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*** JAMAICA TOURISM GROWTH.   Preliminary figures suggest that Jamaica has experienced strong growth in tourist arrivals this winter, with stop-over arrivals up 9.2% to 311,210 in the December-February period.   Earnings weren't quite as strong, increasing by 7.5% to US$209m.   The number of cruise passengers in January was up by 10.5% to 96,323.
 Tourism Minister Edmund Bartlett described the figures as “very strong".   However, he warned that airlines in North America were looking at reducing their flights to the Caribbean, with the loss of up to 60,000 seats in the summer possible.

*** ST LUCIA GEARING UP FOR ELECTIONS.   Prime Minister Stephenson King and his ruling United Workers' Party (UWP) should face the polls before 11 December 2011, the fifth anniversary of the last general election.   However, King has hinted that there could be a delay of up to three months as the country struggles to overcome the consequences of Hurricane Tomas.
 The opposition St Lucia Labour Party (SLP) says that any delay beyond 11 December would be unacceptable, but King has responded saying: “The constitution allows that option, and we are the ones who will decide whether to use it."   Elaborating, King added: “I can't give any assurances, what I have indicated is that the experience of Hurricane Tomas has certainly extended the agenda of the government and has added more weight to our workload.   It has given the government the additional task of engaging in its reconstruction programme, and that can extend the call of the election."
 In 2006, the UWP took 11 seats to the SLP's six, but since then it has lost its charismatic founder-leader John Compton, and King has yet to be tested in the polls.   The expectation at this stage is that opposition leader Dr Kenny Anthony will lead the SLP back to power in December.

*** CHAVEZ AND BOUTERSE.   In documents made public by the WikiLeaks website, US diplomats claim that Suriname's President Dési Bouterse received funding from Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez for the election in May last year in which Bouterse's Mega Combinatie (MC) coalition secured the largest number of parliamentary seats.   Bouterse was sworn in as president in August.
 A 2005 diplomatic cable to Washington reported that a member of Bouterse's Nationale Democratische Partij (NDP) has claimed that “the former military dictator Desi Bouterse has made a number of recent trips to Venezuela; that he is receiving financial support from Venezuela; and that President Chavez has promised him recognition and support should Bouterse succeed in his stated goal of bringing down the government of President Venetiaan".

*** BETTER NEWS ON CCJ.   There was dismay among supporters of the Trinidad-based Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) when Jamaica's Prime Minister Bruce Golding hinted during a speech in December at the possibility of Jamaica establishing its own final court of appeal to replace the London-based Privy Council [RC-11-01]. Meanwhile in Trinidad & Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar continues to show little interest in pushing the CCJ agenda given the distrust that many of her core supporters from the Indian community have of an institution in which their interests would be marginalized.
 However Grenada's Prime Minister Tillman Thomas, one of the strongest critics of Bruce Golding's suggestion, has now backed up his criticism by saying that Grenada will soon take the necessary measures to adopt the CCJ. Despite being established in 2005, only Guyana, Barbados, and Belize have so far agreed to use the CCJ as their final court of appeal.

Relations between Argentina and Chile never remain smooth for long, and they took a customary downturn in the last month following the appointment of Ignacio Walker as Chile's new foreign minister on 28 September. At the same time, Argentina has placed all its money on Tabaré Vázquez winning the Uruguayan presidential election on 31 October.

The Argentine government's animosity towards Walker stems from an article he wrote in the conservative Chilean newspaper El Mercurio in May after Argentina had cut its gas exports to Chile in response to its own energy crisis. Walker directly criticised Argentina's President Néstor Kirchner on this point, asking: 'Does he respect treaties and contracts? Not if they endanger his popularity.'

However, his criticism went further than the case in hand. Walker's piece accused the ruling Partido Justialista (PJ, or Peronists) 'and its perverse logic' of being 'what really divides Chile and Argentina'. Walker derided the Peronists for their 'authoritarian, corporate, and fascistic traits' and alleged that 'since Perón came to power in 1945 Peronism and militarism have taken it upon themselves systematically to destroy Argentina'. 'One of the legacies of Peronist doctrine,' wrote Walker, 'seems to be its ignorance and disdain, not only for the most elementary norms of economics but also of the law.'

The Argentine government was not prepared to let such slurs pass, especially after the Buenos Aires daily Clarí­n reprinted Walker's piece in full. The foreign ministry demanded that 'Walker clarify the attitude he will adopt henceforth as a statesman and a representative of his country'. Walker did apologise, but the stand-off dragged on longer than was necessary, with Kirchner at one point threatening to cancel a visit to Chile planned for the end of November.

President Tabaré Vázquez is lost for ideas in trying to resolve the acrimonious paper-mill dispute with Argentina. Having threatened to downgrade Uruguay's presence in Mercosur to that of an associate member on 1 May, out of frustration at Argentina's thwarting Uruguay's efforts to put the dispute before the dispute-settlement mechanism in Mercosur, Vázquez expressed resignation on 19 May. He said that there will be no more dialogue with Argentina over the issue as he no longer sees the point. The breakdown in communication means that the long-running row could go to The Hague for international arbitration on 8 and 9 June.

Vázquez is left with little choice but to take a firm line as his approval rating is steadily falling: a little over a year after having taken office, his rating has fallen to 44% according to a survey conducted by Equipos Mori for El Paí­s in May, down eight points on a similar survey carried out in November. His failure to resolve the dispute with Argentina is believed to be the main reason for his waning popularity.

Mercosur: stay put or up sticks?

Vázquez travelled to Washington on 1 May to meet his US counterpart George W Bush. Nelson Fernández, the Canal 10 journalist accompanying Vázquez on his visit to the US, reported that his president had told him he was planning to scale down Uruguay's participation in Mercosur to associate status, such as that of Chile and Bolivia, and that he would be adopting the Chilean model in Uruguay's international economic relations. None of this was captured on camera, however, and Vázquez subsequently strenuously denied suggesting Uruguay was contemplating withdrawing from Mercosur. 

On 4 May Argentina filed its suit against Uruguay at The Hague. It charges Uruguay with repeatedly violating the River Uruguay bilateral protocol signed in 1975, in which both parties committed themselves, among other things, to "preventing the contamination" of the river. The next day Uruguay initiated arbitration procedures within Mercosur, accusing Argentina of undermining the trade bloc by failing to prevent environmentalist protesters from blocking international bridges between the two countries, costing Uruguay US$400m in losses in bilateral trade.

Kirchner wades in

The Argentine government, initially reticent about involving itself in the dispute between Uruguay and the province of Entre Rí­os, then adopted it as "a national cause". On 5 May President Néstor Kirchner made a public appearance in Gualeguaychú, the town at the centre of the protests against Uruguay's construction of the paper mills, accompanied by his entire cabinet, 19 governors and the leaders of Argentina's main trade union, the CGT. 

Kirchner addressed a crowd of some 30,000 people. Although he did not say anything that he has not said before - principally that Uruguay had contravened the River Uruguay protocol - the high-profile public act, attended by the whole of Argentina's political elite, made a very clear political statement. With elections due in 2007 (see page 14) Kirchner will never back down on a "national cause" now. Kirchner told the protesters: "They tell us that Argentina also has plants that pollute_ but they don't say that these are distributed in different locations, and that their joint annual production is only half of what the Fray Bentos paper plants will produce in a single location."

Key players

One man who should be playing a bigger role in breaking the impasse is Carlos Chacho Alvarez, the president of the committee of permanent Mercosur representatives. Alvarez, a former vice-president of Argentina, claims he is speaking to the Uruguayans all the time and that there is a great deal of perplexity about the whole affair. His clear affinity with the Kirchner administration, however, means that he is open to criticism of partiality. 

