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The US State Department and the FBI will assist the Policí­a Nacional Civil (PNC) to identify and pursue the most dangerous members of the mara gangs by creating a transnational anti-gang unit (TAG), which will also include a special prosecutor. This was the main development at a regional conference on the mara gangs in San Salvador on 5 February chaired by President Tony Saca and the US attorney general, Alberto Gonzales. The new security initiative, like Saca's Mano Dura plans, places the emphasis on aggression rather than rehabilitation. The justice and security minister, René Figueroa, spoke of "an organised offensive at a regional level".

Gonzales promised that the US would finance a new programme to train regional police forces, enhance a Central American Fingerprint Exploitation (CAFE) initiative to acquire criminal fingerprints from Central America to go into an FBI database, and help develop legislation and judicial institutions in the region to contend with the gang problem. Gonzales did not, however, promise a halt to the deportations of thousands of maras from the US. A total of 14,328 Salvadoreans were deported from the US last year, 22% with criminal records. This shows no sign of slowing up: 1,697 Salvadoreans were deported in January 2007. The heads of police of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize are taking part in a three-day meeting with the FBI in Los Angeles until 9 February to go into the details of improving information sharing, such as passing on the criminal records of gang members when they are deported. 

New political movement
The Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR), a recent offshoot from the main opposition Frente Farabundo Martí­ para la Liberación National (FMLN), is formulating a strategy it hopes will propel it into contention in the 2009 presidential elections. The FDR has forged a new movement "Lí­deres por el cambio" out of popular mayors from a range of smaller opposition parties to strengthen grassroots support. It has even tried to poach the mayor of Santa Tecla, Óscar Ortiz, from the FMLN but he is intent on reforming the FMLN.

The government of President Evo Morales presented a document entitled "Towards a new justice system in Bolivia" to the media on 23 May. It contained 50 pages of studies by groups such as the Red Anticorrupción de Bolivia and the Comisión Andina de Juristas, as well as the results of the government's own investigations, which uphold comments by Morales this week that the judiciary is the most corrupt entity in Bolivia. The document's publication was designed to escalate the pressure on the constitutional tribunal (TC) which earlier this month delivered an adverse ruling on four supreme court (CSJ) justices appointed by Morales by decree in December.

The origin of the government's dispute with the judiciary dates back to last December when Morales named the four justices during a congressional recess despite the fact that the constitution stipulates that congress should select the justices from a list of candidates. Morales said they would serve in an interim capacity while congress struggled to reach a consensus over permanent appointments. The TC ruled on 9 May that Morales acted within his rights but that the 90-day interim period had expired. The government sought to extend this but the TC rejected the appeal.

Undeterred, the government decided to file a suit against four of the five TC magistrates for perverting the course of justice and failing to fulfil their functions, crimes which are punishable by up to a four-year sentence. Morales said that the magistrates had exceeded their remit which was to pronounce on the constitutionality of the appointments and not to suspend the four justices. He said their decision was motivated by political and not judicial considerations.

It is now in the hands of the attorney general's office and the judicial police to investigate the magistrates and to present their recommendations within 90 days to the congressional constitutional committee, which will then choose whether to submit these to the chamber of deputies to vote on whether to prosecute the magistrates. A majority vote of 62 would be assured as the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) has 72 seats. It would then be up to the senate to sentence the magistrates. It is unlikely to come to this as the MAS lacks a majority but by this point the government might have applied enough pressure to force changes to the judiciary. One of the remaining seven CSJ justices resigned on 22 May after the minister of the presidency, Juan Ramón Quintana, branded the judicial system "colonial" with a "profound racism and disdain" for litigants. 

The president of the CSJ, Héctor Sandoval sent a letter to congress urging the prompt selection of four permanent justices to deal with a backlog of cases. Congress met for a bicameral session on 17 May to vote on four justices from a list of 179 aspirants. They failed to reach a two-thirds majority of 105 after the 84 members of the MAS decided to vote for the four interim justices.

The dispute with the judiciary is one of several issues that the country's nine prefects intend to brng up with Morales during a meeting in Cochabamba on 26 May. Morales said the prefects could dictate the agenda. Relations between Morales and the six opposition prefects have been especially tense since 20 November when Morales sent a proposal to congress making them accountable and open to censure (and dismissal) by congress. In January violent clashes in Cochabamba briefly forced the prefect, Manfred Reyes Villa, to flee the city.

 

President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa made his foreign priorities clear when he left the Nafta summit early in Montebello, Ontario on 21 August. He flew home to confront Hurricane Dean which was threatening the Yucatán. By the time Calderón got to Mexico, Hurricane Dean had been downgraded from a dangerous (category-five) storm, to a mere (category-two) squall. Few previous presidents of Mexico would have passed up the chance of time with a US president to supervise disaster relief. Calderón, however, wanted to emphasise that close relations with the US are not his government's priority. 

As we noted last week [WR-07-32] Mexico is repairing relations with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo Chávez , sees himself in competition with the US. On 21 August the Mexican government made a significant move towards improving relations with Cuba, the US's only longstanding enemy in the hemisphere. The Mexican government confirmed that it wanted to meet Cuban officials to discuss Cuba's bilateral debt of US$554m.

Calderón clearly wants to improve relations with Cuba, which have deteriorated over the past 10 years and led to both countries recalling their ambassadors in 2005. Until President Ernesto Zedillo was pulled into the US's diplomatic orbit by the economic crisis of 1995, Mexico had maintained cordial relations with Cuba based on the principle that neither government would comment on the other's human rights record. Zedillo changed this arrangement and his successor, President Vicente Fox, emphasised that respect for human rights would be a major factor in determining the closeness of foreign relations. Under Fox, Mexico voted for UN investigations into Cuba's poor record for respecting human rights. Calderón reversed this policy: earlier this year, Mexico's representative at the UN Human Rights Council voted, with the majority, to end any UN monitoring of human rights in Cuba. 

The Mexican government underlined its change in policy towards Cuba by putting up the newly-appointed Mexican ambassador to Cuba, Gabriel Jiménez Remus, to discuss the government's Cuban policy at a meeting with the standing committee of Mexico's congress. What was interesting was that Jiménez did not mention human rights, which is the stick the US and its allies use to beat Cuba.

Jiménez talked about boosting business with Cuba and increasing Mexican investment in the island's economy. This is a direct challenge to the US which passed the Helms-Burton Act allowing companies and individuals to use the US courts to sue foreign companies which use Cuban state assets expropriated from US companies. The Helms-Burton Act has deterred foreign companies from investing in Cuba for fear of generating expensive legal disputes in the US.

At the summit
Although President Calderón did have a one-to-one meeting with President George W. Bush at the Ontario summit, little came of it. Calderón's briefers made it clear that the Mexican president had complained about several aspects of US policy, particularly the extension of the regulations that penalise companies which hire illegal immigrants. 

Calderón also made it clear that any US aid for his anti-drugs offensives would be on his terms, not those of the US. Calderón and his foreign policymakers are making it absolutely clear to the US that Mexico will not accept US military advisers as part of the proposed anti-drugs package. Mexico wants US hardware, especially helicopters, and for the US to do more to prevent automatic weapons being sold by US dealers to organised criminals in Mexico.

The US is disconcerted by Mexico's truculence, rather than its traditional grateful supplication. The US's head of customs, Ralph Basham, said that the US efforts on curbing the arms trade were hampered by Mexico's refusal to share information. He said that the US wanted the Mexicans to tell US officials where they suspected the trade was being done (see side bar).

On the evidence of the summit, Calderón also may be having second thoughts about his controversial use of the army in his government's anti-drugs offensives. He did not bring his defence minister to the Nafta summit on the 20 and 21 August, even though the biggest item on the bilateral US-Mexican agenda was the package of military aid for the anti-drugs offensive, billed by the US as Plan México. The US spin had been that the aid package for Mexico should be on the lines of the controversial Plan Colombia. 

