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On 10 February the Truth Commission (CVR) which is investigating the circumstances of the coup d'état against former President Manuel Zelaya in June 2009, said that it was close to concluding its report, even though it has yet to talk to some of the main protagonists. Zelaya himself refuses to talk to the CVR because he says it has no standing (as it was set up by his elected successor, Porfirio Lobo).

The chairman of the Commission is Guatemala's former vice president and foreign minister, Eduardo Stein. It started work on 4 May 2010. The other members are: a Peruvian judge, Marí­a Amadilia Zavala Valladares; a Canadian diplomat, Michael Kergin; the head of the national university, Julieta Castellanos; and one of her predecessors, Jorge Omar Casco.

On 9 February the CVR interviewed the former president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, who was intimately involved in trying to find a compromise which might have led to Zelaya's return to office (if not power) immediately after the coup. Stein said that Arias's testimony provided verifiable evidence that “there were major breaks in the legislation (i.e. the Honduran constitution) during the period of crisis in Honduras. In this context, it is possible that people will be upset by our conclusions."

The big question is whether the “people upset" will be Zelaya supporters; partisans of the group, led by Roberto Micheletti, that overthrew him; or even Lobo himself. Stein also said that Arias had made some suggestions about what should go into the CVR's report which will be published at the end of March.

According to Stein, Arias welcomed the CVR's work and said that it was right for the Honduran people to understand the background to the events of 28 June 2009 so that similar crises could be averted in the future. According to Stein, Arias also criticised those governments, led by Brazil, which still refuse to recognise Porfirio Lobo as rightful president of Honduras.

Separately, José Miguel Insulza, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), another prominent figure who is also due to give evidence to the CVR, reiterated that he wants Honduras to recover its full membership of the OAS because Lobo should be rewarded for his good faith. However, Insulza doubted that if the issue came to a vote (perhaps at the forthcoming OAS meeting in El Salvador at the beginning of June), Honduras would be readmitted to the OAS. He noted that two-thirds of the OAS's 35 members would need to vote in favour of ending Honduras's suspension but doubted that 24 OAS members would vote accordingly.

It does seem, however, that South American hostility towards the current Honduran regime is on the wane. It is worth noting that in early February Ecuador sent its national football team to Honduras for a friendly international. Ecuador's president, Rafael Correa, was one of the strongest supporters of suspending Honduras from the OAS after the coup.

Lobo's reform effort: On 2 February, President Lobo met the 15 members of the country's supreme court (CSJ) in a bid to dispel concerns about the confrontational relationship between the executive and the judiciary. Lobo said his intention was to convince the court to drop its pending criminal charges against Zelaya. On 14 February President Lobo said that the government would not add further charges to the ones Zelaya already faces. This means that Zelaya now faces one charge of corruption (involving L$57m or US$3m) over misuse of funds for advertising. The CSJ, which opposed and still opposes Zelaya, will appoint the judge for this case. First, however, the judge will have to establish that there is a case to answer and that a crime has been committed by Zelaya.

• Remittances

In January 2011 the inflow of remittances to Honduras jumped by 14.8% year-on-year to US$210m. In 2010 remittances came to US$2.53bn, up 5.3% on 2009. In 2009 remittances were 11.2% down on 2008, thanks to the economic crisis in the US which badly affected the 1m Hondurans working there.

With just over a month to go before regional elections, Chile's rightwing opposition, Alianza por Chile, is eager to turn the media spotlight away from the prosecution of retired General Augusto Pinochet and on to more electorally-fertile ground: law and order. More specifically, they wish to highlight the Concertación government's failure to tackle a steadily rising tide of violent crime. A set of crime statistics published on 23 September appears to help their cause: reports of serious crime are up 9.8% in the second quarter. However, since Chile's rising crime rate coincides with the implementation of a new justice system, the figures are not as clear-cut as they may appear.

Nationwide, reports of serious crime, such as murder, rape and robbery with violence, were up by 9.8% in the second quarter of 2004, compared with the same period of 2003. Rape was up 31%, robbery with intimidation up 15.5% and robbery with violence up 13.5%. However, most arrests in the second quarter were as arrests of theft (61.4%), actual bodily harm (17.8%) and robbery with force (11%). Arrests related to serious crime offences were down by 15.7% on the same period of 2003.

The government remained upbeat about the figures. The subsecretary of the interior ministry, Jorge Correa Sutil, claimed that the rise in reported crime was due to the greater confidence people had in the police and judiciary, especially in areas of the country where the new justice system was already in place; reports of crime there were up 10% on the same period of 2003. Correa argued that second quarter crime rates were always higher than first quarter figures and the statistics just published showed that the government had been successful in slowing the rise. 'This year crime has increased less. In 2003 crime increased by 25% (compared with 2002), and this year the rise was only 10%,' he said.

Others put a different gloss on the figures. Gonzalo Vargas, the director of the citizens' peace foundation, said the rise 'was not solely due to an increase in confidence, but also to an increase in the level of delinquency, among other reasons.' 

The leader of Alianza por Chile, Joaquin Laví­n, did not use the statistics to score points, perhaps mindful of the fact that, as mayor of Santiago, he bears some responsibility for the city's position at number two in the rankings of areas with the highest reported crime rate. Seizing on the fact that crime in the city was down 3.21% in the second quarter of 2004 compared with 2003, he commented, 'serious and profound work has been done and for me the most important thing has been that all the authorities; the ministry of the interior, the city council and the police have worked as a team and for the same side'. 

However, Laví­n and his APC colleagues have been more aggressive on another law and order issue: pardons. According to the opposition, in the last five years the government has pardoned 235 prisoners, 60% of whom have been sentenced for drug-related offences. 'President Lagos is always asking in public what kind of Chile do we want, and the Chile that we don't want is one where drug-traffickers get off scot-free and the President of the Republic refuses to give any explanation,' Andrés Chadwick, a senator from the rightwing Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) party, said.

The government says these numbers include reductions in sentences and the pardoning of fines. None of those convicted of drug-related crimes, the government claims, served a shorter sentence; their only benefits were limited to fine pardons or reductions. Keen to avoid appearing weak on crime, José Miguel Insulza, the interior minister, pointed to an increase in the number of prisons and a reduction in such benefits as day release and parole. Insulza has also proposed toughening the laws on drug-trafficking by confiscating the property of such criminals.

The new justice system

The justice system is in the process of being modernised. In September 1999 Congress approved the most important judicial reform for over a century, the creation of an office of public prosecution, the Ministerio Publico. Complementary legislation included the establishment of a legal aid service and a new code of penal procedures, replacing a system in which a single judge investigated, prosecuted and passed sentence. The new penal system was introduced gradually from 2001, and by the start of 2004 the whole country except for the Santiago metropolitan region was operating under the new regime. Santiago was expected to join from December 2004, but entry has been postponed until June 2005 owing to delays to preparatory measures, including the construction of a new justice complex, the Centro de Justicia de Santiago.

The Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST), Brazil's largest landless movement, has commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Carajás massacre with more of its notorious - yet increasingly usual - assaults on farms. President Lula da Silva has been noticeably quiet about these actions, which according to opinion polls are opposed by the majority of the Brazilian population. For the rightwing press, these actions are criminal and Lula's failure to criticise the MST is a clear affront to the very notion of state. 

The number of farms squatted by the MST and other peasant groups has shot up in the first three months of the year to a six-year high. The farms considered productive according to the agricultural ministry's standards are now being targeted. Two Eucalyptus plantations, one owned by Aracruz Cellulose in Rio Grande do Sul and another by Suzano Papel e Celulose in Bahia, have been vandalised causing an estimate US$700,000 in damage costs. In the case of Aracruz, years of genetic research have also been lost after peasants destroyed the farm's laboratory. 

On 17 April the MST commemorated the tenth anniversary of the massacre of 19 peasants by the police in the town of Carajás, on the borders of the Amazon rainforest, by squatting more farms, blocking roads and fomenting looting across the country. The leaders of the movement considered the actions "a protest against impunity". Indeed, so far none of accused of committing the massacre have gone to jail. Two officers are waiting in freedom while their sentences are revised, while all the 142 police involved in the Carajás operation have been found not guilty of the crime. The government's response to the MST's actions has been dissonant to say the least. During the official ceremony to remember the dead, the government's representative, the human rights minister, Paulo Vannuchi, declared that the MST is misunderstood by some commentators. For Vannuchi, the movement "avoids the occurrence of a civil war" in Brazil. The juridical representative of the agrarian development ministry, Gercino da Silva Filho, went further saying that "protests for access to land are welcomed". 

