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Development: On 1 June, Miguel Angel Jiménez, the president of the tiny Partido Nueva Alianza, promised more uncomfortable revelations about Roberto Madrazo, the presidential candidate for the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, during the final TV debate on 6 June.

Significance: The first batch of revelations, that Madrazo had not paid income taxes for two years, discomfited Madrazo in the first TV debate at the end of April. The allegations were made by a former prií­sta, Roberto Campa, who is the Nueva Alianza's presidential candidate. The Nueva Alianza is run by Elba Esther Gordillo, another prií­sta, and a sworn enemy of Madrazo's. 

Another damaging attack on Madrazo is likely to detach most of what remains of his crumbling support. The assumption amongst political commentators in Mexico is that Gordillo has an understanding with the rightwing presidential candidate, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, from the ruling Partido Acción Nacional and will use Campa in the debate to push voters towards Calderón. 

The key element in the debate, which will probably prove decisive for the election on 2 July, is how the leftwing candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, performs. He made a major miscalculation in refusing to attend the first TV debate. López Obrador's comfort is that Campa was one of only seven prií­sta congressmen to ignore Madrazo's instructions to vote for López Obrador's impeachment in 2005.

Development: Candidates in the forthcoming October general elections, including President Lula da Silva and his main contender, Geraldo Alckmin, started their campaigns officially on 6 July.

Significance: President Lula da Silva, who is seeking re-election, started the campaign from his political base in the metropolitan region of São Paulo as the favourite, according to all opinion polls. Lula's goal is to ensure he wins in the first round, thus avoiding a strenuous extension of the campaign. For that to happen, his main tactic will be comparing his administration with the previous government of the now opposition Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). Crucially, Lula also needs to avoid, at all cost, being linked to the corruption scandals involving his Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). 

Lula has been working hard behind the scenes to guarantee support from politicians from other parties, notably the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PSDB). Negotiations between Lula and his allies in the PMDB to form a coalition led to nothing, not least because the PT and the PMDB are fierce contenders at local level. Lula, however, still wants the PMDB's national leadership to issue a message of support for his bid. As expected for a catch-all party like the PMDB, this message is unlikely to come - at least not until after the end of the first round if there is one. 

The main opposition candidate, Geraldo Alckmin from the PSDB, has a different mission. His goal is to polarise the Brazilian electorate and thus force the presidential race to a second round. Alckmin's performance in opinion polls has only just started to improve, after over three months of stagnation. The improvement has happened following a no-holds-barred party debate over Alckmin's style of campaign. Since then, he has started to follow instructions from his allies and stepped up criticism of Lula, successfully raising doubts about the honesty and competence of the government. 

Alckmin has also tried to court the PMDB, as yet to little avail. Nonetheless, he launched his campaign in the southern state of Santa Catarina, where the PMDB governor is an ally. After that Alckmin flew to São Paulo for the launch of the campaign of José Serra, also from the PSDB, for the governorship of that state. Serra is the favourite to win in the first round against the PT's candidate, Aloizio Mercadante, who is in second place. Former governor, Orestes Quércia from the PMDB, is in third place. Quércia's candidacy has been one of the main obstacles to a PMDB alliance with either the PT or the PSDB in these elections.

Crucially, Alckmin's alliance with the rightwing Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) has guaranteed 81 minutes weekly in the free televised slots allocated for candidates. Lula, who failed to forge alliances with any significant party, will have 58 minutes per week. The other five presidential candidates together will have just over one-third of the time granted to Lula and Alckmin put together. The presidential campaigns of the seven hopefuls are expected to cost R$280m (US$125m) - that is without counting the so-called caixa-dois (off the record funding). Lula will spend R$90m, while Alckmin's campaign is expected to cost R$85m.

Development: After much delay, Bolivia finally appointed an ambassador to the US on 9 August. The US has also replaced its ambassador in La Paz, David Greenlee, with another career diplomat, Philip S. Goldberg.

Significance: The appointments will give new impetus to the two countries relations. The Bolivian and US governments are currently at loggerheads because of the Bolivian government's support of coca growers and the US's silence over Bolivia's request to extradite a former president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, currently living in exile in the country. 