Further evidence that Calderón may be having second thoughts was his decision to field Mexico's foreign minister, Patricia Espinosa, to comment on the proposed US anti-drugs package. She, rather than the defence minister who is a general, discussed the hardware Mexico wants. She told the media on 20 August that the US was planning to offer Mexico a three-pronged anti-drugs package worth between US$800m and US$1bn. She stressed that unlike Plan Colombia, the US would supply neither military advisers nor soldiers. Espinosa stressed that the package was still being finalised and she was therefore cagey about details of the equipment the US is offering. Mexico wants seven armoured helicopters, and unspecified amounts of infra-red sensors and cameras.

There was always a danger that relations between Colombia and Venezuela would deteriorate if the mediation process brokered by President Hugo Chávez ended in any way other than the release of the hostages held by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). The moderation of Chávez 's initial response to the abrupt termination of his role by his Colombian peer Alvaro Uribe swiftly gave way to an unedifying exchange of diatribes between the two heads of state who despite ideological differences, had enjoyed a good rapport. By 28 November Chávez was vowing to have no relations with Colombia while Uribe remained in power. Diplomats in Caracas and Bogotá will have their work cut out repairing the breach. 

Given the time and effort - not to mention the resources - that Chávez invested in the mediation process it was at best discourteous that Uribe did not contact him personally to inform him of his decision. Ending Chávez 's role because he spoke to a Colombian General on the telephone looks like a pretext. Uribe indirectly admitted the real reason - that the Colombian government could not reconcile itself to the political recognition the Farc was getting on the international stage - on 22 November. "The Farc wants to make political points, not to free the hostages," he said. "They want to pose with political figures in international capitals, while continuing to kill people here." 

Uribe was also irked to discover that the recent talks between Chávez and the Farc representative, Iván Márquez, in Caracas revolved around the establishment of a despeje, or DMZ, rather than the humanitarian exchange. Uribe had ruled out a despeje and felt Chávez had overstepped the mark.

Chávez showed remarkable restraint in his initial response. He said he would respect Uribe's decision but he also pointed out that the process had begun and could not be stopped, in reference to the Farc's apparent attempts to provide him with "proof of life" for its 45 hostages. He said that if the Farc did provide them he would still receive its leader, Manuel Marulanda, in Caracas. He might have been hoping that Uribe would have a change of heart. When it became clear that Uribe had no intention of reinstating him in his role - and almost seemed to mock him on 23 November by saying the Farc had made "useful idiots" out of everyone who had tried to reach out to it - Chávez changed his tune. 

He visited the issue on two separate occasions over the weekend. First he suggested that "There are people very close to Uribe […] who don't want there to be an agreement […] who just want war." Then he accused Uribe of "lying […] in a shameless, horrible, ugly way," adding that "I think Colombia deserves another president, it deserves a better president." He said he was "putting relations with Colombia in the freezer because I've completely lost confidence with everyone in the Colombian government […] They have spat brutally in our face when we worked heart and soul to try to get them on the road to peace."

Chávez said that relations had never been so bad because in the past when there had been tension, such as when the Farc's foreign minister Rodrigo Granda was kidnapped by Colombian agents on Venezuelan soil in 2005, "the heads of state never fully entered into the conflict". 

He claimed that economic and trade relations would suffer, although this seems unlikely given the importance of two-way trade - US$6bn per year. He was adamant, however, that there was now no chance of Venezuela rejoining the Andean Community (CAN). 

Uribe did not hold back. He delivered a highly charged speech, punctuated with oratorical repetition, each sentence beginning "The truth President Chávez " in response to the charge that he had lied. "Your words, your positions, give the impression that you are not interested in peace in Colombia, but rather in Colombia becoming the victim of a terrorist government of the Farc." 

Uribe did not restrict himself to Chávez 's mediation efforts. In the most candid attack on the Venezuelan president by a Latin American head of state, he accused Chávez of "fomenting an expansionist project in the continent, stripping away liberties bit by bit". He added, "you cannot incite the continent as you do, talking one day against Spain, the next against the US; mistreating one day Mexico, the next day Peru, and Bolivia the morning after; talking about imperialism when you, through your budget, want to create an empire." He accused Chávez of misusing history in his constant references to Bolí­var, who "believed in integration not expansionism". 

Constitutional reform package

Uribe also said it disturbed him that Chávez was using the dispute for electoral ends. This point, at least, is relevant. Chávez 's remarks must be taken in the context of the referendum on his constitutional reform proposals on 2 December. Chávez 's concern that a high rate of abstention could mean a defeat for him, was underscored when he said this week that he would "have to go" if he lost. The "freezing" of relations looks like a bid to stir up nationalist sentiment in the hope of encouraging his supporters to vote. This explains why he continued the next day by describing Uribe as "a sad pawn of the empire" and recalled Venezuela's ambassador to Bogotá. Colombia did not reciprocate. It also explains why he decided to "freeze" relations with Spain until he received an apology from King Juan Carlos for telling him to "shut up" at the Iberoamerican summit in Santiago.

Where now for Farc talks?

The end of Chávez 's role in the mediation process means peace commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo will now take over - an announcement unlikely to stir much optimism among the relatives of the hostages given his failure in five years in his post to register any tangible success. Restrepo's comments at a press conference on 22 November, however, were telling. He said that he would "redirect" the mediation efforts "as necessary, in a discreet manner". "It is very clear to us that this public spotlight generates huge risks." The family of Ingrid Betancourt, the French-Colombian politician held hostage by the Farc, expressed their disillusionment to Uribe during a meeting the following day.

During her testimony to congress on 27 November to justify her joint mediation efforts with Chávez , Senator Piedad Córdoba said that the proofs of life would still come. She said the Farc would have released some of its hostages before the end of the year had Chávez been allowed to meet Marulanda. She also claimed a peace process could have begun in January. She said there was a contradiction between the support Uribe gave her in private and the public comments of his ministers against the exchange. Córdoba also denied charges she was a "terrorist". On 25 November she tearfully revealed she was being investigated by the supreme court for "treason and collusion." This relates not to her role as a mediator, but rather to comments on 11 March during a conference in Mexico that Uribe was a "paramilitary elected by paramilitaries and drug-traffickers" and that Latin American governments should sever ties with Colombia. 

The President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, might have been unimpressed when President Chávez arrived for their rendez-vous in Paris without the proofs of life Sarkozy had stressed were "indispensable", but he was equally unimpressed with President Uribe's decision to end his mediation role. The presidential spokesman said "We continue to believe that Chávez 's efforts are the best option for achieving the hostages' release." Addressing Colombia's congress, peace commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, confirmed that Sarkozy had sent a letter. He did not reveal the contents beyond saying Sarkozy stressed the importance of obtaining the proofs of life.

European Union member states will soon come under renewed pressure to change their do-nothing policy over Cuba. Speaking during a three-day visit to Cuba last week, the European Commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, Louis Michel, said that he had found a new "open-mindedness" in Cuba. His comments echoed those of the Vatican's Secretary of State, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, who conducted a six-day visit to Cuba in late February. Michel will deliver a report to the European Council, the EU's highest political body, advocating that the EU should break the current deadlock and hold talks with President Raúl Castro.

Michel said that he had noticed "a lot of changes in Cuba," placing special emphasis on the "spirit […] and the atmosphere of the talks." The director general of the EU's development and humanitarian aid commission, Stefano Manservisi, told the press that Michel was more convinced than ever that failure to change the current immobility of the EU would be "a big mistake".

During Michel's visit, the Cuban authorities made it clear that there would be no political dialogue until the EU definitively dropped sanctions imposed on the island in 2003 when 75 political dissidents were summarily sentenced: 55 still remain behind bars. These sanctions were suspended (but never dropped) in 2005. In a joint statement, the European Commission acknowledged Cuba's position that the sanctions are "the main obstacle" to establishing political talks with the EU and "should be definitively eliminated".

While Cuba remains unbending on the issue of sanctions, it has made several overtures to the EU to demonstrate its desire to get talks going. It recently promised to release seven of the imprisoned dissidents for health reasons - four were reunited with their families, issued passports and flown to Spain - and signed up to two UN human rights treaties [WR-08-09]. It was also noteworthy that during Michel's visit, Cuba did not demand the elimination of the EU's "common position" on Cuba - something it has long been demanding along with the end of the sanctions.