The minister for institutional relations, Tarso Genro, on the other hand, believes that farm-squatting and other actions perpetrated by the MST should be treated "in accordance with the law". The agriculture minister, Roberto Rodrigues, was more emphatic when he classified the invasions of the Aracruz and Suzano's farms as "acts of vandalism". Rodrigues said that the MST was misinformed and that the invasions were about ideological questions and not about the protection of the environment. 

Rightwing backlash 

Creating further doubts about the government's position, President Lula da Silva has kept notably quiet about the MST's recent actions. A few days after the 17 April celebrations, however, Lula finally opened his mouth and criticised big farmers whom he accused of not paying back their debts with the government. The issue is highly contentious: development-minded politicians take the side of big farmers whose intensive farming methods kick-started the recent economic recovery. The socially-oriented side with landless groups which complain the government does not support their cooperatives. 

To make matters worse, Lula seemed to have incited more protests from "social movements". According to Lula, they should "enjoy and make demands to this government, because if he does not deliver now, no other government ever will". As expected Lula's comments instigated a rightwing backlash. The rightwing magazine Veja, for instance, deemed this "one of Lula's most shameful moments", stating that the president should be demanding respect for the country's law and order.

Furthermore, according to Veja the government is to blame for the increasingly chaotic situation in the countryside. The publication linked the federal government's donations to landless groups with the number of invasions of farms, showing in a pictorial graphic that the more the government gives money to peasants, bigger is the number of invasions. In 2004 the number of farms squatted tripled in relation to 2002, the last year of President Cardoso's administration, despite the government's transfers to the MST having increased almost fivefold in the period. 

As agreed by the government's own financial overseeing agency, the right says that the money given by the government to the MST and other landless groups is badly spent. An official report published at the beginning of the year found several irregularities in MST projects which are financed by the government, such as schooling and assistance to small farmers. The report concludes by recommending the government initiate court proceedings to retrieve R$15m (US$6.97m) given to the MST from public coffers. 

The MST's aspirations and the legal side of things

The right have also started to question what are the MST's real aspirations. Many commentators doubt that landless protests have anything to do with justice and are instead part of a much bigger - and sinister - objective. For instance, the right says, if the MST was really concerned about justice for the victims of Carajás, it should also respect the law. The right argues that MST leaders do not care about impunity because their criminal actions are not punished by the Brazilian justice system either. 

That is not exactly true since the main MST leaders, José Rainha, Pedro Stedile, Clédison Mendes and Jaime Amorim, currently answer to forty judicial processes between them, ranging from robbery to incitation to violence and trespassing. Things turned nastier after Stedile, together with 36 other people, was charged with money laundering on 24 April after the police discovered US$10,000 in the MST office in Porto Alegre. Public prosecutor Daniel Indrusiak, who is leading investigations, requested the court's permission to scrutinise the MST accounts to find out where the money came from.

The main difficulty for jurists to examine the MST lies in the fact that the movement is not legally registered as an entity. Because of that, they cannot stop invasions as they have no entity to prosecute. Yet due to its exceptional legal circumstances, the MST is also not legally allowed to receive donations apart from governmental assistance to finance social projects carried out in partnership with official agencies. This might be the breakthrough waited for by MST's enemies who are now pressuring for official investigations to be carried out to establish how the movement is really financed. 

Brazilian society's inability to discuss the land issue earnestly contributed for the polarisation of opinions. For rightwing commentators the MST's objectives - and its associates - have already been established. For them, the MST is really engaged on a "socialist revolution" against the Brazilian state with the support of the Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez , who publicly declared his support for Lula during an event promoted by the MST on 26 April. 

On the other end of the spectrum, MST leaders have also started to step up their ideological discourse. The MST wants to act in urban centres to unite "all Brazilian workers against the elites that concentrate wealth and power". The new movement will also bring together non-engaged or not-yet-organised associations, such as small farmers and favelados (inhabitants of Brazilian shanty-towns) with the aim of bringing about "a social revolution" in Brazil.

The draft budget for 2008 envisages GDP growth of 5%, which would take the economy's output up to G$56.6trillion. The problem is that the figures do not appear to add up. The government is forecasting that both imports and tax revenues will fall this year. Such a combination is usually a sign of a faltering economy. Most independent economists say that the economy will grow by, at best, 4% in 2007. 

The government is also expecting exports of US$2.76bn, virtually the same as they were in 2006 and imports of US$6.24bn, down US$50m on the 2006 result. Tax revenues will fall from G$7.6tr to G$6.6 trillion. 

Inflation: In July inflation was 0.4%, up from June's minus 0.7%. This brought the rate for the first seven months to 1.1% and the rate for the past 12 months to 7.5%. In 2006 the rate was 12.5 %. 

Budget
The government is drawing up the 2008 budget on the expectation of significant pay increases for civil servants. The biggest single increase is a 20% pay rise for teachers. The big question is whether the government is being realistic in its budgeting. The government claims that total government spending will be around G$13.5 trillion, or only 8% more than 2007 spending. Given the scale of the pay increases it, and congress, have authorised and the way the public sector has been hiring, this forecast looks far too low. The cost of the teachers' pay rise is likely to be around G$330bn (US$55m) in a full year. The money had not been budgeted for this year, yet all that is needed to authorise the increase is approval from the senate. 

The authority of Kirchnerismo is weakening. A year ago the ruling Frente Para la Victoria (FPV) boasted a comfortable majority in both houses; now it can barely muster quorum and is at real risk of losing its congressional majority entirely in October's midterm elections. Already under pressure, the FPV suffered two blows in February. First, dissident Peronists and the popular mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri, announced a new alliance; and second, seven FPV legislators defected in as many days, including the powerful Peronist senator Carlos Reutemann. The rebellion had its roots in what could pose a formidable threat to President Cristina Fernández's authority ahead of October: the revival of the government's conflict with Argentina's farming sector.

The anti-K alliances: Opposition to the Fernández government ahead of October has coalesced into two fronts: a centre-left coalition of Radicals, Socialists and Elisa Carrió's Coalición Cí­vica (CC); and the centre-right alliance between Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronist) dissidents and Macri's Propuesta Repúblicana (Pro).  The Pro-PJ dissident alliance allies Macri, whose party controls half of all seats in the Buenos Aires city legislature, with two powerful Buenos Aires deputies: Felipe Solá, a former governor of the province of Buenos Airess, who is popular with the country's rural sector; and Francisco De Narváez, a millionaire businessman who won 15% of the vote when he stood to be governor in 2007 [he lost to the FPV candidate, Daniel Scioli]. Behind the alliance looms the presence of another influential PJ dissident and party veteran, the former president Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003), who, despite the trio's best efforts to distance themselves from 'Duhaldismo', doubtless helped engineer the agreement.  

The alliance aims to topple Kirchnerismo in the crucial Buenos Aires province, the largest electoral district (accounting for 38% of voters), and where the government will hope to compensate for expected losses in the nation's farming provinces. The three men will, however, have to overcome their personal rivalries if they are to present a convincing challenge to the FPV. Both Solá and Macri harbour presidential ambitions ahead of 2011 (De Narváez cannot run for president as he was born in Colombia), while De Narváez and Solá will vie with each other to head the party list in October. If the trio do succeed in presenting a convincing united front, it is possible that other disaffected Kirchneristas will join their ranks. 

The second challenge to the Kirchners will come from a coalition of traditional opposition parties, made up of the Unión Radical Cí­vica (UCR, Radicals), the Partido Socialista and the CC. Assuming it can remain united, the alliance has the potential to make significant gains in October: the Radicals have struggled to recover following the ignominious end to the presidency of UCR leader Fernando de la Rúa in 2001, but retain a potentially powerful national network, while the CC has a strong presence in both the capital (the country's second largest electoral district) and the main Buenos Aires province. The alliance received a boost in early February, when the popular Vice President, Julio Cobos, who leads the anti-K grouping Consenso Federal (ConFe), said that he would work with the UCR, his former party, with a view to fielding joint candidates in his native province of Mendoza. Cobos is one of several UCR dissidents to rebel against the government, whose “K-Radical" support base has all but evaporated since Fernández came to power in 2007. 