The new Bolivian ambassador to Washington is Gustavo Guzmán, a former journalist on Bolivia's leading newspapers. Guzmán was a communist militant in his youth and served as adviser to two leftwing mayors in La Paz. The US Ambassador to La Paz, Goldberg, has served in Kosovo, Chile and Colombia and has been the State Department's representative in the US congress. 

In an interview just after his appointment, Guzmán said that he would work to bring Sánchez de Lozada to account for his alleged responsibility for the deaths of 60 protesters at the end of his troubled government in 2003. He expects extradition negotiations to be "long and difficult" but seems confident the US government is "open to dialogue". Guzmán also announced that the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act would be renewed at the end of the year. Under this pact the US gives preferential trade terms to Andean countries fighting drugs.

ARGENTINA : The Argentine economy grew 8.3% in the first half of the year compared with the same period in 2005.

BRAZIL : Industrial employment was up 0.3% in July on June, the first positive result in nine months.

BRAZIL : A survey by the trade-union-linked Dieese reveals that 45.5% of Brazilian unemployed are 16 to 24 year-olds.

URUGUAY : Exports were up 19.4% in the eight months up to August on the same period last year, reaching US$2.69bn.

URUGUAY : The Uruguayan industry grew 13% in July year-on-year.

Development: President Néstor Kirchner and his Bolivian counterpart, Evo Morales, signed an agreement on 19 October which will increase the amount of gas supplied by Bolivia to Argentina from 7.7m to 27m cubic metres per day by 2026.

Significance: The deal is Kirchner's latest move to try to combat the energy crisis which Argentina faces. As part of the agreement, the state-owned Energí­a Argentina Sociedad Anónima (EASA) will carry out work to locate more gas in Bolivia and exploit deposits it finds. To guarantee the delivery of gas to Argentina, Kirchner also plans to invest US$1.2bn building the Gasoducto de Noreste Argentino.

The signing of the agreement took place in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, an area where opposition to Morales is particularly strong. Kirchner's presence implied his support for the Morales government. For Bolivia, the deal will bring in US$17bn over the next 20 years.

BOLIVIA: Imports rose 22% between January and October on the same period last year, reaching US$2.3bn. Exports also rose, reaching US$3.3bn in the period.

BRAZIL: Public debt fell 0.4 points to 49.5% of GDP in October, reaching R$1.04 trillion (US$484bn). This year alone the debt/GDP ration fell 2 points.

BRAZIL: Brazil posted a US$40.4bn trade surplus on the year through 24 November, a 1.54% increase on the same period last year.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 71.8% of Dominicans believe the country's economy is doing "badly", according to Gallup.

MEXICO: Economic activity grew 4.3% in September year-on-year.

MEXICO: The Mexican central bank forecasts inflation of 3.5% in 2007.

Development: Two protesters were killed in Cochabamba on 11 January.

Significance: These deaths are the first in political protests since President Evo Morales took office a year ago. The only other confrontation that has produced a death toll in Morales's term was between freelance and salaried miners at Huanuni on 5 and 6 October. Some commentators claimed that the deaths in Cochabamba were the first in what will become a civil war between leftwingers and rightwingers. 

The two men who were killed were a coca-grower and a 17 year-old who was a relation of a senior official in the local Cochabamba administration. It seems almost certain that the 17 year-old was a supporter of Manfred Reyes Villa, the prefect of Cochabamba, who triggered the violence in Cochabamba with his announcement on 4 January that he would try to overturn the decision of the national referendum in July 2006. In this referendum Cochabamba voted heavily (63%) in favour of the central government and against the rightwing argument that the country's nine departments should have more autonomy.

Besides the two deaths, around 200 people were injured in the confrontation. The local police had to call in the army to restore order and to keep the two sides apart. An army colonel, Ramiro Valenzuela, said that 1,500 soldiers had been deployed in the streets of Cochabamba. He reckoned that the two sides had fielded 20,000 demonstrators in total. 