Alvarez has shown no inclination to play an active role in the dispute: he has not taken Kirchner to task for refusing to give Uruguay recourse to Mercosur's supranational dispute-settlement institution. This raises serious questions not just about his lack of personal motivation to get involved in the damaging dispute but more pertinently about the significance of the position of president of the Mercosur committee if it is not to help resolve disputes of this nature. 

Radical change is on the agenda for Mercosur irrespective of what Uruguay chooses to do. Venezuela's decision to join Mercosur at the expense of the Andean Community will give the bloc a political edge it does not currently possess, while rendering the prospects of a future trade deal with the US very unlikely. On 23 May the Argentine foreign minister, Jorge Taiana, said that Argentina and Brazil hoped that Venezuela would become a full member of Mercosur as soon as possible. The next Mercosur summit will take place in Córdoba, Argentina, in July.

Brazilians' hopes that the supreme court's decision to accept the "mensalão" case in late August would trigger a movement to punish corrupt politicians were dashed just a few weeks afterwards. In mid-September senators acquitted the president of Brazil's senate, Senator Renan Calheiros, in spite of a recommendation from the senate's ethical council to impeach him for having breached "parliamentary decorum" by accepting bribes from a construction company. Calheiros's acquittal made it absolutely clear that politics is still above justice in Brazil. 

Following a five-day hearing in late August, Brazil's supreme court judges agreed, unanimously, to take on a corruption case involving allies of President Lula da Silva. The case refers to the "mensalão" scandal, denounced by the public-prosecutor general, Antonio Fernando de Souza, over a year ago. De Souza accused a group of 40 former ministers, government-allied congressmen, managers of state-owned companies and businessmen of orchestrating a corruption scheme to siphon money from state-owned companies. The money was allegedly used to pay monthly allowances to allied congressmen - hence the name "mensalão" - so they could pay campaign debts. In this way Lula's leftwing Partido dos Trabalhadores managed to win support for government bills from ideologically unrelated, but nominally allied, parties. 

The supreme court accepted De Souza's charges against all 40 people, ranging from embezzlement, money laundering and tax evasion. Among the most prominent accused are one-time influential politicians such as José Genoí­no, the PT leader at the time the "mensalão" scandal broke out. Another is José Dirceu, who served as Lula's chief of staff until being dismissed in July 2005 over the scandal. Dirceu, who was considered Lula's political heir up to then, was subsequently impeached by his peers in the lower chamber of congress and lost his political right to stand for eight years. Most other serving politicians accused, however, were acquitted by their peers.

Still, the supreme court's decision to accept the "mensalão" was seen as a chance for Brazil's justice to redeem itself in the eyes of ordinary Brazilians: Brazilian courts are notoriously lenient in cases of white-collar corruption and in over 40 years the supreme court has not convicted a single politician implicated in corruption. Yet, increasing popular pressure forced supreme court judges to abandon their customary argument that they needed to accept the status quo to guarantee "governing stability", even if that meant not bringing corrupt politicians to account. Significantly, the popular outcry over the "mensalão" and the supreme court's decision to accept the case prompted a wave of euphoria among Brazilians and the country's press that "things have changed" and that white-collar corruption would finally be punished.

Calheiros dashes hopes for change
The euphoria did not last long. Just over a fortnight after the supreme court took the "historic decision" to accept the "mensalão" case, Brazil's senate dashed hopes for change when it acquitted its president, Senator Renan Calheiros, despite a report from the ethical council of congress recommending his impeachment for his involvement in corruption. The council found enough evidence to suggest that Calheiros accepted bribes from a construction company lobbyist and used false documents in his defence, which breaches "parliamentary decorum".

Calheiros was acquitted by 40 votes to 35, with six abstentions, in a secret ballot. For the press it meant that 46 Brazilian senators "collude with corruption". Significantly, the press picked on the disparity between the number of those who declared they voted in favour of Calheiros's impeachment and the actual number of votes counted with this intent. On the day before the vote the newspaper Folha de São Paulo counted, based on declarations made by senators, the necessary 41 votes that would lead to Calheiros's impeachment. Hours after the vote, the website G1 conducted a poll with senators, in which 46 declared to have voted in favour of Calheiros's impeachment. For the current affairs magazine Veja there is no other conclusion but one: "11 senators are liars". 

Crucially, the vote on the senate's floor was carried out in secrecy, thus allowing senators to vote differently from their declaration without fear of public reprisals. Meanwhile, supreme court judges had to publicly declare their decision over the "mensalão" case, allowing the public to exert pressure against them. Indeed, just after the decision was taken to accept the case a supreme court judge declared "we had a knife to our throats". The vote recommending Calheiros's impeachment in the ethical council was also carried out in the open and the result was that only Calheiros's most faithful allies dared to vote, not based on evidence but on political partiality, against the recommendation.

This led to another public outcry and the condemnation of Brazil's senate as a "secretive privileged club". The case may bring some positive outcomes, though: the lower chamber's justice and constitutional commission approved the creation of a special tribunal to rule just on white-collar corruption involving serving politicians, who enjoy parliamentary immunity from common prosecution. In effect, lawyers of corrupt politicians distort this privilege to drag out cases in the supreme court until their legality expires, leading to Brazil's notorious 'injustice system'. Another decision, this time taken by the senate's justice and constitutional commission, was to abolish all secret votes in congress, including on impeachment recommendations. The danger is these decisions will never be implemented, or at least they will not be implemented until the ethical council of congress rules over the other three corruption proceedings still pending against Calheiros. 

Significantly, Calheiros would not have been saved without Lula's discreet, albeit omnipotent, backing. Presently, Lula's main concern is the approval of a constitutional amendment extending a tax on financial transactions, the CPMF, and a new budget regulation which gives the government complete discretion on spending up to 20% of its total revenues (the current limit is 5%). In order to have the bill approved the government was forced to disburse R$21.7m (US$11.5m) to finance pet projects backed by lower chamber deputies who are nominally government supporters, but have no ideological links with the government's projects. Lula also had to appoint several associates of his political allies to management positions in state owned companies to guarantee support. 

This attitude is in line with Lula's notorious declaration, while campaigning for the presidency in the 1990s, that Brazil's congress is made up of "a bunch of crooks". For the Brazilian press he managed to prove that assertion by interfering in favour of Calheiros and with this "brought the senate to its knees". According to Veja, the deal was that Lula would support Calheiros by pressuring PT senators to abstain from the vote on his impeachment (see next page). In exchange the most unprincipled faction of Calheiros's party, the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, would stay in line with the government over the CPMF. The PMDB is the largest party in Brazil's congress. 

Calheiros has already started to work for Lula days after his acquittal to have the CPMF approved. While the bill is likely to be approved in the lower chamber, not least because generous cash disbursements and positions guarantee the maintenance of a government-allied majority, it faces fiercer opposition in the senate. Calheiros and his allies, however, have already started to manoeuvre to lure support from unprincipled opposition senators. It was reported that two of those are ready to change party and move to the PMDB.

Bugs
Following last month's controversy over alleged bugging of supreme court judges [BSC-07-08], the federal police and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) opened fire against each other. The new Abin chief, Paulo Lacerda, the former federal police director, wants Abin to be legally allowed to use recording devices in its investigations. Currently only the federal police are legally allowed to use bugs. According to Lacerda, Brazil is "now in the frontline of the war against drugs and terrorism" and the device is important to prevent "damage to society". His suggestion, however, was not welcomed, not least because Abin is directly linked to the presidency while the federal police are nominally independent. 

