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Development: On 7 July Teodoro Petkoff, a opposition candidate for the presidency, criticised the US-backed Súmate for trying to impose primaries.

Significance: Petkoff made it clear that he was only opposed to Súmate's management on an opposition primary, not to the principle of an opposition primary.

Petkoff said that Súmate was acting "dictatorially and arrogantly" in trying to impose a primary on all the opposition candidates. He said that Súmate seemed to have modelled itself on Pedro Carmona: he was the president brought, briefly, to power by an anti-Chávez coup in 2002. Carmona issued one decree: abolishing the whole of the Venezuelan state.

Petkoff confirmed that he was still in the running for the presidency and backed the idea of a single opposition candidate to challenge President Hugo Chávez in the elections at the beginning of December. He said that he expected to meet the only other two opposition candidates to feature in the opinion polls, Manuel Rosales and Julio Borges, "soon" to discuss the situation. No opposition candidate is currently running at over 15% in the opinion polls.

Súmate has given politicians until 13 July to agree to take part in its primary. Both Rosales, the governor of Zulia, and Borges, the leader of Primero Justicia, are standing in the Súmate primaries which are scheduled for 13 August.

BRAZIL: The Brazilian population will reach 225.3 million by 2030 up from the current 187 million, according to new official estimates.

BRAZIL: The Brazilian sovereign risk fell to its lowest level ever, reaching 205 points.

BRAZIL: New estimates put the Brazilian 2006 harvest at 118,094 million/tons, 0.15% more than previous forecasts in June and 4.9% more than in 2005.

MEXICO: The government issued domestic bonds worth 135bn pesos to anticipate the payment of US$12.3bn of its foreign debt.

Development: The latest opinion polls published on the weekend of 16 and 17 September show that most of the local elections will be decided in the first round.

Significance: Apart from deciding the local elections in the first round, the once volatile Brazilian electorate seems likely to keep its present rulers in power. The almost certain re-election of President Lula da Silva in the first round on 1 October is just a reflection of a wider national trend. For many local commentators the results of the 2006 general elections will lead to a continuation of the status quo.

If the poll's results materialise in the ballot box there will be a second round vote in only eight of Brazil's 27 states. Furthermore, only two states ( Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte) have seen a change in their likely results since the beginning of the statutory TV and radio election broadcasts last month. In every other race the situation has not changed since candidacies were made official in early July.

The ruling PT is likely to keep two of its three governors, all in small states. The main opposition party, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, will continue to run São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The catch-all Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro is the party with the best chances in local elections: it has 11 candidates with a chance of winning a governorship and is likely to maintain its grip in the three wealthy Southern states. Rio de Janeiro, however, is one of the eight states were there is no clear favourite.

BRAZIL: The IMF replaced Agustí­n Carstens, who is left last week to become, almost certainly, Mexico's new finance minister, with Murilo Portugal from Brazil as its second deputy managing director.

BRAZIL: The cost of debt servicing has risen from 20% to 42% of total government spending between 1995 and 2005, according to a report by the union of public sector auditors (Unafisco). This has led to a halving of public sector spending on investment.

BRAZIL: Press freedom in Brazil has fallen. An NGO, Reporters without Frontiers, ranks Brazil 75 in the world for press freedom, down from 63 in 2005. 

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: The economy grew by 11.3% in the first nine months of 2006.

ECUADOR: The trade surplus in the first eight months came to US$1.09bn on exports of US$8.27bn and imports of US$7.18bn.

MEXICO & CENTRAL AMERICA: Delta Airlines announced that it will fly to 16 new destinations in the region this winter, mostly from Los Angeles.

VENEZUELA: The energy minister, Rafael Ramirez, said that Opec would consider a further cut of 500,000bpd at its next meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on 14 December.

Development: On 28 November the interior minister Pilar Mazzetti announced the capture of a regional leader of the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso.

Significance: The capture of Mansuelo Ascencio Mori, also know as "Mansho", was a coup for the government because it coincided with renewed fears about guerrilla activity. On 26 November, a Sendero Luminoso leader, Comrade Artemio; surrounded by 50 masked followers, threatened to relaunch the armed struggle against the state unless President Alan Garcí­a granted amnesty to guerrilla leaders within three months.