The acting president, vice-president Alvaro Garcí­a Linera, broadcast to the nation on 11 January and blamed Reyes Villa for the deaths and the unrest in Cochabamba. Garcí­a Linera emphasised that the two people killed came from either side of the political divide. Garcí­a Linera also said that three members of the pro-Reyes Villa Comité Cí­vico de Cochabamba had been arrested for carrying guns. 

The department of Cochabamba disputed this interpretation and said both of those killed were anti-government supporters. This is clearly wrong, since one of those killed is universally agreed to have been a coca-grower and therefore a supporter of President Morales.

Garcí­a Linera, who is running the country while President Morales visits Nicaragua for the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega, claimed that Reyes Villa had neglected his duties in Cochabamba because he was playing politics, by attending a meeting of prefects opposed to the government in La Paz. The opposition prefects issued a statement on 11 January, rejecting any negotiation with the government.

Reyes Villa responded by saying Morales was to blame because he had sauntered off to Nicaragua instead of sorting out a compromise in Cochabamba. Reyes Villa repeated his claim that Morales wants to depose the six (of nine) departmental prefects who oppose the government. Late on 11 January, military units surrounded the hotel where five opposition prefects were meeting in La Paz: the official line is that the government wanted to protect the opposition prefects from pro-government supporters who were massing outside the hotel. 

The opposition prefects want more autonomy from the central government but they, along with the opposition parties in congress, do not trust the constituent assembly, which has been meeting, fruitlessly, in Sucre since the beginning of August, to produce a new constitution that will define this autonomy. Reyes Villa let the cat out of the bag before Christmas when he hailed Santa Cruz's drive to “independence" at a rally. Reyes Villa immediately corrected himself, but the central government fears that autonomy is only the anteroom to independence. Santa Cruz, the most prosperous department in the country and home to about a third of Bolivians, is leading the drive to greater autonomy.

The civil war fears are based on the fact that even in the secessionist east of the country around a third of the population supports Morales and his Movimiento al Socialismo. What is clear, even pro-government supporters admit, is that the government has lost control of its most militant supporters, the coca-growers of Chapare, who spearheaded the pro-government protests in Cochabamba. Equally, the prefecture seems to have lost control of some of its police. And there are gangs of criminals roaming around in Cochabamba who are trying to stir things up further.

Development: The federal government announced on 15 February a R$16.4bn (US$7.8bn) cut in the 2007 budget. 

Significance: At first sight the cut seems to go against the government's own investment plans, which are contained in the recently proposed Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC). The reality, however, is that the cut hits mostly “congressional amendments" to the federal budget, which in essence are the pet projects of Brazilian congressmen in their constituencies. The ability to cut the budget is about the only way the Brazilian executive can reign over Brazil's unruly congress. 

With the announced cut the government hopes to put pressure on congress to approve most of the proposals included in the PAC. Congress has until March to vote on the proposals otherwise they will block up congress's voting agenda. President Lula da Silva sent the PAC to congress in the form of decrees, which have precedence over other legislation. If not voted on by March congress will have no other alternative but to rubber-stump the decrees or face delays in its voting agenda. 

Most of the budget savings came from the health, education, sports and culture ministries, which are currently under the management of allied parties and will most likely continue to be after the imminent cabinet reshuffle. The government has also cut the budget of the social development, social security and labour ministries, which are controlled by the rebellious leftwing of Lula's Partido dos Trabalhadores. The government signalled it may reverse the cuts “if tax revenues start to rise as predicted". The reality is it will just wait to see which of its allies will vote in favour of the PAC to decide whose projects will be financed with federal money.

Development: The lower chamber of congress approved the government's reforms to the state-employees' pension system, ISSSTE, on 22 March.

Significance: The third-biggest party in congress, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, plus three small parties, PVEM, Nueva Alianza and, interestingly, the social democratic, PASC, backed the government's proposals. The leftwing Partido de la Revolución Democrática and its allies from the PT and Convergencia tried to disrupt the session and there were protests outside. President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa said that the reform was probably the most important congress had approved for the past 10 years.

