The regional and municipal elections held in Venezuela on 21 November marked the first vote since 2017 that was not boycotted by the political opposition. In an election cycle that was conducted under the supervision of a European Union electoral observation mission (EU-EOM), there was hope in some quarters that a diminished opposition could regain some momentum. It was not to be – the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) won the governorships of 20 of Venezuela’s 23 states. Whilst the EU-EOM cited a number of “irregularities” in the electoral process, it noted that the vote was an improvement on the previous three elections. Opposition disunity and voter apathy may have been the key factors in the PSUV’s victory.
The election represented an opportunity for the opposition to dent the PSUV’s dominance at the subnational level, with 23 state governorships, 335 mayorships, 253 seats in state legislatures, and 2,471 local councillor positions up for grabs. Despite fears that President Nicolás Maduro’s government would not permit a free and fair election, the presence of the EU-EOM had boosted the confidence of the opposition. Opposition parties canvassed freely, with a marked reduction in political violence compared to previous election cycles.
That climate of relative tranquillity did not translate into opposition gains at the ballot box. Turnout was low, at just 41.8%, according to the national electoral council (CNE), effectively dashing any hopes of turning the tide against the PSUV. The opposition suffered a net loss of two state governorships, winning Cojedes from the PSUV, holding Zulia and Nueva Esparta, but losing control of Táchira and Mérida.
The disappointing result for the opposition raises questions over its direction under the leadership of Juan Guaidó. He had two key tasks if the opposition was to improve its standing – drive up voter turnout, and quell infighting in a broad opposition coalition [WR-21-46]. Neither of those happened: the high abstention rate recalled Guaidó’s lost ability to conjure massive anti-government demonstrations and, in a gift to the PSUV, the perennially fractious opposition fielded more than one candidate in several races. Guaidó acknowledged these problems on 22 November, calling for the “reunification of all [opposition] factions so we can fight the regime”. Guaidó also accused Maduro of “hijacking power” by holding elections “without [necessary] preconditions” in order to “corner us in the false dilemma of whether or not to vote”.
The EU-EOM’s preliminary report, published on 23 November, found evidence of a number of irregularities in the electoral process, with the leader of the observation mission, Isabel Santos, noting that “there have been arbitrary bans on candidates for administrative reasons, there have been suspensions, or the most recognised leaders or members of some parties have been withdrawn”.
The report states that the PSUV utilised a mixture of patronage and coercion to secure votes, making “extended use of state resources” for “the delivery of goods, such as food rations, gas bottles or water tanks”. It also claims that government officials waited outside certain polling stations in all of Venezuela’s 23 states, pressuring voters who receive state benefits to vote for the PSUV.
Furthermore, after a lull during the final weeks of campaigning, electoral violence returned on polling day. A man was shot dead and two others injured in an attack on a voting station in the town of San Francico, Zulia state. Witnesses claim that the assault was carried out by a ‘colectivo’ – a pro-government citizens’ militia – which they said assaulted people queuing to vote before opening fire on the polling centre.
Also in San Francisco, the local campaign director for the opposition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) coalition, Eduardo Labrador, claimed to have been attacked in a colectivo raid on the MUD’s headquarters, posting a video on social media with a bloodied face.
Despite voicing concerns about violence and coercion, the EU-EOM found that the official results published by the CNE were “technically” accurate, and that “the automated voting system offered sufficient guarantees of integrity and confidentiality”. It adds that, “despite the persistence of structural deficiencies…electoral conditions improved in comparison to the three previous national elections [in 2020, 2018, and 2017]”. Presenting the preliminary findings to a press conference, Santos repeatedly declined to say whether the election was “free and fair” and said that a full verdict will be presented in the EU-EOM’s final report in January or February.
The report’s findings will be weaponised by both the government and the opposition. However, very few expected a level playing in these elections, and the preliminary report by the EU-EOM indicates that Guaidó will not be able to convincingly cry fraud. Instead, the pressure will be on him to regroup the opposition, put an end to the infighting among his fragmented coalition, and persuade Venezuela’s citizens to return to the streets in large numbers, which they have not done since early 2020. Should Guaidó fail to achieve this, the pressure will grow on him to step aside. Whilst he is not yet facing a formidable rebellion in the opposition ranks, discontent is likely to build in the aftermath of the election.
Capriles
Another leading opposition figure, Henrique Capriles Radonski, appears to be waiting in the wings, charging on 23 November that “today, nobody is in charge of the opposition,” and blaming the fragmentation of the opposition vote for the electoral defeat.
Dialogue
Despite promises from President Maduro in recent weeks that the government would resume its suspended dialogue with the opposition after the elections, he appeared to row back on that pledge on 21 November, saying that “the conditions are not there” for further negotiations. The dialogue process was suspended on 16 October in protest at the extradition of the financier Alex Saab from Cape Verde to the US, where he is accused of laundering money for the Maduro administration.