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Development: On 4 August the ruling Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) of President Alan Garcí­a announced that its candidate for the 3 October Lima mayoral election, Carlos Roca, was withdrawing from the contest.

Significance: Roca's withdrawal from the race was not a surprise given his low popularity (he was trailing with 1% of voting intention, far below Garcí­a's 30% approval rating). It leaves the ruling party without a candidate for what is the most important of this year's municipal elections.

Roca had been picked by the party's executive committee just a day before the deadline for nominations, suggesting his nomination was already a compromise.  While a long standing Aprista and one of the main heirs of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the party founder, his nomination surprised both politicians and political commentators given his lack of widespread support.

This is also not the first time that the ruling party has been forced to withdraw candidates for lacking grassroots support. In 2004 Garcí­a's former health minister, Hernán Garrido Lecca, was declared candidate for the regional governorship of Callao but subsequently resigned after failing to rally party backing. Similarly in 2002, the PAP invited Gastón Barúa a former mayor of a Lima district, San Isidro and an independent to run for the main Lima mayoral seat although again he was forced to step aside.

The latest poll for the Lima mayoral race, published on 5 August, shows Lourdes Flores, the leader of one of Peru's main parties, the centre-right Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), increasing her advantage over her main competitor, (also right-leaning) Alex Kouri (Cambio Radical and the current mayor of Callao). The poll by Dátum, has Flores on 42%, and Kouri on 19%.

Development: On 10 September the governments of Mexico and El Salvador announced plans to establish a high level security and justice group to boost cooperation in the fight against organised crime.

Significance: The announcement was the most significant outcome of a summit between Mexico's President Felipe Calderón and El Salvador's Mauricio Funes. The summit was initially called by Funes to discuss the massacre of undocumented migrants discovered on 24 August in Tamaulipas, Mexico (of which 13 were Salvadoreans). The fact that the emphasis of the meeting shifted from the massacre to regional security illustrates the importance of the problem. Mexico is involved because blood-thirsty Mexican drug gangs dominate the region's drug trade.

This development has left the so-called Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala) with some of the highest homicide levels in the world. Since 2006 the Honduran homicide rate has shot up by almost two-thirds, to 67.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. El Salvador's rate, which had dropped by almost a fifth between 2006 and 2008, rose sharply in 2009 to 60.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, while Guatemala has experienced a steady rise in its rate, which reached 44.9 per 100,000 in 2009.

With   President Porfirio Lobo of Honduras also due to meet Calderón today in Mexico, the proposed new Mexico-El Salvador working group also points to growing regional cooperation in the absence of an effective US-sponsored plan for the region. Funes has also spear-headed criticism of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the Central American portion of the US-funded US$1.4bn Mérida Initiative. During a visit to the US in March 2010 during which he met President Barack Obama, Funes complained that the US$100m assigned to the region for fiscal year 2010 was insufficient and the plan was largely restricted to police training.

There are growing signs that Central America is increasingly intent on combating its security problem on a regional basis. In July, Costa Rica, which is fast shedding its reputation as a 'safe haven', with its homicide rate almost doubling over the past five years to 11 per 100,000 inhabitants, formally joined the Central American Security Commission.

This commission was set up in 1995, as one of the branches of the Central American Integration System (Sica). Costa Rica's decision to join was significant given its traditional policy of keeping the other Sica institutions - the Central American parliament (Parlacen) and the Central American justice court (CCJ) - at arms' length. Last week, leading security officials from all the Sica member countries (bar Nicaragua) met in Antigua, Guatemala and agreed to draw up a regional security strategy.

On top of this, Guatemala's President Alvaro Colom is calling for a sub-regional anti-gang law (in the Northern triangle, where the problem is most acute). This follows El Salvador's recent approval of a new law criminalizing gang membership. Colom also revealed that he had been discussing the possibility of extending the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Cicig) to Honduras and El Salvador. The idea of replicating the commission (an independent investigative body which incorporates both international and local staff while operating through the national judicial system) was first floated in May, on the heels of a string of successes by Cicig in Guatemala.

Pointer: Among Mexican gangs now said to have a presence in the region; Los Zetas, which traditionally recruit from Mexican special forces, have a presence in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. The Golfo gang, which operates along Mexico's Caribbean coast, is present in Belize and Nicaragua (in cooperation with a Guatemalan gang [Los Lorenzana]). The Sinaloa gang, the biggest and most influential gang in Mexico, operates in Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, while the Familia Michoacana is also active in Costa Rica and Honduras.

Development: The 27 European Union (EU) foreign ministers will meet in Brussels today (25 October) to discuss Spain's motion to drop the 1996 EU Common Position on Cuba and replace it with a bilaterally negotiated political and economic agreement.

Significance: There is no unanimous agreement among the 27 to drop the Common Position but there is some degree of consensus on the need to move from a unilaterally imposed 'stick' to a negotiated bilateral 'carrot'. Spain argues strongly that real change is afoot in Cuba and that the EU should support this process.

In contrast, many of the 42 former political prisoners recently exiled in Spain urge caution. Guillermo Farinas, the Cuban dissident who staged a 135-day hunger strike earlier this year and was last week awarded the European Parliament's Sakharov human rights prize, has similarly counselled against 'rewarding' the Cuban government for the mere fact of releasing political dissidents.

The Common Position, which explicitly conditions economic and political relations on human rights improvements and political reforms towards democracy in Cuba, was unilaterally imposed at the behest of a conservative Spanish government.

On 14 June, the foreign ministers postponed their annual review of the Common Position to the autumn in light of the moves by the Cuban government, supported by Spain's socialist government, to release political prisoners. This has since been followed by the announcement of a major policy shift towards economic liberalisation.

Spain's (ex) foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, who has made it something of a personal mission to axe the Common Position, was last week replaced in a cabinet reshuffle. His successor is Trinidad Jiménez, formerly the health minister but with ample knowledge of Latin American affairs. She has previously been the International Relations Secretary for Spain's ruling Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and between 2006 and 2009 served as the government's Secretary of State for Ibero-America. She travelled with Moratinos to Cuba in March 2007, a trip that restored political dialogue between Spain and Cuba after several years of chilly relations.

The Spaniard Javier Solana, the EU's former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, stated yesterday that he would like to see Cuba do “much more". “The solution to the Cuban problems is change and the faster they do it, the better", he emphasised.