A new old scandal
The institutional relations minister, Walfrido Mares Guia, was cited in a federal police investigation as the leader of a corruption scheme involving members of the opposition. The scheme, mounted to finance a gubernatorial campaign in Minas Gerais in 1998, is considered as the beginning of the "mensalão". Guia belongs to the unprincipled Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, which supports whoever is in government, left or right. The PTB's illegal campaign financing scheme was adopted by the PT at the federal government level after 2003.

 

On 17 February Argentina's trade and foreign ministers went to Brasilia to meet their local counterparts in an effort to resolve recent bilateral trade difficulties. Trade between the two main Mercosur partners has fallen victim to the global economic crisis, prompting calls for protectionist measures by businesses on both sides. The latest spat is a fresh 'stress test' of the Mercosur integration mechanisms, which typically require political intervention at the highest level to kick them into touch. Argentina, however, gave no sign following the meeting that it was willing to suspend recently imposed import barriers.

The global downturn is leading to a rise in protectionist sentiment, amid a collapse in export demand and efforts by local producers to shore up their position in domestic markets.  According to preliminary estimates, Argentine exports to Brazil fell 46.1% year-on-year in January, while its imports from there fell 50.8% year-on-year. Argentina typically runs a trade deficit with Brazil: in 2008 it amounted to US$4.34bn, up 8.4% annually.

Brazil's President Lula da Silva, who has been very critical of creeping global protectionism, is anxious to prevent any trade rows on his doorstep. In late January, Brazil was controversially forced to backtrack on proposed new import licenses (affecting 60% of total imports) after only 48 hours. The government blamed a technical error, saying it was an efficiency measure gone wrong.

However, Argentina went ahead in early February with new reference values on 800 import products, including textiles and other designated “sensitive" goods, in what it said was an anti-dumping measure. It also imposed new import license requirements on some Brazilian imports. Brazilian manufacturers reacted furiously to the measures, with the São Paulo Industry Confederation (Fiesp) calling for countervailing measures, accusing Argentina of engaging in unfair competition.

• Amorim - In January, Brazil's minister for external affairs (and Lula's chief representative in global trade talks and multilateral forums), Celso Amorim, warned against beggar-thy-neighbour policies within the region, saying that Brazil would try to persuade Ecuador to reverse its recent decision to impose both tariff and non-tariff barriers on a range of designated “non-essential" imports. He said the move went against the free trade agreement between the Andean Community and Mercosur.
  

Time is ticking fast for Uruguay's ruling Frente Amplio (FA). The left-wing coalition wants to pass an 'interpretative' bill aiming to repeal three crucial articles of the country's 1986 amnesty law (Ley 15.848 de Caducidad) before the Inter-American court of Human Rights (IACHR) issues the verdict on the case brought against the Uruguayan state by Macarena Gelman [RBS-10-10]. Arguing that the law goes against Uruguay's international commitments such as its 2002 ratification of the Statute of Rome (1998), which created the International Court of Justice, the FA wants to render the law 'inapplicable' - echoing the October 2009 ruling by the Uruguayan supreme court (SCJ) which stated that the 1986 legislation was unconstitutional - rather than repealing the law.

In a test case in October 2009, the SCJ allowed prosecutors to go ahead with an investigation into the murder of a communist militant in 1974, arguing that the passage of the amnesty law had “transgressed the principle of the separation of powers" by excluding the judiciary from investigating acts that may have constituted crimes. On 1 November 2010, the SCJ used the precedent it set in 2009 to declare the law unconstitutional for a second time.

This new ruling came at a crucial time, when the push to pass the interpretative bill has revealed divisions within the FA. It may help to increase the pressure on those legislators who oppose the move on principle. Some FA senators oppose the bill not because of its content but because of the manner in which the party is trying to render the law inapplicable. Uruguay has held two previous public referendums on whether the law should stand or be repealed (1989 and 2009) and on both occasions voted to leave it in place. So, while the dissenting FA senators are in favour of annulling the law, they are against repealing it through a legislative process that appears to go against the desires of the electorate, the ultimate 'authority' of the land.

The latest SCJ verdict affects the cases of 20 homicides committed between 1973 and 1976 for which former members of the armed forces are being investigated. The cases are being pursued in relation to the open dossier regarding the responsibility of former president (1972-1973) and dictator (1973-1976) Juan Marí­a Bordaberry, 82, for these “forced disappearances" and “political homicides". It should be noted that Bordaberry was sentenced to 30 years in prison (to be served under house arrest due to his advanced age)  in March 2010 for violating the Uruguayan constitution during the 1973 coup d'état. That sentenced came on top of another 30 year sentence Bordaberry was already serving for his responsibility in the murder of several Uruguayan lawmakers exiled in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1976 as part of Plan Cóndor.

The role of Plan Cóndor (in reverse)
With the exception of Argentina, whose amnesty legislation was repealed in 2005, amnesty laws have remained on the statue books of all the countries that participated in the Plan Cóndor (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay). However, some trials have still taken place, as legal and human rights advocacy groups find and exploit loopholes in the legislation.

The earliest attempts to seek justice for human rights violations (HRV) in the region were made during the small window provided in the period that elapsed between the end of the military regimes and the subsequent introduction of amnesty laws. This initial 'transitional justice', meant to showcase the new rule of law and demonstrate accountability in the new democratic regimes, has latterly returned to the forefront of the human rights debate, in the form of 'post-transitional justice' or, as its sometimes referred to in the Southern Cone, “late justice".

Plan Cóndor is now playing the reverse role for which it was designed. The military regimes used it to collude with other regional dictators to disappear, torture and murder. Now, it is possible to speak of a “reversal" of the initiative, as human rights activists, academics and legal experts from the region collaborate to find records, locate remains and prosecute those responsible for the disappearances (see box below). The case currently before the IACHR is a Plan Cóndor case.

Macarena Gelman Garcí­a is the daughter of Marcelo Ariel Gelman and Marí­a Claudia Garcí­a Irureta Goyena de Gelman, both detained by the military regime in Argentina in August 1976. Gelman was subsequently killed in Argentina and his body later found and identified, but his heavily pregnant wife was transferred to Uruguay as part of Plan Cóndor, where she delivered a baby girl (Macarena) who was expropriated by a member of the Uruguayan police force. Macarena recovered her identity in 2000 and is now advocates repealing Uruguay's amnesty law to prosecute those responsible for her parents' fate; which is why she turned to the IACHR. Coincidentally, the latest SCJ verdict was issued on the same day it is presumed Macarena was born in a Uruguayan military hospital in 1976.

According to Dr. Leigh Payne of Oxford University, the IACHR often plays a crucial role by increasing pressure on sitting magistrates to allow for the use of these legal loopholes to press on with investigations. This “judicial guilty-conscience" has allowed for certain cases to be investigated, whilst more general judicial reforms, allied to an increase in judicial independence, have also meant that magistrates are now more willing to exploit said loopholes.

Making the judicial information available to the public
The Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Cels) in Argentina pioneered the creation of a database to map the progress of local HRV trials in 2003. Earlier this year, in a process that drew on the input of sociologists, political scientists, lawyers, the relatives of victims and the collaboration of Cels experts, the HRV observatory of the Universidad Diego Portales in Chile launched its own database, allowing the Chilean public to follow the progress of ongoing HRV trials.
Ideally, academics in other Southern Cone countries would create similar databases if and when trials commence in their jurisdictions. Paraguay, where the so-called “terror archives" unveiling the murder of thousands by state actors collaborating across the region were discovered in 1992, and Uruguay are expected to become the next two countries in the Southern Cone where such databases are being developed. Another one is already under construction for Peru. 
 

