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The 12 month inflation rate in April was 6.4%. Although the annual rate is falling, it is still well above the government's target for 2007. The government is aiming for an inflation rate of 5% in 2007. The target has a one percent margin either way. 

The government is plying up the fact that the 12 month inflation rate has fallen from 7.02% in March. The April figure was something of an achievement given that petrol prices jumped 12.5%. Food prices are also rising worryingly: the food and drink subindex was up by 2.16% and tortilla prices were up by 2%. 

The central bank raised interest rates in April and March by 0.25% in each month in an effort to puncture inflationary expectations. The central bank argues that monetary policy is having less effect on inflation than exogenous factors such as oil prices and the weather. 

The president of the Junta Monetaria, Marí­a Antonieta de Bonilla, argues that the main inflation drivers are the international oil price and the price of maize. The third reason for inflation in the country, Bonilla says, is excessive liquidity. 

Bonilla pointed out that since January 2005, the central bank has marched interest rates up to 5.5%. The steady rise in rates has not stopped banks lending. At the beginning of May 2007 bank lending was 27% higher than at the same period of 2006. Consumer loans were up by 53% at Q15.6bn (US$2.1bn). construction lending was up by a third (at Q7bn). Total lending was just over Q53bn.

 

President Martí­n Torrijos' dwindling popularity showed little sign of picking up last month, with his perceived failure to address inflation together with his controversial security reforms provoking protests across the country. Worryingly for the president, the issues are proving a rallying point for the traditionally divided union movement.

On 14 August some 15,000 Panamanians marched in the capital, with protests also taking place in other key cities such as David (in Chiquiruí­ province); Santiago (Veraguas) and Changuinola (Bocos del Toro) to demand an end to high living costs and inflation, which reached 9% in the first few months of 2008 - one of the highest levels for 17 years. The protests point to the failure of recently unveiled populist measures (see sidebar) to satisfy public demand, with the umbrella union which organised the march, the Frente Nacional por la Defensa de los Derechos Económicos y Sociales (Frenadeso), warning Torrijos of further strike action if its demands are not addressed.

Increasingly, the issue is proving a rallying point for the national union movement. The movement has traditionally been split between Frenadeso, (which includes the construction workers union, Suntracs, and the national teachers association, Asoprof) and rival union group, Unidad de Lucha Integral del Pueblo, (Ulip, which includes the Coca-Cola workers' union and unions representing non-medical Seguro Social workers). Furthermore, spiralling food prices have affected rural areas which are normally absent from confrontations between the government and the unions.

Meanwhile, Torrijos' attempts to implement security reforms by decree is proving another rallying point for the opposition and was included on the Frenadeso agenda too. Torrijos was granted “extraordinary powers" by congress at the end of June for two months [RC-08-07] to create four new state security entities: a national aero-naval service; a national border service; a council for public security and national defence; and a national intelligence and national security service.

The move has been condemned as an attempt to “remilitarize" the country, with the human rights ombudsman and anti-corruption executive secretary criticising the reforms as “unconstitutional". Sectors formerly sympathetic to the government - such as the media and the Catholic Church - have also come out against the reforms. They argue that the proposals should be discussed by congress and amended, rather than being forced through by decree.

• Populist measures

In what the opposition has cynically dismissed as a bid to buy back public support, President Martí­n Torrijos unveiled a series of measures designed to combat high living costs. Costing the state some US$36.2m, the measures will benefit more than 160,000 public sector employees. They include: a US$160 one-off bonus for those earning less than US$1000 a month; a US$30-US$50 increase for the 9,000 teachers working in remote areas (both as of this month); a US$25 monthly increase for public sector workers earning US$300 (as of September 2008) and the reimbursement of US$1.6m in income tax.

*** COURT CASES DELAY ST KITTS & NEVIS ELECTION CALL.  Legal action over constituency boundaries is delaying the calling of a general election in St Kitts & Nevis by Prime Minister Denzil Douglas.  The opposition People's Action Movement (PAM) has also said that it will challenge the recently passed law that requires election candidates to prove that they only hold St Kitts-Nevis citizenship.
 The fifth anniversary of the 2004 election, won by Douglas's St Kitts-Nevis Labour Party (SKNLP) is on 25 October, but parliament may continue until the fifth anniversary of its first sitting following the election, that is until December 2009.  The general election must then be held within 90 days, which would be March 2010.

*** GUYANA'S BRAIN DRAIN.  The UN's 2009 Human Development Report revealed that Guyana's emigration rate is 33.5%, but amongst Guyana's university graduates the rate is a colossal 76.9%.  The upside of this is the economic contribution made by remittances.  In 2007, total remittances to Guyana were US$278m, an average of US$377 per person compared with an average of US$114 per person for Latin America and the Caribbean.
 Guyana has dropped 17 places on the report's Human Development Index, to 114 from 97 position in 2007/08.

*** DOMINICA GEARING UP FOR 2010 ELECTIONS.  The ruling Dominica Labour Party (DLP) has rejected suggestions that it will not be able to find candidates to contest all 21 seats at the general election due in 2010, despite the fact that a number of sitting MPs will be retiring, including some ministers.  The DLP president, Senator Peter St Jean, who himself plans to stand against opposition leader Ron Green, said in late September that there was an “over abundance" of candidates willing to stand for the party and that they would represent “the best and brightest that Dominica has to offer".  He added: “Let me assure Dominicans that when the Dominican Labour Party 2010 team is presented it will be the hardest working team across party lines."
Meanwhile, in a sure sign of increasing political activity, Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit has accused the opposition United Workers Party (UWP) of seeking funding from Taiwan for its election campaign.  The DLP government switched Dominica's allegiance from Taiwan to China.
 Ron Green denied the prime minister's allegations of a visit by UWP officials to the Taiwanese embassy in late September, saying on 6 October: “No such thing happened two weeks ago, and he is just attempting to hide away from the issues affecting us in Dominica_When I look at the broad picture, this is an attempt by the PM to hide the critical questions of the day."  But having denied this particular episode, Green added: “Why can't we be in contact with Taiwan?  Are we restricted to speaking with certain countries of the world?"

*** SURINAME GENERAL ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR 25 MAY.  Suriname's President Ronald Venetiaan has announced that a general election will be held on 25 May.  At the last election, Venetiaan's Nieuw Front won 23 out of 51 seats in parliament; however the latest opinion polls put the Mega Combination led by former dictator Desi Bouterse in the lead.

*** TRINIDAD TO HOLD OFF LNG EXPANSION.  David Small, director of policy at Trinidad & Tobago's Ministry of Energy, said on 7 October at the World Gas Conference that there would be no immediate expansion of Trinidad's LNG (liquefied natural gas) production due to a lack of gas. The possibility of adding a fifth “train" to the four at Atlantic LNG has been mooted for some time, but Small said: “As of now, the gas is not all there for an expansion.  It is not automatic that there will be a fifth train at Atlantic LNG."