Development:   On 7 December, the Honduran foreign ministry said it would send a verification mission to the Honduran/Nicaraguan border to corroborate the alleged destruction of three border markers.

Significance:   The foreign minister, Mario Canahauti, stressed that the government would repair the markers and emphasised that they had not been moved, that they were fully identified with their geographic coordinates and that there was no question of any border dispute. The Honduran government led by President Porfirio Lobo is keen not to rise to any potential provocations.

Yesterday, the man at the centre of the current Nicaragua-Costa Rica border dispute, Edén Pastora, gave an interview to the Honduran daily El Heraldo in which he accused both Honduras and Costa Rica (along with Colombia) of conspiring against Nicaragua and the broader left-wing regional integration group, Alba, led by Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez .  Curiously, Pastora, long a controversial figure, said he was in Tegucigalpa at the time of the June 2009 coup against the former president Manuel Zelaya, an ally of Chávez and Nicaragua's left-wing President Daniel Ortega.

Nicaragua is the only Central American country still refusing to recognise the Lobo administration (although trade flows are unaffected). Last week Lobo publicly stated that there was no evidence that illegal groups operating in northern Honduras had been armed and financed by Nicaragua - shooting down earlier suggestions to that effect by his security minister, Oscar Alvarez.  

On 5 December, the Nicaraguan daily La Prensa published an interview with a local army colonel, Juan José Sevilla Núñez, who alleged that a cooperative of Honduran shrimp farmers had moved/or destroyed three markers (16, 17 and 18) in the Nicaraguan municipalities of Puerto Morazán and Somotillo, in the Chinandega department. The previous day (4 December) he told the same paper that Nicaraguans had been forced out of the area, as Hondurans had bought up more than “100 manzanas" (one manzana = 1.68 acres) in Nicaraguan territory taking advantage of the fact that the Gausaule River, which divides the two, had apparently changed its trajectory since the 1998 Hurricane Mitch. Canahauti stressed that the row was a private one between rival producers in the area and would be dealt with accordingly.

Development: On 27 January the opposition daily La Prensa reported there was political propaganda from the ruling Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in at least four educational establishments, promoting the candidacy of President Daniel Ortega, ahead of the 6 November general elections.

Significance: Political campaigning in public buildings is illegal under the electoral law.

Key points:

The breach of the law by the ruling party follows another recent move by Ortega which has sparked concerns regarding the elections - his announcement on 10 January that national and international observers would not be permitted to 'monitor' the election. The announcement, which echoes a similar move in the November 2008 municipal vote - which saw a sweeping victory for the FSLN and were widely denounced as fraudulent - prompted outrage from civil society groups which on 26 January presented congress with a bill on electoral observation which would “guarantee" the presence of local and foreign observers.

Ortega's refusal to allow electoral observers, which contravenes the Organization of American States' (non-binding) Inter-American Democratic Charter, may well trigger a response from foreign powers such as the US and the European Union. Last week Germany's minister of state at the foreign office, called for a European observer mission to be allowed “unrestricted access" to monitor the vote. The German call was endorsed by Holland, which has been a major supporter of Sandinista governments.

The latest polls show Ortega's refusal to allow observers is unpopular. A poll by Cid Gallup published on 25 January by weekly analysis publication, Confidencial, showed 72% of those questioned opposed the move. The poll nonetheless showed Ortega continuing to top the polls with 36% support, just above the 35% required for an outright win. Arnoldo Alemán of the main opposition Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) is on 23% and a rightwing radio personality, Fabio Gadea Mantilla (who lacks a ballot spot) is on 17%.

Development: On 16 March President Dilma Rousseff hosted the opposition governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin, in the Planalto presidential palace in Brasí­lia.

Significance: Alckmin is seeking to position himself as the 'natural interlocutor' of the opposition Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) with the federal government, at a time when the PSDB is still nursing its wounds and is in state of flux after its relatively poor performance in the 2010 elections. Alckmin, handily re-elected state governor in October last, ran against former president Lula da Silva in 2006, and while not the party favourite for the nomination, he may seek another tilt at the presidency in 2014. Alckmin has political clout as the most powerful of the PSDB's eight state governors.

Key points:

With the defeat by Dilma of the PSDB's José Serra in the presidential race, the traditional seat of power in the PSDB has shifted away from Serra and the Paulista barons towards the popular senator, Aécio Neves, of Minas Gerais, touted as the party's most likely presidential nominee in 2014. The PSDB's main ally, Democratas (DEM), is also in a state of flux, after its main elected political representative, Gilberto Kassab, the mayor of São Paulo (and Serra's protégé), recently defected to form a new party.

Alckmin made sure his visit to the Planalto was high profile and stressed the “similarities" in his and Dilma's quiet but efficient government styles. He also played up Dilma's firm support for the major infrastructure upgrades planned for São Paulo ahead of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, including airport improvements, the Greater São Paulo beltway (the Rodoanel) and the proposed bullet train between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

Development: On 8 May, the governor of the Argentine province of San Juan, José Luis Gioja, won a referendum (65.96% to 34.04%) that enables him to reform the provincial constitution to run for a third consecutive term.

Significance: San Juan has now joined Salta as one of two provinces where the governor can serve three consecutive terms in office; Gioja's reference to former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) - who reformed the constitution of Santa Cruz province to allow for indefinite re-election- as his inspiration for the reform in San Juan is unlikely to sit well with either the opposition or the Cristina Fernández administration which is actively trying to deny it would seek a constitutional reform proposed by members of the ruling Frente para la Victoria (FPV) to allow for Fernández's indefinite re-election  should she secure a second term on 23 October.

Key points:

On 5 May, in response to the call from a supporter who asked her to stay in power for another 10 years, Fernández said: “no, that's too much...I think my body would give in"; the opposition quickly flagged up the fact that Fernández did not point out that she is constitutionally barred from seeking more than one consecutive re-election.

  “I told the president...that when I took the most difficult decision in my life, which was to send the [constitutional] reform proposal to congress, I followed the example of a fighter and of a bloke [sic] who gave his life for his ideals, and who never left his convictions aside each time he ruled:...Néstor Carlos Kirchner", said Gioja.