• Controversial presidential intervention

On 30 October, two former Uruguayan presidents, Jorge Batlle (2000-2005) and Julio Marí­a Sangunetti (1985-1990), published a letter in a national daily in which they described the FA's initiative to amend the amnesty law as “an affront to institutions" and an “insult to the citizens" of Uruguay.  An FA senator, Ernesto Aghazzi, responded by accusing the presidents of being “opportunists" noting that their defence of the results of the two public referendums on the issue looked cynical, as neither man ever called a public consultation when in office

• The case at the IACHR

Macarena Gelman's law suit requests the IACHR to order the Uruguayan state to “adopt the legislative and other types of measures [necessary] to leave the Ley de Caducidad without effect". The problem is that, even if the IACHR rules in Gelman's favour, the court's decisions are generally disregarded by regional governments. The Paraguayan state has effectively ignored two IACHR rulings (2005 and 2006) condemning its violation of the rights of the Xákmok Kásek indigenous tribe. It remains to be seen if the latest ruling has any repercussions on the ground.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: PERU

The economy minister, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, said that the economy probably grew by 5% in 2004. Previously the government had claimed growth was 4.5%. The actual figure will be released on 15 February. Kuczynski said that the industrial sector is beginning to pick up. He noted that in 2004, the agricultural sector had a record year and the textile industry also did well. Exports were also strong, thanks to the surge in metal prices. They came to US$12.4bn. For a US$60bn economy that is quite a decent level. Mining exports were US$6.6bn, the economy ministry said, while agricultural and textile exports topped US$1.1bn. OULOOK The central bank held interest rates at 3.75% at its meeting on 3 February. Few analysts expect much change in rates any time soon. The economy recovery is leading to higher fiscal revenues: in January tax revenues were up by 9%, year-on-year at NS2.26bn (US$684m). Inflation: The January inflation rate was 0.1%, bringing the 12-month inflation rate to 3.03%. Inflation in 2004 was 3.48%. Fish exports: Fish exports in 2004 were up by 35% at US$1.39bn, the Comisión para la Promoción de Exportaciones reported. Fishmeal, at US$948m, accounted for the bulk of the exports, 28% up on 2003.

The minister for mines and energy, Hernán Martí­nez, issued a warning that Colombia may start having to import oil by the end of this year to meet domestic demand. Martí­nez's warning came on 30 October, one day before the Colombian congress started discussing the government proposal to sell 20% of Ecopetrol, the state-owned oil company. 

Martí­nez's warning has a clear political aim. The Colombian government is keen to sell a 20% stake in Ecopetrol to generate cash to boost exploration. According to Martí­nez, "if Ecopetrol doesn't find more oil it's going to turn into a company dedicated simply to refining fuel". The main problem is that as a government company, Ecopetrol has to compete with social programmes for its annual budget. This leaves the company with little money to invest in exploration. 

The government claims that the partial sale of Ecopetrol is the only way for Colombia's to reverse its waning self-sufficiency in oil production. According to official statistics, the country's proven reserves have fallen to 1.45bn barrels now from about 2bn barrels in 2000. This obviously makes Colombia's status as a net exporter of oil increasingly more precarious. At present Colombia produces 530,000 barrels per day (bpd), of which 320,000bpd are extracted by Ecopetrol and the rest by associated companies such as BP, Petrobras and Occidental. Ecopetrol currently needs to produce 313,900 bpd to meet domestic demand and export commitments. With the Colombian economy growing at an average of 5% annually this leaves the state oil company with scant margin for increased production before it has to start buying from its associates.

Martí­nez hopes congress will approve the sale by year end. If this is the case, the government will sell the shares of Ecopetrol on the Colombian stock market between August and September next year. Under Colombian privatisation laws, the government has to give a first option to Ecopetrol current and former workers, as well as national cooperative associations and pension funds. Martí­nez, however, said that if the domestic capital market cannot absorb all the shares it will offer, the government would consider issuing shares on the New York exchange. The toughest part of the plan will be fixing an appropriate price. A 20% stake in Ecopetrol could be worth anything between US$2bn and US$8bn, depending on price and reserves projections.

The rise in the oil prices will benefit the economy. The mining and oil minister, Galo Chiriboga, claimed in the run-up to the March Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries meeting in Vienna that a price range of between US$90 and US$120 for crude oil "reflected market realities". Chiriboga, who has usually been a moderate since the country rejoined Opec, seems to be moving to the more radical side. He argued, along with Venezuela and Iran, that the depreciation in the value of the dollar was forcing the oil price higher. He argued that this phenomenon, and pure speculation, were driving the oil price higher, not Opec's threats to cut production.

It is worth noting that import figures show that Venezuela has replaced the US as the country's main fuel supplier. Politically Ecuador has been trying to keep its distance from President Hugo Chávez , but the trade figures show that the country is becoming dependent on Venezuela for imports of refined products.

The surge in Venezuelan exports of refined products to Ecuador is the result of trade agreements: the central bank's analysis of where the country's imports are coming from is the first statistical proof that the agreements are having an effect. Ecuador exports crude oil but imports of petrol, diesel and other refined products are the biggest single item in its import bill. Traditionally the US has been the country's biggest supplier, but in the first 11 months of 2007 US exports of diesel fell from US$628m in 2006 to US$262m. Venezuela stepped into the gap.

Reserves: The country's official reserves dropped marginally to US$3.89bn at the end of February. In mid February they hit a record of US$3.98bn.

The economy is labouring. The most obvious sign of this is the fall in imports. In the first six months the import bill came to US$15.57bn, down 17.7% on the first half of 2008.The main reason for the fall was lower imports of cars and car parts, electrical goods and organic chemicals.

Colombia's big suppliers are: the US (25%); China (11.5%); Brazil (8.2%) and Mexico (5.2%).

The country's trade surplus has virtually halved in the first six months of 2009 to US$742m. In the first half of 2008 the surplus came to US$1.3bn.

Business confidence is brittle. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios do Colombia (Andi) and seven other business associations published their half year survey of the economy in mid-August. They found that industrial output to June was 6.7% down and total sales were down by 5%. Most businesses said that things have begun to improve, but the advent of the freeze on trade with Venezuela may tip the economy back towards recession again.

The big question is what will happen to jobs. In the first half of the year companies tried not to layoff people, but if sales continue to slide, they may be forced to trim payrolls in the second half of 2009.

Inflation: In July consumer prices fell by 0.04% bringing the monthly rate to 3.28%.

It was probably no coincidence that President Hugo Chávez 's cautious stance on the popular uprisings in North Africa, and his initial silence on the crisis in Libya, only ended once the government had reached agreement with over 80 student hunger strikers camped outside the Caracas branch of the Organization of American States (OAS). Students have provided some of the most effective opposition to Chávez , handing him his only electoral defeat in November 2007 and more recently forcing him to backtrack on a controversial university reform. This has prompted comparisons with the youth-led popular revolts in Egypt and elsewhere. However, Venezuelan students are a minority, hail largely from the small middle class and are, as yet, unable to muster up the mass support seen in North Africa and the Middle East. And critically, neither do they have the support of the Venezuelan army.

'Operation Freedom'
Between 31 January and 22 February, 83 students camped outside the OAS HQ in Caracas staged a hunger strike in demand of the release of 27 alleged political prisoners, including three opposition deputies elected in the September 2010 legislative elections (who have been disqualified by a court from taking up their seats). They were also highlighting the case of a Caracas judge, Marí­a Lourdes Afiuni, detained and jailed in December in 2009 for ordering the conditional release of a local businessman held in pre-trial detention on corruption charges for three years (beyond the maximum allowable two years). (Afiuni is now under house arrest, after recent surgery). Most notably, the students were also demanding that the government authorise visits to the country by the OAS and the Inter American Commission of Human Rights (IAHCR) to assess the human rights situation. This has been a demand of the students and the main political opposition for several years now.