Recent Chinese involvement in Latin America has centred on commodity procurement to fuel its rapid domestic development. However, Central American countries are neither commodity rich nor in a position to relinquish established ties with the US, their primary export market. What is more, many of the Latin American commodities China imports are subsequently re-exported back to the region's markets as low-priced manufactured goods that inevitably compete with Central American manufactures, thus challenging the region's large scale manufacturing enterprises.  This is not to say that Chinese trade and investment doesn't also benefit Central America and Chinese presence has translated into a reassessment (or at the least a questioning) of traditional political ties with Taiwan.

Following Nicaragua's recognition of Taiwan in 1990 all states in the isthmus were aligned with Tapei. However, in 2007 Costa Rica decided to break relations with Taiwan in favour of closer ties to Beijing. President Oscar Arias's decision was an unquestionable breakthrough for Chinese diplomats in the region, allowing Chinese trade with Costa Rica to increase 30-fold between 2001 and 2008 to US$2.9bn, thanks largely to investments in the high-tech manufacturing sector (see sidebar). Along with a bilateral free trade agreement (signed in April 2010), China has also made generous financial gestures to Costa Rica including the purchase of US$300m government bonds and assistance in the construction of a new 35,000-seat stadium in the capital, San José.

Although Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama have all stated that they do not intend to renounce their ties to Taiwan, this can no longer be simply equated with a rejection of China. For instance, last September, President Porfirio Lobo of Honduras agreed a US$1.2m contract with the Chinese Sinohydro Corporation to build several hydroelectric dams and Panama's Ricardo Martinelli stated that his country had “chose[n] to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan but commercial relations with both". Guatemalan exports to China reached US$30m in 2009 from US$3m in 2000; Nicaraguan imports of Chinese goods in 2009 totalled US$260m. Figures from the Central American Secretariat for Economic Integration show that the combined value of Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, Costa Rican, Salvadoran and Honduran exports to China reached US$848.3m in 2009 from US$35m in 2002.

• Betting on technology

The UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) claims that over 90% of the products exported from Costa Rica to China between 2006 and 2008 were integrated micro-electronic circuits. Although only 8.8% of Costa Rican exports went to China in 2009, as opposed to 35.8% to the United States, the country's ability to court both superpowers has been a major attraction for other Central American states to pursue a closer relationship with China, particularly in light of the improving relations between China and Taiwan.

President Néstor Kirchner marked his third year in charge, and Independence Day, with a massive rally in the Plaza de Mayo outside the presidential palace on 25 May. Elections are due in 2007 and Kirchner is expected to use the large 200,000 strong crowd as vindication of his right to seek a second term.

Kirchner, who took office having won just 22% of the vote after Carlos Menem pulled out of the second round, would win 59% of the vote if elections were held now, according to a poll by the consulting firm Analogí­as. The poll also showed that 81% of Argentines think that Kirchner should stand for a second term while 74% feel that the country is better off since he came to power. Kirchner is playing down his intention to stand for re-election saying that his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández "could be president as she has all the right credentials".

Kirchner addressed the crowd, thousands of which were bussed in from the provinces or provided with free train and underground rides across the city for the day, from a huge stage in front of the presidential palace in a clear echo of Juan Perón's mass addresses. He listed a detailed catalogue of the achievements of his administration in the economic and social fields, and singled out big businesses and the press for his customary diatribes. 

A banner proclaiming "La Patria somos todos" was draped around the box. This revealed the objective of the rally. Kirchner hopes to form an electoral platform buttressed not just by the Partido Justicialista but also sectors of the main opposition Unión Cí­vica Radical and smaller centre-left parties, social organisations and trade unions. He will have been disappointed by the decision by the UCR provincial governors not to make the trip even though many of them are ostensibly allies of the president. 

The opposition was reluctant to be a part of the celebrations and accused Kirchner of hijacking Independence Day for his own political uses. Various opposition politicians accuse Kirchner of increasing authoritarianism, riding roughshod over the country's institutions and passing more decrees than any previous president. Mauricio Macri, the leader of the centre-right Partido para una República con Oportunidades (PRO), derisively dismissed the rally as serving to show "who is the most servile to the president or who manages to bring most people to the plaza". The leader of the centre-left Alternativa por una República de Iguales (ARI), Elisa Carrió, said that Kirchner had committed an "enormous error" by holding the rally as he was "appropriating a date which belongs to all Argentines".

Is there a viable opposition?

The divided nature of the opposition is, however, something that is occupying the minds of leading representatives of opposition parties, some of whom are contemplating an alliance behind one man: Roberto Lavagna. Kirchner's former economy minister, who was edged out in October 2005 after disagreeing with the president one too many times, is the most popular politician in Argentina after Kirchner and his wife according to polls. Raúl Alfonsí­n, a former president and strongman of the UCR, said that Lavagna could be "the Ricardo Lagos of Argentina" by bringing together the progressive forces of Argentine politics. By this he meant an alliance between the UCR, the Partido Socialista of Hermes Binner, who scored a resounding victory over Kirchner's candidate in legislative elections in the third-most important province of Santa Fe in October 2005, and eventually Carrió. Lavagna is saying nothing.

The "mensalão" scandal which revealed high-level corruption in the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores, has left the party with it's reputation in tatters. The PT, which always prided itself for being different from the majority of other Brazilian parties - "a party with an ethical obligations" - saw its whiter-than-white reputation ruined after its leadership was accused of corrupting the same parties it always accused of dishonesty. The PT's recent role in the acquittal of Senator Renan Calheiros (see previous page) led the party to "sink lower in the mud" according to the Brazilian press. 

For the Brazilian press there is no doubt that PT senators either voted to acquit Calheiros or abstained from voting. The influential current affairs magazine Veja ran long articles explaining how the PT has abandoned its professed ethical baggage to submit to the interests of the government. In this way the PT has also submitted to the interests of its unprincipled allies; the vast majority of parties that have backed any government in order to win privileges and, essentially, gain access to federal money, both legally and illegally. 

This submission to the government and the interests of other parties within President Lula da Silva's governing coalition could be sensed during the PT's national convention in late August. Indeed, Lula and his interlocutors in the PT's ruling faction, the Campo Majoritário, barred any discussion over his succession. The PT's left wing factions wanted to put forward names to succeed Lula in 2011 to "purify" the party. Lula and the Campo Majoritário, however, did not allow the discussion to go on because it could "undermine the coalition". 

The fact is, allied parties, especially the all-encompassing Partido do Movimento Democrático, have the necessary ambition to put forward a presidential candidate with Lula's blessing. The PMDB leader, Michel Temer, was clear that he did not want to see any discussion over Lula's prospective successor within the PT when he declared "we must live well together, at least until [next year's] municipal elections, in order not to undermine the coalition". The message was received. 

Significantly, the PMDB, the largest party in congress, is the party of Calheiros, who threatened the government with the withdrawal of support from his political associates if the PT did not back his acquittal. Lula pressured PT senators to do anything but have him acquitted. Calheiros heaped on the pressure using different tack: he reminded several PT (as well as senators of other parties) of their own hand in potential corruption scandals. 