“I don't have a knife underneath my poncho. This is a political decision to give continuity to the project for one more term... I am not going to perpetuate myself in power; I'm 61 and I don't plan to go to the government palace with a walking cane", declared Gioja yesterday. His reassurances failed to wash with his critics however, given that in 2008 he had said he wouldn't seek the constitutional reform he has just secured.

Latin America's finance ministers are running more orthodox economic policies than their Asian counterparts. Only six of the 11 Asian countries have real interest rates, as measured by our crude calculations of subtracting short-term interest rates from inflation. In Latin America only Argentina and Venezuela, both special cases, have negative interest rates. Argentina's negative rates are the highest of any economy in the two areas. 

Such deeply negative rates point to economic problems ahead: already inflation is beginning to pick up. It is quite possible that Argentina will revert to hyper-inflation. In the late 1980s money was literally losing its value by the minute. 

China's first quarter growth is hugely impressive. The economy has now been growing at 9%-plus annual rates for over two years. Venezuela's strong growth has yet to take the economy back to the size it reached at the end of the 1990s before the recession of 2001 and 2002. 

Brazil's extravagantly high real interest rates have done little to squash inflation. Pressure on the central bank to try another policy is likely to grow.

HAITI: Métayer arrested in Miami

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fernández visits US

OAS: State Department hedges its bets over new secretary-general

VENEZUELA: Noriega talks up regional arms race

COLOMBIA: Orejuela faces judge in US

HAITI
Buteur Métayer, the head of the rebel group that launched the uprising in Haiti's fourth-largest city, Gonaí¯ves, which eventually unseated then-president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, was taken into custody by the US Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents in Miami on 7 December. Immigration officials failed to explain why Métayer was picked up; the only press explanation for this is that he might have spent too long outside of the US. He lived in the US before travelling to Haiti in the wake of the death of his brother, Amiot Métayer, who was once the head of the Armée Cannibale, which subsequently mutated into the Front de Résistance Nationale (FRN) after incorporating the ex-soldiers brought across from Haiti by Guy Philippe.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Leonel Fernández carried out a four-day visit to the US to talk about energy and investment between 4 and 7 December. In addition to seeking to promote investment in the country to US businessmen, Fernández also addressed a large audience of Dominican-Americans at a public seminar at the City College of New York. There are some 700,000 Dominicans living in and around New York. They are responsible for sending back about US$1bn in remittances to family members in the Dominican Republic every year. One growing concern in US and Dominican bilateral relations is immigration: on 10 December at least eight Dominicans drowned when a boat carrying more than 90 Dominican migrants capsized off the coast of Puerto Rico.

OAS
The US State Department is hedging its bets over whom it should back to be the new secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS). The State Department's spokesman, Adam Ereli, said that the US still preferred a Central American, preferably a former president, to head the OAS. Significantly, however, Ereli did not name the former President of El Salvador, Francisco Flores, as the US's candidate. Flores has all but been blackballed following revelations from the former Mexican foreign minister, Jorge Castañeda, that Flores had tried to drum up support for the coup against President Hugo Chávez at a Rio Group meeting in April 2002. Flores was already opposed by Costa Rica and Honduras. Mexico has pushed the case for its current foreign minister, Luis Ernesto Derbez. Ereli said that the US had a good working relationship with Derbez, but would have to consult more widely before deciding to back him. The position of OAS secretary general has been open since a former Costa Rican president, Miguel Angel Rodrí­guez, resigned after corruption allegations in October.

VENEZUELA
The US assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, Roger Noriega, said that the Venezuelans should decide for themselves if they want the weapons President Hugo Chávez has ordered from Russia. The buzz in Washington is that Noriega is likely to be reappointed to his current position when Condoleezza Rice takes over as US Secretary of State. The rumour mill had been suggesting that she would replace Noriega with a career diplomat. More controversially, Noriega also said that Venezuela's neighbours should have some input into President Hugo Chávez 's arms-purchasing decisions. He said that unless this consultation occurred, there would be a risk of an arms race in the region. These statements were at odds with Noriega's broadly conciliatory remarks about relations between the US and Venezuela: he said that both countries were working on ways of improving cooperation in the war against drugs and terrorism and on ways of improving regional security.

COLOMBIA
Gilberto Rodrí­guez Orejuela, the former head of the Cali drugs cartel, appeared before federal Judge William Turnoff in Miami on 6 December to face charges of drug smuggling. Orejuela, who has been extradited to the US, stands accused of smuggling 200 tonnes of cocaine into the US between 1997 and 2002, earning some US$2.1bn in the process. On 6 December Turnoff caused controversy by suggesting that he intends to try Orejuela for '20 years of drug smuggling', meaning the former head of the Cali cartel could also face charges that predate the extradition treaty between the US and Colombia which came into force in 1997. However on 7 December, following an angry note from the Colombian ministry of foreign relations, Florida's state prosecutor, Marcos Daniel Jiménez, said that Orejuela would be judged on the charges for which he was extradited and blamed the misunderstanding on the press. Jiménez described Orejuela's extradition as the most significant event ever in the US's fight against drug trafficking. In Colombia, meanwhile, the mood is less upbeat; there is great concern over what Orejuela might reveal during his trial, especially with regard to deals he might have done while one of the country's most powerful drug lords.

Central America: On 4 May the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, said that US cooperation with Central America on security would remain within the framework of the current US multi-year 'Mérida Initiative' for Central America and Mexico. The US insistence on maintaining cooperation within the Mérida Initiative will frustrate Central America leaders, led by El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes, who have repeatedly called on the US to either deepen the initiative (which assigns only US$100m of its US$550m budget for fiscal year 2009 to the region) or draft a specific plan for the sub-region. Valenzuela's remarks were made in El Salvador, as part of a week-long tour of Central America. He also announced an 18-month extension of the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for migrants from Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. The TPS, which was due to expire on 5 July 2010, is granted to countries that have suffered natural disasters or civil wars and allows undocumented migrants to remain temporarily in the US with a work permit.

