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Hasta esta semana, la principal oposición a un sucesor Kirchnerista de la Presidenta Cristina Fernández era el Frente Amplio-Unen, una coalición electoral de ocho partidos y cinco aspirantes presidenciales. Pero, como con todas las coaliciones, el Frente Amplio-Unen está probando ser díscolo, y todavía falta casi un año hasta las elecciones generales. El debate dentro de la agrupación es acerca de los beneficios de tener alianzas al nivel provincial cuando los partidos compiten como oponentes a nivel nacional.

El 19 de noviembre, la Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), la columna vertebral de la coalición, anunció que rechazaría cualquier alianza con otros partidos políticos a nivel nacional. La decisión provocó la salida de la diputada nacional de la Coalición Cívica ARI, Elisa Carrió, una oponente al gobierno de alto perfil. “La decisión de la UCR de no hacer alianzas es la mejor manera para que el Peronismo gane las elecciones”, dijo Carrió a los periodistas. “Está bien que la UCR haga lo que quiera. Pero yo no cometeré suicidio”, agregó Carrió. “Me voy de UNEN”. La legisladora que nació en la provincia de Chaco, sin embargo, no descartó todas las posibilidades de competir por el sillón presidencial.

Otro legislador del Frente Amplio-Unen, Fernando ‘Pino’ Solanas, dijo que la decisión de Carrió de abandonar la coalición de centro-izquierda no significa el fin de la alianza. “Estoy un poco sorprendido, recién me he enterado. Es una pena”, dijo, acerca de la salida de Carrió. “Ella [Carrió] es una fundadora de UNEN, es una lástima que esta coalición no pueda mantener una unidad ejemplar que hemos buscado desde el principio”, dijo Solanas en una entrevista transmitida por televisión.

-Costa Rica’s finance minister, Helio Fallas, has forecasted 4% GDP growth for 2015, up from 3.5% in 2014.

-The third round of US-Cuba talks have taken place in Havana behind closed doors.

En los primeros siete meses de este año, hubo 3.000 homicidios registrados en Honduras, marcando una a la baja tendencia que, si se mantiene, podría conducir a una caída del 20% desde el 2014. San Pedro Sula ha registrado la mayor caída.

En los últimos cinco años, el número de homicidios en Honduras ha crecido de manera constante, de 5.280 a un pico de 7.172 en el 2013. Luego cayó un 10,3% en el 2014, con una declinación mayor esperada este año. En enero-julio hubo 489 casos en San pedro Sula, un inesperado 29,2% menor que durante el mismo periodo del 2014. En el distrito central (que comprende Tegucigalpa y Comayagüela) al cifra cayó a 510 casos, un 8,4% menos que un año atrás.

Leonel Sauceda, el vocero de la policía nacional (PNH), atribuye la mejoría en San pedro Sula a dos factores: respuesta rápida a los delitos y una mayor coordinación entre todas las instituciones involucradas en la seguridad pública. Ambas son prioritarias en el plan de ‘seguridad ciudadana y coexistencia’ del gobierno, concebido a fines del 2014 y lanzado este año. Sauceda descartó las diferencias mostradas en las estadísticas entre San Pedro Sula y el distrito central, diciendo que estas son leves y que lo que es importante es que la situación en ambos ha mejorado.

On 23 September, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its ninth review of Jamaica’s economic performance under the current Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in which it pronounced Jamaica’s performance “exemplary”. But it also warned that “risks to the program remain high”.

The main source of the IMF’s pleasure is the continued commitment that Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller’s People’s National Party (PNP) government is showing to implementation of the agreement. In its latest review, the IMF reported that all key performance targets had been met, including the primary balance target where higher tax receipts and lower-than-projected capital expenditures more than compensated for “a slight overrun in program spending and lower non-tax revenue and grants”. The IMF was pleased that tax revenues exceeded budgetary expectations. It was also happy to report that Jamaica’s structural reforms “are broadly on track”.

One vital area of improvement has been in Jamaica’s public debt position. At end-March 2013, this was at a clearly unsustainable 146.5% of GDP. By end-March 2015 it was down to 136.9% of GDP, and it is projected to fall to 125% of GDP by end-March 2016 and eventually to 98.5% of GDP by end-March 2020. This is slightly higher than the 96% target set at the beginning of the program, but still an impressive achievement.

Much of the success has been due to “sustained fiscal consolidation”, with central government operations posting a primary surplus of 7.5% of GDP during the past two years and likely to do so again in the current fiscal year.

Other key factors have been the buy-back from Venezuela in July 2015 of its outstanding (as of end-December 2014) debt incurred under the PetroCaribe scheme. The total amount of retired debt and associated interest payment savings came to US$3.25bn. This was a politically controversial move, with the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) arguing that Jamaica was swapping a low interest debt for newly raised debt of US$2bn at a higher interest rate, albeit with longer maturity. The IMF, however, endorsed the swap and calculated that there would be overall fiscal savings of US$287m as well as a short-term 10% instant reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio.

Apart from the arithmetic of the debt-swap, the fund-raising exercise also marked the crossing of an important threshold in that Jamaica proved that it was once again able to tap into the international bond market. A 13-year bond for US$1.35bn was issued at a yield of 6.75% and a US$650m 30-year bond was issued at 7.875% - a historic low. The bond issue was also oversubscribed and led to rating upgrades in May by Standard & Poor and Moody’s (to B and Caa2 respectively).

One further point of satisfaction for the IMF was the fact that the current account registered a surplus (of 0.3% of GDP) in the first quarter of 2015 for the first time in more than a decade. This was brought about by the decline in oil prices and a decent growth in revenues from tourism. Nevertheless, the IMF is still projecting a current account deficit of 3.7% for FY2015/16.

But for all the good news, and the optimism shown by the international bond market, there is an underlying sense that Jamaica may yet fall off the tightrope that it is walking. The threats are both economic and political. As the IMF put it, “risks to the program remain high” because “growth remains frail and high unemployment persists”. Jamaica’s recovery could be hit by external shocks, and (warns the IMF) “the run-up to elections before end-2016 could also potentially delay reform progress”.

One particular area of concern, given possible electoral pressures, is the need to keep the government wage bill under control. It is projected to amount to 10.1% of GDP in FY2015/16 with the aim of lowering it to 9% of GDP in FY2016/17. Meeting this latter target, however, “would require measures for 0.4% of GDP”. The IMF warns that current measures under consideration, such as a reduction in the head count through attrition and voluntary redundancy, may need to be supplemented “by additional reform measures to modernize the public sector and transition towards a smaller and more efficient civil service”.

The IMF argues that the costs to the economy of failing to contain the wage bill at 9% of GDP “are likely to be high” as options to offset the additional wage expense “would then be limited to undesirable choices of either compressing non-wage primary spending, including capital spending at a time when growth is weak, or raising additional revenue”.

There is another major point that was not raised in the Review, and that is the effect that the renewed debate over debt relief for heavily indebted countries may have on Jamaica’s determination to continue with the hard decisions required by the IMF.

The issue of debt relief was raised at the time of US President Barack Obama’s visit to Jamaica in April by the US-based Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), which pointed out that Jamaica was running the most austere budget in the world and that its interest burden was one of the highest in the world at 8% of GDP. It argued that alternatives to the IMF-imposed austerity “are key if Jamaica is going to emerge from its debt trap and begin economic recovery”.