For instance, Calheiros leaked information that PT senator Tião Viana employed a member of the PT's directorate who had never turned up to work, paying her R$6,000 (US$3,200) monthly. Another one threatened was Serys Slessarenko, a PT senator for Mato Grosso do Sul, whose son-in-law was involved in the sanguessuga scandal. [BSC-07-05] 

The influential Aloizio Mercadande and Idele Salvatti, the latter the leader of the government in the senate, were also threatened: Calheiros gave hints he would allow the opposition to install a parliamentary investigative committee into the shady disbursement of government funds to NGOs, which Salvatti has links to, and to resurrect the involvement of Mercadante's aides in the so-called "dossiergate", just prior to the presidential election in 2006. [BSC-06-10]

• Dirceu
  President Lula da Silva gave an interview to The New York Times in which he declared "as far as I know there is no proof that Dirceu committed the crime [of which] he is accused". Lula is referring to his former chief of staff, José Dirceu, who is accused of being the "gang's leader" in the "mensalão" corruption scandal. Lula's declaration was understood as a signal which may pardon his former associate if Dirceu is found guilty by the supreme court before he leaves office. 
  

 

Faced with the very real possibility of defeat in mid-term congressional elections in October, President Cristina Fernández has brought the ballot forward by four months to 28 June. Fernández argued that the move would spare Argentina a lengthy electoral cycle at a time of global economic crisis. In truth, she is calculating, shrewdly, that earlier elections will work to the government's advantage and wrong-foot its opposition. The vote is now set to become a referendum on Fernández's administration, with her husband, predecessor and political strategist, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), poised to head the government's offensive in the crucial province of Buenos Aires.

The government rushed the change through congress in the space of 13 days. Ironically, its bill repeals “for a single time" a measure introduced in 2004 under Kirchner's watch, which fixed elections on the last Sunday of October in order to prevent the executive from using ballot dates to its political advantage. Fernández had little difficulty in securing support among legislators from the ruling Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), a faction of the Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists), and allied parties, who realise they are likely to stand a better chance at the polls in June than October; the date-change was passed by 136 votes to 109 in the lower house on 18 March, and 42 to 26 in the senate on 26 March.

Ulterior motive?
Fernández argued that a protracted “electoral marathon" would be “suicide" for Argentina as the country is experiencing what she termed “the worst year in the last century" as a result of the global economic slowdown. Her real motives are surely less public-spirited. First, the extent of the country's economic difficulties, which will hit the government's key support base - the lower-middle and working classes - hardest, will be less apparent in June than in October. Second, the surprise deadline will deprive the opposition of time to cement nascent alliances. As the Kirchners are well aware, the weak and fragmented opposition is one of the FPV's greatest strengths. The date-change is also likely to stem a recent tide of desertions from government benches [RSC-09-03], as the Peronist party closes ranks ahead of the vote.

Lastly, the move robs opposition parties of the chance to exact defeat on the government - and therefore gain political momentum - in a series of provincial elections in the run up to October. A week before Fernández announced the date-change, Kirchnerismo was defeated in provincial elections in Catamarca by an ally of the popular vice president and arch-enemy of the Kirchners, Julio Cobos. The 8 March ballot was the government's first electoral test this year, and the opposition and the media were quick to suggest that the defeat would be replicated on a national level in October.

High stakes
The government is gambling on maintaining its congressional majority in June, when some 53% of FPV seats in the lower house and 25% of its seats in the senate are up for renewal. The government may deliberately sell the vote as a referendum on Fernández's administration. If the FPV renews or builds on its majority in congress, the Kirchners will argue that the result gives the president - whose popularity has dived from 56% to 30% since she was elected in 2007 - a fresh mandate. It would also deal a notional defeat to the government's main challenger in recent months - the farming sector (see page 3).

If, on the other hand, the government loses, the Kirchners will face a bleak two 'lame duck' years ahead of presidential and legislative elections in 2010. Fernández would be likely, in such a case, to rely heavily on “decrees of necessity and urgency" (DNUs), which allow the president to bypass congress. It is worth noting that an opposition with teeth could, however, move to abolish DNUs entirely.  

After the lower house vote, the notorious Kirchnerista piquetero (street protest) leader, Emilio Pérsico, spoke plainly: “We are going to take our [political] project to the polls", adding dramatically, “If we do not have the support of the people, we will surrender the government, and may Cobos and Clarí­n [a leading opposition newspaper] govern instead". Although Kirchner subsequently disowned Pérsico's remarks, local media speculate that the former president's strategy is to engender just such an 'all of nothing' attitude to the vote in June. At a rally following the senate vote, Kirchner stressed that the elections would be crucial to guaranteeing “governability", his implication being that, should Fernández lose, the country would be thrown into chaos.      

The focus of the electoral battle will be the populous Buenos Aires province, the largest electoral district, whose lower-middle class population is the bedrock of government support and where the Peronist party enjoys a vast patronage network. Currently, the FPV controls 46% of the province's seats (32 of 69). If the government wishes to hold on to its majority in the lower house, it must repeat this success; of 61 FPV seats up for renewal nationwide, 20 of these are in the province of Buenos Aires.

It is increasingly likely that Kirchner himself will lead the FPV's list in the province, where his enduring political clout could well carry the party to victory. His main challenge will come from the centre-right dissident Peronist alliance, Unión Peronista [RSC-09-03], whose party list will be headed by millionaire businessman Francisco De Narváez (and not, as had been expected, the group's founder and presidential hopeful, Felipe Solá).

Santa Fe Peronists split
The Peronist party, of which the Kirchner's FPV is a faction, is set to field two rival candidate lists in Santa Fe. One will be headed by the leader of the Kirchnerista bloc in the lower house, Agustin Rossi; the other, by the popular Peronist senator and presidential hopeful Carlos Reutemann, who left the FPV along with fellow Santa Fe senator Roxana Latorre on 17 February to form the congressional bloc, Santa Fe Federal [RSC-09-03]. Reutemann is popular with the province's influential farming sector and refuses to share a list with Rossi, whose support for the government's agricultural export tax reforms last year antagonised the rural vote. The FPV controls 6 of 18 lower house seats in Santa Fe, the country's third largest electoral district. Three of these seats are due to be renewed in June. The government lost three of its deputies in February to Reutemann's bloc.

The path to elections_

• 28 April
  Deadline for sealing electoral alliances. Official campaigning will begin the following day.
• 9 May
  Deadline for submitting candidate lists.
• 27 May
  Candidates may launch their media campaigns. Until this date media advertising is prohibited.
• 28 June
  Mid term congressional elections to renew 127 seats in the lower house, and 24 in the senate. The city of Buenos Aires will hold elections to nominate 30 provincial legislators on the same day.

Uruguay's state-owned enterprises are expected to invest US$3.6bn on infrastructure projects during the administration of President José Mujica. This sum represents a 110% increase in public sector investment when compared to the administration of Mujica's predecessor, Tabaré Vásquez (2005-2010), when the state spent US$1.735bn on infrastructure works.