The reform, essentially, switches civil servants' pensions from being paid for by taxes to being paid from a new separate fund. The government is giving the new fund almost US$6bn to start it off and leaving it to be run by officials and the trade unions, virtually unsupervised, for the next three years. The government is also guaranteeing that the minimum pension will be two minimum wages (so roughly US$270 a month). These two concessions were the price of union support. 

The senate now has to ratify the measure. The senate has proved to be less in the thrall of the government than the lower chamber. Earlier this month senate rejected the government's nominee, Carlos Hurtado, for the board of the Banco de México, even though he was eminently qualified.

Development: On 26 April an explosive device of low intensity was detonated near the Bolivian embassy in Caracas, but did not cause any injuries or damage to property.

Significance: The government claimed that the man they have arrested for the attack, Luis Alberto Rodrí­guez Villamizar, is from a terrorist organisation linked to the Venezuelan opposition. The foreign minister, Nicolás Maduro, said that the US government had encouraged this type of terrorist attack by allowing Luis Posada Carriles, a former CIA agent wanted in Venezuela on terrorism charges, to leave prison on bail. 

Opposition attacks on foreign embassies have happened before in Caracas; the Cuban embassy was targeted during the 2002 coup attempt. The Bolivian president, Evo Morales, is due to visit Venezuela on 28 April for a summit of the alternative trade bloc, Alba, and the attack was possibly a sign of protest against the close relations between President Hugo Chávez and Bolivia.

However, it is not unknown for the government to try to elicit support by exaggerating, or even fabricating, threats against it. In March a retired general from the national guard was arrested on suspicion of conspiring to overthrow President Hugo Chávez based on highly dubious evidence.

Development: On 1 June President Alvaro Uribe revealed that US is about to release data showing that the amount of coca planted in Colombia in 2006 increased from the previous year.

Significance: The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has yet to issue its official report for last year, but Uribe admitted to having been tipped off as to its content. According to the president, the ONDCP found that coca acreage rose 8% in 2006 to 156,000 hectares. Such an increase strongly suggests the anti-narcotics policy is failing and thus casts doubt on the effectiveness of US aid to Colombia.

"I was told yesterday that [the US] was very worried about releasing these figures because of my trip to Washington," Uribe declared, referring to his visit to the US on 6 June. "Let them release the numbers; I'm revealing them now: this is a fundamental issue."

Such defiance notwithstanding, Uribe did question the accuracy of the US report. The president compared the ONDCP's findings with those of the United Nations: in early May Uribe's government leaked an early copy of the report for 2006 produced by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime which showed that coca acreage fell by 9% last year to 78,260 hectares.

While the US figures have been much higher than the UN figures in recent years, they have until now followed the same trend. Uribe said that he could not understand the enormous discrepancy between the two figures and asked for the US and the UN to "agree on a methodology".

Meanwhile, Colombia and Venezuelan have overcome a minor spat caused when Colombia's defence minister, Juan Manuel Santos, said last week that there had been a notable increase in the amount of Colombian drugs flowing through Venezuela. The Venezuelan government sent a protest note to Colombia, but the two countries' foreign ministers patched up their differences at a meeting on the sidelines of the OAS meeting in Panama.

Development: President Tony Saca announced on 5 July that he is considering withdrawing Salvadorean troops from Iraq.

Significance: El Salvador is the only Latin American country that still has troops in Iraq, and its commitment has been rewarded by the US government with, for example, the recent extension of the Temporary Protected Status for 230,000 Salvadorean immigrants.

However, the participation in the war has been heavily criticised by the left-wing opposition Frente Farabundo Martí­ para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), especially as five Salvadorean soldiers have lost their lives on the mission. Saca made a surprise visit in May to the 380-strong contingent of troops from the Cuscatlán VIII battalion, who are stationed in Al Kut, the capital of Wasit province, 90km from Baghdad.

Saca made the announcement following a meeting in Chile with President Michelle Bachelet. The Chilean government has been against the Iraq war from the outset. Saca said the troop withdrawal would be "gradual"; "As hostilities diminish and the Iraqi forces are able to take control of the situation, we will gradually take our troops out."

Development: Gabor Beszterczey, a Hungarian citizen who was working as a translator for a European delegation interviewing Cuban dissidents, was expelled from Cuba according to reports published on 6 August.