A boost to this argument was then provided by the IMF itself in the context of the Greek debt crisis when an IMF memo was leaked in which it said that it would not get involved in a debt restructuring unless there was “an explicit and concrete agreement between Greece and its Eurozone partners on how to provide debt relief”. Not surprisingly this comment was seized upon by many in the Caribbean. For instance, veteran Caribbean diplomat and commentator Sir Ronald Sanders wrote in mid-July: “What’s good for the Greeks should be good for the Caribbean and other small and vulnerable nations.”

Further support for debt relief was then provided by the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac), which presented proposals for debt relief at an international conference on ‘Financing for Development’ held in Ethiopia in mid-July. It proposed that multilateral institutions should “gradually…write off 100% of small states multilateral debt stock”.

None of this was lost on Jamaica, and on 30 July Prime Minister Simpson Miller took the opportunity to add her own plea for debt relief during a contribution to a UN Security Council debate on ‘The Peace and Security Challenges of Small Island Developing States’. She told the Security Council that debt was a major contributor to lack of security, and she specifically drew “the attention of the Council” to the Eclac proposals. She said: “Comprehensive debt relief for Caribbean Small Island Developing States that would write off 100% of their multilateral debt stock is timely. In our view, this proposal is worthy of serious consideration and support from the international community.”

Peace talks between the government led by President Juan Manuel Santos and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Colombia’s second guerrilla group, are off before they have even formally begun. The interior minister, Juan Fernando Cristo, accused the ELN of “living on another planet” after its maximum leader, ‘Gabino’ (Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista), ruled out releasing all of the group’s hostages. This followed the revelation that far from unconditionally releasing a prominent political hostage on 3 April to coincide with the announcement of formal talks with the government, the ELN had demanded an exchange.

The ELN claimed in mid-April that the peace process would begin in Ecuador in May. The government had conditioned the start of talks on the release of ELN hostages but is now demanding that every last one of them be freed beforehand. The tough rhetoric followed the discovery that the ELN had only released the former governor of the northwesternmost department of Chocó, Patrocinio Sánchez Montes de Oca, in exchange for his brother Odín, a former deputy in the lower chamber of congress for the Partido de la U (PU), part of the ruling coalition. Details of the exchange came to light on 28 April when Sánchez told the national daily El Tiempo that ELN commanders had informed him that he was going to be released after three years in captivity “sleeping in chains every night” because of a serious deterioration in his health. Sánchez was told he would be swapped with his brother Odín, who in 2011 had been sentenced to nine years in prison for supporting the paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) but did not serve the full sentence.

Patrocinio Sánchez was mayor of Quibdó, the capital of Chocó, from 2001 to 2003 and departmental governor from 2008 to 2010 when he was sentenced to 18 months in prison by the supreme court for irregularities surrounding public health contracts he signed when he was mayor. He was kidnapped in August 2013, and it was not until more than two years later, in November 2015, that his family received any news about him. This came in the form of a cassette on which he appealed to Odín to move swiftly to try and secure his release as he feared he was dying.

Patrocinio Sánchez did not reveal how the details of the exchange, which took place in the municipality of Atrato, Chocó, close to the estate where he was kidnapped, were struck. The family must have conducted negotiations with the ELN without informing the authorities. Patrocinio Sánchez said he had been instructed not to reveal anything about the exchange upon his return, but after PU Senator Armando Benedetti revealed what had happened, he opened up. Patrocinio Sánchez even maintained that the ELN had informed him that he was kidnapped for economic not political reasons (an admission which he acknowledged would antagonise the guerrillas), but he pleaded ignorance over whether any money changed hands to secure his release.

Denouncing the hostage exchange as “deplorable”, Interior Minister Cristo said “We cannot begin a peace process with the ELN behaving in this way”. He added: “The ELN persists in causing incredulity and distrust among the Colombian public regarding its true commitment to peace.” A joint military and police operation has been launched in the area to try to rescue Odín. The ombudsman, Alfonso Cajiao, called for Odín’s immediate release. His office also release a statement on 2 May condemning Gabino’s interview with the Basque paper Gara: “It is one thing negotiating in the middle of the conflict and ‘to proceed with the Agenda as it has been agreed’, as Mr Bautista says in his interview; quite another to disavow the principle of international humanitarian law”.

• Colombia’s external debt

On 2 May Colombia’s central bank (Banrep) released a report showing that the country’s external debt reached US$111.82bn in January 2016, representing a 7.8% increase compared to January 2015 (US$103.66bn). According to the report, public sector debt reached US$67.25bn, from which short-term obligations accounted for US$670m and long-term obligations for US$66.57bn. In the private sector, obligations reached US$44.57bn, from which US$30.65bn constitute long-term debt and US$13.92bn represent short-term debt. On the other hand, the report shows that in January 2016, Colombia’s external debt represented 41.3% of the country’s GDP, a 5.8 percentage point increase compared to January 2015 (35.5%).

Presidents Mauricio Macri and Tabaré Vázquez of Argentina and Uruguay met in Buenos Aires on 24 October for the second of their bi-annual meetings. After a 10-year hiatus bilateral relations are improving significantly: Venezuela, the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), China, and the 2030 football World Cup were on the agenda.

For a 10-year period from 2005 to 2015 relations between otherwise close neighbours Argentina and Uruguay were very strained. The construction of a major pulp mill on the Uruguayan side of the Rio Uruguay was bitterly resisted by the Argentine authorities who claimed it would create excessive pollution. Uruguay denied it was harmful to the environment. The pulp mill was built, but only at the cost of years of arguments, international arbitration, border bridge blockades, damage to tourism, and port and tariff disputes. All this President Macri this week sought to sweep away in an instant, welcoming his Uruguayan opposite number and saying “we will ratify that we want a great relationship, like we had until 10 years ago, when we entered into a series of absurd conflicts.”

Both heads of state agreed to set up a “joint laboratory” to monitor environmental quality in the river. The two countries are also set to work on a bi-national port development strategy, putting aside disagreements there too. They are to work with Brazil to improve border security and coordinate strategies against drug trafficking. And there will be a joint investigation of the economic feasibility of a fourth binational bridge across the Rio Uruguay.

In a further sign of the better chemistry now in play across the River Plate estuary, Macri and Vázquez confirmed that they would mount a joint bid to host the football World Cup in 2030, the centenary year of the competition (the first championship was hosted, and won, by Uruguay in 1930). This allowed the two Presidents to make jokes about the relative talents of strikers Lionel Messi (Argentina) and Felipe Suárez (Uruguay).

Two much more serious issues were also on the agenda. While supporting a call for mediation in Venezuela’s political crisis issued by Pope Francis, the two men hardened their position on the subject of excluding Venezuela from the Mercosur trade bloc on the grounds that it is failing to meet minimum standards of democratic rule. Macri, along with Brazilian President Michel Temer, has taken the hardest line on this, with Vázquez being more cautious. Macri said human rights were not being respected in Venezuela “and on these terms Venezuela cannot be part of Mercosur”. Vázquez underlined his “great concern” over developments in Venezuela and called for dialogue between government and opposition to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis.

There was also an interesting hint of how Mercosur may seek to reposition its trade policies and negotiating processes. Vázquez recently conducted a 12-day visit to China and agreed to start negotiations on a China-Uruguay free trade agreement (FTA), to be completed by 2018. Macri suggested that such an agreement could, and should, be widened into a much bigger China-Mercosur FTA (see sidebar). Vázquez welcomed the idea, although he commented rather drily “If we bear in mind that China proposed an FTA with Mercosur six years ago, and Mercosur still hasn’t officially responded…I think it would be very good for us to analyse this in depth in the next Mercosur meeting and see if we can progress with it jointly”.