The government downplayed the threat posed by the Sendero Luminoso; Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo said that the group was "in no condition to impose its demands on the state". Nonetheless, Mazzetti emphasised Mansho's links with Artemio, who was his direct superior and also announced that the guerrilla camp from which the Artemio television interview was broadcast had been pinpointed, in Huánuco, although no guerrilla fighters were found there.

Comrade Artemio is thought to lead a group of around 300 fighters, who also have links to the coca trade. Artemio belongs to the "hardline wing" of the Sendero Luminoso which splintered off when Abimael Gúzman, the founder of the group, proposed a peace agreement in 1993.

Development: On 15 January Rafael Correa was inaugurated as president.

Significance: In his hour-long speech, the new president said his government would concentrate on five areas. Chief among these would be "constitutional revolution", to be achieved through a constituent assembly. The other "axes" of Correa's government will be the fight against corruption; the development of a sovereign economic policy; the promotion of human capital; and the push for further South American integration. Correa is Ecuador's eighth president in a decade.

Correa was the first of Ecuador's 81 presidents to be sworn in without wearing a tie. In another break with protocol, he was handed the presidential sash by outgoing president Alfredo Palacio. Correa had refused to accept it from Jorge Cevallos, the president of congress, and sat stony-faced throughout Cevallos's speech, which emphasised the importance of the independence of the legislature. On taking up office, Correa's first action was to send a proposal for a referendum on a constituent assembly, to be held on 18 March, to the supreme electoral court (TSE).

It is unclear how the seven person TSE will respond. The court is composed of representatives from the main parties with seats in congress. The second-largest party, the Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), initially formed part of a majority bloc in congress opposed to the assembly, but last week completed an about turn and claimed it would now support Correa's proposal. Correa's response, however, was less than gracious, calling the party a "wolf in sheep's clothing". Gilmar Gutiérrez, the PSP's candidate for the presidency in 2006, called Correa a "professional insulter". If the PSP does support the assembly, as seemingly do three out of four Ecuadoreans, the TSE is likely to rule that Correa's proposal is legal.

Of the presidents other "axes", the fight against corruption is an oft-repeated promise, but Correa has sought to initiate the process by putting all the gifts he receives as president into a museum. Once again, the president emphasised the necessity of putting "life before debt" and called for the creation of an international court to revise developing countries' external debt. What Correa meant by developing human capital appears to be the reincorporation of the Ecuadorean diaspora, by defending emigrants rights and reducing restrictions on remittances.

Ecuador's eagerness to push for greater South American integration is not new, but Correa offered Quito as the seat for the secretariat of the South American Community of Nations. Among the audience for his inauguration were the presidents of Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Colombia, Nicaragua and Iran. Also present was Correa's 101-year old grandfather, the nephew of Ecuador's great liberation hero, Eloy Alfaro.

Development: President Alvaro Uribe accepted the resignation of his finance minister, Alberto Carrasquilla, on 16 February.

Significance: Carrasquilla, who held the post since June 2003, quit for personal and financial reasons. He said that his greatest success had been to oversee a period when confidence in the Colombian economy improved dramatically, and he classified his inability to reform the tax system as his greatest failure in office.

Carrasquilla has been replaced by Oscar Iván Zuluaga, one of Uribe's most senior advisers. Zuluaga is considered much more a politician than a financial expert and is expected to play a key role defending the government in congress on all issues, not just those relating to the economy.

The loss of Carrasquilla is poorly timed for Uribe, as he battles to hang onto his foreign minister, Marí­a Consuelo Araújo. Members both of the opposition and the pro-Uribe parties have described her position as untenable after her brother, Alvaro Araújo, was arrested on 15 February for his links to paramilitaries.

Her plight was hardly helped on 16 February, when the supreme court ordered an investigation into her father, the former minister and senator Alvaro Araújo Noguera, also for alleged links to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. On 17 February Uribe stuck by her once again, saying that she has no connection with “the crimes which are being investigated".

Development: Three police chiefs resigned in Veracruz on 23 March.

Significance: The resignations are the most serious vote of no-confidence in the federal government's offensives against the drug trade which are now underway in nine of the country's 32 states. The police chiefs resigned five days after three policemen were gunned down in the state. So far this year at least 61 policemen have been killed by drug gangsters. 

The three senior policemen who resigned were Alberto Rodrí­guez, the head of the municipal police in the port of Veracruz and two supervisors, Jorge Castillo and José Enrí­quez. According to the local press, all three had recently received credible death threats. 