The strike was organised by 13 students from the group Juventud Activa Venezuela Unida (JAVU), and was led by one of JAVU's founders, Julio César Rivas (23), and its national coordinator Lorent Saleh (22), whose mother, Yamilah Saleh, joined the strike in solidarity with the students. Other students also set up solidarity camps outside other diplomatic buildings in Caracas, including the Brazilian, Chilean and Costa Rican embassies, and in ten states across the country. On 23 February, the justice and internal affairs minister, Tareck El Aissami, presented the students with a proposal to end the strike, which they accepted as “sufficient" to call off their protest. The deal includes the release of seven prisoners and the creation of working groups to discuss the cases of the rest, with a view to securing their conditional release. The students argued that they had won a significant victory. Earlier (December 2010) protests by students and their professors had also forced the president to backtrack on a planned reform of the 2009 Education Law ending the university sector's prized traditional independence.

Rivas, on his fourth hunger strike, is well known to the authorities. In September 2009, his colleagues staged a hunger strike to secure his release from the notorious Yare prison, where he endured a 22-day stint following his arrest (on 7 September 2009) on charges of rebellion, after participating in an opposition march against the government's polemical August 2009 Education Law. That law asserted stronger state control over the sector, which the opposition argued amounted to the 'Cubanization' of the Venezuelan education system.

Rivas defends his methods, arguing that his group has exerted sufficient pressure on the government to reduce the number of 'political' prisoners, and has successfully drawn the attention of the OAS secretary general José Miguel Insulza and other external actors, notably including the IAHCR and the US, to their cause.   Insulza on 23 February said he was pleased that “dialogue" had contributed to the end of the protest. A week earlier, he had stated that he would be prepared to go to Venezuela but noted that he could not go without government authorization. Insulza and the Canadian OAS delegation later brought the hunger strike up for debate at the OAS permanent council, a move Venezuela's OAS ambassador, Roy Chaderton, denounced as “a grave precedent". Venezuela and its allies in the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América later issued a statement calling on Insulza, to “stop his attacks on the Venezuelan government and respect Venezuela's democratic institutions." It added that Insulza's actions could prompt “a dangerous return to the times when the OAS was an instrument of interventionism and colonialism" of the US. The Chávez government denied that Insulza had ever been refused permission to visit (though he insisted the contrary).

'Cairo on the Guaire'?
The government is publicly dismissive of the student movement and for several years has sought to polarise an already politicised student body by actively promoting pro-government student unions. It also regularly argues that students are “used" by opposition politicians and media to attack the government.

After a spokesman for the US State Department expressed concern about the “health and wellbeing of the (hunger striking) students who are risking their lives for their belief in democratic governance and individual liberties," Venezuela's foreign minister Nicolás Maduro accused the US of attempting to create “something like a virtual Egypt" in Venezuela. President Chávez dismissed the idea that the people's revolutions in the Arab world would be replicated in Caracas, noting that 'people's revolutions' had already taken place in Venezuela, Ecuador and Cuba.

The local pollster Luis Vicente León takes a similar view to Chávez , albeit for different reasons. While he acknowledges the resonance of the Venezuelan student movement, which first emerged at the forefront of the protests against the government's efforts to shut down RCTV in May 2007, and again in opposition to President Chávez 's constitutional reform referendum in November 2007, he makes the point that it's not immediately possible to conflate the student movement with the broader youth population. “While the majority of students are young people, unfortunately the majority of young people in Venezuela are not students. Students are 'the elite' of Venezuelan youth, independently of their socioeconomic bracket. They are active, motivated and articulate, but the base of young people is not".

León also points out that it is not possible to conflate the student movement with the opposition. The student movement, he argues, is working to a different dynamic. Students “don't give a toss" about opposition plans, he suggests, seeing the opposition as “irrelevant". “They [the students] are not against Chávez but in favour of a government that respects their rights and freedom".

Chávez has been in power 12 years (since 1998), meaning that a generation of young people born in the early 1990s has reached adulthood under him. Yet according to León, rather than the emergence of a 'Generation Ch', there is a stronger case to be made for a 'Generation anti-Ch',   representative of   a youth “that is not only not convinced by Chávez , but is much more irreverent towards and opposed to his revolutionary proposal than the national average". León argues that what the students and the broader youth population do share is their rejection of the Chávez government, which is 14 points higher than among the rest of the population. According to his calculations, of every 100 young people eligible to turn out to vote in the future (including in 2012), 60 would vote against Chávez . Yet the under 24s are “slow to register to vote and the majority declare themselves abstentionists". The difficulty then, for the student movement and the terminally chaotic opposition alike, is in mobilising these potential voters.

• 'Cairo-on-the-Guaire'
  Many Venezuela-watchers believe that the most likely threat to Chávez may come from his own disaffected supporters, setting off , in the words of one, a “defection cascade" ahead of (or after) the 2012 elections, which if significant enough might prompt the army to eventually withdraw its support for Chávez 's Socialist project. Bloggers have baptized this the 'Cairo-on-the-Guaire' scenario.
• 
  Opposition blasts Chávez over Libya
  On 6 March the opposition Primero Justicia lambasted President Chávez for his intervention in the Libyan crisis. The Venezuelan opposition will hope to use Chávez 's declared support for Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime to open up another front against him ahead of the 2012 presidential elections. Chávez and his allies Nicaragua and Cuba have been almost universally criticised for their support of the Libyan government. Whereas in the past Chávez 's megaphone diplomacy won him plaudits at home from the 50% of the electorate that previously backed him, his latest efforts are more likely to backfire domestically. Not only does it cement the opposition's view of him as an autocrat, but more importantly, the shrinking Chavista electorate may also baulk at Chávez 's support for a leader bombing his own people.

Un mes y medio luego de lo prometido, el Presidente Vicente Fox designó la semana pasada a un comisionado federal para Ciudad Juárez, para hacer frente a la situación creada por la alta tasa de asesinatos y desapariciones de mujeres [IL-03-35]. Escogió a la abogada y poeta Guadalupe Morfin, ex presidenta de la comisión de derechos humanos del estado de Jalisco y miembro de la comisión consultiva de la Academia de Derechos Humanos.

La decisión de Fox se produce luego de una serie de eventos relacionados a las muertes en Juárez: la visita de legisladores de EU (recomendaron incluir el tema en la agenda EU-México), una protesta de Amnistí­a Internacional por el atraso en dar respuesta a la situación (incluyendo la designación de un comisionado) y el descubrimiento en el área de otro cadáver de mujer, el número 24 este año. El asunto también se debí­a presentar ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a principios de esta semana.

Morfin dice que ve tres aspectos en su tarea: 'escuchar, trabajar para reconstruir la estructura social [de Ciudad Juárez] y tender puentes hacia el futuro para garantizar la gobernabilidad y la estabilidad.'

“Si [la nueva ley electoral] tiene ser impuesta, ella será impuesta, porque ese es su rol cuando usted está en el poder. El poder debe ser ejercido. Cualquiera que diga lo contrario deberí­a convertirse en aprendiz de peluquerí­a."

Hipólito Mejí­a, Presidente de la República Dominicana, buscando la reelección.


“El problema marí­timo se ha convertido en un elemento potencialmente desestabilizador en la región porque eso cuestiona la democracia de Bolivia."