Ending the sanctions will be hugely problematic while the EU's "common position" remains in place. Michel said that an increasing number of the EU's 27 member states are in favour of restoring normal ties with Cuba, which would require unanimity on the European Council, when foreign ministers meet in June. However, others, such as the Czech Republic view Cuba as a nasty relic of the Cold War. Britain was among a group of member states that had sought to set conditions for Michel's visit to Havana, such as insisting he meet dissidents.

In the event, Michel did not seek to antagonise the government and stuck to meeting government figures. He did not meet Raúl Castro but he held talks with the foreign minister Felipe Pérez Roque, Vice-President Carlos Lage and the president of the national assembly, Ricardo Alarcón.

The debate among European foreign ministers is likely to be quite intense, with Spain pushing hardest for the EU member states to make a decision to engage Raúl's government soon, before the US beats them to it. The frontrunner for the Democratic nomination in the US presidential elections, Senator Barack Obama, is calling for "direct contact" with Raúl.

 “I don't mind if the cats are white or black, the important thing is that they catch mice."

- Sebastián Piñera, the leader of Chile's opposition Renovación Nacional, argues that whether education is public or private is irrelevant as long as it's high quality.

“Venezuela is a Titanic heading for an enormous iceberg."

- Raúl Isaí­as Baduel, a former ally of Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez on releasing his new book, “Mi solución: Venezuela crisis y salvación", which advocates calling a constituent assembly.

“The government must bathe itself in democracy."

- Argentina's radical farming leader, Alfredo De Angeli, shortly after being released having spent several hours in prison.

“They told us South Americans that the market would solve everything, that the State wasn't necessary […] However, we're now seeing the most formidable act of state intervention in living memory, in precisely the place where they'd been telling us that the State was unnecessary."

- Argentina's President Cristina Fernández.

 

 “God has publicly admitted that he's Brazilian. He said: 'Since Lula is here, I'll hang around a little bit more."

- Brazil's President Lula da Silva on the campaign trail explains the achievements of his administration since he came to power.

 

“Who said you can't change a treaty? Where there's a will, there's a way."

- Paraguay's President Fernando Lugo visits Brazil to push for a renegotiation of the Itaipú dam treaty.

John Cartmel Alexander Rettie, born in Sri Lanka, November 24, 1925; died in Yorkshire, January 10, 2009.

John Rettie, one of the founders of Latin American Newsletters in 1967, has died at the age of 83. Rettie worked as a foreign correspondent in numerous countries across the globe, but he made his reputation in 1956 in Russia when he landed a huge scoop: the details of Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech, denouncing Stalin's personality cult and crimes. Rettie invested considerable time and money into making LAN a respected and trustworthy source of news when military dictatorships and censorship flourished in Latin America in the 1970s.

The very public spat between the supreme court president Gilmar Mendes and his peer Joaquim Barbosa last week exposed the deep ideological divisions that undermine the effectiveness of Brazil's judiciary. The spat demoralised the supreme court just as congress hit crisis point with yet another case of wrongdoing, this time involving legislators of all political parties and persuasions. Brazilian commentators argue that the current situation weakens Brazil's democracy: facing internal problems, neither the supreme court nor congress is keeping check on the executive.

Mendes and Barbosa exchanged diatribes in a way never seen before, in public at least, in the supreme court's history, prompting the tribunal to be shut as their peers attempted to find a way to placate them. The two men exchanged personal attacks as the court debated, surrounded by TV cameras and journalists, the extension of public benefits to employees of the privately run civil registries and juridical privileges to holders of public office.

“Your Excellency has no conditions to give a moral lesson to anyone," Mendes said when Barbosa accused him of hiding information about a case that was judged while Barbosa was on leave for medical reasons. “Your Excellency is destroying the justice system of this country," Barbosa answered back, adding that “you are not out on the streets, you are only out in the media, destroying the credibility of the Brazilian judiciary." More personal insults and accusations followed, leading other judges to call for an end to the session.

Elitist vs. popular
The spat was personal: Mendes and Barbosa have never got on. But the argument also revealed that Brazil's highest court is, like the rest of the country's judiciary, deeply divided between jurists who have an elitist view of the law and jurists who believe the laws should be applied to benefit the socially disadvantaged. For a majority of commentators in Brazil's mainstream media, both views are wrong. Justice, they reminded Mendes and Barbosa, must be impartial to be effective.

Indeed, while some Brazilian judges apply the laws to reflect their view of “social justice," others work in a strictly technical manner that undermines the work of the police and public prosecutors, due to Brazil's intricate legislation. Both views allow for abuses of the legal system, generating the juridical uncertainty for which Brazil is still notoriously known, despite the country's recent progress in economic areas.

Two recent cases illustrate these juridical abuses. Brazil's landless movements, such as the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST), continued to carry out the invasion and vandalism of private property last week, this time in the state of Pará. Their action led to violent clashes with local police and federal troops had to be deployed to stop the violence. But despite the illegality of their acts, none of the landless leaders have ever been held to account because sympathetic “social" jurists prevent cases from being brought against them by using loopholes in the law.

Meanwhile, Eliana Tranchesi, the owner of the luxury superstore Daslú in São Paulo, was sentenced in late March to over 100 years in prison for tax evasion, when the maximum sentence for murder is 30 years. Tranchesi, however, stayed less than a week in prison, having been granted the right to wait in freedom while her case is reviewed because she was not a “threat to society," in spite of the fact that her company continued to commit irregularities in the import of luxury goods well after her first arrest for the same crime in 2005. And with endless possibilities for appeal, many believe it is unlikely Tranchesi will ever set foot in jail again.

Supreme court divided
Mendes has been vocal about landless crimes and also about abuses committed by the federal police in arrests and other operations, which included the use of agents from the Brazilian intelligence agency to monitor suspects illegally [WR-09-16]. But while Mendes's declarations about abuses committed by the MST and the federal police have been praised by many sectors of the Brazilian press, he has been criticised for his silence regarding juridical privileges to holders of public office.

For many, including Barbosa, this is evidence Mendes is intentionally undermining the work of the police and public prosecutors to prevent justice from being done as regards white-collar crime. Barbosa's tirade, however, may isolate him as he hears testimonies before presenting the landmark mensalão case to his peers, which is expected to go to trial at the end of 2010.

The case involves 39 people, including President Lula da Silva's former chief of staff, José Dirceu, who have been accused by the police and public prosecutors of forming a circle to embezzle public money with the aim of bribing congressmen. Strong evidence suggests the 39 are guilty and Barbosa took the unprecedented decision of turning them from suspects into accused in the case - a decision that won him plaudits. His spat with Mendes, however, has opened the door for defence lawyers to ask for a review of the case or even to demand it begin again under the watch of another - and perhaps more sympathetic - supreme court judge, by claiming that Barbosa's work is prejudiced.

Congress hits crisis point
The fight in the supreme court undermined its authority exactly when it is most needed. Congress has been brought to a standstill because of internal disputes and allegations of wrongdoing, to the extent that in the past four months only one bill has been voted upon. The latest wrongdoing case to rock congress involves the widespread misuse of air-ticket allowances by politicians of all political parties. Backbenchers and also leaders were found to be using their air-ticket allowances, paid for out of the public purse and granted so they can visit their constituencies, to go on foreign holidays with families and friends.

In an attempt to regularise their wrongdoing, congressmen agreed on new rules that allowed them to use the tickets indiscriminately. This, however, led to a public uproar that forced congressional leaders to back down and restrict the use of air-ticket allowances for the sole purpose of visiting constituencies. The tougher regulation was supposed to come to vote to show that congress had understood the public outcry. However, congressional leaders had to use a mechanism to force the regulation upon deputies after many of them failed to understand the gravity of the situation - some going as far as giving indignant speeches in congress, claiming the whole affair had been manipulated by the media.

