2008). His term ended on 15 September 2010, amid a
scandal caused by Legislative Decree 1097, an amnesty law benefitting soldiers
accused and convicted of human rights violations during the internal armed
conflict (1980-2000). He joined Keiko Fujimori's electoral plank as her
vice-presidential candidate in the 2011 general election and won a seat in the
Andean Parliament (Parladino) in the 10 April vote. In 1992 he founded
Renovación Nacional and got a seat in the 1992 constituent assembly following
Alberto Fujimori's 'autogolpe'. In 1995 he was re-elected to congress, broke
with Fujimori and returned to the opposition, but continued to support
Fujimori's economic policies and a controversial 1995 amnesty law, which gave
amnesty to those responsible for human rights violations during the conflict
period. This included the Colina Group, responsible for the massacres of Barrios
Altos and La Cantuta. Alberto Fujimori's direction of the Colina Group resulted
in his 25 year prison sentence, which was handed down in 2009. Rey is a
life-long member of Opus Dei.
Latin American Newsletters (LAN): What are your views on the
election? The second round between Keiko and Humala - what does it mean for
Fuerza 2011?
Rafael Rey (RR): I'm not a party member, I was an invitee
for this election. Generally and personally, I think that winning the election
is not going to be easy. Lamentably there is too much resentment and fear in
many sectors of the population, even if this isn't reflected by the candidates
themselves, you can see it at the level of followers. At the very least there
are going to be strong verbal confrontations. We went through this in [the] 1990
election between Vargas Llosa and Fujimori and we will see more of the same now.
This influences the population. We feel an enormous responsibility to win this
election...to prevent the country from falling into the alternative's trap. Any
of the other [electoral] alternatives would not have worried me as much as the
one we currently face. Because there is no doubt that this would mean a
regression.
LAN: The other parties are holding back from making firm
alliances - preferring to dip their toes in the water - does this worry you?
RR: This doesn't worry me. Today, not even the Partido
Aprista Peruano can say they manage their voters, although they may do so again
in the future.
LAN: They can promise - but the question is: can they
deliver?
RR: They behave as if they were the owners of the parties.
They are not.
LAN: What has been the effect of Fuerza 2011's decision not
to enter into alliances - in both the first and second rounds?
RR: The Peruvian electorate doesn't like alliances. They see
them as a sign of weakness, precisely because the groups don't think themselves
sufficiently strong to win alone. Moreover, in this election we have seen how
PPK [Pedro Pablo Kuczynski] lost, in spite of the alliances he made. His parties
didn't help him one little bit. Yehude Simón was meant to help him win
Lambayeque...well, they lost there; if César Acuña [mayor of Trujillo] was meant
to help him in the North and Trujillo...well, they lost there too. We will not
make alliances, but that does not mean we have closed our doors. We want to
include valuable people, who are already identifying themselves to us.
LAN: What is the strategy that is being drawn up to tackle
the second round? There is a very clear national voting pattern: Keiko won much
of the North and Humala the South, effectively dividing the country, but neither
won in Lima. However, the second round is effectively a separate election, a
battle for Lima, how will Fuerza 2011 tackle this?
RR: I don't like using the phrase strategy, even though
evidently that is what we do, because it sounds like we are trying to hoodwink
the population into believing in us. I think instead it is our duty to help
people begin to believe in us. This has to be done through concrete policies,
policies that relate to political liberties. Fujimorismo has been stigmatised.
Whatever Fujimorista alternative comes in the future, it will be a 'dictator' a
'thief', 'dishonest', 'against human rights' etc. It is not the moment, nor will
it be easy to try and prove that many of these accusations are not objectively
true. That there have been all these kinds of cases, of course there have been.
Fujimori was a dictator who broke with the constitution; there can be no doubt
about that. Going forward, we have to give out a clear message that this will
not happen again.
LAN: How is Fuerza 2011 going to do that? Can you give me
three concrete examples of how this could be achieved?
RR: I would say that the discourse will stay the same,
unlike that of Mr. Humala. We will continue to explain, that fear of us is more
emotional than rational. We have named technocrats who will, as debates get
underway, explain in further detail exactly what we intend to do. Although it
seems that there will not be many opportunities to do this. For us, questions
and fear will not be reduced through debates...rather we will win confidence
through our politics. It is difficult to say how exactly we will do this. But if
some of the media want to objectively help us to disperse our message, because
it is important to repeat, and repeat, and repeat the same message, then we
welcome that. We will have to make some big gestures: Keiko swearing that she
won't pardon her father [Alberto Fujimori] has won us the support of many
people.
Humala has to explain many things, and we will continue to pressure
him to do so. He needs to explain presenting a manifesto and then saying it is
just for the first round. Humala is someone people should distrust. Gana Perú's
manifesto is written with the mentality that they have. Gana Perú ranks are
filled with radical Marxists. But now, given the mistrust that his
campaign has generated, he is changing his line for strategic reasons.
LAN: Can you give me three concrete social policies that
Fuerza 2011 is going to implement if it gets into power?
RR: there are several. In the sierra there are two
programmes. The 'Sierra Verde' is the use of pre-Inca water management to
transform dry parts of the highlands into agriculturally productive zones. It
sounds unbelievable but I have seen it. They are concentric circular walls that
maintain a constant supply of water inside the mountains, maintaining the water
table, reducing the likelihood of landslides, flooding. It would enable greater
productivity, greater access to water for agriculture and domestic use.