• Macri on China FTA

President Macri said he understood Uruguay’s determination to pursue a free trade agreement (FTA) with China. “We understand Uruguay’s vision, its need to open markets for its production,” Macri said. “It produces nearly 10 times more food than it needs and China is a great possibility”. Macri expressed an “open attitude”, but he stressed that it would be “ideal” if Mercosur were to seek a trade deal as a bloc in line with internal regulations.

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO | PM says “anarchy will not be tolerated. The prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr Keith Rowley, addressed the nation on 24 November following unrest in the Beetham area of the capital Port of Spain.

The unrest in Beetham erupted after a police operation to evict illegal squatters and the arrest of two men. Local residents dragged barriers onto a highway and threw missiles at vehicles. In his response to the unrest, the prime minister said that he would not tolerate anarchy. He said: “The conduct yesterday that had the effect of shutting down the nation’s capital, terrorising those who were caught in it…the trauma that the national community experienced yesterday must not and will not be tolerated.”

Rowley’s hard line was backed up by Senior Superintendent Floris Hodge-Griffith, the head of the Port of Spain Division of the national police service (TTPS). She was reported as saying that her officers were “prepared to remove the kid gloves”.

However, a different complexion was put on the incident, and the role of the police, by the head of the Beetham Police Youth Club, retired police inspector Sheila Prince. She said that the police have been too soft in the area, conferring too much status on local gang leaders. She said: “People in authority [are] supposed to know better…. They have been playing games with gang leaders. Putting too much status on to them. Calling them all kinds of names projecting innocence….”

In his response, the prime minister said that he had instructed Minister of National Security Edmund Dillon to ensure that the T&T Defence Force would provide all necessary lawful support to the police.

GUYANA | ExxonMobil reportedly aiding government on border issue. It has been reported by local media in Guyana that the US oil firm ExxonMobil has put aside US$20m to help the Guyana government with legal fees in fighting its border dispute with Venezuela.

Guyana is preparing to take the case to the International Court of Justice if the UN’s ‘Good Offices Process’ does not produce “significant progress” by the end of 2017. Venezuela claims Guyana’s Essequibo region along with a significant part of its maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which significant oil discoveries have recently been made.

JAMAICA | IDB to support fight against crime. On 22 November, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) announced the approval of a US$20m loan to Jamaica for the purpose of improving the country’s conviction rates for serious violent crimes. Between 2010 and 2016, Jamaica averaged more than 1,200 murders per year, yet only 43% of cases resulted in the arrest and charging of a suspect, and only 36 individuals were successfully convicted of murder each year. That equates to a clear-up rate of just 3%.

An IDB spokesperson said: “Modernising the intelligence of the Jamaica Constabulary Force through the use of technology and better surveillance techniques are important to enhancing policing and citizen security in Jamaica.” The loan is for 25 years.

The largest-ever foreign investment project in Uruguay, worth up to US$4bn, has been given an almost-definitive green light. On 14 May President Tabaré Vázquez said agreement had been reached with UPM of Finland to build its second (and the country’s third) paper and pulp plant, known as UPM2. The government and the company had completed all the major points of negotiation, with a decision now awaited by UPM shareholders in the second half of June.

When the government and UPM started negotiating over the installation of a second pulp plant in 2017 it was estimated that it would cost around US$3bn, add two percentage points to Uruguay’s GDP, boost the value of annual exports by 12% (increasing them by more than US$1bn), and create 8,000 jobs. Since then the total investment cost has expanded to around US$4bn. UPM estimates that building the plant at Centenario in the centre of the country will cost around US$2.3bn. It will have capacity to process 2m tonnes of eucalyptus pulp per annum. As part of the deal the government has agreed to build a 273km railway allowing the pulp to be hauled to a purpose-built handling terminal in the port of Montevideo from where it will be exported. The cost of the railway was initially estimated at US$825m, and the export terminal will cost another US$260m. The railway contract has been awarded to a consortium including Sacyr (Spain), NGE (France), and Saceem and Berkel (both from Uruguay). The port terminal will be built by Tebesur, a UPM subsidiary.

The project has faced a number of obstacles. Some may have been resolved in negotiations, but details have not so far been made public. One issue has been UPM’s insistence on an agreement to minimise strikes or other industrial action during the construction phase of the plant. Talks have been underway between the company and the labour unions, brokered by the government. Another issue has been the routing of the railway line through Montevideo, which has been opposed by some residents and requires an environmental approvals process.

A third potential issue is the reaction of the authorities in neighbouring Argentina. Construction of Uruguay’s first two pulp mills led to a prolonged diplomatic and political dispute over alleged pollution of the Uruguay River, that lasted for around five years to 2010. The dispute went to arbitration at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which eventually dismissed the pollution claim but ruled that Uruguay had failed to properly consult with Argentina. The Argentine foreign ministry says that this time it has asked for all the relevant information concerning the new plant. A final concern is that agreement comes ahead of Uruguay’s presidential election campaign. While the boost to the economy is being welcomed by the ruling left wing Frente Amplio (FA) coalition, some opposition candidates are critical of the project and of the terms agreed by the government.

On 19 November, violence suddenly intruded into the run-up to Dominica’s 6 December general election. Protesters, mainly supporters of the opposition United Workers Party (UWP), blocked roads leading to President Charles Savarin’s official residence, leading to the use of tear gas and rubber bullets by riot police. The opposition and its supporters were demanding electoral reform before the holding of an election which it feared could return Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit’s Dominica Labour Party (DLP) for a fifth consecutive five-year term.

Regularly over the summer the prime minister had been talking about the DLP winning by a landslide, and maybe it was that prospect that pushed the demand for electoral reform towards violence. In late August, Skerrit told a DLP political gathering that he wanted to win all 21 seats in parliament, up from the current 15. More recently, on 20 October, he again openly talked about a landslide, saying: “Labour is winning the elections in Dominica, and we are not only winning, we are winning by a landslide.”

Yet the prime minister’s confidence was not necessarily reflected on the ground and might privately have been shaken by a survey conducted by the Caribbean Agency for Caribbean Advancement (CAPA) in June which indicated a strong feeling that the DLP had had its turn.

Even in Skerrit’s own constituency, where respondents were asked who they voted for last time and who they would vote for in the upcoming election, support for the prime minister was down from 66% to 43.7% with the opposition candidate up from 22% to 31.8%. Most importantly, 24.5% declared themselves undecided.

Government supporters point to external interference

Following the outbreak of violence, President Savarin tried to calm the political atmosphere by calling a series of meetings with community-based organisations, including church and business groups, and the main political parties. According to a presidential press release the meetings were held “to discuss the current situation leading up to the General Elections with a view to preserving the peace and tranquillity of the country…”

But the president’s efforts to calm the political atmosphere were not helped by an upsurge in conspiracy theories about external interference, in part fed by the prime minister himself. Speaking in a national address following the violence on 19 November, Skerrit said: “What really is the reason for these protests? Why are they seeking to destroy the image and economic well being of the country? Something about their behaviour does not add up.”

An article which was published by WIC News on 22 November spelled out the unspoken allegation, namely that malign outside forces could be involved. The article sought to point the finger of blame at “globalist politics not too entertained by [Dominica’s] unwavering progressive stances in the region and internationally”.