These continual disputes and wrongdoing charges have prevented congress from doing any legislative work, to the extent that the country is now governed by the so-called medidas provisórias (presidential decrees) issued by the executive. These decrees have immediate effect and, because under the Brazilian constitution they have priority over other legislation, also allow the executive to force its agenda on congress. In effect, congress now does little more than rubberstamp the executive's orders, leaving the judiciary to check the government and even legislate through its verdicts.

• Rousseff

President Lula da Silva's chief of staff and preferred successor, Dilma Rousseff, admitted her desire to run for the presidency in 2010 for the first time, after holding a press conference to say she was diagnosed with a minor cancer. Rousseff will go through chemotherapy for four months, but said she is optimistic and is considering leaving the government in January next year to start her campaign for the election in October. Critics said she was using her illness to win sympathy from the public after Lula requested an audience “pray" for her while both were launching yet another project in the government's investment programme (PAC) in Manaus.

“We have various intelligence reports which show that after (deposed Honduran President Manuel) Zelaya the next will be me that they want to destabilise."

- Ecuador's President Rafael Correa.

“It is not possible that anybody, however powerful they are, can come and tell us what to do or humiliate us."

- The de facto president of Honduras, Roberto Micheletti.

“In the conditions of our imperfect socialism, because of our own insufficiencies, two plus two often equals three."

- Cuba's President Raúl Castro.

President Evo Morales' recent efforts at winning over the eastern opposition Media Luna regions, ahead of the 6 December presidential and legislative elections [WR-09-44], appear to be paying off. A recent poll showed gas-rich Tarija would back Morales and his ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) over his main competitor, Manfred Reyes Villa, of the right-wing Plan Progreso para Bolivia-Convergencia Nacional (PPB-CN), while the two were neck-and-neck in Beni. The MAS still has its work cut out though - the poll also showed the ruling party short of the much-coveted two-thirds majority in the senate (see sidebar).

The survey by Equipos Mori, which showed a comfortable overall national victory for Morales in the first round (52% to 18% for Reyes Villa), revealed 29% of those questioned in Tarija would vote for him, compared wih 19% for the PPB-CN candidate. Tarija only marginally voted against Morales in the August 2008 recall vote (49.83%-50.17%) and appears particularly receptive to the recent MAS offensive in the Media Luna, consisting of meetings with the private sector and ample assurances regarding the sanctity of private property, together with pledges of economic development. The recent, divisive, decree granting the Chaco increased tax royalties [WR-09-42] could also have had an effect.

While Beni (which voted 43.72%-56.28% against Morales in the August vote) also appears to be wavering, Pando and Santa Cruz remain vehemently anti-MAS (with Reyes Villa winning 57%-25% and 42%-25%, respectively). The strong show of support in Pando, in particular, owes to backing for Reyes Villa's running mate Leopoldo Fernández, Pando's ex prefect, currently awaiting trial for his alleged role in a September 2008 massacre, whose plight remains the rallying point for the PPB-CN campaign.

• Playing the victim card

Reyes Villa has been widely criticised in the local media for his poor campaign which appears based on decrying what he claims is political persecution by the state directed at both himself and Fernández rather than offering a constructive plan of governance. Fuelling Reyes Villa's complaints have been the recent decision by the public prosecutor's office to charge Fernández with six different crimes (including murder and terrorism, in relation to the September massacre), while Reyes Villa himself has recently been subjected to a court order seizing 50% of his property and prohibiting him from leaving the country. The judge ordering the measures ruled that there was a risk that he would flee Bolivia to evade charges against him for offences committed during his term as prefect of Cochabamba. Reyes Villa's complaints regarding the politicisation of the judiciary were undermined, however, by another ruling last month by the plurinational electoral authorities (OEP), which allows Fernández to campaign from his prison cell. The move provoked outcry from Morales who sought unsuccessfully to get it overturned.
   The opposition is likely to cite as further evidence of “political persecution", the recent approval by the MAS-dominated chamber of deputies of its final report on the Rózsa terrorism case (which involves the deaths in Santa Cruz last April of three foreign nationals, who the Bolivian government alleged were mercenaries hired to assassinate Morales [WR-09-16]). The report concluded that the Santa Cruz political and business elite - including Germán Antelo, a PPB-CN senatorial candidate - were behind the alleged plot. The finding came as no surprise given the government has long accused the Cruceños - who deny involvement - of funding the supposed assassins. The report now goes to the attorney general's office although it is unlikely that this will translate into legal action given the current collapse of the judiciary.

• Senate

The Equipos Mori poll showed President Evo Morales two senators short of a two-thirds majority in the new 36-seat senate. The new senate will have four members from each of the nine departments. The poll showed Morales with four senators from La Paz, Oruro, Potosí­, three from Cochabamba, two from Tarija and Chuquisaca, and one each from Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando. It is worth noting however that polls in Bolivia tend to understate Morales's support due to his appeal in the remote rural areas, which are rarely surveyed by pollsters.

EL SALVADOR | Literacy. The government has launched an initiative to reduce illiteracy by 18% by 2014, Vice-president Salvador Sánchez Cerén, who is also education minister, announced this week. The programme, “Educating for Life", was inaugurated in the western town of Izalco, where Sánchez said indigenous communities had been marginalised for years. He said the initiative was a crucial part of the fight against poverty and exclusion, which President Mauricio Funes made clear in his meeting with his US peer Barack Obama in Washington last week were the root causes of crime and insecurity in the country. The initiative, which will establish a national volunteer network and include technical and professional training, will target 65 of the country's poorest municipalities.

HONDURAS | New post for army chief. President Porfirio Lobo appointed Romeo Vázquez Velasquez as the head of the state telecoms company Hondutel last week. It was rumoured that Vázquez would pick up this post [WR-10-09] after Lobo replaced him as head of the armed forces as part of several sops he has thrown to the international community since coming to power in January to win recognition for his government: Vázquez was in charge when former president Manuel Zelaya was ousted from the presidential palace last June and forced into exile. Lobo, who praised Vázquez for his service to the country while relieving him, decided to offer him a lucrative post out of the spotlight. Human rights NGOs criticised the appointment as setting a poor precedent (by “rewarding someone who conspired against the democratic system") and putting the government's commitment to human rights in doubt. Lobo sought to deflect this criticism by announcing that he would be creating the position of a presidential commissioner on human rights shortly.

With his government still reeling from the fallout of Carlos Castresana's resignation as head of the UN backed anti-impunity commission (Cicig) earlier in the month [WR-10-25], President Alvaro Colom incurred a fresh setback last week after his finance and energy ministers, Juan Alberto Fuentes Knight and Carlos Meany, resigned, a week after his economy minister, Rubén Morales, had thrown in the towel. The three departures owe to different reasons. The loss of Fuentes, however, who left in frustration at the government's failure to approve a tax reform - one of Colom's campaign pledges and as yet an unfulfilled requirement of the 1996 Peace Accords - is a particular blow for the President, representing a victory for the conservative elites who have long opposed the move.

Aside from the implications for each ministry, the most recent spate of departures serves as only the latest illustration of the endemic weakness and instability plaguing the Colom government. With the departure of Fuentes and Meany, both in their posts since Colom first took office in January 2008, only four of his original 13-member cabinet remain in their positions - the foreign, environment, labour and culture ministers. Unsurprisingly, the two ministries with the highest turnover are the security and economy portfolios. There have been five interior ministers (two of whom stepped down amid corruption allegations). Following the recent appointment of Erick Coyoy, the former deputy finance minister, to replace Morales (who reportedly quit over differences with ministry personnel), four different people have held the economy portfolio.

Colom himself acknowledged that Fuentes's departure constituted the biggest blow, not just on a personal level - Fuentes was a personal friend of the President - but also symbolically. He was one of the few cabinet members to embody any commitment to Colom's professed principles of social democracy; his father Alberto Fuentes Mohr, also a former progressive finance minister, had founded the Partido Socialista Democrático (PSD) although, like Colom's uncle Manuel, also a left-wing politician, was assassinated by the military in 1979.