Significance: Beszterczey's expulsion prompted three European deputies, members of the Council of Europe, to denounce the Cuban authorities. According to the European delegates the Cuban police "threatened" to expel them if they continued talking with members of the Cuban opposition. The European delegates made their claims during a protest by the Damas de Blanco, a group of women whose husbands, fathers and sons are being kept as political prisoners.

The Council of Europe is a governmental organisation founded in 1949 to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The three European delegates, who are members of the national parliaments of Hungary, the Netherlands and Estonia, arrived in Cuba on 31 July for a week-long mission to interview Cuban dissidents. However, the three delegates and their translator entered Cuba as tourists.

Development: On 10 September Chile's supreme court voted on whether to extradite Alberto Fujimori to Peru, but it refused to announce the verdict.

Significance: The supreme court will not reveal its decision until it has written up the verdict, which was the result of 20 days' deliberation. The consensus seems to be that the verdict on Fujimori, the former Peruvian president (1990-2000), should nonetheless be known by the end of this week.

It would be a major surprise if the supreme court does not extradite Fujimori to face charges of corruption and crimes against humanity. The former president maintains his innocence but his attempt to run for office in Japan suggested he did not have much faith in his lawyers. A ruling against extradition would also be a blow to human rights activists in Chile who have lobbied hard for him to face justice in Peru

Significance: The resignation of José Carlos Marroquí­n, Colom's chief strategist, is the more important event. The manner of his resignation was odd: in an impromptu press conference Marroquí­n declared that he was "fighting against those who had brought Guatemala to its knees." The spin on this was that he was resigning because of death threats against his family. His words, however, could prove the deathknell for Colom's faltering campaign: Colom's campaign has been beset by allegations of corruption and links to organised crime. 

Marroquí­n was not close to Colom, the candidate for the social democratic, Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), and had been the object of an assassination attempt, possibly by people closer to Colom in 2006. At the weekend, the local press alleged that Colom was now in league with grisly figures such as Jacobo Salán Sánchez and Francisco Ortega Menaldo, former army officers, who now have close links with smugglers and organised crime. 

The press also alleged that Julio Girón and Napoleón Rojas, who had previously been important figures in the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco, which is loyal to the bible-bashing former dictator, Efraí­n Rí­os Montt, were influencing Colom. Marroquí­n's big problem was César Fajardo, a UNE deputy, who doubles as Colom's lawyer. Óscar Clemente Marroquí­n, a prominent journalist and José Carlos's father, alleged that Fajardo was behind the attempt to kill his son in 2006. 

Marroquí­n senior made the allegation after Fajardo was one of a minority of deputies to vote against the setting up of the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (Cicig). The arrival of the Cicig should, international organisations hope, improve the law and order situation in the country. 

Marroquí­n made it clear that he was disgusted with Colom and his circle. He said that he "was leaving the political battle, but not the fight against the hidden powers which had brought the country to its knees". He said that his ideas could be used by any government, including a Partido Patriota government headed by Pérez Molina. Alejandro Sinibaldi, the campaign chief for the Partido Patriota, said Marroquí­n had made a brave decision. Colom said that Marroquí­n resignation would not affect his campaign and that his allegations about the links between him and his advisers with organised crime were ridiculous. Colom claimed that the US embassy had investigated the allegations and found them groundless. 

The opinion poll, by Borge y Asociados, published in El Periódico on 11 October, found that Otto Pérez Molina was running at 39.8% support compared with Colom's 37.3%. The poll, carried out between 29 September and 6 October, found that 23% of the voters would spoil their ballot papers. This is the first time that the Borge poll has put Pérez Molina ahead. The margin, however, is still less than the poll's margin of error.

Development: On 11 November, President Michele Bachelet of Chile refused an offer of a cheap petrol supply to run Santiago's new transport system (Transantiago) from her Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chávez .