The Usinas y Terminales Eléctricas (Ute), the state-owned power company, will lead the way, with an investment of US$1.35bn towards the establishment of a 50mw interconnection with neighbouring Brazil; improved transmission and distribution networks and the development of alternative renewable energy sources. Ute's investment is followed by that of the Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcoholes y Portland (Ancap), with an investment of US$800m. Other state companies awarded increased investment budgets include the Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (Antel), with US$800m; the Obras Sanitarias del Estado (Ose), with US$500m; and the Administración Nacional de Puertos, with US$200m.

Salary agreements: As we went to print in early November, only 25% of the 320,000-strong workforce whose salary agreements expired on 30 June last had agreed new accords. The government position was that negotiations had formally concluded as the deadline of 29 October went without a resolution. Another 120 collective agreements for the largest sectors in the economy expire on 31 December.

As we went to press, President Carlos Mesa was waiting on congress to decide whether to accept his letter of resignation. Mesa offered to step down in a broadcast to the nation on 6 March, 17 months after he took up the position. Early on 7 March thousands gathered in the Plaza Murillo in La Paz, outside the government buildings. The overwhelming majority demonstrated in favour of Mesa staying on. An extraordinary session of congress was called for 8 March.

Mesa said that he was offering his resignation because he was fed up with the apparently endless protests against his government. He reserved most of his vitriol for Evo Morales, the leader of the second biggest party in congress, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). Mesa said that Morales was shirking his responsibilities by constantly carping from the opposition benches, and destabilising Bolivia's fragile democracy by fomenting protest actions. He specifically mentioned Morales's decision on 4 March to call for a nationwide series of roadblocks and protests and the decision by leftwingers in El Alto, a sprawling suburb of La Paz, to step up their protests to get rid of the foreign-owned water and sewage company, Aguas de Illimani. 

Mesa said that Morales and his supporters wanted two things: a constituent assembly to reform the country's constitution and a reform of the hydrocarbons law. The president added that he was in favour of both of these things but that they could only be decided upon by congress. Any other course would be undemocratic, he said. 

Mesa said that, unlike his predecessor, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who sent in troops to break up similar nationwide protests in October 2003, he was not going to use force to break the roadblocks (Sánchez Lozada's decision caused over 60 deaths and forced him into exile). However, it is Mesa's continued refusal to take this step which has preserved his moral stature: it is for this reason that his threat to resign is his strongest card, eliciting a display of popular support that congress is unlikely to be able to ignore. Many of those demonstrating outside the presidential palace on 7 March actually called for Mesa to take a tougher line with the protesters. Surprisingly, Mesa's announcement even triggered a large demonstration in his favour in Cochabamba, Morales's stronghold.

Should congress accept Mesa's letter of resignation the president of the senate, Hormando Vaca Diez, a member of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) would be the next in line. However the early indications were that congress would urge Mesa to stay on. Guido Añez, head of the MIR, said on 7 March that the MIR was "not interested in the constitutional succession," preferring instead to see Mesa complete his mandate.

Statistically, the economy is doing well though there is no feel-good factor. The reason for this is, probably, the lack of new jobs. The unemployment rate is actually rising. In August it hit 12.9% up from 11.4% 12 months earlier. The problem is what is happening in rural areas. In cities, the unemployment rate is continuing to fall: in August 2006 it was 12.9% down from 13.5% in the same month of 2005.
The government prefers to stress the 30% increase in investment in the first six months of 2006, compared with the same period of 2005. Foreign investors are also keen on Colombian securities. At the end of October the government sold US$469m in bonds. The issue was seven times over subscribed (attracting bids worth over US$3bn).

Inflation: Inflation is another of the indicators going the government's way. In October inflation was minus -0.14 %. This is a significant improvement on September when the rate was 0.29%. The 10-month figure is 4% and the 12-month rate is 4.2%, which is a substantial improvement on 2005's 6.5% rate.

On 26 February a congressional deputy and former minister of public security, Reinaldo Garcí­a, who is a strong supporter of President Hugo Chávez , admitted knowing the man who blew himself up while planting a bomb outside the headquarters of the country's main business organisation, Fedecámaras, in Caracas on 24 February.

Relations between the Federación de Cámaras Empresariales (Fedecámaras) and the government have been strained ever since its former leader, Pedro Carmona, took over as president when President Chávez was toppled by a short-lived coup in 2002. A previously unknown group, the Frente Guerrillero Venceremos-Ejército Izquierdista del Pueblo (FGV-EIP), claimed responsibility for the attack and for four other small-bomb explosions in March.

The interior and justice minister, Ramón Rodrí­guez Chací­n, said that the perpetrators of the attacks were "anarchists" from Movimiento 13 de Marzo and Bandera Roja, two originally ultra-left groups which he said had been infiltrated by the CIA to destabilise the government. This appears far-fetched.

Before the bomb outside Fedecámaras, the FGV-EIP set off bombs by a statue of George Washington, the Spanish embassy and the Papal Nuncio's residence, leaving behind pamphlets that insulted critics of the Bolivarian Revolution. All these targets symbolise powers much criticised by President Hugo Chávez recently: the US, Spain and the Church. There was also a bomb attack on the national assembly building, probably by the same people.

Reinaldo Garcí­a said that the dead bomber, Héctor Serrano, who had an identify card giving him the rank of honorary inspector in the Policia Metropolitana (PM) which is responsible for policing Caracas, had been part of the government's "social intelligence network". This network is staffed by civilians who are given police powers when they work as minders for politicians or help to steward rallies. Their detractors call them informers.

The mayor of Caracas, Juan Barreto, who presided over the transfer of the PM from the city to Rodrí­guez Chací­n's ministry on 13 February, said that Serrano worked for Pedro Infante, a deputy for Chávez 's Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela. Seven of the 10 members of the group believed to have carried out the small-bomb attacks have been identified, the authorities say. They include active officials from the PM and the Caracas police as well as civilians.

The CCTV cameras around the Fedecámaras building filmed the bombers who arrived on police motorcycles. Rodrí­guez said that the police had already arrested one of the people accused of riding up to the Fedecámaras building on the motorbikes.

The Ultraleft: On 28 February President Hugo Chávez criticised the ultraleft for undermining the government. His targets were Lina Ron, a local leader in Chávez 's Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), and Luis Tascón, who has been expelled from the PSUV (see next story). Ron led a sit-in at the Archbishop's palace on 27 February during which she made threats to the Roman Catholic hierarchy and private TV channels and justified the action taken by Serrano. Chávez said that fond though he was of Ron she was displaying a "lack of revolutionary discipline". Chávez also said that people should remember what happened to President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 when the radicals started to take unilateral action. Two deputies - Pedro Lander and Reinaldo Garcí­a - took part in the sit-in at the archbishop's palace.