The February exodus: Barely a week after the launch of the Pro-PJ dissident alliance, the FPV received a second blow: the resignation from the party of senator Reutemann, a popular and influential former governor of the central province of Santa Fe. Reutemann left the FPV along with fellow Santa Fe senator Roxana Latorre on 17 February, because, he said, the government was “endangering the interests of [his] province". Two days later, Peronist senators Juan Carlos Romero and Sonia Escudero, from the north-western province of Salta, followed suit. Then, on 23 February, three Peronist deputies, Walter Agosto, Ariel Dalla and former Santa Fe governor and close ally of former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), Jorge Obeid, quit the FPV to join Reutemann's newly formed congressional bloc, Santa Fe Federal. The FPV can now count on around 119 of 276 deputies (a year ago it enjoyed the support of some 153), and 40 of 72 senators (down from 44).

The minor exodus sparked by Reutemann indicates the key role that provincial pressures - and the farming conflict in particular - will have to play in the run up to October's vote. Reutemann, who voted against the government's agricultural export tax reforms last year, is popular with farmers. He is likely to stand for re-election as a senator in October, with a view to the presidency in 2011 [RBS-09-01]. To have run on an FPV ticket in Santa Fe, an agricultural powerhouse where some 76% of voters have a negative opinion of Fernández, would likely have been electoral suicide. The exodus may not be over: if Peronists judge that they are better placed outside of Kirchnerismo, they will not hesitate to jump ship. 

The rural threat: A repeat of last year's conflict with the farming sector, which lasted four months and dealt Fernández's administration a humiliating defeat in the senate, has the potential to derail the government ahead of October. Doubtless mindful of this threat, the government has now agreed to what it did its utmost to avoid in 2008: face-to-face talks. Negotiations began on 24 February, following a four day suspension of grain and cattle sales - the sector's first strike of 2009 - and continued on 3 March, with the surprise appearance of the president herself at talks. Fernández's decision to attend the meeting, a conciliatory gesture intended to demonstrate the government's willingness to resolve the conflict, did not go unheeded by farmers. Union leaders subsequently signed four agreements with the government, including: the elimination of dairy export taxes; an increase in the beef export quota (from 550,000 to 610,000 tonnes); and an increase in domestic wheat prices (from 370 to 420 pesos per tonne).  

The problem is that Fernández cannot afford to bend to the farming sector's principal demand: the reduction of grain and oil seed export taxes, including a 35% levy on soya. The government relies heavily on this revenue to finance public spending, which Fernández has promised to boost further this year in an attempt to stoke Argentina's ailing economy. Union leaders warned after the meeting on 3 March that although significant progress had been made, "the conflict is not resolved".

• Nationalisation rumours

In the lead up to the 3 March meeting between farm leaders and the government, rumours abounded in the local press that the government would announce the creation of a national board to regulate grain trading. The reports enraged farmers, who accused the government of seeking to pressure the sector into selling some nine million tonnes of soya held back from last year's harvest (export duties on which are worth some US$1bn to the government). In the event, Fernández downplayed the rumours of a state take-over, although she did not rule it out, saying that, the government would send the bill to congress “if deemed necessary".

The third placed presidential candidate, Marina Silva of the Partido Verde (PV), caused a major upset in the first round of the Brazilian election on 3 October, taking an unexpectedly strong 19.3% of the vote and forcing the election to a run-off between the first placed Dilma Rousseff of the ruling left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the runner up José Serra of the main centre-left opposition Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), on 31 October. Silva, President Lula   da Silva's estranged former environment minister and PT defector, has been crowned Brazil's new kingmaker. The second round kicks off on Friday, 8 October.

The result was a defeat for President Lula, who has personally championed Rousseff over the past 18 months, having imposed her candidacy on a doubtful PT. Rousseff took 46.9% of the valid vote (or 47.6m votes, of a 135.8m electorate), a few points shy of her much trumpeted first round victory (which required 50% plus one of the valid vote). Notably however, the ruling 10-11 party coalition, led by the PT and Brazil's largest party, the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), won the general election overall, securing strong majorities in both houses of the federal parliament and at the state level. That seems to suggest that some of the electorate may still harbour some doubts about Rousseff herself, despite her status as Lula's anointed heir. A corruption scandal centred on Rousseff's former office, the ministry of the presidency, did her no favours.

Together, Marina Silva and José Serra won 52%. Serra, who took 32.6% (33.1m votes),   a bit better than pollsters forecast, has Silva to thank for rescuing his political career. Silva's rise in September matched Rousseff's last minute decline point for point. Yet almost everyone was at a loss, immediately, to explain her 20% support (see sidebar).

Immediately after the vote the PSDB leadership made strong overtures to Silva. Serra's campaign team is being shaken up, with his former party presidential rival Aécio Neves, now senator-elect for the country's second largest electoral college, Minas Gerais, along with the PSDB party president Sérgio Guerra and the former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) rumoured to be mounting an 'intervention' to seize Serra's campaign from the hands of “marketing people", and reconnect the somewhat isolated Serra with the rest of the party (and its frustrated allies, one of which, the Partido Trabalhista do Brasil, walked away from the PSDB alliance just days before polling). Ahead of the vote, when it was evident that Silva might just pose a threat to Rousseff, Cardoso said he would “do everything" to promote a second round alliance between Silva and Serra. Cardoso will now counsel Serra, who ran a limp campaign, to strongly attack Rousseff, who Cardoso accuses of being a mere puppet of Lula's and not “a real politician".

Lula, who himself contested two run-offs (in 2002 and 2006), declared after the shock result that he had always been ready for a second round. He will now take personal charge of Rousseff's campaign. At stake are Silva's 19.6m votes. Brazil's chastened pollsters, who completely underestimated Silva's support right up to the eve of the vote, when they were still giving Rousseff 51% of the valid vote, suggest that Rousseff would be able to take 30% of PV supporters, against 50% for Serra, just enough to see her through on 31 October. The first round victor in Brazil almost invariably wins the run off and Rousseff is technically in a better position than Lula was in 2006. But only brave pollsters would now dare call the second round, in the wake of their disastrous predictions.  

Silva   - the most wanted
On 4 October, Marina Silva announced that the PV would take two weeks to decide which presidential candidate to support in the second round. Silva is playing it very cool. “We are going to go through a process_I am not taking up a position a priori, I will be consistent with my convictions", she insisted. One option would be   to adopt a neutral stance. Silva said that the PV would hold a national convention in the second week of October, after consultations with a broad array of groups ranging from Greens to academics and students to unions and the business sector.

Despite Silva's protestations it's fairly clear that the PV leadership is leaning towards Serra. Notably, the PV's high profile Fernando Gabeira, who lost his bid for Rio governor, defied Silva and unilaterally gave his support to Serra on 4 October.The PV's vice president, Alfredo Sirkis, newly elected to the federal congress, immediately stressed that Gabeira was speaking in a personal capacity.

The PV and the PSDB are already in alliance in São Paulo (Serra's home state), governed by the PSDB and its allied Democratas (DEM). The day after the first round, rumours were already doing the rounds that Serra was thinking of ousting his vice-presidential running mate, Antônio Pedro de Siqueira Indio da Costa (of the DEM), in favour of either Silva herself or, more plausibly, Gabeira, who could usefully get out the vote for Serra in Rio, governed by the PT's main coalition ally, the PMDB. Costa and the DEM denied the rumours.

Over in the PT, the party president José Eduardo Dutra is leading the campaign to woo Silva. Rousseff effusively praised Silva's election result but appears less convinced that Silva will come on board. Silva's fractious end to her relationship with the Lula government appears a real hurdle (see sidebar).

The PT is very nervous. Despite the fact that Rousseff goes into the second round having won a majority of states and needing only a few more points to win, the run off is a very different game. Rousseff needs to reconnect with the educated middle classes, whom Silva won over with her 'third way' ethical and green alternative. Two more televised presidential debates will pit Rousseff and Serra head to head for the first time, having tiptoed around each other in the first round debates. They will also have an equal amount of free political advertising time (Rousseff had a big advantage in the first round). Both will need to be much clearer about their policies, which were all but lost in the backward looking comparisons of the Lula-Cardoso eras that dominated the first round. Silva will push them to talk about environmental issues, particularly the question of sustainable growth. Rousseff will also have to appease the evangelical and Catholic voters that rejected her in favour of Silva.  