Significance: The refusal reveals Bachelet's intention to stay away from Chávez 's influence. The Venezuelan president has used his country's abundance of oil to attract allies in Latin America, with subsidised fuel and other financial aid. This has allowed Chávez to increase his influence, especially in Bolivia, which has stepped up its campaign for access to the sea. Bolivia lost its coastline after being defeated by Chile in a war in the nineteenth century. Bachelet evidently considered that accepting Chávez 's offer would have meant accepting his involvement in future negotiations with Bolivia.

Santiago's new transport system, which began operating in February, turned out to be more chaotic for commuters than the old one. The new system was devised by Bachelet's predecessor but she went ahead with the plans. The chaos that ensued after the implementation of the new system dogged her administration and resulted in Bachelet's approval rating dropping below the 40% mark. She was forced to go on TV to apologise to Santiaguinos.

Bachelet said in a public ceremony that "I am convinced that us Chileans can resolve the problems of Transantiago ourselves". The declaration followed a more emphatic one from foreign minister, Alejandro Foxley, who said that Chile did not want any subsidies because "we are not used to have others telling us what to do". Transantiago is running a deficit of US$145m, and Chávez 's offer would have allowed the Chilean government a lifeline. The Chileans clearly consider US$145m a small price to pay for avoiding interference from Chávez .

BRAZIL: Market analysts rose their economic growth forecast for 2007 from 4.71% to 5.06%, according to a central bank survey. The change came after official statistics were published showing that Brazil's economy had expanded by 5.3% between January and September in comparison to the same period last year.

Who is Dr. Carlos Vinicio Gómez Ruiz? He is Guatemala's new interior minister.

Why watch him? With 5,781 murders registered in Guatemala in 2007 and impunity levels at 98%, the country's appalling security situation undoubtedly poses the biggest challenge for President Álvaro Colom's new administration. Upon taking office, Colom reiterated his campaign pledges to fight violence and drug trafficking and declared security would be one of the main priorities of his 100-day plan.

Education: Having initially trained as a dentist, Vinicio Gómez completed a training course for high-ranking police officers at the police academy in Ávila, Spain (1987-8) and holds a certificate from the Spanish interior ministry in civil protection. He also completed courses in Guatemala in other areas, such as police methods and investigation of stolen vehicles.

Public Life: With over 20 years experience in security matters, Vinicio Gómez served as deputy director general of the home guard (Guardia de Hacienda) in 1994 and then as deputy chief of the attorney general's criminal investigation division in 1996 under the Álvaro Arzú administration (1996-2000). He worked as head of security at La Aurora international airport and more recently at Banco Internacional. Considered a technocrat rather than a politician, Vinicio Gómez has largely maintained a low media profile. In April 2007 he was appointed as deputy interior minister.

Time Line:
1989-90: Coordinator and teacher of crime studies at the national police academy
1991: Deputy director of the police subdivision responsible for planning, analysis and case monitoring
1992-3: Adviser to the Presidential Human Rights Commission (Copredeh)
1993-94: Inspector general of the national police directorate
1994: Deputy director of the Home Guard
1995-6: Deputy chief of the attorney general's criminal investigation division
1996-8: Deputy chief of the attorney general's office
1998-9: Head of security at the La Aurora international airport
1999-2007: Head of security for Banco Internacional
2007-8: Deputy interior minister

Strengths:

Having worked in a range of security-related posts, most recently as deputy interior minister, Vinicio Gómez is by no means a novice to the field. He also has a close relationship with Colom, having worked with him since 2003 on the design of his security plans. In terms of addressing the security situation, Vinicio Gómez will receive a boost from the newly established international commission against impunity in Guatemala (Cicig), which is tasked with investigating organised crime. Cicig officially began operations on 11 January and any achievements are likely to reflect positively on the government.

Weaknesses:

The enormity of the task ahead cannot be underestimated, not least because of the entrenchment of organised crime networks in state institutions. The pledge to crack down on crime has invariably formed the basis of many a campaign platform, yet the situation continues to worsen. The attorney general's office has long been accused of inefficiency and corruption, while the police remains one of the institutions most afflicted by the infiltration of organised crime: during the previous administration, at least 2,245 police agents were sacked for various offences.