Almost a quarter of the 61 policemen killed this year have been murdered in the northern border state of Nuevo León. On 23 March the 15th policemen to be killed this year was gunned down in Santa Catarina, near Monterrey. Last week, the gangsters killed two people and left messages on their bodies saying that, if the authorities wanted to end the killing, they should stop protecting Joaquí­n "El Chapo" Guzmán, the head of the Sinaloa gang. This gang is fighting for control of the drug trade in Nuevo León with the Golfo gang.

Development: On 29 April the residents of Gualeguaychú organised the biggest protest yet, attended by some 130,000 demonstrators, against the construction of a pulp mill on the Uruguayan side of the River Uruguay.

Significance: The size of the demonstration shows the depth of feeling in Argentina about the pulp mills, and the difficulty that the Argentine government will have in resolving the dispute with Uruguay without losing face. The pulp mill, which is being built by the Finnish company Botnia, is in an advanced stage of construction and should be up and running by October this year.

There were signs at a meeting in Madrid earlier this month between the two sides that the Argentine government might be ready to accept that it is too late to relocate the mill. In return Argentina wants an admission from the Uruguayan government that it failed to comply with all the statutes of a 1975 bilateral treaty regulating the joint management of the Uruguay River.

Development: The opposition in Brazil's senate vowed on 4 June to block Venezuela's entry into Mercosur until the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez , issues a formal apology for his comment that Brazil's senators “parroted" US policies.

Significance: The Brazilian opposition's decision is a blow to President Lula da Silva's policy of engaging with Chávez and will further divide Mercosur, the South American customs union which Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay founded in the 1990s. Venezuela was accepted as a member by the presidents of the four founding members last year. Venezuela's accession as a full member, however, is still dependent on congressional approval in Brazil and Uruguay. The parliaments of Argentina and Paraguay have already ratified Venezuela's entry to Mercosur.

The controversy started after Brazil's senators voted for a motion of censure against the Venezuelan government's decision not to renew the license of RCTV, the main opposition TV station in Venezuela. This led to Chávez 's comment that irritated not only Brazil's opposition but also members of Lula's coalition. The Uruguayan senate, as well as those of other Latin American countries, issued similar motions against the Venezuelan government's decision, claiming it went against the right to free speech.

Lula tried to stay out of the whole affair by not commenting publicly about RCTV's licence loss. Lula, however, found himself forced to issue a statement criticising Chávez 's comment against Brazil's senate. As well as dividing Mercosur, the issue seems to have divided the Brazilian government. While Lula's key foreign policy adviser, Marco Aurélio Garcia, defended Chávez 's decision against RCTV the foreign minister, Celso Amorim, is adamant that Brazil needs to be more forceful against Venezuela if Chávez fails to apologise officially about his remark.

Development: On 8 July the Argentine press published the first opinion poll since Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced her candidacy for the presidential elections to be held on 26 October.

Significance: The poll, produced by Opinión Pública, Servicios y Mercados (OPSM), showed that Cristina's support increased slightly, from 46.5% to 48.2%, after she announced her decision. Until a week ago President Néstor Kirchner was more than 10% ahead of his wife in the opinion polls. However, Jorge Giacobbe, from La Nación newspaper, believes that Cristina is now beginning to occupy her husband's old ground.

Cristina enjoys a considerable lead over the opposition. Ex-economy minister Roberto Lavagna, who heads the coalition Una Nación Avanzada (UNA), is second in OPSM's poll with 11.9%. Elisa Carrió, of the centre-left group ARI, is a close third with 10.6%. If Cristina obtains more than 45% of the vote in October she will win the election outright. She can also win by over 40%, with a 10% advantage over her closest rival, to stave off a second round. Cristina will formally launch her candidacy on 19 July in the city of La Plata.

Meanwhile, support for the government has fallen steadily. From 61% in September 2006 its approval rating now stands at 54%, according to the consultant Graciela Römer. The proportion of respondents who expect the economic situation to worsen has risen to 5%.

Development: Bolivia's deputy foreign minister gave reasons on 7 August for the dismissal of the country's top diplomat in Chile.

Significance: Hugo Fernández, the deputy foreign minister said that Roberto Finot, who had forecast an imminent resolution to Bolivia's century old dispute with Chile, was fired for "speaking more than was needed and without having taken part in any of the top level diplomatic meetings with Chile." Fernández said that Bolivia would not negotiate with Chile about an issue as sensitive as the restoration of Bolivia's Pacific seaboard through the media.