The PT is also worried about the demobilisation of the coalition campaign in the big states that were decided in the first round, such as Bahí­a, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco -   in whose cities most of Silva's 19.6m
voters are concentrated. The plan of action is to get President Lula even more involved with Rousseff. To start he will visit key states to congratulate the newly elected coalition governors and chivvy them to get out the vote again on 31 October. The PT is anxious that Serra does not gain early momentum on the back of Rousseff's disappointing first round result. PT strategists stress that it's crucial that Rousseff sits well atop the first pre-31 October opinion polls.

• Silva's ethical appeal
  Pollsters belatedly attributed Marina Silva's strong result to her support among Brazil's evangelicals, which make up some 20% of the population (Silva is an fervent evangelical) and anti-abortionists suspicious of Dilma Rousseff's ambivalent stance on abortion. With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that Rousseff   and the PT   underestimated the growing political reach of the country's conservative religious factions, including the powerful evangelical Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which came out heavily in favour of Silva from the pulpit - preaching   to those poor factions that the PT, perhaps presumptously, considered its natural electorate.   Lastly, the young, urbane middle class also swung behind Silva's ethical and environmental message.
  

• No love lost between Rousseff and the Greens
  Marina Silva stepped down as environment minister in May 2008, citing disenchantment with the Lula government's economic policies and pointing the finger at the productive ministries, then led by Dilma Rousseff in her capacity as minister of the presidency. Silva directly accused Rousseff, who led the government's national infrastructure development programme, the PAC, of riding roughshod over environmental concerns as part of the prioritisation of (vote winning) public investment schemes, designed to promote faster economic growth.

President Carlos Mesa's acceptance of the rebellion in Santa Cruz has embarked Bolivia upon a hasty, and inevitably messy, adoption of departmental autonomy - the terms for which have so far been set only by the Cruceño business élite. The constitution will have to be amended at full speed to meet a tight, improvised electoral calendar, which includes a referendum that assumes a partially predetermined result: approval of a still unknown system to devolve powers upon new regional authorities.

When it became clear that on 28 January the Comité Cí­vico Pro Santa Cruz (CCPSC) would unilaterally set up an autonomous government Mesa rushed to preempt it, issuing a call for departmental gubernatorial elections to be held on 12 June and reinterpreting the Cruceño rebellion as not having breached the constitution.

The CCPSC was careful to tiptoe around the letter of the law. It did not establish a new, autonomous government at the public assembly, attended by tens of thousands. Instead it emerged with a mandate, by acclamation, to set up a “provisional assembly" charged with guiding the department towards the adoption of autonomy. The members of this assembly, moreover, were people already holding elected public office: the 25 Cruceños serving as national legislators, the 23 members of the current departmental council, the leaders of the three indigenous groups of Santa Cruz, and the 56 heads of municipal governments. Carlos Hugo Molina, the incumbent, government-appointed prefecto (governor) and himself a Cruceño, resigned clearing the way for an eventual elected successor.

The CCPSC has not yet unveiled a blueprint for the autonomous administration it wants, but it has made clear in the past that it aims to install an assembly with broader legislative powers than the existing departmental council, including the ability to determine the department's share of the oil and gas revenues. The central government is no clearer about what extra autonomy it is prepared to grant the regions, beyond the move from appointed to elected prefectos. Mesa admitted as much when he issued the call for gubernatorial elections: 'We shall have to study in detail what powers, additional to those already vested in the prefecturas, can be given to the departments.'

An aim with many meanings
Achieving a consensus on this will not be easy. The kind of autonomy Santa Cruz is demanding is not the only model around. Similar demands have been made by the Comité Civico de Tarija (CCT), a mirror-organisation of the CCPSC established in Santa Cruz that holds the bulk of the gas reserves. Chuquisaca, partly sandwiched between the two, is divided: geography and history link a big portion of this department with the highlands. The other two departments usually included in the Media Luna ('Crescent'), northern Beni and Pando, have sprouted different models of regional rearrangement. One that has gained a substantial following is the notion of linking up the Amazonian portion of Bolivia, which stretches into the north of Santa Cruz and provides the fanlike network of river outlets for the coca grown just south of them.

Associations of municipalities, known as mancomunidades, have been established across departmental boundaries, pointing to the existence of common interests not well served by the current administrative map. In the recent municipal elections the dominant new force, dramatically displacing the established political parties, was the array of civic associations closely in touch with local needs and with Bolivia's first big experiment in decentralisation. They have little sympathy for the existing, centrally appointed departmental government, but are not keen to see this replaced by centralism at departmental level.

Also part of the picture is an entirely different demand for autonomy: that of the indigenous communities, most forcibly expressed by Felipe Quispe's proposal to recreate the old Aymara domain which includes portions of both Bolivia and Peru as a new entity called Collasuyo, after one of the 'corners' of the Inca empire. And partially overlapping the ethnic element are the common interests of the coca-growers, whose 'territory' has spread out from the Yungas valleys north of La Paz down across northern Cochabamba and, more recently, into Santa Cruz.

All of this was meant to be thrashed out at the constituent assembly, scheduled to emerge from elections which the mayors of Bolivia's main cities have asked congress to call within 60 days - more than a month earlier than the initial tentative date of 8 May. Even if the electoral authority could manage this, it would not give the constituent assembly much time to agree on a blueprint for regional autonomies, let alone a whole new constitution (including such things as the status of the country's hydrocarbons), before the 12 June elections of departmental governors.

That is not the only problem. Whatever constitutional reforms are approved by the constituent assembly must be ratified by the whole electorate in a referendum. In order to avoid having governors elected before the autonomy provisions are fully enacted, the mayors and a number of politicians have been proposing that the gubernatorial elections and constitutional referendum take place on the same day. 

This does not completely solve the problem, but it preserves a semblance of legal propriety. Unavoidably, the new governors will end up ruling not autonomous departments or regions but areas in the process of becoming autonomous, with hastily concocted rules to guide them. Given Bolivia's social and political volatility, this is not a comforting thought.

Calls for prudence
The president of the chamber of deputies, Mario Cossí­o, has been urging a slower, more deliberate pace. What is needed, he says, “is to discriminate the logical sequencing of a process which must conclude in a profound reform of the Bolivian state." Cossí­o, wary of the problems that haste might bring, says, 'Each issue demands specific treatment: I don't know if putting it all into a single bag is in the country's best interests.'

The main problem, says Cossí­o, is Mesa's call for gubernatorial elections on 12 June, which forces the whole schedule to be reorganised to accommodate them. Personally, he adds, he is not sure that the debate on regional autonomy has 'matured' enough to make June the key deadline. Cossí­o, it should be noted, belongs to the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the party which took the heaviest battering in the municipal elections.

He is hardly the only one calling for prudence. Williams Paniagua, president of the constitutional committee (also MNR), is advocating a two-step approach: first a referendum on autonomy, accompanied by the election of governors, and secondly, at a later date, the election of a constituent assembly, which will have a far more comprehensive remit.

The obvious question about the Venezuelan presidential elections due on 3 December is whether Manuel Rosales, the opposition candidate, can beat President Hugo Chávez . If he can, what are his prospects for forming a stable government? If he fails, what will happen to the Venezuelan opposition and what new direction will the "Bolivarian Revolution" take?

The polls
On 24 October, a poll by Zogby International found support of 59% for Chávez , 24% for Rosales and 2% for Benjamí­n Rausseo, a comedian running for the Piedra Party. On this evidence, it appears Rosales' chances of victory are fairly slim. However, forty days before Brazil's presidential election, Zogby International gave Lula a 33 percentage point margin over his rival, Gerardo Alckmin. In the event Lula won 48.6% and Alckmin won 41.6%. William Lara, minister of communication and information, said that such drop in support for the incumbent was equally possible in Venezuela. It is worth noting, however, that the gap is still large, and polls which claim to show the two candidates are approaching parity tend to have a suspect methodology.