Mexico: On 29 April the Chihuahua state government called on its fellow border states to boycott the 28th annual meeting with their US counterparts scheduled for September. Already, Sonora has cancelled its annual bilateral meeting with the state government of Arizona to underline Mexican objections to a new law allowing state police to stop suspected undocumented immigrants and demand proof that they are in the US legally. The row is likely to colour President Felipe Calderón's forthcoming state visit to Washington on 19-20 May. The Mexican senate has called on the government to come up with an action plan over the next 90 days to persuade Arizona to rescind the legislation. Calderón's neglect of the immigration issue (coupled with a slacker US labour market due to the recession) has allowed anti-immigrant lobbying groups to seize the political initiative. The result is the anti-immigrant law in Arizona, which rightwing legislators in Oklahoma now say they want to introduce in their state. The US federal courts will almost certainly strike out the Arizona law on the grounds that it is discriminatory. The legislation, effectively, calls for the police to judge on racial appearance whether to ask a person for papers. It is significant that the ambitious (Republican) governor of Texas, Rick Perry, argued that introducing an Arizona-style law would not be right for Texas. He dodged the judicial issue, arguing on 29 April that it is wrong to use state police as auxiliary border patrol agents. Mexico's economic integration into the North American market is far more developed than other aspects of its relationship. In the first quarter of 2010, Mexico's vehicle exports to the US were up by 86%, year-on-year.

Mexico: On 4 May Fernando Gómez-Mont, Mexico's interior minister travelled to the US. He spoke at the Brookings Institution with his US counterpart Janet Napolitano, Homeland Security secretary. Both delivered remarks on the ongoing and “groundbreaking" ways that the US and Mexico are working together to make the Southwest border region more secure and prosperous. "Over the last 15 months, the US and Mexico have forged unprecedented partnerships to strengthen the mutually reinforcing goals of securing the border and facilitating legal travel and commerce," said Napolitano. "We will continue to work closely with our Mexican counterparts to build a 21st century border that prioritizes security and enhances the US's economic competitiveness both along the border and throughout the country." Both emphasised what they described as the unparalleled level of collaboration between the US and Mexico to disrupt and dismantle drug cartels and combat criminal activity in the border regions—noting that, in the past year alone, illegal traffic across the Southwest border has decreased by 23 percent.

Trinidad and Tobago: On 5 May the US and Trinidad & Tobago published an “open skies" agreement. This comprehensive plan will expand and their bilateral civil aviation relationship. The agreement was initiated on 1 May, after three days of negotiations in Port-of-Spain between a delegation from the twin-island state and a US delegation from the Department of State and Department of Transportation. A US state department statement said the agreement “represents a market-oriented approach to aviation relations: airlines, not governments, will decide which cities to serve, the frequency of flights, the equipment used, and the prices charged". In addition it expected that the agreement would strengthen and broaden tourism and trading links between the two countries. The agreement in particular will benefit civil aviation in both as well as the consumers that use this service, “while preserving our commitments to aviation safety and security," the communiqué added. The agreement will supersede the 1990 aviation agreement and grant, for the first time, code-share opportunities and intermodal rights, and expand cargo opportunities. The US has nearly 100 'open skies' agreements in place.

The Week Ahead

FRIDAY

Brazil: Spain's labour minister Jesús Caldera will visit Sao Paulo.

Argentina: Preparatory meeting of the II Latin American Business summit, which will analyse the problems facing companies in Latin America.

Honduras: Honduran foreign minister Edmundo Orellana will travel to the Dominican Republic to meet his Dominican counterpart, Carlos Morales Troncoso.

SUNDAY

Mexico: European commissioner for science and investigation Janez Potocnik will meet his Central American counterparts.

Mexico: Mexico's president Felipe Calderón will make a five day visit to the US, travelling to New York, Boston Chicago, Sacramento and Los Angeles to meet the Mexican community and promote investment between both countries.

Is Latin America in the grip of a new arms race? Though experts disagree on the details, they do concur that at least the trend towards lower military spending has been halted, and in several countries reversed — markedly so in some cases.

Carlos Malamud, senior researcher on Latin America at Spain's Real Instituto Elcano, notes that the trend towards declining defence spending actually changed in 2005. Between 1995 and 2004 the region's combined military spending fell from 1.77% of GDP to 1.31%, one of the lowest rates in the world. Last year, he says (without offering an overall figure) there were increases across the region.

This, he reports, has continued into 2006, with Venezuela's military spending expanding by 33% to more than US$2bn, followed by Colombia (up 10%) and Chile (up 4.5%). He says that Ecuador and Brazil have also increased their military spending, but not in similar proportions.

The Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (Resdal), a private thinktank that monitors the region's defence budgets, comes up with a picture that differs considerably in the details. It has no 2006 data for Venezuela, but shows Brazil's spending up by 29% to US$17.2bn, Colombia's up 14.3% to US$4bn, Argentina's up 11.8% to US$1.9bn and Mexico's up 10% to US$3.3bn. In Resdal's tally, Chile's defence spending this year falls by 6.5% to US$2.9bn.

It is worth noting that even with its current increase, Venezuela is far from being the region's biggest military spender: it ranks fifth in absolute terms, after Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Chile. In relative terms, in 2005 it ranked sixth, spending on defence 1.2% of its GDP. Ahead of it were Ecuador (3.3%), Colombia (2.9%), Chile (2.7%), Bolivia (1.9%) and Brazil (1.7%).

Military spending in Latin America % of GDP*
Country	2005	2006	Country	2005	2006
Ecuador	3.3	-	Argentina	1.0	0.9
Colombia	2.9	3.0	Dominican Republic	0.9	-
Chile	2.7	2.4	Paraguay	0.8	-
Bolivia	1.9	1.8	Nicaragua	0.7	0.6
Brazil	1.7	1.7	El Salvador	0.6	0.6
Venezuela	1.2	-	Honduras	0.6	-
Peru	1.4	1.3	Guatemala	0.4	0.4
Uruguay	1.3	1.2	Mexico	0.4	0.4
*Ranked by spending in 2005

 

Variations in 2006 Spending in US$bn, selected countries
Country	2005	2006	% var.
Brazil	13.3	17.2	29.0
Chile	3.1	2.9	-6.5
Colombia	3.5	4.0	14.3
Mexico	3.0	3.3	10.0
Argentina	1.7	1.9	11.8
Source: Resdal

The race for the governorship of Puerto Rico still hangs in the balance. The elections were submitted to a recount on 8 November because so little separated the two candidates and the result is unlikely to be declared until late December. Aní­bal Acevedo Vilá, who is in favour of keeping Puerto Rico's commonwealth status, took 48.38% of the vote while the pro-statehood former Governor Pedro Rosselló took 48.18%.