According to the local press, Fuentes had already floated the possibility of stepping down last November, following congress's refusal to pass an already watered-down tax-reform bill which would have raised the tax take to 11.7% of GDP, up from the current 9.9% [WR-09-47] - albeit still below the 12.5% stipulated by the Peace Accords. However, the most recent outcry from the private sector lobby Cacif (which wields considerable influence in congress) over the possibility of a new tax reform in order to raise funds for the country's reconstruction following the damage wrought by tropical storm Agatha [WR-10-24], appeared the final straw for the frustrated finance minister. As if to underline Colom's weakness in the legislature, where his Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) has a mere 33 out of 158 seats, the president of congress, Roberto Alejos, also Colom's close ally, announced he was resigning from the UNE leadership committee amid frustration over the party's efforts to obstruct the passage of key legislation - including tax reform.

While Fuentes' departure undoubtedly signified a triumph for the private sector, the exit of energy minister Carlos Meany could be cast as a triumph for the public wellbeing over private interests. Officially he quit for “health reasons". His decision has been linked, however, to the government's announcement the same day (23 June) that it would adhere to the 20 May ruling by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) ordering the suspension of operations at the Marlin gold and silver mine, owned by Canada's Goldcorp amid environmental concerns. Hailed as a breakthrough by local environmental and indigenous groups, the government's announcement - which could take months to fully implement - corresponds to mounting international pressure in recent months, not least, the visit by the UN Special Rapporteur for indigenous rights, James Anaya, the previous week [WR-10-25].

• Rosenberg suspects surrender

While no doubt welcoming the news regarding Juan Alberto Fuentes' decision to step down as finance minister, Guatemala's conservative elites could well experience some discomfort following the surprise surrender this week of two suspects - businessmen Francisco and José Valdés Paiz - accused of the murder of lawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg, whose posthumously released video accusing President Colom of his death scandalised the country last year. Although Cicig concluded in January that Rosenberg planned his own death - it said it was the result “of a severe troubled emotional state" - it also found that the two men, who were part of Rosenberg's inner circle and have been at large since last December, had been asked by the lawyer to kill an alleged extortionist before calling the assassins with the description of their target — himself.  Their implication in the plot is significant given that the actions of Rosenberg - who had links to the business elite which opposes Colom - were intended, according to Cicig, "to inflict maximum damage" on his administration. Some local commentators such as Fernando Carrera, the director of the Central American institute for fiscal studies (ICEFI), have linked the video plot, which led to calls for Colom's resignation by Cacif and other private sector representatives [WR-09-22], to his fiscal reform efforts. 

• El Salvador military

In line with President Mauricio Funes's recent announcement of plans to increase military involvement in citizen security, last week 1,500 troops were sent into 20 prisons while a further 1,000 were sent to 62 out of 300 designated 'blind spots' in border areas notorious for drugs, arms and people trafficking as well as contraband. This, on top of the 3,600 soldiers already deployed to assist the police, means that 6,600 troops (out of a total of 15,000 in the army) are currently being used for citizen security.

Three years on since it began operations, the need for the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Cicig), remains acute. While the recent high-profile arrest in Spain of Carlos Vielmann, a former interior minister accused by Cicig of links to organised crime, served as a timely reminder of its success, the acquittal of another prominent official signals persistent deficiencies in state institutions. It raises questions over the long-term impact of the UN-backed commission whose mandate is due to run out in September 2011.

In a move hailed by leading local human rights organizations, Vielmann was detained in Spain on 13 October, two months after the issuance of an arrest warrant. Along with 18 other officials from the previous Oscar Berger administration (2004-2008) - including a former police (PNC) director, Erwin Sperisen (currently in Switzerland); ex director of the PNC's criminal investigations department, Ví­ctor Soto; and former director of the prison service, Alejandro Giammattei - Vielmann is accused by Cicig of the extrajudicial execution of prisoners as well as murder, drug-trafficking, money-laundering, kidnapping, extortion and drugs theft [WR-10-34].

Vielmann's arrest came as the latest reminder of Cicig's impact in redressing past impunity, several weeks after it released its third annual “balance sheet". This noted that since September 2007, when the UN-backed committee began its mandate of investigating the infiltration of state institutions by criminal organisations, it had investigated 29 high-impact cases. Of these the most significant were that of murdered lawyer, Rodrigo Rosenberg - whose posthumously released video accusing President Alvaro Colom of his murder scandalised the country - and the arrest of one of Guatemala's most corrupt presidents, Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004), in custody since January.

Cicig's balance sheet also noted achievements in its other remit - making recommendations to promote institutional reform. These include approved legislative reforms, such as amendments to arms and ammunitions laws; legislation establishing courts to hear sensitive cases; and the adoption of criteria aimed at strengthening the appointment process of the13-member supreme court (CSJ) in October 2009. The report also flagged up Cicig's intervention in the CSJ election - in which three out of the six judges to which the UN-backed committee and civil society had raised objections were replaced. It similarly noted Cicig's ultimate success in preventing Conrado Reyes, a lawyer subsequently revealed to have links to organised crime, from assuming the post of attorney general in June this year [WR-10-24].

Continuing deficiencies
Just as Vielmann's arrest served to illustrate Cicig's success, the acquittal by a local court the next day of another high-profile official, Carlos Quintanilla, pointed to the continued problem of impunity and existence of so-called Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (CIACs). The former head of the presidential security unit (SAAS), Quintanilla had been accused of spying on Colom in September 2008 in the so-called “Guategate" scandal [WR-08-36]. While not directly involved in the investigation, which was led by the attorney general's office, Cicig had flagged up Quintanilla's dubious credentials amid controversy over Reyes' appointment. Among its objections to Reyes were his ties to Quintanilla who has been linked to former General Francisco Ortega Menaldo, a former director of the now defunct Guatemalan intelligence agency (known as D-2 or G-2), implicated in some of the worst human rights abuses perpetrated during the 36-year civil war (1960-1996). Ortega is accused of heading the so-called Cofradí­a, an organised criminal enterprise which spawned many of the CIACs.

Cicig's annual report itself noted familiar difficulties which have cropped up; aside from the instability at the top of the security institutions (there have been five police chiefs and five interior ministers since Colom took office in 2008), it highlighted the fact that it is forced to cooperate with the institutions it is also investigating. This problem has emerged on various occasions where attempts to bring former officials to justice have met with resistance [WR-09-06]. Another question mark over Cicig's long-term impact emerges in relation to the issue of dependency. This is important given that other leaders in the isthmus such as El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes are hailing the Cicig model (which incorporates international and local officials and operates through the local judicial system) as the answer to the current regional security crisis.

Cicig was initially established with a two-year mandate which has already been extended once and Colom is once again calling for it to be renewed (a request to which the UN has yet to respond). Cited in a June 2010 report by the NGO, International Crisis Group, Cicig's former chief Carlos Castresana warned of the risk of too great a dependence on Cicig, which he underlined was, by its nature, a “short-term mission", adding that its mandate should end as planned in September 2011 even though it is unlikely that its work will have been completed.

Judicial developments
The need to address institutional weakness is particularly vital given general elections due to take place next September and the main priority facing the government is the appointment of a new attorney general, the top law job. Forty candidates have registered from which six will be shortlisted by the special judicial commission for President Colom to make the final choice.

The other priority urged by Cicig was finally addressed this week however - the pending appointment on 19 October of a supreme court (CSJ) president by its 13 members after the one-year term of presiding judge, Erick Alvares ran out on 13 October. While Alvares had been accused of corruption [WR-10-32], civil society has yet to raise objections to his successor, Arturo Archila. The delay over the appointment had exposed a major power struggle between two factions within the court, however. One is aligned with Sergio Roberto López Villatoro, a powerful businessman and reported ally of Colom's wife, Sandra Torres, touted as a possible 2011 presidential candidate for the ruling Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE). The other, to which Archila belongs, reportedly represents the traditional business elite.

The tensions over the appointment highlight the importance of the post, particularly ahead of the elections; among the institutions over which the CSJ president wields influence is the five-member constitutional court. This could be important, amid constitutional questions over whether Torres can in fact run. Article 186 of the constitution prohibits anyone related to the president by blood (up to second cousin) or “affinity" (widely understood to mean 'by marriage') from running for the presidency.