It went on to say: “The threat to Dominica’s democracy is real, and it is not from inside but from powerful forces outside, especially those who have frowned upon the DLP government’s spirited defence of Venezuelan sovereignty, perceived close relations with China, and support for progressive ideas and causes particularly in Latin America.”

In case anyone missed the point, the article concluded: “The demonization of the Dominican leader by some of the forces has been a long-term project, only now, with three weeks to go before an election…it is on steroids. Where did we see that script before? Salvador Allende in Chile 1973? Michael Manley in Jamaica in 1992? It might be a different era, but it is the same strategy from an old playbook.”

The OAS’s concerns

This narrative was no doubt fuelled by interventions such as that by the deputy US Permanent Representative to the Organisation of American States (OAS), Alexis Ludwig. Speaking at the OAS on 20 November, he said: “We feel it is important to raise concerns that we have heard about the upcoming elections in Dominica to the Permanent Council.”

Ludwig pointed to a joint report on electoral reform produced by a special commission made up of representatives of the OAS, Caricom (the Caribbean Community), and the Commonwealth in August. The report identified three main areas of concern, namely the need to remove deceased persons and ineligible voters from the electoral roll; the issuance of photo-identification cards; and the removal from the electoral roll of diaspora voters who have been out of the country for more than five years.

Ludwig told the OAS: “Sadly, the Government of Dominica rejected all of these recommendations” - and he added comments that seemed designed to call into question the legitimacy of any electoral victory by the DLP. He said: “We believe that implementing the recommendations would have contributed significantly to the fairness and transparency of the elections that all Dominicans seek, but also reaffirm the OAS and international community’s confidence that Dominica wants to ensure that its elections meet the standards of the OAS Democratic Charter and the international norms for organising and holding elections.”

Apart from the subliminal references to malign forces (“something about their behaviour does not add up”), the government’s response to all of this was twofold. First, on the one hand, it tried to blame the UWP and the Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM) for blocking electoral reform. But, on the other hand, it also argued that reform was not all that necessary in any case.

Skerrit said: “Both the current Labour government and the UWP opposition have been elected through this exact process and under the same laws and conditions. It is this same process and those same laws that saw the United Workers Party increase its seat count in the last general elections in Dominica.”

UWP turning to the courts

The opposition, for its part, turned to the courts. On 23 November, UWP leader Lennox Linton said that a meeting with the president had produced nothing of value on electoral reform and so “we fully expect matters to go before the court”. He added: “We are in a situation that requires interventions, if not from the president who had the authority to act in certain matters, then certainly from the court.”

At the same meeting, UWP president Isaac Baptiste also warned the president that there could be more violence on the way. He told reporters after the meeting: “We also impressed on the president that, based on our assessment of the situation on Dominica, if there is no electoral reform there could be a lot of problems in this country. The protests will continue because the people are in an angry mood.”

At the very high end of the value-added export spectrum, Brazil’s aerospace company Embraer is developing eVTOLs (electric vertical take-off and landing aircraft).

In February, Embraer subsidiary Eve said it had secured advance orders for 90 eVTOLs from two Australian companies, Microlite (helicopters) and Aviar and Helisprit (air-tourism). To date Eve says it has reached 17 partnerships to deliver a total of 1,735 eVTOL aircraft, with an order value of over US$5bn and the first delivery dates starting in 2026. The concept for the craft is that it will be 100% electric and have space for one pilot, four passengers, and their luggage.

Eve is 80% controlled by Embraer with other investors including Republic Airways, Rolls Royce, and SkyWest. The company is seeking air certification for its eVTOLs from Brazil’s civil aviation agency (Anac). The industry sees a range of possible uses for eVTOLs, with ride-hailing companies such as Uber planning air taxi services as a low-carbon way of avoiding traffic congestion in big cities. Eve and Skyports are developing a concept of operations (CONOPs) for the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB). Embraer and UK-based BAE Systems are also investigating how the aircraft can be used by the defence and security industry, including for disaster relief and humanitarian response.

A wave of massive cyberattacks against Costa Rican institutions has shone a spotlight on vulnerabilities which are cause for concern in countries throughout the region.

The cyber attacks began on 12 April, and when Costa Rica’s new President Rodrigo Chaves of Partido Progreso Social Democrático (PPSD) took office on 8 May one of his first acts was to declare a state of emergency in response. “We’re at war and this is not an exaggeration,” said Chaves, with the ransomware attack attributed to Russia-based cybercrime group Conti.

By 16 May Chaves was forced to admit that a total of 27 institutions had been affected, of which nine have been “very affected” – including the finance ministry. He also suggested that Conti, which was cited by the international media as threatening to “overthrow the government by means of a cyber-attack” if its US$20m ransom demand was not met, had collaborators within the country.

With the extent of the damage yet to be quantified, Chaves said the attacks had had an “enormous” impact on foreign trade and the tax take, and the education ministry said some 12,000 teachers had encountered issues regarding salary payments. At the start of June, the national social security institute (CCSS) reported a new cyberattack, which reportedly forced it to deactivate its digital record-keeping system, affecting the country’s hospitals and clinics. At the time the latest attack was not attributed to any hacking group.

In response, Chaves has said that the vulnerability of the country’s institutions to these attacks is due to a lack of investment, and should be treated as a national emergency. As part of an immediate response, the national information security incident response centre (CSIRT-CR) has started to assess security measures at public bodies, and 50 civil servants are gathering information in order to strengthen protective measures. Information on the wave of attacks will also be used to develop a “general emergency plan.”

In addition, Costa Rica’s ombudsman’s office has asked the finance ministry to provide details of three cybersecurity projects which the media are reporting were supposedly financed by a US$100m loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Officials have questioned how the ministry was so vulnerable to attack given the sum of money received which was meant to strengthen its defences.

The situation in Costa Rica has also attracted attention from international allies. Chaves said that the governments of Israel, the US and Spain would provide assistance in helping to protect Costa Rican computer systems and repair the damage. In the longer term, Costa Rica needs resources to strengthen cybersecurity, as well as more workers with relevant skills in the public sector, Carlos Enrique Alvarado Briceño, minister of science and technology, told local media outlet La República in an article published 1 June. 

Also indicative of efforts by the government to improve protection against cybercrime, on 15 June, the country signed the second additional protocol to the European Council’s Budapest Convention on cybercrime, which allows for greater international cooperation to combat cyberattacks. Adopted in 2001, the Convention was ratified by Costa Rica in 2017. There are also more international efforts targeting Conti, with the US State Department announcing a US$10m reward for information on its members on 6 May. Officials singled out the attacks on Costa Rica and the “severe impact” on the country’s foreign trade due to the disruption of customs and tax platforms, among other incidents.

This shines a light on the danger of cyber attacks, particularly in a region where safety measures are woefully underdeveloped, as shown by the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI), which “measures a country’s level of cybersecurity, its preparedness to prevent cyber threats and its readiness to manage cyber incidents, crime and large-scale crises” using a score out of 100. Put together by the E-Governance Academy, a non-profit foundation based in Estonia, the index shows Costa Rica as the highest-scoring Central America country with a score of 53.25. By way of comparison, the United Kingdom has a score of 77.92. The next highest-scoring country from the region is Panama with 48.05, followed by Nicaragua (29.87), Guatemala and El Salvador (both 24.68) and Honduras (10.39).