With just 0.2 of a percentage point, or 3,880 votes, separating the two men the electoral commission was obliged to launch a lengthy process of verification of the electoral lists to see whether 30,000 uncounted ballots were legally cast. Any election with a margin less than half a point is subject to an automatic recount. But the recount will only begin once the outcome of the election is known provided that the margin is still within half a point.

Rosselló's Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) took control of the legislature from Acevedo Vilá's Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), winning 18 seats in the 27-member Senate and 34 in the 51-member House of Representatives.

The two men
Rosselló was born on 5 April 1944 in San Juan. He graduated from the university of Notre Dame in 1966 and obtained a doctorate in medicine in 1970 from Yale university. He began his political career in 1988 with the PNP and became president of the party between 1991 and 1999. He served two terms as governor between 1993 and 2001. His biggest success was bringing unemployment down from 20% to 9.2%, partly through attracting foreign investment for big urban projects. He also carried out major healthcare reform. Various privatisation initiatives were deeply unpopular: the sale of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC) in 1998 triggered a general strike. Several members of his second administration were arrested on corruption charges. Although he himself remained untouched, Roselló decided not to run for a third term in 2000. In 2003, he won the PNP primary elections against Carlos Pesquera. He has vowed once again to campaign for statehood for Puerto Rico. During his first two terms, he called two referendums on Puerto Rico's status. He failed to get the clear-cut option for statehood on both occasions; the majority of Puerto Ricans are content with the status quo - an estado libre asociado, or commonwealth. 

Acevedo Vilá was born on 13 February 1962 in Hato Rey. He obtained a degree in political science from the University of Puerto Rico in 1979 and completed his postgraduate studies in law at Harvard university in 1985. He married Luisa Gándara, with whom he had two children, Gabriela and Juan Carlos. In 1989 he served as an advisor to former governor Rafael Hernández Colón before being elected to the House of Representatives in 1992 representing the PPD. He served on a number of government commissions. In 1997, he became the president of the PPD but in 1999 he ceded this title to Sila Calderón, the incumbent governor, and assumed the vice-presidency. He defeated José Alfredo Hernández Mayoral in the PPD party primary.

PEOPLE PROFILE is published every Tuesday and describes the professional background of key people emerging in the political and economic scenario.

Who is Sabas Pretelt de la Vega?
He is the interior and justice minister in Colombia. Last November, he was plucked from the retailers’ association, Federación Nacional de Comerciantes (Fenalco), of which he was president, and given the most important ministry in Colombia, dealing with the counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency campaigns in which the country is embroiled. He replaces Fernando Londoño Hoyos.

Why watch him?
With the capture of the notorious leader of the guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc), Simón Trinidad, in Quito, Ecuador, Sabas Pretelt de la Vega has made the biggest strike against the guerrillas in four decades of war.

Born: 11 April 1946.

Place of birth: Cartagena, Colombia.

Education:
BA in Humanities from the Universidad de los Andes, and Economics from the Universidad del Valle.

Public life:
He was a professor at the Universidad Social Católica de La Salle and the Universidad del Valle and founded the faculty of Economics at the Universidad de San Buenaventura. He is also the author of various publications.

Timeline:

1980: Director of social security during the administration of President Julio César Turbay Ayala.
1980-2000: Presidential assistant and general-secretary of the Corporación Financiera del Valle.
1980-2000: President of various private sector companies.
1980-2000: Sat on the board of directors in the public and private sector, including the Banco Popular and Banco de la República.
2003: President of the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes, Fenalco.
2003: On 6 November he was appointed interior and justice minister by President Alvaro Uribe.

Strong points:
He is not a politician and therefore started the job with a clean slate, unhampered by previous involvement in politics that might have complicated negotiations with the guerrillas.

Weak points:
The opposition has attacked his appointment on the grounds that he lacks political experience and is more associated with the private sector than he is with public office.

Prospects:
Pretelt de la Vega took the post amid high expectations from the most influential sectors in Colombia, exhausted by the constant strain on the economy and their everyday lives caused by the war against the guerrillas.

He has come under fire for the disarming of 850 paramilitaries from the Cacique Nutibara bloc of the AUC on 25 November. The men were reintegrated into society after three weeks at a government-run camp in La Ceja, Antioquia. The opposition and the press think that they should be investigated for rights violations in their fight against the guerrillas.

Who is he? A millionaire businessman, De Narváez is the leading opposition candidate in Argentina's largest electoral district, the province of Buenos Aires, ahead of mid-term congressional elections on 28 June.

He heads the lower house ticket for the Unión-Pro, a centre-right alliance between dissident members of the ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists)and the mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri.

Why watch him? De Narváez's main rival is the government's leading candidate, former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), who is gambling his political authority - and his 2012 presidential ambitions - on a win in the Buenos Aires province, a Peronist party stronghold.

If De Narváez beats Kirchner into second place he would be in a strong position to challenge him for the leadership of the ruling Peronists.

Born: 22 September 1953, in Bogotá, Colombia. De Narváez moved to Buenos Aires at the age of three. His father, Juan de Narváez, was a Colombian coffee merchant and his mother, Doris Steur, is Jewish, of Central European origin.

Education: De Narváez received no formal education beyond senior school. At the age of 17 he started working for his family's business, a major Argentinean supermarket chain called Casa Tí­a. This was launched in 1946 by his maternal grandfather, Karl Steuer, a toyshop owner from Prague who made his money in the 1930s from a chain of shops called 'Te-Ta' in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. De Narváez names Steuer, who fled to Argentina following the Nazi invasion of Prague in 1939, as one of his main influences.

Between the ages of 13 and 16 De Narváez attended a military academy in Toronto, an experience which he says taught him discipline. When he arrived at the school he spoke almost no English. During this period his parents separated.

Public Life: De Narváez has been a national deputy for the ruling PJ since 2005, although he has openly opposed Kirchner and his political movement since 2006. He stood, unsuccessfully, to be elected governor of Buenos Aires (one of the country's most important political posts) in 2007. He is also one of Argentina's leading businessmen and is owner or main shareholder of:  La Rural SA (a famous exhibition and conference centre in Buenos Aires); the broadcaster, América TV; the Buenos Aires financial newspaper, Ámbito Financiero; the radio station, La Red; and the internet and new technology holding company, D&S.

Time line:

1956: De Narváez, aged three, moves with his parents and three siblings from Bogotá to Buenos Aires.