For example, on 2 November anti-Chávez news outlets picked up a poll published by the Caracas-based AKSA Partners which appeared to show Chávez 's lead over Rosales narrowing to just four percentage points. In fact, the poll, of 1,200 Venezuelans interviewed face-to-face, was somewhat sly: it did not actually ask respondents how they intended to vote. Instead Alfredo Keller, the chief pollster, organised the electorate into categories according to their view on certain policy matters, such as "should Venezuela be made into a Socialist country?". 

Based on their answers, Keller assigned voters into one of four categories: hardcore Chavista, softcore Chavista, softcore opposition or hardcore opposition. By this method he found that 22% of the electorate are hardcore Chavistas and 30% softcore Chavistas; thus, he concludes 52% will vote for Chávez . By the same logic, he combines those opposition leaning voters into one group and concludes they will vote for Rosales. Given the paranoia that pervades the electorate following the widespread dissemination of lists of citizens' voting histories, this method has the advantage of eliciting honest responses without fear, but it is a massive assumption to claim those opposed to key government policies will vote for Rosales.

Rosales in government
Under the Bolivarian Constitution promulgated by President Hugo Chávez and ratified by the constituent assembly in 1999, the presidency's powers were expanded to include the right to dissolve the national assembly under certain circumstances. Given the assembly is currently packed with deputies who are loyal to Chávez , if Rosales wins he says he will call new congressional elections "to escape the institutional crisis". The new national assembly would be elected according to a system of proportional representation. Rosales also said he would reduce the presidential period of office from six to four years, with only one immediate re-election allowed. 

On economic policy, the Zulia governor's flagship programme is the "Mi Negra" debit card which would grant working and middle-class families between Bs$600,000 (US$280) to Bs$1m per month from the country's oil profits, regardless of their political affiliation. Rosales has sought to distance himself from Chávez by promising that his government would be respectful of private property and seek to attract foreign investment. He also said there would be no backlash against the government or its supporters if he won.

The future of Bolivarianism
Whether Chávez 's supporters would be so magnanimous in the event of a Rosales victory is questionable. On 2 November the opposition released a video of the oil and energy minister, Rafael Ramí­rez, threatening workers at the state oil company Pdvsa who did not proselytise for President Hugo Chávez ahead of the presidential elections.

In the video, Ramí­rez says, "we are not going to allow anyone in the company to repress the expression of our people or our workers in support of President Chávez . […] Here we support President Chávez , who is the maximum leader of the revolution and whoever does not feel right about it should surrender his job to a Bolivarian. […] I am insulted that we find Ni-Nis in here, Chavistas light, that there are people who say that we need to open up this thing. 

No sir, anyone here who forgets that we are in the middle of a revolution will get hit hard by us." In the same 14-minute film, Ramí­rez said the Venezuelan government was going "to liberate Bolivia" from the US-sponsored coup threatening the government of President Evo Morales.

It is unclear who filmed the footage, and why it was distributed to the media. Although the proximity of the election has forced the government to unite, it has been unable to hide all the differences between those who want to accelerate the pace of the revolution and those content with its current speed. In the probable event of a Chávez victory such splits are likely to widen. This instability may well be exacerbated by a losing opposition increasingly frustrated with its inability to return to power via a democratic route.

Love makes Chávez blue

On 11 October President Hugo Chávez 's electoral advisers suggested he considered dropping the colour red from his campaign and use blue instead in order to project a less radical image. Spokespersons from Comando Miranda, the Chavista election campaign team charged with the job of winning Chávez 10 million votes (out of a possible 16m), said they had chosen the colour blue because psychologists told them it generated positive feelings in the viewer, such as "love", a concept which is playing an increasingly important part of Chávez 's campaign. The president has an advertisement running in newspapers entitled: "Message of love for the people of my Venezuela". It ends with the supplication, "I need your vote, your vote for love."

Alberto Fujimori's daughter, Keiko, is trumpeting her intention to launch a new party - "Fuerza 2011" - to fuse the different factions within Fujimorismo. Keiko, 32, was elected to congress to represent Lima with more votes than any other candidate in 2006. She says she wants to keep the flames of Fujimorismo alive in the face of a vicious media campaign designed to discredit her father. She will have her work cut out for her. Fujimorismo as a political force is on the wane and Fujimori's name does not need the media to blacken it. Evidence being heard in court now suggests that he was fully aware of the activities of the Grupo Colina death squad, which carried out the infamous Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres (in 1991 and 1992, respectively).

"Fuerza 2011" would bring together the Alianza por el Futuro - which currently has 13 seats in the 120-seat legislative assembly - Cambio 90, and Nueva Mayorí­a. It would serve as a platform for a presidential candidate in 2011 as well as offering political support for Fujimori. The idea has not met with universal approval: congressman Andrés Reggiardo, a representative of Cambio 90, was one of the most outspoken critics of the proposal, but even Fujimori's brother, Santiago, was critical. Santiago said that, while well-meaning, Keiko's initiative was "inappropriate" in the short-term and could even be interpreted as "irrational". He said that it might make more sense in the medium to long-term. His claim that Fujimorismo as a combined force would command 25% to 30% of electoral support appears more than a little exaggerated.

Keiko said that Fuerza 2011 aimed to collect one million signatures over the course of the year in order to register with the national electoral council and demonstrate that the people do not agree with the "lynching" of her father. This would be a symbolic figure, as only 140,000 signatures are required to register a party in Peru. Keiko rejected criticism that she had chosen to collect huge support for the party in order to apply pressure on the judiciary, adding that her intention was purely to be prepared for the next elections. However, even by Latin American standards, three years is a long preparation time. Furthermore, Keiko's assertion was undermined by her brother Kenyi, who urged supporters to sign up "for El Chino's liberty". The media condemned the initiative outright. Mirko Lauer, a columnist for the national daily La República, was particularly critical. "Are they not thinking of running a candidate in Japan?" he asked rhetorically in a sardonic reference to Fujimori's eleventh-hour efforts to compete in the Japanese senatorial elections when he appeared to be losing his case to avoid extradition from Chile.

Keiko for president?

Keiko did not rule out running for president herself in 2011, although she made it clear that she is still very young and that her father is the natural leader. However, he has already received a sentence that will keep him locked up until 2013 and further convictions are pending. He is currently on trial over his alleged responsibility for the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres, in which 25 people were killed. This could result in a much longer sentence: up to 30 years in prison.

In late January Pedro Supo, a former leader of the Grupo Colina death squad, claimed that the Fujimori administration negotiated an amnesty for Colina members in exchange for keeping the government's involvement in the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres secret. Fujimori's defence counsel maintains that Colina acted on its own initiative and that the army had no orders to murder suspected insurgents, having been instructed to hand them over to the justice system.

• Grupo Colina

Although several members of the Grupo Colina death squad were convicted by a military tribunal in February 1994, President Fujimori's ruling coalition in parliament approved an amnesty law in June 1995 under which they were released from prison. Pedro Supo, former leader of the group, claims that the officers were paid US$100,000 and the non-commissioned officers US$50,000 to keep their silence over the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres.

Former president Alberto Fujimori (1991 to 2000) went on trial for embezzlement in July, accused of paying US$15m to his security chief Vladimiro Montesinos. In the space of two weeks he was convicted and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison, the third conviction he has received. Fujimori had admitted paying Montesinos out of state coffers but insisted that he repaid the money before fleeing Peru for Japan in 2000, although he did not clarify from where this money came. Fujimori clearly hoped that by admitting his guilt he would speed up the trial and avoid inflicting irremediable damage to his legacy and the presidential ambitions of his daughter Keiko.

“I express my partial and relative conformity with the charges [...] I only acknowledge the facts, I don't accept the criminal responsibility, the punishment or the civil reparations," Fujimori told the court in Lima. In April Fujimori became the first former, elected head of state in the region to be tried and convicted in his own country for serious human rights violations. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison for murder, aggravated assault and kidnappings, mostly carried out by members of Colina, a death squad in the army intelligence service (SIE).

“Pinochet effect"
The motivation behind Fujimori's decision to plead guilty in the latest case against him was to avoid the fate of Chile's dictator Augusto Pinochet, whose image was damaged far more by the discovery that he embezzled millions of dollars in the Riggs bank scandal than by his responsibility for human rights crimes. He feared that a protracted trial would bring to light the full extent of the kleptocracy over which he presided and damage Keiko's prospects in the 2011 presidential elections. Keiko claimed after April's trial that she would pardon her father if she were to win, although international law and past rulings by Peru's constitutional tribunal prohibit pardons or amnesties in cases of crimes against humanity. 