Fernández accused Finot, who was officially dismissed on 5 August from his post as consul general in Santiago, of creating false expectations by claiming that La Paz and Santiago were close to an agreement. Finot will be succeeded by his deputy, Fredy Torrico Zambrano.

Development: On 10 September, the liberal opposition Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) and the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) agreed to unite and hold primary elections to select candidates for municipal elections in 2008.

Significance: The agreement is further evidence of deepening ties between the ALN and PLC, since the announcement of a "strategic alliance" in July. Both parties also made a further agreement on 3 September to vote together to approve 18 legislative proposals. These include reforms to both the executive and legislative acts, which would remove both the president's right to create citizen power councils (CPC) as well as the "excessive" powers of the president.

On 6 September, the ALN-PLC alliance resulted in a defeat for the ruling Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in congress, with the approval of an amendment to a law which effectively outlaws any link between the CPCs and the government. With total of 51 votes, the ALN, PLC and Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS), defeated the 33 votes of the FSLN.

This represented a significant blow for President Daniel Ortega, although the FSLN has said that, in any case, the CPCs will be installed as planned on 13 September because the councils "grant the constitutional right of citizens to organise themselves". What is at stake will be the input and relationship of the government in the process. While Ortega had said that the councils, made up of over a million people in the country, are a means to encourage popular participation and will simply co-ordinate the work of NGOs and public institutions in each of the country's 15 departments, the opposition maintained that the councils are simply a mechanism for the FSLN to consolidate its power.

Development: On 14 October President Nicanor Duarte appointed his sixth interior minister since taking office in 2003.

Significance: The fifth, Guillermo Delmás Frescura, resigned after losing a battle to purge the police. His replacement Libio Florentí­n, is close to the public works minister, Rogelio Bení­tez, who had previously served as interior minister and came up with the idea of installing surveillance cameras in the main streets of the capital.

Delmás quit after a row with police over the kidnapping (and release) of Belén Argaña Fretes, an 18 year-old. She was held captive for 24 hours and released after a ransom of US$50,000 was paid. In 1999 her great-uncle, Luis Argaña (then the country's vice-president), was murdered.

Delmás held a press conference after the release of Argaña Fretes and said bluntly that he had no confidence in the police commanders, all but accusing them of complicity in the kidnap and extortion business. Delmás said that he would set up a kidnap rescue squad that would be answerable to him and he made it clear that he would not allow the attorney general's office to put pressure on the families of kidnap victims to pay ransoms.

Delmás went on to say: "Inside the police there are numerous irregularities and I will ask the president to relieve the national police commissioner, Fidel Isasa, of his duties." Delmás lost that battle because Bení­tez protected Isasa and brought in Florentí­n to whom Bení­tez is related by marriage. Delmás had said that Isasa already tended to take orders from Bení­tez, rather than him.

Bení­tez is a powerful figure. He was governor of Encarnación and as public works minister controls government spending. He is loyal to Duarte and is a supporter of Duarte's preferred candidate in the presidential elections, Blanca Ovelar. Bení­tez is running for the senate on her slate: she has yet to be adopted by the ruling Colorado party as the presidential candidate. Her chances of winning the presidency next year have been increased by the release of General Lino Oviedo, the man generally blamed for organising the assassination of Luis Argaña in 1999: Oviedo is likely to split the opposition vote which was coalescing around the former bishop Fernando Lugo.

The opposition argues that the policed need a major shake-up. The opposition alleges that the police force is in league with organised crime and that Duarte, who came to power promising a drive against crime, has failed. Opposition senators say that if well-connected families such as the Argañas can be forced to pay ransoms to keep their children safe, no-one is safe.

COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA: President Hugo Chávez announced on 14 November that he expects to meet a delegation from the Ejército de Liberación Nacional today (15 November). Colombia's peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, confirmed plans for the meeting before flying to Caracas on 14 November for a meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolás Maduro

Development: On 18 December the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) announced that it would release three of the 45 hostages it holds.

Significance: President Alvaro Uribe anticipated such a move on 17 December and, accurately, dismissed it as a negotiating tactic. What the Farc wants is to increase the pressure on Uribe to respond to its move. What the Farc would like, but was too clever to set as a condition for the release of the hostages, would be for Uribe to make a major concession. One such concession would be to expand the size of the demilitarised zone, which the Farc wants for the release of the bulk of its hostages. Another would be to secure the release of the Farc leaders whom Uribe extradited to the US. Right on cue the relations of the hostages called on Uribe to make a generous response.