In addition, a February 2020 report from the Panama-based NGO Instituto Panameño de Derecho y Nuevas Tecnologías (IPANDETEC) said that many countries do not have a national cybersecurity strategy or a cyber attack response team. “This failing leaves citizens and state bodies in every nation undefended in the face of any advance in cybercrime,” wrote the authors, who added that very few countries in the region have specialised cybercrime investigators, or courts that specialise in this sort of crime. While the report praised governments for their intention to improve the situation, “cybercrime laws do not meet minimum standards and the vast majority do not have legislation that protects citizens’ personal data.”

And the problem is only increasing. From January to November 2021, cybersecurity company ESET, headquartered in Slovakia, detected 600,000 individual files related to phishing attacks in Central America as reported by Bloomberg Línea, a multi-platform business news brand on 23 April. This is a 53% increase compared to the same period in 2020 and a 280% increase from 2019 according to the same source. Phishing refers to the practice of tricking Internet users (as through the use of deceptive email messages or websites) into revealing personal or confidential information which can then be used illicitly. In one phishing attack in Honduras at the end of April, thousands of users received an email asking them to share banking information.

But Honduran internet users are terribly exposed, with the country’s penal code lacking a specific section on cybercrime. “There isn't even a specific cybersecurity law, strategy or public policy,” said Sandy Palma, CEO of Honduras Cibersegura, an NGO which promotes improving internet governance in the country, in an interview with Bloomberg Línea from the 23 April report. While Honduras has a long way to go, the national telecommunications commission (Conatel) recently announced its intention to create a national cybersecurity strategy, indicating growing awareness of the scale of the problem.

Other Central American nations may not have suffered such eye-catching attacks recently, but cybersecurity is a hot topic throughout the region. On 15 June, 16 public bodies in Panama participated in a cyberattack simulation designed to improve their response to an emergency situation, and on 19 May the country agreed a US$60m loan with the IDB for a programme which aims to digitalise public services, including improving cybersecurity. For its part, Guatemala introduced a national cybersecurity strategy in June 2018, and Nicaragua did the same in September 2020.

The increasing digitalisation of the economy due to the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has made the region more attractive to hackers, with more people carrying out more tasks online. Resources may be tight amid troubled economic times following the pandemic, but the effects of the attack on Costa Rica should underline the risks of leaving important public institutions vulnerable to hackers.

In his previous administrations (2003-2011), Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva launched two iterations of the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC), programmes which entailed massive investment in infrastructure projects. On 11 August Lula announced the third version of the PAC, which will provide nearly R$1.7tn (US$341bn) for a package of initiatives, this time round with an emphasis on green industrial growth.

Brazil has long been known to have an infrastructure gap which has hindered the country’s productivity. The World Bank’s systemic country diagnostic update for Brazil, released on 20 July, included figures showing the effects of infrastructure problems. It was estimated that Brazilian firms lose amounts equivalent to 0.2% of GDP every year due to infrastructure disruptions, mostly caused by failures in transport and power outages.  

The World Bank’s diagnostic report also suggested that the “expansion of non-hydro renewables and the transition to a greener urban infrastructure and transportation sector” could provide better growth opportunities. The new PAC’s budget allocation has reflected these priorities, with R$540bn being channelled toward renewable energy projects and R$610bn towards a ‘sustainable cities’ plan which would fund new transport links, sewage systems, and other urban infrastructure.

In his speech at the programme launch event, President Lula boasted that energy and transport infrastructure will lead to the “rebirth of our industry”. But such promises have been made before, and yet Brazil’s infrastructure gap has not improved significantly since the launch of the previous PAC.

First rolled out in 2007 and again in 2010, many projects funded by the previous PACs faced significant delays or went over-budget, and some PAC projects, such as refineries of the state-controlled oil company Petrobras, were implicated in corruption scandals. Lula insisted in his speech that the new PAC would be more transparent than the previous programmes, with more mechanisms to include different actors, including the private sector, to hold the government accountable.

Efforts to boost green hydrogen

In line with Brazil’s wider push for green energy infrastructure, the government of the north-eastern state of Ceará signed the Pacto do Hidrôgenio Renovável, an agreement with several associations of energy producers to establish a regulatory framework for the production and distribution of hydrogen fuel, among other measures. When he signed the pact on 9 August, Ceará governor Elmano de Freitas boasted that his state was the first to sign an agreement like this and expressed his ambitions to make Ceará a “global player” in green hydrogen production.

Environmental organisations in Panama and beyond have claimed a major victory after Panama’s supreme court (CSJ) struck down legislation in late November authorising a new contract between Canadian mining company First Quantum Minerals (FQM)’s Panamanian subsidiary, Minera Panamá S.A. (MPSA), and the Panamanian government regarding the Cobre Minera copper mine. The CSJ found the contract violated no less than 25 articles of Panama’s constitution, ranging from the right to live in a pollution-free environment to the obligation of the state to promote the economic and political engagement of indigenous and rural communities. Here we consider some of the concerns raised by the environmental lobby regarding the mine ahead of the CSJ’s ruling.

The original concession for the mine, which is located in Colón province, in the Donoso Protected Area, within the globally important Golfo de los Mosquitos Forests Key Biodiversity Area (KBA), was granted in 1997. In 2013, FQM took over the contract, which had previously been granted to two other companies. In response to lawsuits filed against the initial contract, the CSJ ruled in 2017 that it was unconstitutional partly because it was granted without the proper bidding process. However, the mine was permitted to keep operating under successive governments while a new contract was drawn up, and in 2019 it began commercial operations.

In March 2023 the new contract was agreed by FQM and the government led by President Laurentino Cortizo which, according to environmental organisations, would have added 4,000 hectares (ha) to the size of the mine. It was then approved on 20 October by Panama’s 71-member unicameral congress – at which point massive unrest erupted across the country, forcing the government to defer to the top court which struck down the contract (see our sister Weekly Report for more discussion of the new contract and unrest).

Opposition to the 13,000ha open-pit mine came from a range of sectors – not least the environmental lobby. As well as local environmental NGO Centro de Incidencia Ambiental (Ciam), it drew attention from organisations abroad such as US-based Re:wild, the UK’s Synchronicity Earth, World Wildlife Fund, and American Bird Conservancy, among others.

A joint statement co-signed by these groups dated 18 November highlighted the various threats that the mining project posed to biodiversity in the Donoso Protected Area where over 1,000 wildlife species live, many of which are threatened with extinction, according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s Red List of Threatened Species.

• Species affected

According to the 18 November statement by the various local and international NGOs, wildlife species threatened by the development of the mine include the great green macaw, the Baird’s tapir (also known as the Central American tapir), the Central American spider monkey, the jaguar, the harpy eagle (Panama’s national bird), the horned marsupial frog, and the critically endangered Gemini’s dart frog, a species only described in 2014 and whose entire known habitat is in the Donoso Protected Area, near the mining project.

The statement notes that the mine is located in the heart of the Panama Atlantic Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, which connects wildlife habitats in seven countries of Central America to southern Mexico, adding that a road built for the mine crosses the corridor, disrupting the connectivity of forests in the region. The same statement adds that over 3,000 ha of forest have already been destroyed for the mine’s construction and operation.

A 1 December FQM statement, however, said it had “completed reforestation of some 4,200 ha throughout Panama, and provides support programmes for more than 200,000 ha of protected areas, representing almost 20% of Panama’s total protected areas.”

As of 4 August, Brazil’s supreme court (STF) has authorised three police investigations into businessman Fábio Luís Lula da Silva, the eldest son of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The investigations are based on suspicions of corruption and influence peddling by Fábio Luís, who has already faced pressure due to his indirect connections to other suspects implicated in the high-profile corruption scandal involving the national social security agency (INSS) [WR-26-13].