MERCOSUR | Trade protectionism. Argentina's government has slapped quotas on a dozen imported goods, such as luxury automobiles, consumer electronics, glass, textiles, white goods and metal products, to protect local industry “from unfair competition from South-East Asia and China," the industry minister Debora Giorgi, said. Importers will now have to request a special permit for these products. China has retaliated in the past, refusing to import Argentine soy oil for six months, and will do so again. Manufacturers in fellow Mercosur countries, who have had cause to complain about Argentine trade protectionism in the past (flouting the internal rules of the customs union) reacted angrily. Giorgi's Brazilian peer, Fernando Pimentel, travelled to Buenos Aires on 18 February to secure exemption from the import quota for Brazilian products. Uruguay's President José Mujica said he would express his disquiet about the measures to President Cristina Fernández in Buenos Aires on 25 February. Uruguay's foreign minister Luis Almagro said the government was negotiating a “fast-track formula for Uruguayan products affected by the permits".

On 10 December the Colombian senate gave final approval to a highly controverted antiterrorist statute, which allows the government to suppress rights guaranteed by the constitution and grants the military power hitherto enjoyed only by the police under judicial supervision.

Because the new legislation required the amendment of four articles of the constitution, it had to be approved in eight congressional debates, held in two separate sessions of congress. Essentially, the antiterrorist statute grants the armed forces the same powers as the judicial police, a provision which has been strongly criticised by human rights organisations and no few legislators.

The statute allows the military engaged in antiterrorist operations to conduct searches of private premises and persons, intercept communications and detain people — all without prior judicial authorisation. In committee, the senate toned down some aspects of the original draft, cutting from 72 to 36 hours the time the military can hold anyone without judicial intervention, and excising an article which would have barred the media from publishing the names of people arrested under the statute. The military are also entrusted with the registration of all inhabitants of the areas where they conduct antiterrorist operations.

Interior minister Sabas Pretelt de la Vega has tried to mollify critics with the argument that the military would only act as judicial police in units supervised by the chief prosecutor's office, that this office would be kept informed of proceedings, that there would be prompt ex post facto judicial control, and that individual rights would be guaranteed.

Before the statute comes into effect (which the government wants to happen before mid-2004) congress must pass a law regulating its implementation — or, if congress fails to act promptly, the executive must do that by decree. The provisions of the statute will remain in force for four years, renewable for a further four. In many respects, it is as if a state of emergency (which can entail the suspension of constitutional guarantees) were to be imposed for four years at a time.

Apart from Colombian human rights organisations, the new statute has been criticised by the Colombian office of the UN Human Rights Commission.

Detention before the statute
An illustration of what critics of the statute fear was provided by a military `sweep' through the localities of Puli, Quipile and San Juan de Rí­o Seco, about 100 kilometres east of Bogotá, in late October, when 69 people were arrested on suspicion of being Farc collaborators. On 10 December — the day the senate was giving final approval to the new statute — the chief prosecutor's office ordered the release of 65 of those arrested, rescinded arrest orders that had been issued against another 15, and ordered the prosecution for false testimony and procedural fraud of the informants whose information led to the arrests. In the first 11 months of this year the military arrested 6,493 alleged members of guerrilla organisations (68% more than in the same period of last year), and 2,790 members of paramilitary groups (up 126%).

The UN Security Council's decision to equip the stabilisation force in Haiti, Minustah, with a rapid-deployment unit, appears to have been sidelined by the powers that had been discussing it. Instead, the emphasis has shifted towards the adoption of a more 'aggressive' stance by the existing force, and towards talking up its achievements. Violence, however, has continued largely undiminished in and around the capital, and developments in the neighbouring Dominican Republic are giving cause for concern.

When the Security Council authorised an increase in the number of troops and police deployed in Haiti with Minustah, it stated explicitly that it wanted a 750-strong rapid reaction force, plus 50 troops to help set up headquarters in the capital. US officials first suggested, off the record, that Washington might send in the Marines and would urge France to do likewise but soon afterwards poured cold water on this prospect.

With August drawing to a close, the reinforcement of Minustah has not been secured even in straight numeric terms. At one point, reports that the Philippines would commit 200 soldiers and Jordan 750 suggested that the numeric target would be met, but it turned out that Jordan was only replacing its existing contingent, not increasing its strength.

When Jean Guéhenno, the UN's undersecretary for peacekeeping operations, reviewed the situation at the end of July, he reported that Minustah had been able to improve security in one Port-au-Prince slum district, Bel Air, but not so in Cité Soleil, where the [pro-Aristide] gangs remain strong. Alluding to the operations conducted by the UN in both these districts, Guéhenno said: 'It is not easy for Minustah to conduct these operations because, operating in an urban environment, ideally you need the kind of specialised capacities that the mission doesn't really have. But this security situation needs to be addressed urgently.' This was a clear plea for fulfilment of the Security Council's decision to add a rapid-deployment force, but it fell on deaf ears.

On 11 August, the UN's representative in Haiti, Juan Gabriel Valdés, claimed that 'tangible progress' had been made on the security front, citing the decline in kidnappings and crime generally as evidence of this. However, he could not but admit that the hard-core areas in Port-au-Prince remained basically unpacified. All he could say regarding that was that Minustah would use 'the necessary force that our mandate permits [to defeat those who] understand only the language of violence and weapons.' The level of violence was not negligible: in the previous fortnight 58 bodies had been delivered to the morgue of the capital's general hospital. Also, though progress was indeed being recorded in checking the wave of kidnappings, just before Valdés produced his review a former president of the chamber of deputies, Kelly Bastien, was abducted in Port-au-Prince.

The Dominican front
The government of the Dominican Republic has been presenting itself as another victim of the unrest in Haiti, as it has seen the flow of Haitian refugees and illegal immigrants increase over the past couple of years. Under considerable domestic political pressure, it has been responding to this with measures to tighten controls over its 335-kilometre border with Haiti and with mass expulsions of undocumented Haitians. It is worth noting that the latter is a fairly periodic occurrence in the Dominican Republic, particularly when the country is facing unease over job losses or rising crime, as at present [SSR-05-07]. 

The official rationale for 'modernising' border control is the need to curb the movement of drugs from Haiti (though it is not clear how much of the traffic comes in overland). An added motive invoked recently for tightening border surveillance has been a spate of reports - so far unconfirmed - that former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has been recruiting South African 'mercenaries' to destabilise Haiti, and that these would try to enter Haiti via the Dominican Republic.

On 1 August, Dominican President Leonel Fernández confirmed that the US Southern Command (Southcom) would be helping to establish more 'modern' controls along the border with Haiti. After having sent experts to visit the border area, Southcom is now working on a report to be submitted 'soon'. In the mean time, Fernández has been trying to enlist the help of the Haitian government and of Minustah. On 4 August the Dominican military launched an unprecedented joint operation with the Haitian national police along both sides of the border, concentrating mainly on the stretch abutting the southeastern Dominican province of Jamaní­. In all about 200 soldiers and police officers took part, under the command of General Rafael Ramí­rez, head of the investigations department of the Dominican armed forces, and Mario Andrésol, chief of the Haitian police.

The Haitian government, however, is unhappy with the Dominican policy of deporting illegal immigrants en masse. In the first half of August the authorities expelled at least 1,300 Haitians, and there have been reports of about as many again arrested for 'status checks'. 

Unsurprisingly, officials have been putting a security gloss on the deportations. On 17 August defence minister Sigfrido Pared said that the massive presence of Haitians represents a threat to national sovereignty and that this is causing 'a level of concern, though not alarm', in the government. 'It must be kept in mind,' he noted, 'that the Dominican-Haitian border is one of the most difficult in the world, and as such facilitates situations of crime caused by citizens of both countries.'

Somewhat more candidly, Juan Isidro Pérez, deputy director of migration in the north of the country, said the government was implementing a plan to 'clean' Haitian indigents off the streets of Santiago and other resorts of Cibao because their presence 'is creating a bad image abroad.' The government has been suggesting that the mass deportations are being conducted with the blessings of the Organisation of American States (OAS). They quote as evidence remarks made by OAS Secretary-General Insulza on President Leonel Fernández's Sunday radio broadcast on 14 August to the effect that the Dominican Republic had suffered from large-scale immigration from Haiti but had never received any support from the international organisations. 