Uribe will have to do something, if only to reassert his authority in the process. His immediate response to the Farc communiqué, which was released by the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, was to point out, again accurately, that none of the three slated for release had appeared in the Farc's proof of life video, seized by the Colombian authorities at the beginning of December. Uribe is suggesting that the Farc is simply playing political games with the hostages.

Colombia's peace commissioner, Luis Restrepo, led the government's response. First he raised questions about the veracity of the Farc's offer; then, learning that President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela had confirmed it, welcomed it and finally criticised President Hugo Chávez for the disobliging comments he made about President Uribe.

The three hostages the Farc said that it will release are: Clara Rojas, who was running as the vice presidential candidate of the ticket headed by íngrid Betancourt when they were both kidnapped in 2002; Rojas's son Emmanuel, who was born in captivity after Rojas had a relationship with one of her captors; and a former congresswoman, Consuelo González de Perdomo, kidnapped in 2001.

The Farc said that the release of the two women and a child was a goodwill gesture to the families of the other hostages; to Chávez , whom Uribe dismissed as a mediator with the Farc on 21 November, and to the other Colombian mediator, Piedad Córdoba, a leftwing senator.

Exactly how and when the hostages will be freed is unclear. The Farc talks about releasing them in Colombia but then also adds that they will be released to Chávez or his nominee. Chávez expects them to be free by Christmas. Chávez , who was attending the Mercosur summit in Montevideo on 18 December, admitted that he had been warned by the Farc that it was about to make an announcement about the release of some of the hostages.

Chávez took the opportunity to insult Uribe: he said that Uribe was a "puppet of the [US] empire" and "someone who did not want peace in Colombia." Chávez claimed that Uribe was just doing what the US wanted; which was to use Colombia as a base for a military buildup which would be used to topple progressive governments, such as Venezuela's, in the region.

The Colombian government all but ignored the insults: the peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, simply asked for Chávez to moderate his language and be more courteous about Uribe and Colombia.

Chávez 's staff in Caracas claim that the three Farc hostages have already been released into Chávez 's guardianship, even though they are "in the heart of the [Colombian] jungle". Chávez 's staffers say that the three are now outside the Farc's security ring. Chávez clearly believes that the three hostages will reach civilisation pretty soon because he said that he was sorry that he would not be able to meet them personally. He is off to Cuba, to discuss oil supplies.

Development: On 30 January Colombian senator Piedad Córdoba declared that Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez will continue to negotiate with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) in order to secure the release of the guerrilla group's hostages.

Significance: Córdoba's comments indicate that Chávez has not been deterred by two significant setbacks to his involvement in the prisoner swap: the almost global rejection of his call for the international community to stop treating the Farc as terrorists, and last week's highly successful visit by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe to Europe. During his trip Uribe secured support for his handling of the prisoner swap from France, Spain, and the European Union as a whole. They all implied that they do not endorse Chávez 's rival efforts.

Nevertheless, Córdoba believes that the only way the Farc will release more hostages is through Chávez . The Colombian senator - who brought Chávez into the process last year, before Uribe sacked them both from their mediation roles in November - told a meeting of the Inter-American Dialogue think tank in Washington that "both the swap and any peace [negotiations] will pass through Caracas".

Córdoba's comments are unlikely to improve her standing in Colombia, where she is currently reviled by a large proportion of the population for her decision to support Chávez during his vicious verbal spat with Uribe. Her assertion in Washington that she does not support the 4 February nationwide march against the Farc will not play well in Colombia either.

However, the senator said last week that the Farc will release more hostages very soon. If the guerrilla group does hand over more of its captives to Chávez , pressure will slowly grow for Venezuela to be given some kind of official role in the process.

Development: On 4 March President Alvaro Uribe announced that he will go to the international criminal court (ICC) to accuse Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez of "sponsoring and financing genocide".

Significance: Uribe is aware that his strike on Raúl Reyes, the second-in-command of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) who was killed in Ecuador on 1 March, was illegal. He is also aware that no-one (even in Colombia) believes his initial version of events that Reyes was killed after he and his men started shooting across the border, and so from Ecuador, at Colombian soldiers. As Ecuador's president Rafael Correa, who himself was initially deceived by Uribe's version, put it: "There was no hot pursuit."