• Food riot

A mob ransacked a food depot belonging to the state distributor Mercados de Alimentos in Sabaneta, the hometown of President Hugo Chávez on 14 February. The protest not only shows the growing exasperation caused by the shortages of food and basic products but also illustrates, because by the fact of such events being so rare, that most people still expect the Chávez government to sort out the problem. Sabaneta's mayor happens to be one of Chávez 's brothers, Aní­bal.

The campaign for the general elections on 6 December got off to an unexpected start. First the authorities arrested 23 people on 11 August with an assortment of weapons, including four rifles with telescopic sights and then on 12 August two letter bombs exploded in La Paz. The police tentatively concluded that the two bombs were linked.

Both bombs were letter-bombs, which are almost unprecedented in Bolivia. Most low-level terrorism in Bolivia involves blasting caps and sticks of dynamite which are readily available in the mining supply industry. Neither of the bombs killed anybody though they badly wounded two people.

The government immediately linked the arrests to the bombing and claimed that the Right was preparing to destabilise the country in the run-up to the December elections. President Evo Morales accused his opponents on the Right of “hiring Peruvian gunmen" to perpetrate the attacks. This was an allusion to fact that three of the 23 people arrested on 11 August were Peruvians. The arrests took place in Cochabamba.

The ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) blamed the rightwing opposition, based in Santa Cruz, for the bomb attacks. César Navarro, head of the MAS in the lower chamber of congress, said that the bombs were the work of a “political minority which has been defeated and ousted democratically". Navarro is chairing the congressional investigation into an alleged right-wing terrorist cell based in Santa Cruz that had recruited three European adventurers who were gunned down as alleged terrorists by federal security forces in mid-April. The adventurers were allegedly aiming to assassinate President Evo Morales and the cardinal archbishop of Santa Cruz.

Peru, with which Bolivia has testy relations, reacted calmly to Morales's aspersions. The congressional foreign relations committee asked Bolivia to provide evidence that Peru was supplying mercenaries. The president of the committee, Luisa Marí­a Cuculiza, who belongs to the party founded by the jailed rightwing former Peruvian president, Alberto Fujimori, claimed that Morales should not generalise about Peruvians from the activities of individuals.

Peru's foreign minister, José Antonio Garcí­a Belaúnde, argued on 13 August that “crime has no nationality". He said that Bolivia should deal with the issue as an internal affair. He said that Peru condemned all terrorism without any qualification.

On 16 August Bolivia tightened up its border controls. Alfredo Rada, the hardline minister of the interior (gobierno) said that the government had uncovered a “long chain of evidence" which “established that foreign criminals were involved" in the two recent incidents.

The Bolivian police and other government ministers have been much more circumspect in their statements, though an opposition politician, senator Walter Guiteras of Poder Democrático y Social, claimed that the bombs were the result of an internal squabble in Morales's ruling Movimiento al Socialismo.

The only real link between the two bombs is that both were letter bombs. Both were sent through the Empresa Correos de Bolivia (Ecobol). They appear to have been posted from different locations. Both packages had fake return addresses. 

What clearly puzzles investigators is the lack of any apparent link between the two people who received the bombs. The first package was delivered to a construction firm, Ingenieros Civiles Asociados (ICA), where a secretary half-opened it before becoming suspicious. The company had been the target of another letter bomb attack in 2008. She called the return-addressee who said that they had no knowledge of the package. The secretary then called in the police. The bomb exploded when it was being taken out of the building by the head of the bomb squad, Colonel Gustavo Daza, and another officer.

It is just possible that whoever planned that attack guessed that Daza, who had been injured (partly deafened) when a protester blew himself up in congress in 2004, would respond to a call from ICA about another suspicious package. What is odd is why Daza did not take more precautions: he cleared the building before attempting to carry the letter bomb down, from the ninth floor, in the lift.

The other bomb was addressed to Fidel Surco, a leading figure in the Coordinadora Nacional por el Cambio (Conalcam), which brings together trade unionists and social activists. The package, according to the person who received it at Total, one of Surco's many business interests, was addressed simply to “Fidel". The return-address was Conalcam, which meant that the recipient had no reason to suspect the package.

Surco is a prominent supporter of President Morales. Surco's wife, Arminda Colque, picked up the package from Total and apparently went around La Paz with it before opening it, and setting it off, as she waited for a meeting to start at another of Surco's offices.

Both packages were delivered in the morning post. The police hypothesise that the bombs were built by the same, experienced person and that they were designed not to kill. The main reason for this conclusion, despite the serious wounds suffered by Colque and Daza, is that the explosive appears to have been placed in the bomb in chips, which reduced the force of the explosion. Most lethal letter bombs are either incendiaries or contain steel shards, which can kill when propelled at force.

The bombs have panicked the public. On 13 August bomb disposal teams were called to at least three false alarms. On 14 August there were further false alarms. Ecobol says that it has a team of 16 people monitoring packages and that any they deem suspicious are immediately taken out of the post. The two letter-bombs, however, were not picked up and both were franked by Ecobol.

The acting commander of the bomb squad, Major Guillermo Chacón, said that the police's initial view is that both packages were pretty similar, weighing about 250grammes. The bomb itself was composed of explosives and an electrical circuit with a battery. When the circuit was broken, the bomb was triggered. It is possible that the bomb mechanism was based on that used by musical greetings cards, which play a tune when they are opened.

• Did the government thwart a massacre at a shrine?

On 15 August Alfredo Rada, the interior minister, claimed that the alleged terrorists arrested on 11 August in Cochabamba intended to attack the Urkupiña shrine. The Urkupiña shrine had its big annual festival on 15 August, the Feast of the Assumption. The festival has become a celebration of Bolivian national pride and most senior politicians, including President Evo Morales and the leader of the right wing opposition, Oscar Ortiz, attended the mass.

What makes the Urkupiña visions at Quillacollo unusual is that the Virgin talked in Quechua to the shepherd girl who saw her. The Virgin also allowed the shepherd girl to play with the baby she cradled. According to the tradition, the parish priest and the shepherd girl's parents also saw the vision when they turned up, on 15 August, to check on it. The girl was asked where the Virgin had gone, when the Virgin started ascending into the clouds. The girl replied “Urku'piña" which in Quechua means “onto the mountain."

The jump in oil prices, prompted by the unrest in North Africa and now in the Persian Gulf, will help President Hugo Chávez and the economy to start growing again this year. The government is not forecasting a spectacular recovery: the central bank president, Nelson Merentes, confines himself to saying that real GDP will grow by more than the 2% forecast in the budget for 2011.

The central bank is one of the few beacons of statistical clarity in the country. Its growth and inflation figures are generally unquestioned and used by both Chavistas and government opponents. President Chávez hailed the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV)'s report on the final quarter of 2010, which showed a 0.6% year-on-year GDP growth rate. The opposition preferred to focus on the fact that in 2010 overall, GDP contracted 1.4% year-on-year. Chávez 's spin is that the economy is bounding out of recession; the opposition interpretation is that the economy is still in a mess and because of the way the government interferes in the economy, the recovery will be much weaker than it should be. 