1966-69: Attends military school in Toronto. Around this time his parents separate.

1970: Enters his maternal grandfather's business, a major supermarket chain called Casa Tí­a at the age of 17.

1980: Takes over management of the Casa Tí­a chain, along with his brother Carlos, following the death of his grandfather.

1989: Appointed sole managing director of the company, following differences with his brother Carlos.

1992: Attempts suicide, aged 39, in Buenos Aires' 5-star Hyatt hotel, the consequence of “phenomenal stress". The following year he separated from his first wife.

1999: Sells the Casa Tí­a chain, in which he held roughly a quarter stake, for US$638m.

1999-2002: Establishes himself as one of Argentina's leading businessmen. Becomes owner or main shareholder of: La Rural SA (a famous exhibition and conference centre in Buenos Aires); the broadcaster América TV; the Buenos Aires financial newspaper Ámbito Financiero; and the radio station La Red. He also acquires a majority stake in internet and new technology holding company, D&S.

2001: Co-founds the political think-tank Fundación Unidos del Sud, which supports De Narváez's friend, the businessman-cum-politician Mauricio Macri (now the mayor of Buenos Aires).

2002: Joins the Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists).

2003: Supports (financially and personally) the presidential campaign of PJ candidate, former president Carlos Menem (1989-1999), who promises De Narváez a cabinet post. Despite his lead in the first round, Menem withdraws his candidacy in the second round, and a relative unknown, Néstor Kirchner, comes to power.

July 2004: Finances a large portion of events to mark the 30th anniversary of the death of former President and PJ icon, Juan Perón.

2005: Successfully runs for the lower house on a PJ ticket loyal to the former president (and Kirchner rival), Eduardo Duhalde, in the province of Buenos Aires. Becomes the first person of foreign birth to be elected to congress in Argentina.

2006: Joins “El General", an anti-Kirchnerista Peronist group of PJ deputies and senators. Lends his support to the presidential candidacy of the former PJ economy minister Roberto Lavagna, who ran (unsuccessfully) against the government's candidate and Kirchner's wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

2007: Stands to be governor of Buenos Aires (one of the country's most important political roles), with the support of the capital's mayor, Mauricio Macri. Is beaten into third place (with 14.9% of the vote) by the Kirchnerista Daniel Scioli (48.2%), and the opposition Coalición Cí­vica candidate Margarita Stolbizer (16.60%).

Early 2009: Forms an anti-Kirchner alliance with fellow Peronist dissident Felipe Solá and Macri's Propuesta Republicana to contest the 28 June mid-terms in the province of Buenos Aires and the capital (the country's two largest electoral districts).

Early June 2009: Accuses the government of “political persecution" after evidence emerges linking him (tenuously) to a trafficker of the drug ephedrine (used to make the illegal drug methamphetamine). De Narváez denies all allegations, refuses to testify and files a malpractice suit against the judge involved (who has a record 37 malpractice charges already against him). The media, for the most part, takes De Narváez's side.

Mid-June 2009: Opinion polls place him neck and neck with Kirchner in the crucial Buenos Aires province.

Strengths: De Narváez is both extremely wealthy and popular. Part of his success in the Buenos Aires race owes to a carefully planned and intense campaign, much of which he has funded himself. Astutely, he has made crime and insecurity - which top the list of public concerns - the focus of this campaign. De Narváez also counts some powerful political figures among his friends - including the popular mayor of Buenos Aires and 2011 presidential hopeful, Mauricio Macri, and the Peronist party baron, Eduardo Duhalde. His market-friendly policies, and solid business background, will appeal to the country's- increasingly fractious - private sector and moderate voters. De Narváez is also well-liked by one of the Kirchners' fiercest opponents: the country's influential farming sector.

Weaknesses: De Narváez is losing potential votes both to Kirchner's Peronism on the one side, and, on the other, the second main opposition force, the centre-left Unión Cí­vica Radical-Coalición Cí­vica alliance (UCR-CC). His business-friendly position, and obvious wealth, may alienate supporters of “traditional" Peronism in the province's vast poor and working class suburbs (the 'conurbano'), which form the bedrock of government support. Kirchner has been gleefully exploiting this issue, accusing De Narváez of seeking to “sell the national assets" through privatisation. De Narváez also lacks national appeal, and the backing of a party machine. Even if he wins in Buenos Aires, his faction will remain a minority in congress. Moreover, his group, the Unión-Pro (UP), may face unity problems. De Narváez and the UP's number two candidate, dissident Peronist and presidential hopeful Felipe Solá are known to have a difficult relationship, while the third UP leader, Mauricio Macri, was reportedly miffed that his candidates were marginalised in favour of Peronist nominations.

Prospects: De Narváez is now one of Argentina's most prominent politicians. Since he was born in Colombia, De Narváez is barred from ever running for president. Nevertheless, if he defeats Kirchner, or even comes a close second, he is set to become an important power broker within the PJ, particularly as loyalties begin to shift ahead of the 2011 presidential and congressional elections. The fact that President Cristina Fernández is likely to lose her majority in the lower house on 28 June will increase the importance of dissident factions, including De Narváez's Unión-Pro. De Narváez has made no secret of his ambition to stand for the country's second most important political position - governor of Buenos Aires - in 2011 (he already tried - and failed - in 2007, see timeline). He may also find that he is well-placed to challenge Kirchner for the presidency of the PJ.

President Felipe Calderón has been insisting that the emphasis placed by media and politicians on the rising number of drug-war killings has created a distorted picture of the security situation across the country. He has recently been contrasting Mexico's overall intentional homicide rate with the much higher ones of other countries in the region. Statistical evidence from the country's hotspots does not reveal a single clear trend.

Calderón has been citing the rate for 2009, of 14.71 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Organization of American States (OAS) has just published a study, entitled Report on Citizen Security in the Americas 2011, which presents official statistical information on public security in series that run from 2000 to the latest available figures — which in most cases means 2009. This report does include Mexico's intentional homicide rate in 2010: 17.86 per 100,000 inhabitants, 21% higher than that of the previous year, reflecting a 23% increase in the absolute number of homicides.

If the small countries in Central America are left out of the picture, Mexico's intentional homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants ranks fourth in mainland Latin America. Above it are Venezuela (48.93), Colombia (34.64), Brazil (20.32) and Ecuador (19.26) — according to the most recent figures, which correspond to 2009 for these countries.

