No fewer than four election-related murders took place between 13-15 November, reigniting concerns about violence ahead of the 28 November general elections. With presidential candidate for the leftist main opposition Alianza por el Pueblo alliance, Xiomara Castro, the current frontrunner, ahead of Tegucigalpa mayor Nasry Asfura, of the conservative ruling Partido Nacional (PN) [WR-21-44], which has been in office since 2010, election-watchers fear a repeat of the violence, irregularities and polarisation afflicting the 2017 vote. This in turn illustrates Honduras’s continued failure to recover from the hammer blow dealt to its democratic institutions by the 2009 coup which ejected Castro’s husband Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009).
On 15 November Darío Juárez, a candidate for the opposition Partido Liberal (PL) for the deputy mayoralty of Concordia municipality in the eastern department of Olancho, was shot dead by unknown perpetrators. The previous day Luis Gustavo Castellanos, a PL member, was killed in a shoot-out during a campaign event in San Jerónimo municipality in the western department of Copán.
On 13 November Elvir Casaña, a local leader of Partido Libertad y Refundación (Libre), one of the main parties in the Alianza por el Pueblo, was shot dead in San Luis municipality in the contiguous department of Santa Bárbara. The same day Francisco Gaitán, the PL mayor of Cantarranas municipality in the southern department of Francisco Morazán, who was seeking re-election, was also shot dead.
This deadly violence prompted a response from US Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols who tweeted on 16 November that the US “condemns the violence against political candidates” and “all forms of electoral violence”. It drew concerns from electoral observation missions deployed by the European Union and Organization of American States (OAS), while on 23 November, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Michelle Bachelet, expressed her “deep concern”.
An OHCHR statement notes that since primary elections were called in September 2020, the UN Human Rights Office in Honduras has recorded 63 cases of political violence, including 29 killings, 14 attacks, 12 instances of aggressive behaviour, as well as seven people directly threatened and one kidnapped.
In comparison, a letter dated 15 November, signed by over 20 US congress members, addressed to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken underlining fears about “increased potential for violence”. It noted that in the period leading up to the 2017 elections, the OHCHR documented 13 violent deaths of political candidates.
Violence is not the only concern ahead of the election in which think tanks such as International Crisis Group (ICG) point out that the PN and President Juan Orlando Hernández (who ICG says is reportedly looking into ways to protect himself from possible prosecution in the US on drug trafficking changes [WR-21-14]) have a “huge stake”.
A 21 November report by local think tank Centro de Estudio para la Democracia (Cespad) highlighted seven main risks facing the current electoral process. As well as political violence, these include the role of the national electoral council (CNE) which, along with an electoral court of justice (TJE), were created to replace the electoral authority following the 2017 vote. These new bodies are split equally among the three main parties (PN, Libre, and PL), prompting concerns that agreements on solutions are unlikely if the electoral results are contested.
Cespad also identifies as key risks, operational procedures on voting day, given delays to the acquisition of services and equipment related to the preliminary rapid vote count (TREP) system and biometric equipment to carry out finger printing at polling stations (JRVs).
Other concerns include delays in the delivery of identification documents to the public for voting and the process of addressing inconsistencies, in addition to the lack of an electoral procedural law that would enable the TJE to carry out its functions satisfactorily.
Vote-buying
Cespad also highlights as a risk, the use of public resources in vote-buying. It accuses the PN of using vouchers from the Vida Mejor (Better Life) cash transfer programme as part of efforts to win support, which it says “repeats the pattern of partisan instrumentalisation that the PN used in the 2013 and 2017 election years”, a practice it dubs “a serious risk for a transparent, competitive, fair and equitable election”.
Political extortion
Cespad says that the PN’s one-time approval of the “Bono Vida Mejor-Bicentenario” (Decree PCM-218-2021), with a budget of L1.35bn (US$56m), has placed the delivery of nationwide cash payments at the centre of its proselytising activity. The think tank adds that “the bonuses, less than a month before the elections, are and will be functioning as a kind of political extortion mechanism and a clear pay-per-vote transaction”.