One big area of government interference is the way it redirects cash earned by Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), the state oil company, into President Chávez 's pet projects. An analysis of the Pdvsa annual report for 2010 by an opposition newspaper, El Nacional, shows that its tax payments fell 24% year-on-year in 2010, while its payments into social projects (i.e. Chávez 's pet schemes, which are not necessarily monitored by congress) increased by 449%.

The analysis showed that Pdvsa's tax payments in 2010 came to US$16.32bn, down 24% on US$21.53bn in 2009. Pdvsa pays a range of fees and taxes to the government: royalties, income tax, dividends to its government shareholder, property taxes and fees for the right to export. Pdvsa's tax bill in 2010 was lower than any bill since 2005, when it paid US$17.7bn.

On the other hand, Pdvsa's social development payments increased by 449% to US$16.9bn. The annual report states that Pdvsa increased its support for infrastructure, agriculture, food, public housing, health and education. It's unclear whether these payments have actually been made for the stated purposes or have been docked from Pdvsa and are held in a government account, awaiting disbursement.

The big payments identified in the Pdvsa accounts are US$1.7bn to foreign countries and US$2.53bn to pay debt owed by the China Fund.  Neither of these categories showed up in the 2009 accounts. The biggest single item in this social development category is a payment of US$8.4bn for special projects. This dwarfs even the US$1.4bn allocated to the electricity industry.  

The US$16.9bn figure for social development projects in 2010 is the highest figure since 2004. In 2009, when the government's budget was under pressure, Pdvsa's contribution to social projects fell to US$3.08bn.

The other worrying development on Pdvsa's balance sheet is the growth of its foreign debt. This increased by 16% in 2010 to US$24.9bn.

Inflation:  Consumer price inflation is rising. In December, consumer prices jumped 1.8% month-on-month. In January this accelerated to 2.7%. In calendar 2010, inflation was 27.2%.  Merentes blames the effect of the exchange rate unification and speculation for the rise in inflation.

• Foreign debt
  According to Nelson Merentes, the country's foreign debt is between US$28bn and US$30bn. According to the finance minister, Jorge Giordani, the country's foreign debt/GDP ratio is 18.4% now, but has averaged 28.3% over Chávez 's 12 years in power.

IMPUESTOS | 'Menor crecimiento sin la reforma'. La economí­a mexicana crecerá el año próximo en 3,1%, en vez del 3,5% predicho a principios de este mes por el ministerio de finanzas, si el congreso no aprueba la reforma fiscal propuesta por el gobierno. Esto es lo que Rubén Aguirre, subsecretario de ingresos, dijo a un comité especial del congreso la semana pasada. Dijo que tal como estaban las cosas, los ingresos fiscales del año próximo se contraerán en 4,9% -como resultado de bajos ingresos, menor recaudación del impuesto a la renta y la perspectiva de menor precio promedio del petróleo.

Los partidos de oposición han rechazado esa afirmación como una táctica atemorizante, y sus argumentos fueron reforzados por una institución que en realidad concuerda con la mayor parte de las propuestas de reforma del gobierno, el Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas (Imef). De acuerdo con el presidente de Imef, Alberto Espinosa, cada una de las dos reformas propuestas por el gobierno -regí­menes fiscal y de energí­a- 'permitirá un crecimiento de sólo medio punto porcentual, por tanto, las dos juntas sólo elevarí­an el PBI en un punto.' Dijo que los efectos de la reforma sólo se sentirán a largo plazo; la economí­a no experimentará cambios sustanciales hasta 2006.

COMERCIO | Sin acuerdo con Japón, apertura al Mercosur. El tratado de libre comercio con Japón no estaba listo para ser firmado, como se esperaba, durante la visita del Presidente Vicente Fox a Tokio la semana pasada. Las negociaciones se estancaron por la falta de disposición de Japón para otorgar un acceso significativo al mercado, de las exportaciones agrí­colas de México. Japón ofreció reducir a la mitad las tarifas sobre porcinos y elevar la cuota en 14%, a 80.000 toneladas por año, pero fue considerado insuficiente por los mexicanos, que estaban buscando una tarifa cero sobre 250.000t.

El coordinador jefe en las negociaciones de comercio internacional, Fernando de Mateo Venturini, dijo cuando visitaba Brasí­lia la semana pasada, que su paí­s desea alcanzar un tratado de libre comercio con Brasil y con el Mercosur en conjunto. Recientemente cerró un TLC con Uruguay y negocia actualmente con Argentina. En los primeros nueve meses de este año, Brasil tuvo un superávit de US$1,6bn en el comercio de dos ví­as de US$2,4bn con México.

Aún faltan cuatro meses para que el Secretario de Estado de EU, Colin Powell, someta a la Casa Blanca el proyecto para la 'transición' de Cuba pos-Castro, pero algunos de sus más ominosos hallazgos, que reflejan un escenario para el peor de los casos, ya fueron aireados públicamente. Como expresó Andrew Natsios, administrador de USAID, la transición conlleva 'una posibilidad real de una emergencia compleja [con] alto riesgo de caótica migración.'

En realidad, los más de 100 miembros de la comisión inter-agencias formada para ver cómo EU puede acelerar la transición (para usar la interpretación de Roger Noriega de sus instrucciones), produjo tres escenarios:

• Una transición pací­fica hacia la democracia con amplio apoyo popular -es el mejor escenario.
  
• Una transición marcada por espasmos de violencia y divisiones internas que, aunque con dificultades, puede ser superada.
  
• Una transición desordenada que puede causar una gran crisis social y 'humanitaria', con severa escasez de alimentos, saqueos e incluso actos de violencia contra agencias de ayuda.

La semana pasada, en una reunión patrocinada por el Instituto para Estudios Cubanos y Cubano-Americanos, de la Universidad de Miami, dos expertos en salud, Richard Garfield y Frederick Burkle, dijeron que el sistema de salud de Cuba es frágil, pese a su reputación, porque carece de medicinas esenciales y fue seriamente debilitado por años de estrechez económica. Natsios, de USAID, dijo en un momento de optimismo, que esta caótica transición no será tan grave como la crisis en Corea del Norte en los '90, donde murieron más 2m de personas.

Según Natsios, EU concibe una estrategia dirigida a salvar vidas y reducir el sufrimiento humano, a través de programas de rehabilitación social a ser implementados conjuntamente con organizaciones humanitarias, grupos civiles y religiosos, y el 'gobierno de transición'.

La comisión 'Cuba Libre' de Powell ha trabajado sobre estas cuestiones desde el 5 de diciembre. USAID ya ha gastado unos US$20m en proyectos de 'transición' para Cuba, y en el actual año financiero, que comenzó en octubre, ha destinado otros US$7m con el mismo propósito.

La interpretación cubana de este esfuerzo, citando a Lázaro Herrera, vocero de la Sección de Intereses Cubanos en Washington, es que como la comunidad cubana en el exilio 'no está satisfecha con el embargo y otras acciones, EU desea enviar señales concretas de movimiento hacia la llamada transición, creando y apoyando una oposición interna.'