As well as the lack of credibility surrounding the state apparatus, doubts have emerged over Vinicio Gómez himself. For example, the local media recalled allegations that he altered the crime scene where Bishop Juan Gerardi Conedera was found bludgeoned to death on 26 April 1998. At the time, Vinicio Gómez was working for the attorney general's office. Human rights organisations have long argued that Gerardi's murder was politically motivated, taking place two days after the Archbishop's Human Rights Office (ODHA) published a detailed account of the human rights violations committed by the armed forces during Guatemala's 36-year-long civil war.

Prospects:

So far some 1,314 arrests have been made in conjunction with various crimes, and 269 police officials have been fired for corruption as part of Colom's 100-day plan. Vinicio Gómez described the police purge as a "clear message" to other police officials.

Nevertheless, critics have already accused the government of adopting measures designed to have a high media impact rather than tackling the root of the problem. For example, legal experts point out that many of those arrested have subsequently been released due to lack of evidence, and criticise the lack of coordination between the attorney general's office and the police. As such, they say, these measures point to a continuity in the strategy used by the previous president, Oscar Berger, which raises questions over whether the situation is likely to change.

The capacity of Vinicio Gómez to address the security situation is also compromised by Colom's appointment of other security officials with similarly questionable pasts. Defence minister Brigadier Marco Tulio Garcí­a Franco, for instance, was a prominent member of - and later led - the Guatemalan intelligence agency (known as D-2 or G-2), which has subsequently been implicated in some of the worst human rights abuses perpetrated during the civil war.

These ties raise questions over how far the new administration and the UN-backed Cicig will be able to investigate organised crime and paramilitary security forces in the country, given the origins of these groups in the civil war.

Development: On 2 March Brazil's President Lula da Silva discussed with ministers the possibility of his acting as mediator in the current diplomatic row between Ecuador and Colombia.

Significance: Lula exceptionally telephoned his foreign and defence ministers, Celso Amorim and Nelson Jobim, respectively on a Sunday to urgently discuss Brazil's role in the serious diplomatic dispute over Colombia's raid on Ecuadorian territory on 1 March.

On 1 March the Colombian armed forces killed Raúl Reyes, number two for the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc), in a midnight air raid on a Farc camp in Ecuadorean territory. This has caused a major diplomatic row between the two countries, with Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez throwing oil on the fire by sending ten battalions of tanks to his country's border with Colombia and recalling all Venezuela's remaining diplomatic staff in Bogotá.

Brazil's President Lula da Silva, on the other hand, seems to be seeking to dampen the flames. Local media are reporting that he is considering mediating between Ecuador's President Rafael Correa and Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe, with whom he maintains equally good relations. Indeed, mediation seems to be one of Lula's methods of achieving his stated goal of re-confirming Brazil as the region's leading superpower.

Brazilian deputy Raúl Jungmann, from the Commission for Exterior Relations in the lower house, has said that if Brazil were to play a mediating role between the two Andean countries, it would have to be within the framework of the Organisation of American States' "treaty on mutual assistance".

President Felipe Calderón of Mexico is also getting involved: On 2 March he officially offered his government's support to help mediate between Ecuador and Colombia.

Development: On 4 April Chile and Argentina created the "Cruz del Sur", a new joint defence corps for UN peace operations.

Significance: This new military initiative is a sign of the greater push towards regional integration among southern cone countries. It was hailed by both Chilean and Argentine authorities as a milestone in bilateral relations. Notwithstanding, experts highlight that despite an increasingly strong level of trust between the neighbours in the military arena, this has not permeated many other spheres of the relationship.

The "Cruz del Sur" will operate as a "rapid response" military defence force dealing with national and regional emergencies. The troops should be available to be on the ground within 30 to 90 days of the crisis, remaining in the affected area for a period 6 to 12 months.

While Argentine defence minister Nilda Garré described it as the result of a "growing process of approach, co-operation and political coordination", her Chilean counterpart, José Goñi, even qualified the collaboration as "new to [world] history".

The task force - which has been under development since 2005 - comprises seven Chilean and six Argentinean officers, led by Chilean Colonel Ian Mackinnon. Mackinnon is planning and coordinating the forces so that they can be presented to the UN by the end of this year.