Since 2000, when the inter-gang war was not yet in full swing, the number of intentional homicides in Mexico has risen by 23% (the rate by 21%). Two of the countries higher up in the ranking have also recorded increases in that period: Venezuela, with the number of homicides up 74% and the rate 48%, and Ecuador, with 44% and 29% respectively.

The other two, on the other hand, show considerable declines. In Colombia the number of homicides fell by 38%, the rate by 46%; in Brazil, the declines were 11% and 20%, respectively.

One interesting feature of the data on Mexico is that the official figure for drug-war deaths in 2010 (15,273) amounts to 77% of the figure for all intentional homicides (19,769). In 2000 there were 13,849 intentional homicides in all. This raises questions about the criteria used to classify violent deaths as related to the drugs war.

Another unexpected detail is that since 2000 the lowest intentional homicide rate (9.55 per 100,000 inhabitants) was recorded in 2007, the first full year of the Calderón administration, when the number of reported drug-war killings began to rise significantly.

Decline in Juárez
Calderón has been drawing attention recently to what he presents as a 50% decline in the number of killings in Ciudad Juárez, which has long been the most violent city in the country. This figure represents the comparison between the daily average of killings last October, the peak month of 2010, and the average recorded in May this year.

The Mesas de Seguridad, a consultative forum meant to be guiding the federally-backed ‘Todos Somos Juárez' programme designed to improve the city's security situation, has argued that it would be more accurate to compare the average for the first five months of this year with that of 2010 as a whole.
This shows a decline of 26%. While the figure is not to be dismissed, the Mesas points out that it is still 47% above the average recorded in 2008, when the sharp increase in inter-gang fighting began.

Escalation in Monterrey
While declining death tolls are being reported in some states, in Nuevo León, and particularly in Monterrey, the escalation of violence that began in early 2010 has continued to spiral upward this year. In 2010 there were 828 reported homicides, a threefold increase on the previous year. The office of the state's chief procurator reported 737 more homicides in the first five months of the year, and private tallies put the figure at 866 (4.5% more than in the whole of 2010) by 18 June.

The upswing in 2010 has been attributed to the support lent by the Sinaloa/Pacífico cartel to the Gulf cartel (within what was labelled the ‘New Federation') in its campaign against its former allies, Los Zetas. This combination has been weakened by the withdrawal of some of the Sinaloa/Pacífico contingent to strengthen their cartel's battle with the Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes organisation for the control of Ciudad Juárez.

Tijuana rebound?
The number of homicides in Tijuana reported by the office of the state's chief procurator rose from 335 in 2007 to a peak of 844 in 2008. In December that year, retired Lieutenant Colonel Julián Leyzaola was appointed undersecretary of public security in the city, and in the first half of the following year, brought down the toll to 174.

However, in the second half of 2009 it began to rise again, escalating sharply in the last quarter, leaving the total for the year as a whole at 655. The rise continued into 2010, which ended with a toll of 809, only 4% from the peak figure of 2008. This year began with a series of monthly declines on the comparative periods of 2010. This trend, however, appeared to reverse itself in May, which showed the first year-on-year increase. By then, Leyzaola had left his job in Tijuana to take up a similar position in Ciudad Juárez.

Homicide: where Mexico stands
Relative & absolute figures

Country	Rate per 100,000		000 homicides
	2000	2009	2000	2009
Venezuela	33.00	48.93	8.1	14.0
Colombia	34.64	64.59	25.7	15.8
Brazil	25.48	20.32	44.4	39.4
Ecuador	14.90	19.26	1.8	2.6
Mexico	13.99	14.711	13.8	16.12
Paraguay	15.313	12.16	0.93	0.8
Bolivia	37.01	11.46	3.1	1.1
Peru	5.01	10.18	1.3	3.0
Uruguay	6.45	6.72	0.2	0.2
Argentina	7.19	5.45	2.7	2.2
Chile	5.70	3.71	0.9	0.6

12010: 17.86. 22010: 19.8. 32004.
Note: Latest comparative figures for Central American can be found on page 18.

Source: OAS.

Development: On 8 July President Hugo Chávez did a full day's work, speaking to army cadets at a military promotion ceremony and holding a lengthy cabinet meeting, all on live TV.
 
Significance: President Chávez was back to his loquacious self and warned his opponents not to write him off, saying he was looking ahead to 2021 and that they "will never again return to govern the fatherland". Defying all expectations, he shot down rumours of a cabinet reshuffle and confirmed all his ministers plus the military high command in their positions. Some of his ministers appeared teary in his presence and there was no doubt as to who was in charge. Chávez admitted that his illness is "very difficult", but there is no sign, at least publicly, that he has any plans to delegate power down from his tight central command.

Key points:

• There was little mention of the scheduled municipal and presidential elections in 2012. Chávez is always one step ahead of the game and so, without a doubt, he has a plan. It is unlikely –but not impossible – that he will decide to move the date of the elections, depending on his medical progress.

• Chávez rebuffed the widespread rumours of fractures in the ruling Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV). He singled out his closest ministers for special mentions, including his number two, Elías Jaua, who it had been rumoured would be replaced.  Back in May, the president had suggested that Jaua would run for the state governorship of Miranda in the 2012 municipal elections in an effort to take the state back from the opposition.

• The president awarded doctors  - who went on indefinite national strike while he was on his sick bed in Cuba – a 30% rise in their salary scale, along with improved benefits, at a cost of BF3.344bn (US$805m), backdated to 1 June 2011. Chávez also committed BF14.62bn in additional funds for the housing scheme, Misión Vivienda Venezuela.

The discovery in April of 272 bodies in 35 clandestine grave sites in three states — Tamaulipas, Durango and Sinaloa — indicates that the toll attributable directly or indirectly to the violent acts of drug cartels is considerably higher than what anyone had imagined. Like the previous discovery of a mass grave in Tamaulipas, some of the recent killings have been attributed to Los Zetas, but it seems that not all of the victims were US-bound illegal migrants.

It started in the first week of April, when an army unit, investigating a report of a large number of people who had disappeared after having been abducted in March from a bus on the Victoria-Matamoros at the height of San Fernando, Tamaulipas — the same municipality where the bodies of 72 illegal migrants were found in clandestine graves last August — found a grave with 43 bodies. By 7 April the number of clandestine graves discovered had risen to 10, and the bodies to 72.