• Montesinos
  Alberto Fujimori claims that the payment he made to Vladimiro Montesinos was not illegal because he had later reimbursed the state. Judge César San Martí­n was unimpressed. “This was not a political sentence," he said in concluding the trial on 20 July. “The decision today was based purely on the facts." Peru's anti-corruption prosecutor estimates that some US$2bn was plundered from state coffers during Fujimori's decade-long stint in power.
  

Egarsur, the Brazilian consortium behind the proposed Amazon Inambari hydroelectric project, has said that the environmental damages predicted by environmentalists and the 4,000 people the consortium estimates will be displaced, will be mitigated by its plan to fund a US$416,000 “ecological peninsula".

The project, which will flood 410km2, will provide 2,200 megawatts of electricity. Although Peru, where the project will be located, is not in dire need of extra electricity, Brazil's ever increasing energy demand means that it needs the project to move forward. The energy agreement signed between Brazil and Peru in June 2010 involves construction of six dams in the Peruvian Amazon. Within this agreement, Peru will get prioritised access to the electricity. The project will also require the re-routing of the proposed Interoceanic highway - which currently was planned to run along the bottom of the proposed dam.

The dam is also likely to have a negative effect on “uncontacted" semi-nomadic indigenous tribes, which previously lived within Peru's borders but have been force to migrate into Brazilian territory as a result of the continuous encroachment on their lands by illegal loggers. The project will disrupt river flows, alter the landscapes of these indigenous communities and affect local ecosystems, which are meant to be protected under the International Labour Organization's (ILO) convention 169, which Peru ratified in 1994.

On 1 February, photos taken by the Brazilian Indian Affairs Department, a government agency charged with handling relations with the nation's indigenous communities, were obtained by Survival International (SI), an organization working for tribal people's rights worldwide and published in the British daily The Guardian. SI Director Stephen Corry said that "the illegal loggers will destroy this tribe. It's vital that the Peruvian government stops them before time runs out. The people in these photos are self-evidently healthy and thriving. What they need from us is their territory protected, so that they can make their own choices about their future. But this area is now at real risk, and if the wave of illegal logging isn't stopped fast, their future will be taken out of their hands. This isn't just a possibility: it's irrefutable history, rewritten on the graves of countless tribes for the last five centuries."

Cómo una protesta de campesinos, primero descartada por el gobierno, creció pese a la represión hasta ser una fuerza incontenible.

Setiembre
15: Campesinos liderados por Felipe Quispe establecen bloqueos en carreteras al sur de La Paz, en apoyo de dos exigencias: el cumplimiento de las promesas hechas por el gobierno un año antes, y que el gobierno revierta la polí­tica de exportar gas natural a EU.
20: En un intento por sacar a viajeros atrapados en los bloqueos, las tropas chocan con manifestantes: un soldado y cuatro civiles mueren en Warisata, cerca del Lago Titicaca.
25: La confederación obrera, COB, anuncia una huelga general en apoyo de las protestas campesinas y exigen la renuncia del Presidente Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.
26: El Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), el segundo mayor partido del paí­s, liderado por Evo Morales, y lí­der de los cultivadores de coca (y rival de Quispe) se une a las protestas, principalmente en oposición a la exportación de gas.
27: Ministros viajan a El Alto, próximo a La Paz, para negociar una solución con la Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) de Quispe. Fracasan.
28: Un convoy transporta hasta La Paz a 198 viajeros que estuvieron dos semanas aislados por los bloqueos de carreteras.
29: Vacilante lanzamiento de la huelga general de la COB.
30: Miles se unen a la marcha en La Paz contra la exportación de gas, organizada por la COB y apoyada por el MAS. Quispe rehúsa dialogar con el gobierno, a menos que se reúna con él en Warisata.

Octubre
6: Demostraciones masivas paralizan a La Paz.
8: Se lanza una 'huelga cí­vica' en El Alto, con marchas y bloqueos.
9: Choques entre manifestantes y la policí­a en El Alto causa dos muertes y al menos 16 heridos, varios de ellos mineros que llegaron desde Oruro.
11: El gobierno ordena al ejército que restaure el orden en El Alto. Los choques producen dos muertes más.
12: Nuevos choques entre fuerzas de seguridad y manifestantes en El Alto que dejan un saldo de al menos cinco, y quizá 20 muertos más.
13: El gobierno emite un decreto que expresa que el gas no será exportado sin consulta previa con la población y las organizaciones sociales. Esto no aplaca las protestas; se multiplican las marchas y una huelga de transporte paraliza La Paz. Al menos 14 personas más mueren en los choques (incluyendo dos soldados). El Vice-Presidente Carlos Mesa retira su apoyo al Presidente en protesta contra la violenta represión.
14: La OEA declara su apoyo a Sánchez de Lozada. EU expresa 'profunda preocupación'. La tensa calma es rota en la región de Chapare por una bomba que hiere a dos soldados. La Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), el más reciente y pequeño socio en la coalición gobernante, amenaza retirarse si no se cumplen las exigencias de los sindicatos. La COB declara huelga por tiempo indefinido.
15: El gobierno anuncia que llamará a un referéndum sobre exportación de gas, la convocación de una asamblea constituyente, y la reforma de la ley de hidrocarburos. El Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), segundo mayor socio en la coalición gobernante, se une a la exigencia de una reforma constitucional. Unos 2.000 mineros que marchan hacia La Paz chocan con el ejército y la policí­a en Patacamaya. Los disturbios se extienden a Cochabamba. Al menos dos personas más mueren en los choques.
16: Sánchez de Lozada declara que su renuncia será el fin de la democracia, la desintegración de Bolivia y el establecimiento de la 'dictadura narco-sindicalista o narco-terrorista.' Los manifestantes rechazan el referéndum e insisten en la renuncia del Presidente. Los gobiernos de Brasil y Argentina enví­an un equipo conjunto para tratar de mediar una solución a la crisis.
17: La NFR se retira de la coalición de gobierno y exige la renuncia de Sánchez de Lozada. Se convoca al congreso, pero Evo Morales se mantiene fuera. Sánchez de Lozada se reúne con los enviados brasileño y argentino, más tarde dice al ex Presidente Jaime Paz Zamora, que entregará su renuncia al congreso. En cambio, vuela a Santa Cruz, en ruta a Miami, dejando atrás su carta de renuncia.

Mercosur se acerca a hacer realidad su compromiso de libre movimiento de personas a través de las fronteras de los paí­ses miembros: Argentina anunció la inminente introducción de un nuevo sistema que legalizará la situación de unos 700.000 inmigrantes ilegales de paí­ses vecinos.

Los datos censales sugieren que hay cerca de 1m de extranjeros trabajando en Argentina, de los cuales 940.000 provienen de Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay -74% ingresó o permanece ilegalmente en el paí­s. Bajo el nuevo sistema de ví­a rápida para Mercosur y asociados (a Perú aún no), podrán obtener permiso de residencia por un año, renovable por un segundo año, luego deberán solicitar residencia permanente o ciudadaní­a si tienen empleo permanente.

Los requerimientos parecen simples: los candidatos deben probar que son ciudadanos de un paí­s del Mercosur extendido, que no tienen prontuario criminal en su paí­s o en Argentina, y que gozan de buena salud. Obtener algunos de los certificados necesarios en sus paí­ses de origen puede ser difí­cil para muchos. Por ahora, la buena noticia para ellos es que la deportación de inmigrantes ilegales fue suspendida hasta que las nuevas normas entren en vigencia.

“América indí­gena debe de nuevo recobrar su mí­stica y su rol protagónico [...] América Latina y Sudámerica hoy están impregnadas con un nuevo espí­ritu de liberación."

Nicanor Duarte, Presidente de Paraguay.


“Traigo independencia. No soy un polí­tico profesional y traigo una propuesta de ideas."

Jorge Castañeda, ex canciller mexicano, al anunciar su intento de ser candidato a la presidencia en 2006.


“Si no puede mantener las prisiones. Si no puede pagar a los maestros, si no puede pagar a los doctores, si hay deficiencias en los servicios de salud, en las obras públicas, en la seguridad, los ciudadanos comienzan a preguntarse para qué está el estado."