Carlos Mesa, Presidente de Bolivia, sobre la exigencia de su paí­s de una salida soberana al mar.


“Nuestros partidos tienen diferentes enfoques polí­ticos, pero comparten una condición común, que es el de ser de la oposición, y eso nos puede unir en las elecciones municipales."

Jorge Bornhausen, presidente del conservador PFL, de Brasil, sobre su alianza contra Lula con el izquierdista PDT.

Informe Especial (Online) ISSN 1741-7309 Un servicio electrónico de cartas informativas (6 por año) de Intelligence Research Ltd, 61 Old Street, London EC1V 9HW, UK. Teléf: +44 (0)20 7251 0012, Fax +44 (0)20 7253 8193, Email: [email protected]. Web: www.latinnews.com EDITOR: Eduardo Crawley, [email protected]. Las tarifas de suscripción serán enviadas a pedidoSubscription rates will be sent on request. COPYRIGHT © 2003 en todos los paí­ses. Todos los derechos reservados. Ninguna parte de esta publicación puede ser reproducida, archivada en sistemas de clasificación o recuperación de datos, retransmitida en modo alguno, electrónico o quí­mico, mecánico, óptico, fotográfico o cualquier otro, sin el premise previo, por escrito, de Intelligence Research Ltd. REFERENCIAS: Las referencias a números previos se harán así­ [ver IE-03-01]: Informe Especial 2003, No.1.

CRECIMIENTO | Más optimismo. El gobernador del banco central, Guillermo Ortí­z, predijo la semana pasada que la economí­a podrí­a crecer 3,5% este año -un poco más que el 3,1% pronosticado por el gobierno. Esto, señaló con prudencia, no es la proyección formal del banco, que se conocerá recién a fines de este mes. Ortí­z dijo a un comité del senado que el panorama era 'ciertamente mejor' que el desempeño de los dos años pasados. Pero que la tasa de crecimiento esperada, sigue siendo 'insuficiente'.

Lanzó una advertencia sobre el riesgo de colapso del instituto de seguridad social, ISS, al estar comprimido entre el creciente déficit de ingresos y las altas pensiones que garantiza a sus afiliados.

FINANZAS | Se contrae crédito bancario. Uno de los factores que retrasa el crecimiento económico es la escasez de préstamos bancarios al sector privado. En febrero llegó a M$563,9bn (US$51,26bn), o 1,5% menos que un año antes. Esas cifras subestiman el problema: el crédito al consumo, en US$11,1bn subió 40,6% en el año, mientras el crédito hipotecario, en US$5,4bn, subió apenas 1,8%, y los préstamos a empresas, en US$32bn, cayeron 11,1%.

MINERIA | Alza engañosa. Se informó que la producción minera de México, en enero, se elevó 12,1% año en año, principalmente en productos en los cuales México tiene una porción sustancial del mercado mundial (oro, plata, cobre, yeso, plomo, sulfuros, mineral de hierro y flúor). El cobre, alentado por el alza en los precios mundiales, subió 41,8%; la plata, 17,8%. El impacto de la noticia fue atenuado al tomar en consideración que la producción en enero, en realidad, fue menor que en diciembre (en 0,49%).

El embajador de EU, Martí­n Silverstein parecí­a no haber advertido que fue ofensivo cuando dijo, la semana pasada, que su paí­s estarí­a dispuesto a trabajar con quien sea el próximo en gobernar a Uruguay -toda vez que el gobierno surja de elecciones libres y justas. Los uruguayos son orgullosos y han sido elogiados ampliamente por su antiguo compromiso en la realización de elecciones justas y libres, por eso no causó sorpresa que los polí­ticos reaccionaran indignados ante la aparente insinuación de Silverstein que esta vez podí­an alejarse de la norma.

La reacción más fuerte provino del Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA), de centro-izquierda, que tiene fuerte chance de ganar. Su candidato a la vicepresidencia, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, dijo que los uruguayos 'pueden dar lecciones en elecciones y transparencia a EU [donde] aún no se conoce cuántos votos obtuvieron sus candidatos presidenciales en las dudosas elecciones de hace tres años.'

Polí­ticos de centro-derecha, que consideran desafortunada la secuela, tienden a dar al embajador el beneficio de la duda, sugiriendo que fue una frase convencional o que fue arrinconado por alguna pregunta mal planteada. Un legislador Colorado, Pablo Millor, asumió una actitud más electoral, sugiriendo que serí­a bastante razonable que el embajador de EU tuviera 'dudas' acerca del candidato de EP-FA, Tabaré Vázquez.

El número de partidos polí­ticos en Argentina ascendió a 696 -en promedio, uno por cada 56.000 habitantes- como resultado de la legislación aprobada en 2002, en la esperanza de resolver la crisis de confianza en los polí­ticos, partidos e instituciones polí­ticas. Algunos se volvieron poco más que instrumentos para recibir subsidios del estado; ahora se abre un debate sobre cómo volver atrás.

En 2002, el congreso federal eliminó la exigencia que, a fin de permanecer en el registro, los partidos debí­an atraer al menos 2% de votos. Esto no sólo mantuvo la existencia de un gran número de partidos, que de otro modo hubieran desaparecido, sino que alentó el registro de 122 nuevos partidos en 2003.

La información surgió en un informe de la Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE), la más alta corte electoral del paí­s, que señala que la legislación creó una tendencia hacia la fragmentación de la representatividad polí­tica. De los 696 partidos ahora registrados, la vasta mayorí­a es provincial; sólo 41 tienen suficiente presencia en todo el paí­s para ser clasificados como partidos nacionales. Lo que mejor ilustra esa fragmentación es el congreso federal, donde hay 40 bloques legislativos. En las elecciones presidenciales de 2003, a los votantes les fueron ofrecidas 24 boletas separadas para elegir.

Financiamiento del estado a mini-grupos
Todos los partidos reciben fondos del estado -destinado a aliviar su dependencia de contribuciones privadas, pero no tuvo ese efecto. En cambio, aseguró la supervivencia de grupos minúsculos que de otra manera hubieran desaparecido. El diario La Nación, mostró cómo opera el sistema uniendo los datos de una alianza de dos pequeños partidos, la Alianza de Cambio, que presentó a José Arcagni como candidato presidencial, y atrajo sólo 0,33% de votos. Cada uno de los socios intervinientes recibieron el básico Arg$154.333. También obtuvieron Arg$120.000 al imprimirse las boletas. El socio más antiguo, Unión Popular, obtuvo Arg$587 por su anterior desempeño electoral. En total, Arg$429.533 (US$143.178). El presupuesto nacional también asigna a cada partido Arg$4.000 por año para sus gastos de mantenimiento.

Bajo las normas previas, esa alianza hubiera sido borrada de los registros. En cambio, sobrevivió en las arcas públicas. Los que defienden la legislación de 2002, dicen que es el único camino para asegurar que la representación polí­tico partidaria está disponible para todos. En realidad, la legislación previa no fue del todo restrictiva, como podemos ver por el número de pequeños partidos retirados del registro por no atraer 2% de los votos: 179 entre 1982 y 2002, o un promedio de poco menos de 9 por año. Como han señalado los crí­ticos, sólo 17,5% del total actual de partidos polí­ticos se unieron al tropel en 2003.

Un detalle interesante que emerge de los datos de la CNE es que la propensión a formar partidos polí­ticos varí­a considerablemente de una parte a otra del paí­s. De los 655 partidos a nivel distrital en el registro, el mayor número (73) está en la capital, la ciudad de Buenos Aires. Luego siguen las provincias de Buenos Aires (55) y Córdoba (44) -pero Santa Fe, la segunda provincia más importante del paí­s se ubica en octavo lugar, con sólo 30 partidos, mientras que provincias muy pequeñas, como Formosa y Catamarca aparecen con 35 y 34 respectivamente.