On 30 July supreme court (STF) justice André Mendonça, who is the presiding judge in the INSS case, authorised the police to investigate whether Fábio Luís had leveraged his connections to intervene in negotiations for contracts with the health ministry. The police suspect that the president’s son might have tried to help the company World Cannabis win a government contract to supply medicinal cannabis.

However, the company reportedly has ties to businessman and lobbyist Antônio Carlos Camilo Antunes, the central figure in the INSS case. The scandal emerged last year when authorities flagged up irregular deductions from pensions and retirement payments, and further investigations revealed that Camilo Antunes, who owns a murky network of companies, had allegedly acted as an intermediary to divert the funds.

Although Fábio Luís is currently not accused of receiving money from Camilo Antunes or being directly involved in the irregular deductions from pensions payments, his suspected involvement in the attempts to help World Cannabis win a contract with the health ministry was justification enough for Mendonça to launch an influence peddling probe.

The following day, Brazilian news outlets reported that Mendonça had authorised another influence peddling investigation into Fábio Luís. The second probe concerns government contracts with the Empresa de Tecnologia e Informações da Previdência (Dataprev), a digital services company owned by the federal government which provides much of the technological infrastructure for the INSS systems. Fábio Luís is suspected of helping a private technology company, 3Structure, secure contracts with Dataprev.

In addition to the two probes launched by Mendonça, STF justice Flávio Dino launched another investigation into Fábio Luís. According to state-owned news agency Agência Brasil, Dino has authorised the police to investigate Fábio Luís in relation to his possible ties to a network of individuals allegedly involved in “illicit activities with federal government institutions” as well as the possible illegal leaking of confidential information.

Over the past week, Fábio Luís’ lawyers Marco Aurélio de Carvalho and Guilherme Suguimori Santos have been cited by various media outlets as claiming that the recent launch of investigations into the president’s son could have political or electoral motivations, suggesting that these could be attempts to dig up indirect connections between Fábio Luís and the INSS scandal as a way of damaging the reputation of his father, who is planning to run for re-election in October.

• Police bias?

Speaking to news website UOL News, Fábio Luís’ lawyer Marco Aurélio de Carvalho argued that the federal police (PF), which is in charge of the investigations, is an institution “with good and bad elements”. He said that “unfortunately” there are “various groups” within the PF and it is not possible for the top brass to control all the factions. However, in his interview he did not give firm evidence to back up his claims of political bias within the police force.

PANAMA | Growth. Panama registered real GDP growth of 10.3% in the first six months of 2011, according to a report released on 15 September by the national statistics institute (Inec). The Inec put Panama’s nominal GDP in the first half of 2011 at US$11.28bn, up from US$10.23bn a year earlier. In output terms, the first half result was driven by the construction sector, where activity was up 17.3% year-on-year, and mining (up 16.5%). Activity in the Colón Free Trade Zone registered an increase of 15.1%, with Canal operations up 11.4%, port services up 22.3% and air transport up 21.9%. A recent report by the UN Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) forecast that Panama would register GDP growth for 2011 of 8.5%, compared with the regional average of 4.7%. Meanwhile, the national customs authority (ANA) reported a 32.56% increase in customs revenues year-on-year to US$799.84m in the first half of 2011 - much of that increase was attributed to growing trade levels through the Canal, especially between South America and Asia. The ANA expects to receive US$1.3m in revenues by the end of the year.

BELIZE-EL SALVADOR| US blacklist. The US State Department last week released its annual blacklist of countries ranked as major producers or transit routes for illegal narcotics, which for the first time included Belize and El Salvador – the only two Central American countries that hadn’t featured previously. The report estimates that “as much as 90 percent of some 700 metric tons of cocaine shipped annually from Colombia and other producing nations intended for the U.S. markets passes through the countries of Central America”, with 4 tonnes (t) passing through El Salvador in 2009 and some 10t believed to have passed through Belize in 2010.

EL SALVADOR-CUBA | Partial trade agreement. Cuba and El Salvador this week announced the completion of a bilateral Partial Trade Agreement (PTA) whereby 70% of the product lines to be included (433 of which are Salvadorean and 618 are Cuban) will benefit from duty-free status with the tariffs to be reduced on the remainder.  According to figures from El Salvador’s Central Reserve Bank (BCR), Cuba’s imports to El Salvador reached US$126,193 in 2010 while exports amounted US$3.08m. The trade deal follows the restoration of diplomatic ties between the two countries shortly after President Mauricio Funes assumed office in June 2009, which was then followed by a visit by Funes to the island in October 2010 [WR-10-40]. The day after the deal was signed, on 20 September, the first direct flight between the two countries took place, part of a new thrice-weekly service operated by the airline Avianca-TACA. El Salvador’s economy minister, Héctor Dada Hirezi, told local reporters that the PTA is in line with the government’s search for new markets in order to reduce dependence on the US, its main trade ally, and address its trade deficit [WR-11-27]. Hirezi said that El Salvador was currently negotiating free trade agreements with Peru and South Korea with this objective.

COSTA RICA | Unprecedented ruling. Hailed as an historic ruling by indigenous groups, an administrative court in the province of San José last week ordered non-indigenous people living in the Keköldi Indigenous Reserve in the canton of Talamanca to be relocated and the land returned to the BriBrí tribe, to whom it technically already belongs. Costa Rica’s Indigenous Law of 1977 states that all land belonging to indigenous people but inhabited by non-indigenous people must be renounced, trading of land and property on indigenous reserves can only take place between indigenous people and all transactions occurring prior to the approval of the 1977 law should be declared void. However, the law has so far not been upheld. Lawyer Danilo Chaverri, who represented the indigenous group, told reporters that it was the first time a court had ordered the state to begin the process of expropriation and eviction in order to return an entire reserve to indigenous groups. According to the 2000 census, Costa Rica’s indigenous population accounts for between 1% and 1.7% of the total population.

• Pacific port

El Salvador’s congress has approved the terms of a concession for a deep sea port at La Unión, nearly two years after the completion of its construction. The government of President Mauricio Funes expects that the US$200m project (the biggest in El Salvador’s history), located in the Gulf of Fonseca shared with Honduras and Nicaragua, will become Central America’s most important Pacific port. Despite administrative delays on the part of the three participating governments, the port’s administrative body, Comisión Ejecutiva Portuaria Autónoma (Cepa), announced that two international shipping companies (Hamburg Süd and American President Lines) began using the port facilities on 13 September.

MEXICO | Companies ‘running scared’ or scaremongering? The country’s biggest umbrella employers’ association, the Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana (Coparmex), has attracted the anger of the economy ministry for allegedly disseminating misleading information about the impact of public insecurity on companies.

On 3 April Coparmex’s president, Alberto Espinosa, said: ‘Organised crime is eroding the competitiveness of the federative entities [the states], discouraging national and foreign investment, and causing the closure of formal enterprises. In 2011 alone, more than 160,000 firms ceased to operate across the country.’ He also said that due to the climate of violence Mexico lost about US$800m over the past five years because 24m tourists chose not to visit the country.

The very next day, the economy ministry issued a communiqué in which it ‘categorically rejected’ Espinosa’s claim, noting that he did not cite the source of his information, ‘which in the light of available data [compiled] with methodological rigour, appear disproportionate.’