Jaime Nebot, alcalde de Guayaquil, Ecuador.

 

 

Informe Latinoamericano (Online) ISSN 1741-73017 Un servicio electrónico de cartas informativas (50 por año) de Intelligence Research Ltd, 61 Old Street, London EC1V 9HW, UK. Teléf: +44 (0)20 7251 0012, Fax +44 (0)20 7253 8193, Email: [email protected]. Web: www.latinnews.com EDITOR: Eduardo Crawley, [email protected]. Las tarifas de suscripción serán enviadas a pedido. COPYRIGHT © 2004 en todos los paí­ses. Todos los derechos reservados. Ninguna parte de esta publicación puede ser reproducida, archivada en sistemas de clasificación o recuperación de datos, retransmitida en modo alguno, electrónico o quí­mico, mecánico, óptico, fotográfico o cualquier otro, sin el premise previo, por escrito, de Intelligence Research Ltd. REFERENCIAS: Las referencias a números previos se harán así­ [ver IL-04-01]: Informe Especial 2004, No.1.

“ ¿Qué querí­a, que lo esperara [Marcos] para saludarlo?"
Samuel Ruiz, obispo mexicano, sobre la queja del comisionado oficial de paz, que no pudo tener una reunión con el lí­der Zapatista.

“Un mero acto de polí­tica titiritera diseñada para engatusar y embaucar a la nación y la comunidad internacional."
Rickford Burke, presidente del Instituto para la Democracia Caribe-Guyana, sobre el anuncio del Presidente Jagdeo de una investigación sobre las actividades de un escuadrón de la muerte.

“Efectivamente, el crimen organizado está incrustado en el Estado."
Oscar Berger, Presidente de Guatemala, luego del descubrimiento de bandas delictivas compuestas por oficiales policiales.

LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORT: BRAZIL & SOUTHERN CONE, en inglés - AHORA DISPONIBLE

En la edición de este mes analizamos el significado de la aguda caí­da del apoyo al Presidente Lula da Silva de Brasil: su rating de aprobación en junio declinó apenas a la mitad de lo que tení­a cuando asumió el poder en enero de 2003. En otras partes, las perspectivas de Brasil para un sitio en el consejo de seguridad de la ONU al encabezar la misión de paz en Haití­; en el paí­s, el ejército es convocado para tareas policiales en dos estados. En Argentina, la protesta social del movimiento de los piqueteros eleva la apuesta. En Uruguay, Jorge Larrañaga triunfa en las primarias del partido Blanco, mientras en Paraguay el exiliado General retirado Lino Oviedo retorna para afrontar la prisión. La suscripción anual a Latin American Regional Report: Brazil & Southern Cone (12 ediciones) tiene un precio de US$250/ £170. Para más detalles, por favor llame a LAN al teléfono: +44 (0)20 7251 0012 o enví­e su email a: [email protected]

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA | Panorama. Se ha confirmado que la economí­a dominicana creció apenas en la primera mitad del año (el PBI subió sólo 0,8% sobre igual periodo de 2003). Que hubo un crecimiento mí­nimo fue debido a una caí­da de 2,2% en el segundo trimestre. Luego de dar las cifras, el banco central advirtió que la ligera alza 'no significa que hemos superado los efectos de la crisis que comenzó en 2003, pues aún están presentes algunos de los factores que la provocaron, como el fuerte incremento en los precios mundiales del petróleo.'

CUBA | Impacto de medidas de Bush sobre turismo. El número de visitantes de EU cayó en cerca de 25% desde la introducción de nuevas restricciones por la administración Bush [IL-04-29], según el ministro de turismo, Manuel Marrero. Dice que no se espera mejoras 'hasta después de las elecciones de noviembre.'

Sin embargo, Marrero dice que el gobierno cubano aún espera lograr la meta de 2m de visitantes este año. Las llegadas en los primeros ocho meses totalizaron 1,45m, o 10% más que en igual periodo del año pasado. El aumento se debe al aumento de visitantes de Gran Bretaña, Canadá y de los paí­ses escandinavos, por encima de la recuperación en los flujos desde España e Italia.

NICARAGUA | Panorama. En los primeros siete meses del año, la actividad económica de Nicaragua subió en casi 4% sobre igual periodo del año pasado, de acuerdo con el gerente general del banco central, Mario Flores. Él dice que es probable que la tasa de crecimiento para todo el año estará cerca de 4,2%, subiendo drásticamente del 2,3% del año pasado.

La inflación este año, dijo, puede llegar a 7% o 7,5%, subiendo de 6,5% en 2003. Las reservas internacionales, de 1,7% del PBI a 2,5% desde el año pasado, ahora son suficientes para cubrir el costo de cuatro meses de importaciones.

La unidad regional estuvo ausente de forma evidente del proceso de selección del nuevo secretario general para la OEA, puesto vacante desde octubre, cuando el ex Presidente de Costa Rica, Miguel Angel Rodrí­guez, renunció cuando fue implicado en un escándalo de corrupción en su paí­s [IL-04-43]. Al desvanecerse las esperanzas de Centroamérica de retener el cargo con un candidato de la subregión, comenzaron a surgir candidatos en toda la región.

El 9 de diciembre, el gobierno chileno decidió reavivar la candidatura del ministro del interior, José Miguel Insulza, que se retiró de la carrera previa cuando la opinión hemisférica comenzó a inclinarse decisivamente hacia Rodrí­guez, en gran medida para ofrecer a Centroamérica la chance de dirigir una organización regional. Como expresó Insulza: 'Uno de los problemas de la OEA ha sido el bajo grado de participación de los paí­ses del sur en sus actividades, y pienso que si queremos mantener un sistema verdaderamente Panamericano, la voz del sur es ciertamente importante.'

Dijo que tení­a confianza en el apoyo de Brasil y Argentina, y que su gobierno ha logrado una 'alianza estratégica' con México, que es visto como concluir el apoyo de las grandes naciones latinoamericanas. Sin embargo, un dí­a después de anunciar oficialmente su candidatura, Rubén Aguilar, vocero del Presidente de México, Vicente Fox, anunció que México presentarí­a la candidatura de su canciller Luis Ernesto Derbez -una movida transparente para persuadir a Derbez que abandone su anunciada aspiración presidencial [IL-04-47].

La reacción de Insulza: 'La candidatura de Luis Ernesto Derbez fue una sorpresa en el marco de una conversación que mantení­amos sobre una alianza estratégica que habí­amos firmado.'

La proliferación no termina ahí­. También el 10 de diciembre, el canciller peruano Manuel Rodrí­guez anunció que su gobierno propondrí­a un candidato propio para el puesto en la OEA -pero que el nombre del candidato lo darí­a el Presidente Alejandro Toledo. En meses recientes, varias fuentes peruanas han sugerido la posibilidad de impulsar la candidatura del ex Presidente Valentí­n Paniagua -una decisión interpretada por muchos que tiene la intención de alejar a Paniagua de la próxima contienda presidencial (una razón que parece popular en la región).

En Brasil, hay quienes vienen proponiendo al ex Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso como candidato al puesto, justo cuando se habla de reavivar un posible retorno de Cardoso a la contienda por la presidencia. En Honduras, el ex canciller Carlos López Contreras (aspirante a la nominación a la vice-presidencia) ha sido propuesto como una alternativa al ex Presidente salvadoreño, Francisco Flores -candidato inicial de Washington en el último proceso de selección, ahora 'vetado' por el Presidente Hugo Chávez , de Venezuela, como uno de los pocos gobernantes que expresaron su apoyo al gobierno surgido del golpe que depuso brevemente a Chávez en 2002. Incluso sin su oposición, Flores no pudo reunir suficiente apoyo para convertirse en el 'candidato de consenso' de Centroamérica -sin lo cual la subregión no tiene chance de recuperar el alto puesto en la OEA. En Guatemala, se ha mencionado el nombre de Gert Rosenthal, actual embajador ante la ONU.

Tal como están las cosas ahora, parece haber poca posibilidad de un pronto acuerdo sobre un nuevo secretario general. Eso significa que la cuestión probablemente tendrá que aguardar hasta la reunión de la próxima asamblea general, programada para junio en Fort Lauderdale.