Un legislador de la oposición, Mario Negri, de la Unión Cí­vica Radical (UCR), ya ha comenzado a urgir por un debate sobre la reforma de la ley electoral. 'Debemos considerar.' Dice, 'si la [presente] fragmentación en realidad no favorece la concentración de poder en el paí­s.' Su opinión halló eco en el Foro Social para la Transparencia, donde Norberto Borzese mantiene que el actual sistema 'favorece la preeminencia de los mismos de antes, ayuda a dispersar a la oposición y alienta el mal uso de fondos del estado recibidos por los partidos.'

Valores relativos
El informe de la CNE fue tomado por los medios en varios otros paí­ses de América Latina, donde la proliferación de los partidos polí­ticos también es considerada un problema. Una empresa privada de análisis de Argentina, el Centro de Estudios para la Nueva Mayorí­a (CENM), usando cifras de la Base de Datos de las Américas de la Universidad de Georgetown, ha mostrado que Argentina no es el lí­der en ese campo: sigue a Guatemala en el segundo lugar y después de Perú (51 partidos).

El CENM advierte que, en todo el hemisferio, aunque hay un promedio de 17 partidos por paí­s, en realidad es una relación muy baja entre el número de partidos y la distribución de los votos. Señala que EU tiene 16 partidos, pero la contienda se reduce a dos. Uruguay tiene 27 partidos y México 20, pero en ambos paí­ses la principal contienda es sólo entre tres de ellos (nuestra tabla de abajo muestra que el panorama puede lucir muy diferente si se toma en cuenta la dimensión de la población de cada paí­s).

Donde los problemas realmente surgen, es cuando la proliferación de partidos deja la representación legislativa tan fragmentada, que los gobiernos deben buscar constantemente alianzas a fin de lograr la aprobación de sus leyes, o donde los presidentes pueden ser electos con el genuino apoyo de sólo un pequeño porcentaje del electorado. Argentina está en problemas en ambos casos: el mayor bloque en la cámara baja del congreso, sólo tiene ahí­ el 37% de los votos, y el actual presidente, Néstor Kirchner, atrajo sólo 24% de los votos en la primera ronda de las elecciones. Sin embargo, no están solos: un rasgo que pasa bastante desapercibido en el escenario latinoamericano es que hay muy pocos paí­ses donde gobernar a través de una coalición no se haya vuelto la norma.

El Presidente Enrique Bolaños no ha renunciado. En cambio, denunció las reformas constitucionales aprobadas por la asamblea nacional como preludio de un golpe de estado, luego anunció que presentarí­a tres propuestas de reformas constitucionales propias, y que enfrentarí­a a las reformas de la oposición en 'todos los tribunales y cortes del mundo'.

'Si las reformas [de la oposición] entran en vigor,' dijo el 9 de diciembre ante una clase de cadetes del ejército que se graduaba, 'no habrí­a más democracia, que implica igualdad jerárquica entre los poderes; serí­a una dictadura -un poder por encima de los otros.' Las reformas reducen drásticamente los poderes de la presidencia, en la mayorí­a de los casos introduciendo controles del congreso y balances comunes a varios paí­ses latinoamericanos. Sólo en un caso, van más allá de eso: cuando otorgan a la asamblea el poder de anular el veto presidencial por mayorí­a simple, en vez de los dos tercios estipulados.

Al dí­a siguiente, Bolaños anunció tres propuestas de reformas constitucionales que presentarí­a. La primera, dijo, prohibirí­a la reelección presidencial por completo. La segunda, asegurarí­a (no dijo cómo) que los legisladores electos respondan a los intereses de sus distritos, no los de los caudillos del partido. El tercero establecerí­a que las enmiendas constitucionales deben ser ratificadas por el electorado en un referéndum.

Bolaños también anunció que miembros de su gabinete buscarí­an de la corte de apelaciones de Managua, una orden judicial contra las reformas aprobadas por la asamblea. Por su parte, dijo que si fuera necesario apelarí­a a la carta democrática de la OEA o a 'mecanismos de la ONU' diseñados para situaciones donde exista 'peligro de ruptura del orden constitucional'

Sin mucho margen
El problema que él afronta es que sus movidas tienen poca chance de éxito. Los Liberales y Sandinistas, controlan en juntos 79 de las 91 bancas en la asamblea, lo que significa que carece de votos para la aprobación de sus reformas. La corte de apelaciones es improbable que tome acción contra un acto de la asamblea, y si lo hace, la cuestión puede llegar a la corte suprema -que Bolaños describe como dominada por los dos partidos de la oposición. Y le será difí­cil persuadir a la OEA que invoque la carta democrática e intervenga, y los 'mecanismos de la ONU' que él ha citado, no existen.

Eso reduce sus chances a dos: que la presión de EU persuada a los Liberales a romper su alianza con los Sandinistas [IL-04-47], o que pueda ser capaz de dar un golpe -una opción que requerirí­a la disposición de parte del ejército y seguridades de un aval después del hecho, de EU y sus vecinos latinoamericanos. De las dos chances, la primera es la única que suena, aunque remotamente, plausible.

Lo único que Bolaños tiene a su favor es el retraso en la promulgación de las reformas constitucionales. Ellas requieren que sean ratificadas en una segunda sesión de la legislatura. Aún no se ha fijado una fecha, pero son pocos los que esperan que la votación tenga lugar antes de finales de enero.

Según un largo informe en la revista Veja (no amiga del gobierno), las Farc de Colombia ofrecieron financiar las campañas de candidatos del PT en 2002 con US$5m. Esto, dice, fue verificado por Abin, la inteligencia brasileña, pero ni la revista ni Abin pudieron averiguar si el dinero fue desembolsado. El PT ha reaccionado airadamente, calificando el informe de 'irresponsable' y negando cualquier 'relación financiera' con las Farc.

El informe de Veja en la edición de la semana pasada, decí­a que el 13 de abril de 2002, un grupo de 30 personas se reunió en un huerto a unos 40 kilómetros de Brasí­lia, con Olivério Medina, un sacerdote descrito como 'embajador' de las Farc en Brasil. La Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) grabó la reunión y captó la oferta de Medina de US$5m para candidatos petistas en las próximas elecciones. Veja no reproduce la trascripción de Abin, por acuerdo con su fuente.

Sin embargo, la trascripción ha estado flotando, pues el diputado Alberto Fraga, del Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) pudo mostrarlo a Jornal do Brasil el mismo dí­a que la revista salió a la calle. En la versión de Jornal, el documento cita a Medina como diciendo que las Farc 'hací­a una donación de US$5m para la campaña de candidatos petistas de su elección.' Eso es algo más que una oferta. Vale señalar que en su informe online, Veja dijo que las Farc 'dio' (deu) el dinero a candidatos del PT. Es en la parte principal del texto que eso se convierte en oferta, cuya aceptación Veja dijo que no habí­a podido verificar.

También hay que señalar: que la reunión tuvo lugar fue confirmado por uno de los participantes, Antônio Viana, que dijo que se habí­a organizado para expresar apoyo por las Farc -aunque niega que 'se haya mencionado cifras en la manera en que ha sido informado.' En un comunicado, el PT reitera que no tiene, y nunca ha tenido, relaciones financieras con las Farc [y que] no apoya en el paí­s vecino ninguna solución para la antigua situación de beligerancia que no se base en un acuerdo democrático, pací­fico e institucional.' El PT y las Farc eran ambos participantes habituales en el Foro Mundial Social, el evento anual que fue cofundado por Lula da Silva.