Dominican officials also welcomed Insulza's dismissal of recent suggestions that there should be a 'common plan' for both countries, on the grounds that the Dominican Republic differs greatly from Haiti in its economic, political, security and development situations. It is not entirely clear where such suggestions came from, but in July President Fernández appeared to give them credence when he stated publicly, 'Haiti's reality is quite distinct from that of the Dominican Republic. But if perchance, and we do not want to assume this is so - we only present it as a remote hypothesis - if the intention is that the Dominican Republic as a "failed state" is to be occupied, let it be known that we would not in any way accept any possible occupation of the Dominican Republic.'

Statistically, the Caribbean has the world's highest regional homicide rate at 30 murders per 100,000 inhabitants per year. According to a recent study conducted jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the high rate has become a grave obstacle to economic and social development. The report argues that reducing the homicide rate in the Caribbean by a third could more than double the region's rate of per capita economic growth. Much of the violent crime is attributed to the drugs trade, which some indicators suggest may be waning.

The World Bank-UNODC study (Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean) acknowledges that homicide rates in countries with small populations - which means most of the Caribbean - appear magnified.
The Caribbean's high overall regional homicide rate largely reflects the high rates in four countries: Haiti (33.9 per 100,000), Jamaica (33.8), the Dominican Republic (16.5) and Guyana (16.1).

Of 10 Caribbean countries for which the study found relatively recent data, only one other, St Kitts and Nevis, has a homicide rate of slightly more than 10 per 100,0000. The rest have rates comparable to or lower than the average for North America.

Of the four countries with the highest homicide rates, three are also among the most populous: the Dominican Republic (9.4m inhabitants), Haiti (8.7m) and Jamaica (2.8m). Guyana has a population of less than 800,000, meaning that although statistics show huge swings in the homicide rate, the figures represent smaller numbers of actual homicides, compared to other countries in the region.

The other more populous Caribbean country, Cuba -which has 11.4m inhabitants- had in 2002 a rate of violent deaths of 5.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, roughly half that of the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

It has been noted that the homicide rates may be misleading, as they are calculated against the permanent resident population in an area which has a huge annual influx of tourists.

The drugs factor
The study explains that drug trafficking is at the core of the high violent crime rates prevailing in the Caribbean. "Narcotics trafficking," it says, "diverts criminal justice resources from other important activities, increases and embeds violence, undermines social cohesion and contributes to the widespread availability of firearms in the region."

Gun ownership, it adds, is a consequence of the drug trade and, in some countries, of politics and associated garrison communities. While it admits that reducing gun ownership is difficult, it suggests that better gun registries, marking and tracking can help, as can improved gun interdiction in ports. Policies, it argues, should also focus on limiting the availability of firearms and on providing meaningful alternatives to youth.
This links up with another of the study's findings: that deaths and injuries from youth violence constitute a major threat to public health and social and economic progress across the Caribbean.

The study also found that the young population are disproportionately represented as both the victims and the perpetrators of crime and violence.

Of the 20 countries identified as major drug-transit or major drug-producing countries by the US government in 2006, four are in the Caribbean: the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica.

As noted above, the latter three of these are the countries with the highest murder rates in the subregion. The World Bank-UNODC study ventures that 'the good news is that the flow of drugs through the region may be decreasing'. It attributes this to several factors, among which the

following are highlighted:

-A decline in cocaine consumption in the US from its high levels in the 1980s (based on a survey finding on the fall in cocaine use among US high-school 12th-graders from 13.1% in 1985 to 5.1% in 2005).

-A slump in cannabis production for export from Jamaica, the largest cannabis producer in the region.

-The breakup of the major Colombian cartels, leading to their replacement by Mexican drug gangs that prefer to transship along the Central American coast and then across the US-Mexico border, and to market Mexican-produced cannabis on the low end of the market.

The US National Drug Intelligence Center has estimated that the pattern of cocaine flows to the US has been shifting, with the proportion transiting through Central America and Mexico rising from 66% in 2000 to 88% in 2005, while that going through the Caribbean has declined over the same period from 33% to 12%.

These figures are, of course, estimates projected largely from the volume of seizures.

Even before the Mexican gangs began to take over the traffic of cocaine from Colombia, there had been a noticeable shift of traffic, first from the Caribbean islands to the Caribbean coast of Central America, then to routes along the Pacific.

Seizure data is an equivocal basis for projections of total drug flows. For example, UNODC figures show that the number of Caribbean countries reporting record annual drug seizures in 2001-03 (9) was actually higher than those reporting record catches in 1998-2000 (8), and if the record hauls are averaged out for each of these three year periods, the later one, with 4.8 tonnes, surpasses the earlier one, with only 3.3t.

High seizure figures are routinely depicted as both interdiction successes and an indication of a high total flow, while low ones - as in the Cuban case, cited in the World Bank-UNODC study - are said to reflect great success at interdiction.

The Caribbean continues to be a route for cocaine destined for the Canadian market, and for heroin and synthetic drugs headed for the US.

The World Bank-UNODC study predicts that, despite its relative decline, the Caribbean will continue to be a key drug trans-shipment area, for four important reasons:

Colombia remains the source of most of the United States' cocaine and heroin, so the Caribbean will remain an attractive trans-shipment route.

• The Caribbean has lingual, historical, commercial, and legal ties to some of the major consumer countries, not to mention the massive tourism industry, which incorporates daily direct air flights and container traffic.
• The Caribbean diaspora, particularly nationals of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, plays a key role in domestic drug distribution in parts of North America and Europe.
• Expatriates from Europe and the US living in the Caribbean further enhance this network.
• The torrent of remittances from expatriate populations, as well as a large financial services industry, provides cover for money laundering.

Policy response
As has been the case with earlier studies by the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank linking violent crime with obstacles to development, the latest World Bank-UNODC effort hopes the economic argument will spur governments into action. It reads, "Crime is arguably the number one social issue for much of the Caribbean, with its only serious rival being economic development. Leaders are coming to realize, however, that the

two issues are strongly related.

Crime drives away investment, both foreign and domestic, and consequently slows growth. The Caribbean has been described as the most tourism-dependent area in the world, and crime is anathema for this industry.

A second key industry - the financial services sector - is threatened by white-collar crime and money laundering.

The region is also one of the areas of the world most affected by brain drain, and there is evidence that crime is feeding this exodus in some areas. In these and many other ways, it is clear that crime is impeding the development of the Caribbean."

The World Bank-UNODC study suggests that if Haiti were to lower its homicide rate to the same level as Costa Rica's, its economic growth could be raised by 5.4%, while the Dominican Republic and Guyana could raise theirs by 1.8% and 1.7%, respectively.

The study arrives at a conclusion similar to those undertaken prior to it, namely, that there is an over-reliance on the criminal justice system to reduce crime in the region. At the same time, though, it says that it must be recognised that some types of crime -such as organised crime, drug and firearms trafficking- are generally impervious to prevention initiatives; their control requires an efficient criminal justice system.

Peak annual cocaine seizures Tonnes, 1998-2004* Country/territory Tonnes Year Country/territory Tonnes Year Puerto Rico 10.3 1998 Anguilla 0.9 2001 Guadeloupe 3.2 1998 Trinidad & Tobago 0.8 2001 Dominican Republic 2.3 1998 Antigua & Barbuda 0.8 2001 Turks & Caicos 2.1 1998 Bermuda 0.7 2001 Haiti 1.3 1998 Jamaica 3.7 2002 Aruba 0.8 1998 Netherlands Antilles 9.0 2003 Cuba 2.4 1999 Bahamas 4.4 2003 Cayman Islands 1.9 1999 Martinique 1.1 2003 British Virgin Is. 2.2 2001 *Listed by year and volume seized. Source: World Bank-UNODC.