Between 10 and 12 April another four mass graves were found, containing 50 bodies, raising the total which the state's public prosecution service said ‘might also be related' to the investigation into the abduction of passengers going through San Fernando.

These, however were not the only clandestine burial grounds found by investigators. On 8 April they had located another 12, containing 23 bodies; on 14 April another three, with 21 bodies; on 15 April two more, with five bodies; on 19 April a further three, with six bodies. This second set, which raised the total of clandestinely buried bodies to 177, was not considered related to the abduction of bus passengers.

The investigations in San Fernando had clearly been guided by ‘information received'. As early as 1 April, the army had arrested nine suspects; on 6 April, another five; by 12 April, two more. Then, on 13 April, the federal chief prosecutor's office, PGR, reported that 16 officers of the municipal police force had been arrested in San Fernando, on suspicion of complicity in the killings. The PGR also said that arrest warrants had been issued for four more persons, considered leaders of the Los Zetas cartel in Tamaulipas; rewards totalling US$2.4m have been offered for information leading to their capture. Since last year the municipality of San Fernando has been in the grip of Los Zetas.

By 19 April the number of detainees placed under ‘preventive arrest' had risen to 64; the 16 police officers and 39 suspected members of Los Zetas. These arrests had been linked to 145 of the 177 killings. Nine of the arrests were made in the state capital, Ciudad Victoria.

Tamaulipas was not the only state where clandestine graves were turning up.  In Durango City, ‘information received' led federal and state police on 4 April to a site where 26 bodies were found, clearly interred long before those uncovered in San Fernando. Further excavations led to the discovery of 78 more bodies, across two separate sites in the state capital. On 12 April a farmer in Ahome, Sinaloa, led police to one he found on his land, which contained 11 bodies.

More than 200 people turned up and the headquarters of the forensic service in Matamoros, in the hope of determining whether disappeared relatives were among the disinterred. They came from several municipalities in Tamaulipas and nearby Chihuahua and San Luis Potosí, as well as from states further south, such as Oaxaca and Chiapas.

Rí­os Montt has been registered as a candidate, but new legal challenges have arisen, and the issue has started having concrete political effects, bringing together the opposition. 

On 30 July an enlarged constitutional court ruled in favour of a new suit brought by the lawyers of retired General Efraí­n Rí­os Montt, nullifying the supreme court's provisional injunction against him, ordering the electoral authority to register Rí­os Montt as presidential candidate of the ruling Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), and barring the supreme court from granting any further injunctions or hearing any further appeals in this line of litigation. 

New legal avenues sought 

Rí­os Montt was duly handed his registration papers, but this was not the end of the story. Two political groups, the Gran Alianza Nacional (Gana - the coalition fielding poll frontrunner Oscar Berger) and the Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE - a left-of-centre coalition fielding Alvaro Colom; frequent target of the 'clandestine security groups'), have resorted to another avenue, filing a suit with the registry office for the annulment of Rí­os Montt's registration, on the grounds that it is unconstitutional. This new line of litigation could follow the same path as the previous one, up to the supreme court and the constitutional court. 

Perhaps the least expected legal challenge was the suit filed by 15 indigenous organisations against Rí­os Montt, President Alfonso Portillo and interior minister Adolfo Reyes, for allegedly breaching the recently approved law against discrimination and racism. The claim, pioneered by Nobel prizewinner Rigoberta Menchú, is that Rí­os Montt was responsible for 'obliging' or 'pressuring' Indians into joining the mob that rioted the previous week in Guatemala city in a show of force designed to intimidate the judiciary (WR-03-29). 

Some of the Indians had been paid the equivalent of US$12 to join the demonstrations; according to Menchú they were misled, as they were given no indication that there would be violence. Other Indian participants were drawn from among former members of the PACs, the 'civilian self-defence patrols' pressganged during the internal war to assist in the army's counter-insurgency efforts. According to Menchú, testimonies of coercion have been collected to back up the accusations. Portillo and Reyes are cited as accessories, for not having prevented the riots organised by the ruling party. It is not at all clear that the suit will prosper. 

Political ramifications 

The first sign that the Rí­os Montt issue was influencing change on the political front was when all opposition parties in the single-chamber congress announced, on 30 July, that they were coalescing into the Instancia Parlamentaria de Oposición, with the overriding aim of monitoring the electoral process, to ensure that Rí­os Montt, with the assistance of his son Enrique, a serving general who is chief of the defence staff, does not attempt to repeat the methods seen in the Guatemala city riots. 

They also intended to make a strong gesture by tabling on 1 August, when congress reconvened, a motion condemning the riots. It could not be more than a gesture, since even as a bloc they were outvoted by the FRG, which holds 59 of the 113 seats in the legislature. In the event, though, they achieved more: clearly fearing that they would incur public opprobrium if they voted down the motion, the FRG legislators chose instead to walk out, depriving the body of the necessary quorum. 

Two days later an even broader coalition, the Frente Cí­vico por la Democracia, was formed by the leaders of the opposition parties, unions, business associations, human rights organisations, academic and student bodies, artistes, NGOs - even groups of Guatemala expatriates. 

Their first act was to prepare yet another legal challenge, this time aimed at the four magistrates of the constitutional court who ruled in favour of Rí­os Montt. They are filing a suit with the ethics tribunal of the lawyers' association, with a view to getting them disbarred. If things move fast enough, this could influence the outcome of other suits in the pipeline.

Almost a month after US President George Bush authorised the resumption of the antinarcotics aerial interdiction programme in Colombia, Peruvian prime minister Beatriz Merino is off to Washington in the hope of persuading him to do likewise for her country. The programme was suspended two years ago after a US missionary and her daughter were killed when her light aircraft was shot down, mistaken for a drugs flight, over the Peruvian Amazon.

Peruvian military sources say that there are more than 300 unauthorised landing strips in the jungle regions where coca is grown, and that drug traffickers are reckoned to operate out of 77 of them. For the interdiction effort Peru has a fleet of six A-37Bs, refitted and donated by the US, to be piloted by Peruvians who are currently being trained in the US. The maintenance of antidrugs airbases and personnel will cost about US$12m a year, and the interdiction operations are expected to cost an additional US$10m.