Hatuey de Camps, ex presidente del Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), ha lanzado el Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata (PRSD), que inicialmente buscará alianzas con otros para competir en las elecciones legislativas y municipales de 2006. Hace poco, De Camps perdió una batalla ante la corte para ser reconocido como legí­timo presidente del PRD.

En el periodo previo a las elecciones presidenciales de 2004, de Camps fue uno de los principales oponentes al intento de reelección del Presidente Hipólito Mejí­a -permitido por la ley pero prohibido por los estatutos del PRD. Como presidente del PRD, de Camps organizó las primarias en las cuales fue nominado candidato presidencial, pero fue cuestionado con éxito por el campo de Mejí­a ante la autoridad electoral. De Camps apeló en todas las instancias, incluso ante la corte suprema, que el 24 de febrero dictaminó en su contra.

Veterano con 40 años de militancia en el PRD, de Camps fue uno de los cercanos colaboradores del legendario lí­der del partido, el ya fallecido José Francisco Peña Gómez, que condujo al PRD a la victoria en dos elecciones (1978 y 1982) pero fracasó en su propio intento por la presidencia (en 1994 y 1960). De Camps recuerda ese lazo con Peña Gómez con el contorno de un toro negro ('el color de su piel') en el centro de la nueva bandera del partido, roja, blanca y azul. Su objetivo inmediato es 'la creación de un amplio frente de partidos, pequeños o grandes, para mejorar la calidad del congreso y los consejos.' Su objetivo final: conducir a los 'verdaderos militantes del PRD' a 'recobrar el partido'.

México de nuevo fue clasificado en el grupo de paí­ses que no cumplen las normas de EU en relación a frenar el 'tráfico de personas', una categorí­a de actividades que incluye el contrabando de trabajadores, como también la venta de mujeres y niños en la prostitución. Reconociendo que México se ha comprometido a actuar en ese campo, el Departamento de Estado lo culpa de retrasar la legislación y no llevar a los culpables ante la justicia.

El quinto Informe sobre Tráfico de Personas (ITP), ordenado por el congreso, fue difundido el 3 de junio. En el se calcula que unas 17.000 personas son 'traficadas' anualmente de México a EU. Eso es poco más de 2% del total mundial estimado por el Departamento de Estado, y se compara con el flujo anual de cerca de medio millón de migrantes ilegales de México, estimado por el Pew Hispanic Center (PHC).

México no está entre los 14 peores infractores que el informe ubica en el 'Nivel 3' (pasible de sanciones), sino entre los 27 del 'Nivel 2' de la lista: paí­ses que no reúnen el standard mí­nimo pero que hacen esfuerzos significativos para lograrlo. Es el segundo año que México es ubicado en esa categorí­a.

El ITP dice que en México 'no se conocen procesos o condenas [por tráfico humano] en el tiempo cubierto por el informe [marzo de 2004 a marzo de 2005].' También señala que la legislación especí­fica anti-tráfico que el gobierno sometió al congreso el año pasado aún no ha sido aprobada. La protección legal para las ví­ctimas de traficantes también es considerada inadecuada.

Un componente importante del tráfico desde México es identificado como un desborde de la industria del turismo sexual infantil que ya está establecida en centros turí­sticos mexicanos y ciudades a lo largo de la frontera con EU.

El embajador John Miller, director de la Oficina de Control y Combate del Tráfico de Personas del Departamento de Estado, dijo en la presentación del ITP, que la esclavitud sexual es la mayor categorí­a de esclavitud transnacional y, para combatirla, EU insiste en poner mayor enfoque en fuente de la demanda: esperan educar y disuadir a los 'clientes' de la esclavitud sexual. Miller también citó que la explotación laboral, en particular la servidumbre involuntaria de trabajadores extranjeros, ha recibido mayor atención en el informe de 2005.

Arizona, uno de los estados más afectados por el tráfico de personas, aprobó una legislación que castiga con hasta tres años de prisión el transporte de inmigrantes legales o ilegales para forzarlos a trabajar o prostituirse. Hay penas más duras contra los que reclutan, seducen o fuerzan a las personas a prostituirse.

Apoyo aéreo para migrantes

Considerado como contrapunto al Proyecto Minuteman de Arizona, una ONG con base en El Paso, llamada Paisanos al Rescate anunció la semana pasada el lanzamiento de patrullas aéreas para rescatar inmigrantes ilegales en peligro. En realidad, fue iniciado el año pasado con un solo aeroplano ligero, Paisanos tiene ahora tres y ha atraí­do suficientes donaciones para mantenerlos funcionando. Al detectar migrantes en apuros, lanzan botellas de agua en paracaí­das pequeños, junto con instrucciones en español sobre cómo buscar asistencia de emergencia, y direcciones de las ciudades cercanas y detalles de consulados mexicanos. Si se requiere asistencia médica, la Patrulla de Frontera es alertada por radio.

Los escándalos de corrupción han comenzado a afectar seriamente la actual posición del Presidente Lula da Silva y sus perspectivas polí­ticas. Se siguen acumulando pruebas desde distintas partes y cada vez más actores afirman su convicción que, si no involucrado personalmente, Lula debí­a conocer sobre las turbias actividades de sus ayudantes cercanos.

Aún falta que surjan evidencias documentadas en la investigación del congreso, pero las declaraciones de testigos siguen emergiendo pintando un permanente patrón de financiamiento partidario no declarado, originado en sobornos disfrazados manejados por Delúbio Soares, hasta recientemente el tesorero del Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), y supuestamente dirigido por José Dirceu, hasta hace poco ministro de la presidencia de Lula. Los fondos provení­an de firmas que brindaban servicios a municipalidades controladas por el PT, 'banqueros' de la loterí­a ilegal llamada jogo do bicho, publicistas favorecidos con contratos con agencias del estado, y bancos deseosos de contar con personas con conexiones influyentes. Unido a eso está la evidencia de la compra de votos en el congreso e incluso de 'compra' de socios en la coalición.

La semana pasada, Valdemar Costa Neto, presidente del Partido Liberal (PL), confirmó ante la comisión de investigación del congreso las declaraciones hechas a Epoca sobre cómo el PT lo tentó para convertirse en aliado con la promesa de dinero [IL-05-32], aparentemente para cubrir gastos de campaña. Dijo que los pagos fueron recibidos después que el PT asumió el poder, en su mayorí­a 'por debajo de la mesa' y a través del publicista Marcos Valério Fernandes -ninguno de esos pagos fueron declarados.

Presionado por los investigadores, Costa Neto dijo que Lula 'seguramente sabí­a cómo se hací­an las cosas'. Una nota similar fue expresada ante la comisión por Rogério Buratti, sobre los manejos corruptos que él atribuye al actual ministro de finanzas, Antônio Palocci, cuando era alcalde de Riberão Preto [IL-05-33].

'Ninguna compañí­a,' dijo Buratti, 'hace contribuciones sin el conocimiento del jefe. Palocci nunca tomó parte en reuniones donde se discutí­a de dinero, pero yo creo que él sabí­a.' Buratti reiteró ante la comisión sus acusaciones contra Palocci, que el ministro negó con 'vehemencia'.

Los cargos de Buratti son, hasta ahora, los menos verificables. El reconoció que sólo tení­a información de segunda mano sobre los eventos que contó, y que su principal fuente de información fue un amigo personal, Ralf Barquete (también un antiguo ayudante de Palocci), que murió el año pasado.

Secuela polí­tica
El costo polí­tico para Lula se volvió evidente en un sondeo de Ibope difundido el 23 de agosto. Durante el mes pasado, su rating de aprobación cayó en nueve puntos, a 45% y el rating de desaprobación creció en igual medida a 47%. La confianza en el presidente cayó 10 puntos a 43%.

En cuanto a perspectivas electorales, Lula emerge como claro perdedor. Opuesto hipotéticamente contra el alcalde de São Paulo, José Serra, del Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), Lula pierde 30 a 29 en la primera ronda (es un empate técnico) y luego por 44 a 35 en la segunda. Por ahora, Serra dijo que no competirí­a por la presidencia el año próximo, y Lula no ha abandonado sus planes de reelección -pero si la tendencia de las pocas semanas pasadas continúa, serí­a muy sorprendente si Serra no 'reconsidera' su decisión de no competir.