 

Homicide rates in the Caribbean   Per 100,000 inhabitants Haiti                                                   33.9 Jamaica                                         33.8 Dominican Republic     16.5* Guyana                                           16.1* St Kitts & Nevis               10.2 Dominica                                     8.3 Barbados                                   7.9 Antigua & Barbuda       6.8 Grenada                                       7.1 Trinidad & Tobago       7.4*	Homicide rates by region   Per 100,000 inhabitants Caribbean                           30                     North America                     7 Southwest Africa       29                     South Asia                                 4 South America               26                   Southeast Europe               3 East/Southeast Asia 22                   Oceania                                           3 Central America           22                   West/Central Europe     2 East Europe                       17                   North Africa                                 1 Central Asia                         9       Middle East/Southwest Asia 1 East Africa                             8 Source: World Bank-UNODC.
Homicide rates by region   Per 100,000 inhabitants Caribbean 30 North America 7 Southwest Africa 29   South Asia 4 South America 26   Southeast Europe 3 East/Southeast Asia 22   Oceania 3 Central America 22   West/Central Europe 2 East Europe 17   North Africa 1 Central Asia 9   Middle East/Southwest Asia1 East Africa 8 Source: World Bank-UNODC.	Deaths due to violence in the Caribbean   WHO data per 100,000 population, 2002 Bahamas 21.2   Guyana 9.9 St Vincent & Gren. 13.0   Trinidad & Tobago 8.8 St Kitts & Nevis 11.9 Barbados 8.5 Antigua & Barbuda 10.2   St Lucia 7.6 Dominican Republic 10.2   Cuba 5.3 Haiti 10.2   Suriname 4.2 Source: World Bank-UNODC.
Deaths due to violence in the Caribbean   WHO data per 100,000 population, 2002 Bahamas 21.2 Guyana 9.9 St Vincent & Gren. 13.0   Trinidad & Tobago 8.8 St Kitts & Nevis 11.9   Barbados 8.5 Antigua & Barbuda 10.2   St Lucia 7.6 Dominican Republic 10.2   Cuba 5.3 Haiti 10.2   Suriname 4.2 Source: World Bank-UNODC.	Homicide rates in the Dominican Republic & Trinidad   Per 100,000 inhabitants Year         DR       T&T     Year     DR     T&T 2000         13           9             2003       19       18 2001         12       12             2004       25         20 2002         15       13             2005       27         20 Source: World Bank-UNODC.
Homicide rates in Jamaica & Guyana Per 100,000 inhabitants Year Jamaica Guyana Year Jamaica Guyana 1994 31                 16                 2000   44               12 1995 37                 14                 2001   40               10 1996 42                 14                 2002   36               10 1997 37                 11                 2003   54               19 1998 33                 11                 2004   58               27 1999 34                 15                 2005   49               17 Source: World Bank-UNODC.	Routing of cocaine to the US % share of estimated total flow* per route Year   Central America Caribbean   Direct& Mexico 2000       66                                         33                                     1 2001       72                                         26                                     2 2002       72                                         27                                     1 2003       77                                         22                                     1 2004       90                                         10                                       - 2005       88                                         12                                       - *According to the US National Drug Intelligence Center. Source: World Bank-UNODC.

PANAMA | Acknowledging the Farc's presence. A reluctant Panamanian government is slowly acknowledging that the presence of the Colombian Farc guerrillas is greater than has been previously admitted. Since the beginning of the year, four episodes illustrate this shift. On 6 January the public prosecution service announced that it was charging a Colombian with crimes against collective security; while he was openly described in the media as a member of the Farc, this was not mentioned in official statements.

On 10 February a local television station broadcast images of the arrival in Panama City, by air, of a group of people guarded by agents of the national immigration service (SNM). The report identified them as Farc members, but the director of the national police, Francisco Troya, not only refused to confirm this but actually said that police officials were still trying to verify the incident. A subsequent communiqué from the government's communications secretariat identified them as 'suspected irregulars'.

On 11 February the government announced that four Colombian guerrillas who had surrendered to the border police had been classified as illegal immigrants and returned to Colombia, after they had expressed their wish to avail themselves of their country's 'demobilisation' scheme.

A week later, interior minister Dilio Arcio reported that a Colombian refugee had been murdered in the border province of Darién by 'irregulars', which has become officialese for suspected members of the Farc. The killers were three men armed with assault rifles. The victim was residing in Panama under the government's programme of 'temporary humanitarian protection'.

HONDURAS | Murder rate rises. In 2008 there were 4,473 homicides in Honduras, an increase of 25.2% on 2007, according to a report by the Observatorio de la Violencia and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This figure does not include the 2,762 other cases of violent death due to accidents, suicide and other causes.

36% of the homicides in 2008 were attributed to gunmen in the service of organised crime; 47.2% took place in the departments of Francisco Morazán and Cortés (which include, respectively, the cities of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula). The 2008 figure translates into a rate of 57.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

NICARAGUA | Crime rate increases. The national police reports that in 2008 there were 154,771 reported crimes in Nicaragua, or 11% more than in 2007. The report noted that the cases of robbery with violence were up by 10%, those of robbery with force by 12.5% and those of robbery with intimidation, by 47%.

Rafael Solí­s, vice-president of the supreme court, has said that since December there has been a sharp rise in car theft, and holdups of micro-finance institutions, restaurants and other businesses. The government is preparing a bill to grant the police additional powers, but these are designed with the aim of tackling organised rather than 'ordinary' crime.

On 7 October, within days of two major kidnapping cases, the lower chamber of Mexico's congress approved a new law that establishes stiffer penalties for kidnapping, which the chamber had been debating since April, when the bill was passed by the senate.

The congressmen decided against two proposals: the imposition of the death penalty, advocated by some anticrime NGOs, and the adoption of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, suggested by President Felipe Calderón. Instead they set the maximum prison term at 70 years. The new law establishes a basic penalty of 20-40 years, increased to 25-45 years for any public servants involved or when the victim is mutilated, and to 40-70 years if the victim is murdered.

It also sets up a fund to compensate victims, with an initial appropriation of M$98.7m (US$8m). The law imposes upon state prosecution services the obligation to set up special anti-kidnap units, with specialised personnel (prosecutors, police officers and officials).

The debates in congress and the presentation of the new law illustrated the paucity of hard data about kidnapping. One set of official figures reports 1,181 cases in 2009, 40% more than in 2008 and almost twice as many as in 2006. Among the sources cited were a report by the private Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad (Icei) that tallied 236 cases between 2007 and 2009, and another by Alto al Secuestro, an NGO, that reported 1,300 cases in 2009 alone, which by its calculations, represented an increase of 15% on 2008.

Another NGO, the Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad Pública, culled from media reports the figure of 3,000 abduction cases in the past five years that have been attributed to drug gangs, in what is popularly known as levantones ('liftings'). This same organisation puts the total number of extorsive kidnappings in the last four years (excluding levantones) at 5,351.

The chairman of the lower chamber's public security committee, José Luis Ovando, said that the number of kidnappings had increased more than fourfold in the same period. The bulk of victims fall into four categories: merchants (27.8%), students (21%), employees (16%) and entrepreneurs (14.5%).

The two high-profile cases that took place shortly before approval of the new law are proving hard to fit into well-defined category. The first was the disappearance of seven young men, two of them US nationals, last seen on 25 September when stopped by municipal police in Colima for a traffic violation while travelling from Michoacán towards Manzanillo. Relatives have raised the possibility that they might have been secretly detained by police or by a marine unit on the trail of people involved in the drugs trade.

The other involved the 30 September abduction by armed men of 20 men from Michoacán in Acapulco, Guerrero, where they had ostensibly gone for a weekend. Two members of the party who had reported the abduction were not heard from again. Authorities in both Michoacán and Guerrero have speculated that the episode could be a mass levantón, possibly by one of the factions of the Beltrán Leyva cartel, which has been fighting off attempts by the rival La Familia Michoacana (LFM) to take over the Acapulco trafficking hub. Some officials have suggested an additional twist: that the levantón may have been a case of mistaken identity. Up to the time of writing there has been no news of the victims.