Parece haberse logrado un avance en el proceso de 'desmovilización' de las organizaciones paramilitares. Tres grandes grupos que negociaban por separado han vuelto al redil; juntos, ellos implí­citamente han revertido su polí­tica y acordaron concentrarse en las áreas acordadas con el gobierno; y ha circulado una fórmula que podrí­a permitir al gobierno y EU dar marcha atrás en su compromiso de extraditar a miembros paramilitares prominentes. También, sin explicación, el alto lí­der paramilitar, Carlos Castaño ha sido excluido del equipo negociador.

Varios de estos cambios tuvieron lugar poco antes de la reunión del 31 de marzo en Santa Fe de Ralito (Córdoba) entre 33 lí­deres paramilitares y el comisionado de paz Luis Carlos Restrepo. En un manifiesto ellos anuncian que el Bloque Central Bolí­var y su afiliado Bloque Centauro, más el Bloque Vencedores del Arauca (BVA) que hasta ahora negociaban por separado, de ahora más lo harí­an como parte de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). También designaron un equipo negociador de siete miembros, encabezado por el lí­der 'militar' Salvatore Mancuso y Adolfo Paz (jefe del Bloque Cacique Nutibara y el Frente Pací­fico). Carlos Castaño no figura en la lista.

El manifiesto también exige que el gobierno otorgue las 'garantí­as' incluidas en la Ley 782 (promulgada en diciembre de 2002, por la cual el Presidente Alvaro Uribe enmendó la ley de 1997 diseñada para facilitar el proceso de negociaciones con grupos armados ilegales). Las garantí­as en cuestión incluyen la suspensión de las órdenes de arresto contra los negociadores designados, su protección por el estado -y, significativamente, la provisión del estado de la seguridad en áreas donde las partes en las negociaciones puedan concentrar sus fuerzas antes de entregar sus armas.

Dí­as antes, las AUC habí­a rechazado una propuesta de Restrepo de comenzar a concentrar sus fuerzas. En esa ocasión, dijeron que el estado no podí­a proveerles seguridad en las áreas que los grupos paramilitares abandonarí­an.

Eludiendo la extradición
En la reunión con Restrepo, Mancuso lanzó la idea de un compromiso de las AUC de ayudar a erradicar 50.000 hectáreas de cultivos de coca -poco menos de la mitad del área cultivada de coca, de acuerdo con las últimas estimaciones de EU. Los funcionarios confí­an en que esto puede proveer un argumento aceptable en Washington, para que Uribe invoque sus poderes discrecionales y niegue ciertas extradiciones (como las de Carlos Castaño y Salvatore Mancuso).

El dí­a antes de ser publicado el manifiesto de las AUC, el gobierno devolvió al congreso, enmendado, el proyecto de ley introduciendo 'alternativas a la prisión' para combatientes que se rendí­an que fueran hallados culpables de delitos -un instrumento que recibió crí­ticas dentro y en el exterior. En las enmiendas está incluida una provisión para crear un 'tribunal de la verdad'. Está excluido -por instrucciones especí­ficas de Uribe- el tema de la extradición. Luego de su visita reciente a EU, Uribe reiteró que el compromiso del gobierno con la legislación que permite la extradición de colombianos a EU, por cargos relacionados con las drogas, permanece sin cambios. Vale señalar que esa legislación no anula el poder del Presidente de rehusar la extradición.

Por las dudas, una iniciativa para reformar la constitución reintroduciendo la prohibición de extraditar a ciudadanos colombianos ha sido lanzada por la diputada Liberal Rocí­o Arias -que ha sido acusada por muchos, incluido el Vice-Presidente Francisco Santos, de 'trabajar para' los paramilitares. Arias afirma que ya tiene suficiente apoyo para que su proyecto sea introducido en la agenda del congreso. Será interesante ver cuánto apoyo logra una vez en el congreso: luego de las últimas elecciones, Salvatore Mancuso se jactó que las AUC cuentan con el apoyo de 35% de los legisladores.

General amenaza divulgar ví­nculos con paramilitares
Aun antes que fuera creada la 'comisión de la verdad', propuesta por Uribe, el gobierno puede ser blanco de revelaciones embarazosas. La revista Cambio dice que un general enjuiciado por su supuesta participación en una masacre ha amenazado con decir todo lo que sabe sobre la colusión de los militares con los paramilitares, si sus superiores no le aseguran que será exonerado.

El General retirado Jaime Uscategui está acusado de complotar con una unidad paramilitar para la masacre de 30 campesinos en Mapiripán (Meta) en 1997. Fue condenado por una corte marcial a principios de 2001, pero la corte suprema anuló la condena y ordenó que Uscategui sea enjuiciado en una corte civil. Ahora está en una prisión militar en Bogotá. Su juicio se iniciará el 20 de abril.

Cambio publicó la trascripción de una grabación supuestamente de mediados de 2003, en la que alguien identificado como Uscategui amenaza con exponer los lazos de militares con los paramilitares, subrayando que 'eso es extremadamente serio, porque involucra algo que siempre hemos negado oficialmente: las conexiones entre las fuerzas armadas y los paramilitares.'

BRASIL | Panorama de crecimiento. El PBI de Brasil en el primer trimestre, se elevó 1,6% sobre el trimestre previo, y es 2,7% más elevado que hace un año. Los funcionarios dicen que eso confirma las expectativas que la recuperación se acelerarí­a, aunque queda aún alguna distancia del 3,5% de la meta de crecimiento establecida por el gobierno para todo el año.
Datos sectoriales refuerzan la impresión general de repunte. La confederación industrial de Rí­o, Firjan, informa que las ventas industriales en los primeros cinco meses del año subieron 8,95% sobre el año pasado, el mayor incremento registrado desde 1992. No fue tan buena la noticia que lo acompaña: que el empleo en la industria de Rí­o cayó 1,9% entre abril y mayo. Aunque en São Paulo, la tasa de desempleo cayó un punto, a 19,7%, en igual periodo (la más grande caí­da desde 1992).

CHILE | De nuevo sube el desempleo. La tasa nacional de desempleo de Chile alcanzó 9,4% en marzo-mayo, 0,7 puntos más que en el trimestre previo y 0,6 puntos más elevado que hace un año. Esto sucede mientras la producción industrial ha estado creciendo. En mayo fue 4,5% más elevada que un año antes (mientras las ventas industriales subí­an 6,3%). Vale señalar: Sofofa, la asociación de industriales, muestra que el empleo sectorial en mayo subió 1,6 puntos año en año.
La tasa nacional de empleo para marzo-mayo, cayó 0,8 puntos.

URUGUAY | El desafí­o de la deuda. Cualquiera que gane las elecciones tendrá que esforzarse y con rapidez para aliviar el peso de la deuda del paí­s. Las obligaciones que vencen el año próximo llegan a US$2,5bn. Gran parte puede ser refinanciada, pero lo más duro son los intereses adeudados: US$531m en 2005, US$504m en 2006, US$433m en 2007 y US$413m en 2008. Desde que asumió Batlle en el 2000, la deuda del sector público se elevó 41% a US$12,78bn.