The ministry said that Espinosa’s claim was not consistent with the fact that in 2011 590,797 jobs were created in the formal sector, that the number of contributors to social security had risen to 828,529 [up 0.3%]  and that the economy grew by 3.9%.  On the number of visitors lost, the ministry noted that the figure mentioned by Espinosa was unrealistic, given that the tourism ministry had counted more than 190m people visiting the country’s tourist attractions last year.

MEXICO-US | Southbound ammunition or mistake? On 17 April Mexican customs authorities intercepted a truck crossing from El Paso towards Ciudad Juárez and found that it was carrying a huge load of ammunition: 250,000 7.62 x 39 rounds (used in AK-47 assault rifles) and 18,000 5.56 x 45 (used in AR-15 rifles).

A customs official said off the record that the driver, US national Jabin Bogan, had initially said that he was carrying no cargo. Later, though, Bogan said that he had taken a wrong turn in El Paso and found himself involuntarily heading into Mexico. Online comments in the US say that it is hardly unknown for this to happen to drivers travelling along the Interstate 10 (I-10).

Bogan’s employers, the Memphis branch of transport company Demco Express, has been reported as saying that Bogan had been carrying ammunition legally to an address in Phoenix, Arizona.

The Mexican government has said that since 2006 authorities have seized 63,641 rifles, 44,332 handguns and 10.9m rounds of ammunition. Last February President Felipe Calderón called on the US government to do more to halt the crossborder flow of armament. At the same crossing where Bogan was arrested, he held up a placard that said, in English, ‘No More Weapons!’

MEXICO | Narco ‘penetration’ of local government. The 18 April arrest of Martín Padua Zúñiga, of the ruling PAN and mayor of Chinameca, Veracruz is being held up as the latest illustration of the extent to which drug-trafficking organisations have penetrated local government. The mayor was arrested in a safe house of Los Zetas where he had take refuge with several gunmen of that organisation after they had engaged in a shootout with the army.

In March federal police tracking narco associates had arrested the mayor of Las Minas, Veracruz, Mauricio Herrera Fernández (also PAN), found in possession of firearms and psychotropic drugs.

Development: On 11 June, talks between the national confederation of mining cooperatives (Fencomin) and the government of President Evo Morales about the planned nationalisation of the Colquiri mine, a small tin/zinc mine in La Paz department controlled by Sinchi Wayra, a subsidiary of Switzerland’s Glencore, failed to yield results.

Significance: The government’s threat to nationalise the mine, announced on 10 June, is proving highly divisive. Cooperative miners are opposed to the move, while mining workers represented by the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB) are in favour of it.

Key points:

• The government announced the nationalisation after 1,000 members of one of the local mining cooperatives active on the site, Cooperativa 26 de Febrero, took over the mine on 30 May, demanding full control of the mine.

• The move by Cooperativa 26 de Febrero was backed by Fencomin, which is now threatening to stage nationwide blockades. The threat by Fencomin is not to be taken lightly. Last year, the government announced that the mining sector employed an estimated 79,000 workers, up from 54,500 in 2001. Of these, 83% are employed by mining cooperatives and small-scale mines, while 7% are employed by the State. The other 10% work for medium-sized mining firms.

• However, the FSTMB has called for the nationalisation of the mine as a means of resolving the conflict. The state mining company, Comibol, put the cost of the occupation at some US$30,000 a day in losses.

• In April 2011, Morales suggested that the Colquiri mine was one of four mining projects earmarked for nationalisation. The others include San Vicente, a medium-size zinc/silver mine run by Canada’s Pan American, and two others also controlled by Sinchi Wayra; Bolívar (lead/zinc/silver) and Porco (lead/zinc/silver). The government was forced to back down from its proposal after some 15 mining unions declared themselves in a state of emergency in protest, amid concerns that the State was not capable of administering the mines.

• According to the latest figures from the mining and energy ministry, the State accounted for just 6.6% (US$250m) of the US$3.7bn in revenues generated by the mining sector in 2011.

VENEZUELA | Inflation unrelenting. Inflation hit 13% in the first half of 2011, the central bank reported. This means Venezuela is on course to post inflation similar to the 27.2% recorded in the whole of 2010, by far the highest in the region. Inflation in June amounted to 2.5%, higher than expected, after the government raised the price caps on basic foodstuffs, such as bread, milk and sugar to avoid shortages after January’s 40% devaluation left imports significantly more expensive. The government also doubled the metro tariff, the first such fare increase since 2006.

POLITICS | Capriles to meet Santos in Bogotá. Venezuela’s opposition presidential candidate, Henrique Capriles Radonski, will meet in a private capacity with President Juan Manuel Santos in the Colombian capital today (19 September). Announcing the trip at a rally in the Western border state of Zulia, Capriles stated, “There are a lot of matters to be discussed with Colombia. We will be there for a few hours and then we’ll return to continue with our extraordinary campaign…We have to prepare the ground for the strengthening of relations with Colombia”. He noted that if elected on 7 October, he would promote bilateral trade with an emphasis on selling Venezuelan-made goods. Finally, he added that he would offer Santos Venezuela’s assistance as a mediator in the Colombian government’s peace talks with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc).

El habitualmente controversial ministro de finanzas, Guido Mantega, estaba en su mejor comportamiento esta semana en Nueva York, donde él comenzó una gira en busca de más de US$230mm en inversiones en infraestructura. El plan de Mantega y su séquito es captar inversionistas en EU, Europa y Asia en el próximo par de semanas, y en apoyo de este esfuerzo la Presidenta Dilma Rousseff también está dando un firme mensaje en Brasil, prometiendo reglas de juego claras y un ambiente operativo estable para los inversionistas. Habiéndose dado cuenta tardíamente que los inversionistas se estaban alejando asustados por los sucesivos e impredecibles cambios de políticas de los últimos dos años, la administración Rousseff ahora está en una gran ofensiva para desplegar todo su encanto a fin de atraerlos de vuelta.

Se espera que las cifras oficiales del PIB del cuarto trimestre del 2012, que se difundirán el 1 de marzo, muestren que Brasil creció sólo un 1% anualmente el año pasado, con las inversiones cayendo por un sexto trimestre consecutivo. A tan sólo el 18,7% del PIB, la tasa de inversión bruta en capital fijo es una de las más bajas en la región. En las abiertas economías andinas conducidas por la exportación como Perú y Chile, por ejemplo, tal inversión es del 24% - 25% del PIB. En el principal socio comercial de Brasil, China, es de un enorme 48%.

Los críticos del gobierno, conducido desde el 2003 por el Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), de izquierda, advierten que la larga racha del país (desde 2004-2005) apoyada en el prolongado boom consumidor alimentado por los precios de las materias primas, ha finalmente terminado, y que la predilección de la administración Rousseff por el micro-gerenciamiento (en un bien intencionado esfuerzo para mantener el crecimiento) ha tenido el involuntario efecto de desalentar la inversión privada, con el sector industrial desplomándose como resultado.

El equipo de Rousseff ahora parece haber llegado a la idea de que podría ser mejor dejar que el sector privado se maneje por si mismo, y en vez de intervenir hiper-activamente con abruptos (y a veces esquizofrénicos) cambios en las políticas monetarias, de tasas de cambio, impuestos, y comercio, dedicarse a trabajar para facilitar un crecimiento conducido por la inversión eliminando los principales obstáculos estructurales que se interponen, tal como el exorbitante ‘Custo Brasil’.