Uribe is therefore attempting two manoeuvres. First, he is seeking to justify the raid post hoc by saying that Ecuador was sheltering Reyes. Secondly he is pursuing these much more serious allegations against Chávez which, he and his supporters argue, overshadow the illegal raid.

There is little chance of Uribe winning the case at the ICC. His evidence against Chávez is based entirely documents allegedly found on three computers found where Reyes was killed. According to the excerpts released by the Colombian authorities, these documents include correspondence between the Farc's leaders indicating that Chávez had promised to donate oil worth US$300m to the Farc over the course of this year.

Venezuela has already ridiculed these accusations. There are no witnesses to verify that the computer's contents as revealed by the Colombian government are genuine. Moreover, the documents released so far indicate that Chávez had yet to give any oil or oil money to the Farc but rather that, according to the Farc, he had made preparations to do so.

The case has yet to get to the ICC and the ICC has yet to accept the case. These accusations against Chávez are only part of Uribe's attempts to seek legal justification for his actions: the Colombian government is citing United Nations Resolution 1373 and Article 51 of the UN charter.

Article 51 states recognises "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence". Resolution 1373, which was approved after the 9/11 attacks on the US, states that nations should refrain from providing financing, support or safe haven to terrorist organisations.

Why watch him? The influential unionist and former truck driver is President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's most important popular ally outside of government and is reported to have recently asked for one of the vice-presidencies of the ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ). Argentina's media have dubbed the Moyano-Kirchner relationship a "marriage of convenience" that has never been stronger. During the recent farm protests that blocked major roads in Argentina and caused serious food shortages, Moyano stood by Fernández and mobilised 500 trucks to the busiest junction in the north of Buenos Aires to form a counter-piquete.

Born: Ciudad de la Plata, Argentina

Date of birth: 9 January 1944

Public life: Having been chosen at the age of 18 to represent the Mar del Plata division of the national truck drivers' union (Sindicato de Choferes de Camiones), Moyano became general secretary 10 years later. As well as being active in union politics he joined the PJ and was named general secretary of the Mar del Plata branch in 1983. In 1987 Moyano was elected secretary general to the national truck drivers' union in Buenos Aires. He was also chosen as a PJ delegate and went on to become secretary and then vice-president of the parliamentary transport commission. After holding senior posts in both national and international union organisations - including the International Federation of Transport Workers, in 2005 Moyano was appointed secretary general of the CGT, a position he still holds in 2008.

Time Line:
1962: Chosen as representative to the Mar del Plata division of the national truck drivers' union (Sindicato de Choferes de Camiones).

1962-1972: Appointed secretary general of the Mar del Plata division of the national truck drivers' union.

1981-1983: Acts as secretary general to the Mar del Plata division of the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) during Argentina's military junta and is arrested several times.

1983: Democracy returns to Argentina and Moyano is named secretary general of the ruling Partido Justicialista in Mar del Plata.

1987-1991: Elected secretary general to the national truck drivers' union in Buenos Aires. He is also elected as a Partido Justicialista delegate and becomes secretary and then vice-president of the parliamentary transport commission.

1991-2003: Re-elected head of the national truck drivers' union in Buenos Aires in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003. During this period he also heads a number of workers' organisations, including: the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Camioneros, Obreros y Empleados de Transporte; the Unión General de Trabajadores del Transporte; the Movimiento de los Trabajadores Argentinos (MTA); and, the Confederación de Camioneros del MERCOSUR.

1998: Appointed global vice president of the road transport division of the International Federation of Transport Workers, based in London, and becomes president of its committee for Latin America and the Caribbean.

2003: Elected secretary general of the Confederación Argentina de Trabajadores del Transporte, whose legal status was restored by president Néstor Kirchner in 2003 after its suppression by the military junta in 1978.

2005: Appointed secretary general of the CGT, a position he still holds in 2008.