Una conexión diferente
Al gobierno brasileño se le recordó otra conexión con las Farc cuando un juez colombiano que presidió un juicio in absentia, sentenció al brasileño Luiz Fernando da Costa (Fernandinho Beira Mar) a 18 años de prisión por tráfico de drogas. Fernandinho se dedicaba al intercambio de drogas por armas con Tomás Medina Acacia (Negro Acacio), comandante del 'frente' 16to de las Farc. Fue arrestado en Colombia en abril de 2001, y deportado a Brasil, donde fue juzgado y sentenciado a 30 años en prisión. La jueza Marta Patricia Trujillo ha anunciado que buscará la extradición de Fernandinho desde Brasil -un gesto formal pues él tendrá que cumplir primero su sentencia brasileña completa.

Fernandinho, 38 años, es un miembro importante del Comando Vermelho, alguna vez la banda más grande de Brasil. Es uno de los pocos jefes a nivel de favelas (donos) que ha crecido hasta convertirse en importador de drogas. Se cree que él sigue controlando su negocio de drogas desde su celda de prisión.

No es, sin embargo, el único que ha tenido tratos con las Farc que involucraba drogas. El llamado Suricartel, supuestamente conectado con el ex dictador de Surinam, Desi Bouterse, y con importantes ramificaciones dentro de Brasil, también comercia con el 16to 'frente' de las Farc.

Si oí­mos al Departamento de Estado de EU, la asamblea general de la OEA en Fort Lauderdale fue una resonante victoria de sus propuestas para hacer la organización más 'proactiva' en proteger la democracia. Si oí­mos al canciller venezolano, el resultado fue una 'devastadora derrota' para EU. Retórica de lado, la segunda visión parece más cerca de la verdad: la OEA no emergió tan intervencionista como parece desear EU.

Con lo que todos los participantes estaban de acuerdo fue en confiar al secretario general, José Miguel Insulza, la preparación de propuestas para 'abordar situaciones' que puedan comprometer el 'proceso polí­tico democrático o la vigencia de la ley'. El texto destaca que las propuestas de Insulza deben seguir los principios encarnados en la Carta de la OEA, siendo el principal de ellos la 'no intervención y el derecho a la no intervención'.

Se abandonó la propuesta de EU de establecer un comité supervisor permanente (Alí­ Rodrí­guez, de Venezuela, lo llamó 'comité de intervención') -pero nada impide que reaparezca como parte de las propuestas de Insulza. El Secretario de Estado Asistente de EU, Roger Noriega, ha argumentado que una OEA más proactiva puede ayudar a desactivar crisis en varios paí­ses, incluidos Ecuador y Bolivia, y antes en Haití­, 'donde la OEA abordó la cuestión muy tarde.'

En una conferencia de prensa antes del evento, Noriega buscó disipar la noción que EU desea que se incluya un lenguaje más enérgico en la carta, que podrí­a imponer sanciones a paí­ses que violan el gobierno democrático. Los que creen que la administración Bush desea esas sanciones, tienen una 'impresión errónea' dijo. 'Nuestro énfasis ha sido siempre sobre la solidaridad y avanzar más activamente para evitar violaciones al orden democrático. Si usted llega al punto en que debe sancionar a paí­ses, [entonces] usted ha fracasado.'

Aunque la impresión causada por la delegación de EU, quizá mejor ilustrada por el comentario dirigido a la Secretaria de Estado de EU, Condoleezza Rice por el canciller brasileño Celso Amorim: 'Madam presidenta, la democracia no es impuesta. Nace del diálogo.' El propio Noriega no ayudó cuando, durante la sesión del 7 de junio, acusó a Venezuela de estar detrás de los disturbios en Bolivia -sólo para echarse atrás frente a la prensa.

En todo caso, lo importante es el giro dado por EU al resultado de la asamblea en Fort Lauderdale, debido a que eso es lo más probables que se extraiga como una justificación a sus acciones en el hemisferio. Según Noriega, los acuerdos que se produjeron en Fort Lauderdale, afirman 'muy claramente' que los paí­ses en el Hemisferio Occidental 'deben ser gobernados democráticamente, y que los gobiernos deben ser responsables ante sus pueblos'. En realidad, ese no fue el lenguaje de los documentos de Fort Lauderdale, sino de las declaraciones antes y durante la reunión.

John Maisto, el representante permanente de EU ante la OEA, destacó lo que describe como una 'resolución propuesta por Chile', que establece varias nuevas ví­as 'muy importantes' para dar al secretario general de la OEA el poder de promover y defender la democracia, a través de la aplicación de la Carta Democrática Interamericana.

Esa resolución, dijo, establece un 'sistema de alerta para la democracia' cuando está en peligro de caer; y permite al secretario general traer a la atención del consejo permanente de la OEA esas situaciones que pueden llevar a la acción bajo la Carta Democrática de la organización. En realidad, el secretario general ya tiene ese poder, dado por la propia Carta -como, en verdad, lo tiene cada uno y todos los miembros de la OEA.

El tema recurrente del enfoque de EU, que Condoleezza Rice enfatiza desde sus primeras visitas a la región, es, citando sus propias palabras en Fort Lauderdale: 'Debemos insistir en que los lí­deres que son electos democráticamente, tienen la responsabilidad de gobernar democráticamente'.

Eso, como puede verse claramente en sus declaraciones públicas previas sobre asuntos latinoamericanos, es un lenguaje elaborado originalmente para el caso venezolano, como un medio para desviar el argumento que, después de todo, el Presidente Hugo Chávez fue electo democráticamente. La repetición de esa cita se ha convertido en una ví­a de aludir oblicuamente a Venezuela.

Pistas a seguir

En Fort Lauderdale, Rise mencionó cuatro instancias en las cuales le gustarí­a ver a la OEA 'actuar sobre su Carta [Democrática]'. En algunos la aplicación en el mundo real es explí­cita. En otras no es difí­cil darse cuenta. Las cuatro instancias son:  'Fortalecer la democracia donde es débil. En lugares como Bolivia, y Ecuador, y Haití­, las instituciones de la democracia tienen raí­ces frágiles. Para ayudar a las democracias en nuestro hemisferio, en lugares como esos y en otros, para hallar la senda del éxito duradero, esa organización también debe abarcar las contribuciones legí­timas de la sociedad civil.'  'Apoyar la democracia donde está amenazada. Dondequiera que una sociedad libre está en retirada, una sociedad del temor está en la ofensiva. Y el arma elegida por cada régimen autoritario es la crueldad organizada de la policí­a del estado.' [Léase: Venezuela, Nicaragua.] 'Asegurar la democracia con la vigencia de la ley. Por nuestra parte, Estados Unidos está trabajando con El Salvador para crear en el paí­s una Academia para la Aplicación de la Ley Internacional. El instituto entrenará a oficiales de policí­a de todo el hemisferio para proteger mejor y servir a los ciudadanos. Damos la bienvenida a la oportunidad de trabajar con Perú para extender el alcance de esa Academia en Sudamérica.' [Antecedentes a esta iniciativa en particular, cuando Costa Rica era el paí­s en cuestión, pueden hallarse en IL-03-32.] 'Avanzar con la democracia donde está ausente. Treinta y cuatro naciones han ganado su legí­timo lugar en esta gran organización democrática. Pero aún permanece una banca vací­a en la mesa -una banca que será llenada algún dí­a por los representantes de una libre y democrática Cuba.'