At the end of October, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) published a report analysing the concentration of power in Nicaragua in the executive branch and undermining of the rule of law under President Daniel Ortega, who was re-elected on 7 November in an election widely slammed as undemocratic (see our sister publication, the Latin American Weekly Report, for further discussion of the election). The IACHR cites the “manipulation, control, and diversion of functions of the national police [PNN] and army” as crucial to this process. Here we consider key observations by the IACHR with regard to these institutions under Ortega, who first led the country from 1979-1990 and has been in office since 2007.
Released on 28 October, the IACHR report notes that the PNN was founded in 1979, months after the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship (1936-1979). It cites Nicaraguan sociologist Elvira Cuadra Lira as saying that at the time the police “were confronted with many and prolonged social conflicts” and, despite a depletion of its forces and lack of equipment, it embarked upon a “professionalisation and modernisation process that gained national and international recognition”. However, Ortega’s assumption of the presidency in 2007 for the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) precipitated “a major change in the conception of the State whereby a subordinate police force was essential to the regime”.
The IACHR highlights as a key event in this process, the enactment of a new law in 2014 “on the organisation, functions, career, and special social security regime” of the PNN under which it came to be directed by the president, thereby eliminating the interior ministry as an intermediary oversight and control entity. The IAHCR points out that this gave the president the authority to designate and remove the PNN director general, among other things. As well as the institutional changes introduced through the 2014 law, the IAHCR identifies other “executive branch transgressions into the police institutional structure”. These include the prolongation of the tenure of the former PNN director Aminta Granera for consecutive terms, from 2006 to 2018, despite the law only permitting one term in that post. It also highlights promotions and postings granted to officers prior to the established time in exchange for their loyalty.
Just as the PNN underwent change under Ortega, the military was also transformed. Again, the IACHR underlines efforts to professionalise the institution prior to Ortega taking office in 2007. It notes that following the 1979 overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, the Ejército Popular Sandinista (EPS) was created, conceived “as an army to defend the Revolution’s political agenda”, before changing its name in 1990 to the Nicaraguan army and embarking upon a modernisation and professionalisation process. Ahead of Ortega’s assumption of office in 2007, public confidence in the military institution had been boosted by its decision in the 1990s to “refrain from involvement in domestic conflicts, even when police capacities were overwhelmed by the violence and high level of social mobilisation”.
The IACHR identifies as key to the military’s subsequent transformation under Ortega, a 2007 presidential initiative (290) which aimed to subordinate the army to the executive branch, through a “co-optation strategy (...) based on: reiteration of the government rhetoric that constantly reminded the army and police of their political origins and former party ties; the expansion of military autonomy, enabling it to create companies and perform different types of economic activities; and the designation of officers, active or retired, to key public offices, such as social security, construction and diplomacy”.
Further compounding this changed relation were a series of reforms to the military institution’s normative framework implemented in 2010, which significantly increased the role of the military in administering the State and provided for more direct coordination with the executive. Examples of these reforms included the national defence act; the borders legal regime act and the democratic security act. These were followed by further reforms implemented in 2014 and 2015 such as a sovereign security law approved in December 2015, which created a “national system of sovereign security” to be coordinated by the president, with the military to serve as its executive secretary, and at the time fanned concerns about the military’s growing influence over state institutions.
Alemán-Ortega Pact
In its report the IACHR highlights as crucial to the undermining of the rule of law in Nicaragua, the so-called “Alemán-Ortega Pact”, forged under the presidency of Arnoldo Alemán (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, PLC, 1997-2002) in 1999. Under the pact, the FSLN and PLC negotiated a set of agreements aimed at ensuring executive branch control over the other branches of government, and the retention and/or attainment of privileges and immunities. A series of constitutional and legal reforms and political collaborative actions were gradually made possible through modifications to the Nicaraguan State’s institutional structure to ensure control of power by the FSLN and PLC, undermining the principal of separation of powers in the country.
US sanctions
Senior PNN and military officials have featured among those sanctioned by the US government as part of efforts to pressure the Ortega government to improve the democracy and human rights situation in the country, particularly following the crackdown on its opponents which began in April 2018.
Those targeted by the sanctions (which include asset freezes and travel bans) include PNN chief Francisco Díaz and the general commander of Nicaragua’s armed forces, General Julio César Aviles. In March 2020 the US Treasury Department also sanctioned the PNN for its role in “serious human rights abuse in Nicaragua as an entity.”
Shock troops
In its report, the IACHR identifies as key to the Ortega government’s strategy of repression, the presence of “parastate groups”, known as Sandinista shock groups, formed in late 2007 and early 2008. According to the IACHR these groups, which comprise members of the FSLN youth, residents of poor neighbourhoods, and current or former gang members, “perform repressive functions and act in coordination with the PNN and which are in direct subordination to the presidency, vice presidency of the Republic and/or municipal mayors”. According to the report, in 2007, Ortega formed a paramilitary group, known as the “blue shirts” for the colour of their clothing, to strengthen his security. They were composed of former military members, and had “a quasi-military structure, [used] weapons of war, and [carried out] military operations.” Their presence was to be noted as a security force for Ortega in public activities in which the president was participating, and were used “to strike hard,” violently repressing anti-government demonstrations and citizen protests rejecting electoral processes denounced as irregular.