Strengths:
Moyano's power, resources and contacts are considerable. Having initially threatened to cause problems for Fernández last November when he warned that he would "cross to the other side of the road" if the government failed to respect workers' rights, Moyano subsequently opted to cooperate closely with the president. This decision has proved fruitful for both sides, with one of his recent achievements, a 19.5% wage increase for truck drivers. His government allies also include powerful planning minister Julio de Vido.
    The alliance between the government and Moyano was recently underlined in a big public event held on 5 March to celebrate his 20-year-anniversary as leader of the truck drivers' union. Fernández, who was guest of honour, publicly thanked Moyano for "sustaining the [country's] economic, social and cultural model", a reference to his decision to moderate the CGT's salary demands, asking for a 19.5% increase, less than the 20% ceiling favoured by the government .
    The CGT already receives up to US$10m each year from the state. Moreover, during Kirchner's government, Moyano accumulated power independent of the union as a shareholder in a large transport company.

Weaknesses:
His close ties to the government are a mixed blessing for Moyano. While his proximity to decision-makers has allowed him to achieve substantial union gains, some suggest that his independence as a union leader may be compromised. Moyano could find himself in a difficult position if his union loyalties come into conflict with government policy while his hunger for power may distance him from the workers he was elected to represent.
    He has also been accused recently of having had links with a division of "Triple A", a far-right organisation responsible for hundreds of deaths between 1973 and 1975. In a trial investigating "crimes against humanity" committed by "Triple A", Carlos Petroni, former leader of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), accused Moyano of having weekly meetings with the head of the Mar del Plata division of "Triple A", the Concertación Nacional Universitaria (CNU).
   Petroni said that he did not know if Moyano was directly involved in any crimes, but offered the court evidence that the unionist had both known of killings and cooperated closely with the group. The accusations remain unsubstantiated.

Prospects:
Moyano was one of the first open supporters of former president Néstor Kirchner in his attempt to be elected president of the PJ in the party's internal elections in May. Reports that Moyano is after one of the four PJ vice presidencies suggest that he has his sights set on political power, and is playing a shrewd game to get it.

Development: The Nicaraguan government confirmed on 12 May that two Colombians who survived Colombia's attack on a rebel base in Ecuador have been granted asylum in Nicaragua.

Significance: The two women, Doris Torres Bohórquez and Martha Pérez Gutiérrez, might be about to play a key role in the dispute currently raging between the governments of Ecuador and Colombia. Ecuador (and recently Venezuela) has accused the Colombian military of executing the survivors of the 1 March raid on a camp in northern Ecuador which belonged to Raúl Reyes, the second-in-command of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). Colombia denies this charge.

Bohórquez, Gutiérrez, and Lucí­a Morett (a Mexican student who also survived the blast and who is also now in Nicaragua) are the only witnesses to what occurred on 1 March. The three were found by the Ecuadorean military and treated for their wounds at the military hospital in Quito. Morett was granted asylum by Nicaragua's president, Daniel Ortega, on 16 April.

Despite Morett's precedent, Ecuador's decision to allow Bohórquez and Gutiérrez to travel to Nicaragua was a surprise. On 9 May Ecuador's interior minister, Fernando Bustamante, announced that the public prosecutor's office would not allow the two women to leave the country until it had concluded its investigation into the Colombian air raid, although Bustamente stressed that there are no charges pending against them. Two days later, the pair was transported out of the country in a plane belonging to the Nicaraguan air force.

There are conflicting reports from the public prosecutor's office concerning whether or not Bustamente was correct in claiming that the two women were legally barred from leaving Ecuador. However, the chief prosecutor in Sucumbí­os, Wirmar Gonzabay, revealed that he was expecting to question Bohórquez and Gutiérrez today (13 May). There is certainly no evidence that the government consulted with prosecutors before allowing them to leave. The Ecuadorean government has not explained why it wanted the women to leave the country, although human rights groups have suggested that they were not safe in Ecuador.

Nicaragua's leftwing government is hardly an impartial observer in the dispute caused by Colombia's raid on Ecuador. Ortega is a key ally of Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez , and he was just as vocal as Chávez and Ecuador's president, Rafael Correa, in condemning Colombia for the attack. Ortega was also a prominent figure at the Rio Group summit on 7 March where both he and Chávez (but not Correa) lowered the tone of their attacks on Colombia.

Ortega's decision to grant asylum to Morett, Bohórquez and Gutiérrez is not the only reason why Nicaragua is presently attracting Colombia's attention. Information found on a computer belonging to a senior Farc leader, Gustavo Arbeláez (alias Santiago), indicated that the Farc recently received ammunition and explosives from Nicaragua. Arbeláez, who was involved in the kidnapping of 11 Colombian deputies who were killed by the Farc last year, was captured near the southwestern city of Buenaventura in Colombia on 8 May.