Secondly, making the 'Sierra Productiva', a policy that has been in place for
some years, more efficient. These two complimentary policies will help reduce
poverty in the highlands.
LAN: When you said a week ago to the press that there were
going to be “re-touches" to the current economic model, what did you mean?
RR: I'm not a technical expert on this subject, but in Lima
for example, I do think that there has to be greater revenue collection. Not
through an increase in taxes, rather through greater efficiency of collection.
We are giving assurances that we will work towards reducing taxes, and
eventually towards a different type of tax system that incentivises better
salaries. The current modifications of the tax system are meant to assist the
millions of micro-businesses which want to formalise themselves. This has not
yet happened. In micro-industry we have a massive untapped revenue stream.
Finally, one of the country's greatest problems is bureaucratic red tape that
prevents investment and development.
LAN: I wanted to ask you a bit about the long-standing issue
of political protest and the social environmental conflicts often caused or
exacerbated by the activities of extractive industries. Fuerza 2011's two key
policies are economic continuity and greater security. The economic model in
Peru is overly dependent on the extractive industries. Are these two policies
going to produce even more confrontation, violence and difficulties for
companies that operate in this sector?
RR: I see this issue as the most difficult task facing the
next government, whoever wins. And I think that there will have to be a series
of initiatives to resolve real conflicts. I don't really have it clear exactly
how we will deal with conflicts that are based more on ideology and politics
than real social and environmental complaints. Ultimately, finding a solution
depends on the attitude of the local authorities with the assistance of the
media. For example, if a decree is issued, such as those legislative decrees
relating to the jungle [that resulted in 35 fatalities in Bagua in clashed
between protestors and the police] and there are people from NGOs, unions, [the]
media who transmit falsehoods then we have a escalation. For example, it was
said via radio networks that the land [decreed concessions] was going to be
taken and given to Chilean farmers. The government needs to act. The most
logical and efficient way for a government to explain its position, its
intentions, or specific programmatic points is via the media. However, if those
media outlets go as far as to manipulate the government's message they are doing
the population a great disservice. The press does not realise this is necessary
to show that there are two views on the same issue, and ultimately they cannot
be both correct. The authorities need to ask, with humility, sincerity and
calmly, for the media's assistance in this. If there is no Environmental
Impact Assessment [on large scale investments] then of course there are likely
to be protests. People have lost confidence in the arbitrating capacity of the
government. We have to recuperate this.
LAN: Fuerza 2011 won in San Martín, which is a region that
has supposedly benefited from the coca-substitution policies. However, both it,
and the Vrae [Valles de los ríos Apurímac y Ene], remain a centre of coca
cultivation for production of cocaine paste. What is Fuerza 2011's policy
towards narco-trafficking?
RR: We have to be very clear about a few things. You've just
mentioned the example of San Martín: successful substitution policies require
access to markets. It boils down to roads and communications. I think that if
the government had the political will, substitution could work better. Instead,
the government has opted for international support from the US in the form of an
annual US$80m, 90% of which go to pay the employees of the DEA that they have
contracted. This kind of long-standing assistance has been diminishing over time
and has had some successes; however, these cannot be attributed to the
assistance given. We need to have the political will to ask those countries
where most consumption of cocaine takes place too, with a small amount of their
budget that is currently being spent fighting drug-trafficking in their own
countries, they could revolutionise the current situation, through roads and
communications, in the producing countries. That way you cut the problem at the
root. There is no other way.
LAN: New data on drug-trafficking shows that Peru might be
on its way to overtaking Colombia as the number one producer of cocaine.
RR: Colombia's current situation is a result of the type of
assistance they have received and the way that the government of [President
Alvaro] Uribe tackled the [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia] Farc and
drug-trafficking. In Colombia's case, politics and narco-trafficking are truly
intertwined. In Peru we are seeing the 'balloon effect'. In Peru we will have to
fight both our own [narco] growth, and the effect of Colombia's fight against
drug-trafficking.
LAN: There has been lots of speculation over the state of
Fujimorismo within Fuerza 2011. They removed a few spokespeople and there seems
to be a difference of opinion on some issues within the grouping. There has been
a significant vote for Kenji Fujimori in congress whilst other long-established
Fujimoristas have been deprived of their congressional seats. What is going
on?
RR: Firstly, Keiko, from the very beginning, decided to
unify the different Fujirmorista parties. But in addition, so that she would not
be dependent on any of those “leaders" [RR indicated the inverted comas with his
hands], she realised that if she wanted to lead, she would have to create a new
group and unify the others around that [group]...a group that would depend on
her. Secondly, to make plain that the same mistakes and abuses of power would
not be repeated, she decided to opt for people who were new and who she trusted.
To show that even more, the top spots would be given to those less-known than
the established Fujimorista factions. Obviously, in whatever institution or
party, to lose one's leadership is difficult. But the leadership of Keiko is
totally obvious. I don't think that there is a fragmentation within the party,
unlike that of Humala or Apra.
Latin American Newsletters interviewed Mr Rey in his office in Lima on 20
April 2011.