Con poco más de un mes para las elecciones, sigue siendo muy difí­cil anticipar un resultado. Los sondeos muestran un leve progreso para el izquierdista Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA), pero no apuntan con firmeza a un triunfo en la primera ronda, que es el único escenario en el cual Tabaré Vázquez podrí­a tener certeza de convertirse en el próximo Presidente de Uruguay.

En la última semana de setiembre, dos encuestadoras, Factum e Ipsos-Mora y Araujo, ubica la intención espontánea de votos por el EP-FA, en 50%, que por muy poco no supera el umbral requerido para un triunfo en la primera ronda. Pero difieren sobre los que van segundos, Blancos: Factum les dio 32%, Ipsos-Mora y Araujo 22%. El último logró sonsacar un apoyo de 55% para el EP-FA por medio de una pregunta 'guiada', a aquellos cuyas respuestas eran inciertas. El primero señaló que 10% de sus encuestados dijo que podrí­an cambiar su elección. El escenario de la segunda ronda no es concluyente.

Un detalle interesante es que mientras el EP-FA está decisivamente adelante en Montevideo, Vázquez y el candidato Blanco, Jorge Larrañaga están cabeza a cabeza en el interior. La campaña de Larrañaga lo describe como el primer candidato presidencial de fuera de la capital.

México completó la ratificación del Tratado de Roma, que conlleva reconocer la jurisdicción de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) con relación a crí­menes contra la humanidad. Esto significa que ahora enfrentará el mismo problema que otros firmantes de América Latina: decidir si otorga a EU -que no ratificó el tratado- inmunidad para su personal cuando está en México.

El proceso ha sido inusualmente lento en México. El senado ratificó el Tratado de Roma en diciembre de 2002, la cámara de diputados recién lo hizo la semana pasada, cuando aprobó una enmienda al Artí­culo 21 de la constitución mexicana, para que así­ los crí­menes mencionados en el tratado 'no queden impunes [y así­] las naciones puedan contribuir para eso por medio de una respetuosa cooperación internacional.'

La ratificación no fue unánime. El pequeño Partido del Trabajo (PT), de izquierda, se opuso sobre bases constitucionales. Argumentó que aceptar la jurisdicción de la CPI infringe las garantí­as constitucionales que ningún juicio criminal puede tener más de tres instancias (cortes menores, corte de apelación, corte suprema) y nadie puede ser juzgado dos veces por el mismo crimen.

El presidente del comité de asuntos constitucionales de la cámara, Francisco Frí­as, refuta ese argumento, aclarando que la CPI actúa cuando no hay solución en el ámbito nacional, 'cuando el imperio de la ley fracasa'. Frí­as también señaló que, al contrario de lo que algunos crí­ticos argumentan, la aceptación de la jurisdicción de la CPI no tiene efecto retroactivo, y no podrí­a intervenir en casos relacionados a los incidentes de la 'guerra sucia' de México que tuvieron lugar desde los años '60 hasta los '80.

Eso ha sido cuestionado por otros expertos, que señalan que la CPI ha estado tratando casos anteriores a su creación, por el principio que no hay prescripción para el procesamiento de crí­menes contra la humanidad, un punto de vista similar al de la justicia mexicana con relación a la 'guerra sucia'.

El Presidente Nicanor Duarte ha continuado insistiendo sobre la 'conexión Farc' en el caso del secuestro y asistencia de Cecilia Cubas, lanzando una 'real guerra' contra los lazos entre guerrillas colombianas y 'elementos criminales' en Paraguay. Esa guerra, dice, no es contra la izquierda paraguaya, sino contra criminales. Aunque los fiscales públicos dicen haber descubierto evidencia de actividades subversivas en el interior.

Duarte anunció su guerra en su visita de dos dí­as la semana pasada en Bogotá, donde discutió con el Vice-Presidente Francisco Santos detalles de un acuerdo de cooperación en seguridad entre los dos paí­ses. El subrayó que fue gracias a la 'tecnologí­a y recursos humanos' provistos por Colombia que Paraguay pudo 'quebrar' la banda que secuestró a Cubas. No hubo más revelaciones sobre ese 'quiebre' o, en verdad, sobre la 'conexión Farc' -más allá de la sospecha que el 'diplomático' de las Farc, Rodrigo Granda pudo haber enviado instrucciones en código sobre cómo realizar el secuestro en emails a Osmar Martí­nez, antiguo activista de Patria Libre (PL). Martí­nez fue arrestado en enero en Caaguazú.

Por ahora, aparte de continuar con el intercambio de información, Colombia ha ofrecido a oficiales de la ley, lugares en los cursos anti-secuestros que sus propios oficiales están recibiendo del FBI.

El 11 de marzo, el fiscal público Arnaldo Guzzio informó que se realizó una serie de allanamientos por la policí­a en el departamento central de San Pedro y se hallaron tres videos, en los cuales se veí­a a los alumnos de una escuela local elogiando al Che Guevara y al dictador paraguayo del siglo 19, José Gaspar Rodrí­guez de Francia (un héroe para nacionalistas de diversa coloración). También se veí­a, dijo Guzzio, gráficos que se hací­an eco de esos elogios y atacaban al imperialismo.

También dijo que en el área de los allanamientos (Tava Guaraní­ y Agüerito) 'no hay intervención de las fuerzas públicas, la Iglesia no funciona, y no hay estación policial.' Eso no es nuevo: el único factor de organización social en el área es la militante Cooperativa de Productores Agrí­colas San Pedro Norte (CPA-SN) liderada por Elvio Bení­tez, cuya casa fue una de las que allanó la policí­a.

La ministra de educación, Blanca Ovelar, anunció el 12 de marzo que esperaba ver los videos a fin de identificar los establecimientos educativos y actuar contra los responsables. Ella puede ser ayudada por el Vice-Presidente Luis Castiglioni, que visitó recientemente el área: aunque él no lo dijo, no pudo haber dejado de ver una de las marcas locales: el conocido retrato del Che Guevara pintado en la pared de la escuela en Tava Guaraní­.

En su ahora polí­ticamente teñida campaña contra el crimen, en particular el secuestro, Duarte no sólo recibirá asistencia de Colombia. Chile recientemente ha prometido ayudar cuando Paraguay planteó la posibilidad que un grupo extremista chileno podrí­a estar involucrado en secuestros locales [IL-05-09]. Y ahora, Venezuela ha anunciado que su vice-ministro de seguridad ciudadana, Alcides Rondón, y la directora de prevención del delito, Lilian Aya, visitarán Asunción esta semana para explicar su Plan Piloto de Seguridad Ciudadana que, afirman ellos, logró reducir el delito en el área metropolitana de Caracas en 50% en sólo tres meses. Es probable que se ofrezca más asistencia cuando altos funcionarios de seguridad pública se reúnan en Asunción el 24 de junio (Venezuela se unirá a ellos por primera vez).