Es también el caso de que bajo Mantega el ministerio de finanzas ha tenido problemas reales con cosas básicas –como las comunicaciones– hasta el punto que el diario, The Economist, a fines del año pasado pidió a Rousseff que lo destituya, un pedido que ella enfáticamente ignoró. De acuerdo con el diario conservador, O Estado, el ministerio de finanzas recientemente trajo un nuevo equipo privado de comunicaciones para ‘renovar la imagen’ y reconstruir las crispadas relaciones del ministerio con el sector de negocios y la comunidad financiera, tanto en Brasil como en el exterior.

El brillante nuevo mensaje de que ‘Brasil está abierto para los negocios’ y la ‘cruzada’ contra el Custo Brasil llegaron antes del lanzamiento de Rousseff por la reelección en octubre del 2014, antes de lo cual ella y el PT necesitan desesperadamente  producir un más fuerte –y más sostenible– crecimiento. Y esto significa re-equilibrar la economía.

El 27 de febrero en un evento para celebrar los 10 años desde la creación del consejo para el desarrollo económico y social (Conselhão) del PT, Rousseff lanzó un claro gesto a los mercados, al reafirmar el compromiso de su gobierno con los tres pilares de la posición de política macroeconómica de Brasil –estabilidad monetaria, una tasa de cambio flotante, y estabilidad fiscal. Ella también admitió francamente que hay límites a la acción del Estado. Más que esto, la presidenta insistió en que la inflación en Brasil no estaba fuera de control, indicando que una inflación estable es una prioridad política en sí misma. En la última semana, Mantega y el presidente del banco central, Alexandre Tombini, habían enviado las más fuertes señales hasta hoy, de que las tasas de interés podrían elevarse en respuesta a la terca inflación –esto también será música para los oídos de los inversionistas financieros.

Contrarrestar el Custo Brasil no es tarea fácil, como quedó evidenciado por la actual huelga de los trabajadores  puertos contra los nuevos planes de reforma para el sector público-privado. Y no queda claro donde están los límites del micro-gerenciamiento del gobierno. Por ejemplo, Mantega parece haber rechazado, por ahora, la urgente demanda de la petrolera estatal Petrobrás por otro incremento en los precios de combustibles en las estaciones expendedoras de gasolina. Su motivación es clara, dadas las presiones inflacionarias; pero con poco apetito en el mercado por una nueva emisión de deuda, Petrobrás, que sufre de falta de liquidez, ahora está siguiendo a sus pares regionales y está cayendo en los brazos de China. El ministro de energía, Edison Lobão, dijo esta semana que Petrobrás está buscando ayuda de la petrolera estatal de China, Sinopec, para finalizar la construcción de sus nuevas refinerías Premium I, en Maranhão, y Premium II, en Ceará. Lobão admitió ante los periodistas que las obras en la refinería en Maranhão fueron retrasadas debido a “ciertas dificultades financieras”. María das Graças Foster, la presidenta de Petrobrás, está en China esta semana para supervisar personalmente las negociaciones.

Lobão también dijo que la ronda pendiente de subastas de concesiones para el sector ‘pre-salino’ de petróleo en  aguas profundas tendrían lugar desde mayo. Esto podría ser sólo una expresión de deseo; el pleno de la corte suprema rechazo esta semana una decisión previa de uno de los magistrados, Luiz Fux, que efectivamente impedía al congreso avanzar con una moción de urgencia para rechazar el veto de Rousseff a partes del nuevo marco regulador para la distribución de los royalties petroleros. La presidenta vetó secciones del nuevo marco –que ajusta la manera en que los royalties son distribuidos entre los estados productores y no productores– sobre bases legales y constitucionales, pues retroactivamente enmiendan contratos existentes. El congreso parece decidido a desafiar a la presidenta, en cuyo caso las subastas de concesiones de petróleo y gas no tendrán lugar.

Rousseff también aprovechó la oportunidad el 27 de febrero para rechazar los insultos bastante personales de la oposición. Hablando en la ciudad natal de Rousseff, Belo Horizonte, el ex presidente, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003), la acusó de ser “una ingrata” y de “escupir en el plato del que ella estaba comiendo” en referencia a sus afirmaciones de que el PT heredó un caos de Cardoso en el 2003, cuando llegó al poder por primera vez con Lula da Silva (2003-2010). Como su mentor Lula, Rousseff desde hace tiempo ha rehusado dar algún crédito a las afirmaciones de Cardoso de que su administración sentó los cimientos para el ‘milagro’ económico de Brasil bajo Lula.

¿Y qué de Abreu e Lima?

La petrolera estatal venezolana, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa) aún debe completar su parte del acuerdo sobre la refinería conjunta de petróleo Abreu e Lima, con el gigante petrolero de Brasil, Petrobrás. Localizada en el estado de Pernambuco en el nordeste de Brasil, en su visión original, como imaginaron el presidente Hugo Chávez y su aliado brasilero, el ex presidente Lula, la refinería ayudaría a promover el proceso de integración industrial de los dos países, teniendo la capacidad de procesar el crudo pesado de Venezuela.

Bajo un acuerdo concretado entre Chávez y Lula en el 2008, Petrobrás proveería las instalaciones y Pdvsa el dinero, en una división de la empresa conjunta del 60% y el 40%. Al final, Petrobrás se ha tenido que hacer cargo de ambas cosas, construir la refinería y cargar con el costo, estimado en unos US$15mm. Habiendo efectivamente descartado la participación de Pdvsa, ahora no está claro si la refinería incluirá o no la capacidad de procesar cualquier crudo pesado. En el esquema inicial, alrededor de la mitad de la planeada capacidad de refinación de 230.000 barriles por día serían de crudo pesado.

El oficial en jefe de finanzas de Petrobrás, Almir Barbassa, dijo al diario petrolero, Platts, en octubre del 2012, que la refinería comenzaría las operaciones en el 2014, un año detrás de lo programado. Dijo que la refinería estaría “completa en un 60%” al comenzar, indicando al tenso flujo de dinero en Petrobrás mientras trata de desarrollar sus nuevos yacimientos de petróleo offshore en aguas profundas. Barbassa también dejó en claro que las otras tres nuevas refinerías planeadas de Petrobrás apuntan a cubrir la creciente demanda de destilados medios en Brasil. El petróleo que proviene del nuevo sector offshore de Brasil, es crudo ligero y por lo tanto, el país no tiene una necesidad real de tener capacidad para refinar crudo pesado, que es más caro y que consume más tiempo.

• La experiencia de Tiririca

El diputado más votado en Brasil en las elecciones parlamentarias del 2010, el ex payaso convertido en político, Tiririca, ha anunciado que se retirará de la política una vez que su término finalice en el 2014. Él está lanzando un nuevo disco en el cual muestrará su desencanto con la política, cantando que los legisladores se dedican más a hablar y que a tomar acción alguna. Él espera regresar a la industria del entretenimiento, donde él alega que puede hacer mucho por el pueblo brasilero haciéndoles sonreír (también dice que puede ganar más en una noche en el circuito que en un mes en el congreso).

• El complejo de mártir de Lula

El ex presidente Lula se ha comparado a sí mismo con el ex presidente de EU, Abraham Lincoln, elaborando paralelos entre los ataques de la prensa sobre Lincoln en 1860 y los ataques sobre él de parte de la prensa conservadora de Brasil y la oposición política. “Y él no tenía Internet para responder, tenía que aguardar por el telégrafo,” bromeó Lula. Hablando en un evento para marcar los 30 años desde la fundación de la Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), Lula pidió a la CUT que organice un grupo de comunicaciones para crear espacio para los “progresistas”, para que los movimientos sociales y sindicatos no tengan que depender de los medios tradicionales.