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  • Washington Watch

    20 May 2010 Hits: 157

    Cuba:   The Miami Herald  reported on 19 May that the US State Department is involved in "low level, technical level" talks and exchanges of information to help Cuba respond if the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico approaches Cuba. Cuban government officials called US oceanographers seeking assistance last week. Aside from the fact that any oil spill could do damage to Cuba's coastal coral reefs and maritime habitats, US scientists and environmentalist stress that engagement on these issues with all of the relevant Cuban authorities is crucial. Any potential oil spill in Cuba, which is heavily targeting the development of its own off-shore deepwater oil industry, could have equally devastating consequences for US coastal areas.

    Honduras:   On 6 May President Porfirio Lobo confirmed the appointment of Jorge Ramón Hernández Alcerro as Honduras' new ambassador to the US, following US State Department approval. Hernández, one of the authors of the 1982 Constitution, previously held the post under the government of Rafael Leonardo Callejas (1990-1994) and was the minister of governance under the Ricardo Maduro administration (2002-2006). He has also served as a magistrate at the Central American Court of Justice in Managua, Nicaragua.

    Honduras:   On 17 May a new mission from the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrived in Tegucigalpa for a scheduled 2010 Article IV consultation. The fund, which spent 10 days in the country in mid March, will hold further talks with Finance Minister William Chong Wong about the government's economic recovery and fiscal stabilisation plans. Chong Wong hopes the Fund will release a US$300m loan for the country in the third quarter. The central bank governor, Marí­a Elena Mondragón, will approve a new monetary programme on 20 May addressing the exchange rate. She said there was no pressure for a devaluation of the lempira at the minute, as imports are recovering more slowly than exports, allowing reserves to be rebuilt.

    Honduras: On 16 May the top US military chief for Latin America, Southcom commander General Douglas Fraser, visited Honduras for the first time to mark renewed US military ties with Honduras. Fraser met the defence minister, Marlon Pascua, and members of the Honduran armed forces, as well as the US Ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens. On the agenda was the fight against drugs trafficking, humanitarian assistance projects, disaster response training, human rights, educational exchanges and participation in bilateral and multinational military exercises.

    Mexico: On 19 May President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa and his wife were entertained to a state dinner at the White House by President Barack Obama and his wife Michelle. This was the Obamas' first state dinner for a head of state. Today, 20 May, Calderón is due to address a joint session of the US congress.

  • Peru's indigenous consultation law stalled

    28 June 2010 Hits: 282

    Development: On 25 July President Alan Garcí­a said he would refuse to ratify the 'ley de consulta'.

    Significance: The executive worries that the wording of the law, which Garcí­a claims is ambiguous, may allow Peru's national growth to be hindered by the particular interests of indigenous groups.

    Government members, such as Rolando de Sousa (the president of the congressional justice committee) claim the law gives indigenous groups a “hidden veto power" on all developments in the highlands and the Amazon where Peru's mineral and hydrocarbon wealth is mostly located.

    Peru is required to implement this legislation - otherwise it remains a non-ratifying state to the UN Convention on Indigenous Rights and the International Labour Organisation's Convention 169, which covers the rights of indigenous peoples to be consulted. 

    The timing of President Garcí­a's decision has effectively stalled the law for two months. It must now return to congress so that the executive's concerns are taken into account. Mercedes Cabanillas, the president of congress's constitutional committee, said on 27 June that the delay was lamentable but necessary.  Congress is due to enter a two month recess at the end of this week.

    Garcí­a's move comes at a fragile time for government-indigenous relations. On 5 June an indigenous mobilisation took place in the Amazonian area of Bagua to mark the 5 June 2009 violent clashes with police in which 35 people died, 25 of them police officers. The confrontation was over la 'Ley de la selva', which was designed to facilitate the sale of oil concessions in the Amazon.

  • Another car bomb in Mexico

    06 August 2010 Hits: 165

    Development: On 5 August the authorities said that a car-bomb had exploded outside a police station in the border state of Tamaulipas.

    Significance: This was the second car bomb to have exploded in the past fortnight. The attack appears to have been less pre-meditated than the first explosion in Ciudad Juárez which killed two policemen, a doctor and a first-aider who were coming to the aid of a policeman who had been wounded.

    What is alarming about the 5 August bomb is that it went off inside the parking lot of the police station. The car exploded at 5.20pm, the police said, in Ciudad Victoria, the capital of the state of Tamaulipas. The bomb destroyed two police cars but did not injure anybody.

  • Cuba discovers Thatcherite economics

    14 September 2010 Hits: 209

    Development: On 13 September, the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba confirmed official government plans to drastically reduce the public sector labour force, with some 10% of the state payroll, or just over 0.5m workers, to be shed by 1 April 2011, with a parallel major expansion in private sector economic activity.

    Significance:   This is a dramatic push forward by the government of President Raúl Castro. The details are fuzzy - it is essentially an effort to impose a limited market economy on a very dysfunctional Communist economy, but without other supporting measures, to address the market -distorting dual currency for instance, it's difficult to see how it will actually work out in practice. The government clearly calculates that the tremendous pent up demand for goods and services will rapidly drive the creation of a formal private sector. It also appears willing to take the risk of some social dislocation.

    Spurred into action by the desperate state of the public finances, President Castro has given added urgency to his plans to whittle down the role of state in the Cuban economy. Some Cuba watchers believe that his predecessor and brother Fidel Castro, still head of the ruling Communist Party, has tacitly signalled his support for these measures in recent comments.

    In an early August address to congress, Raúl repeated previous warnings that some 1.0m workers in the state sector were “superfluous" and would have to go. Under the plan, the state will absorb around half the workers, in sectors like agriculture, construction, education and policing (and possibly the military?). If workers don't accept alternative jobs in the state sector, they will be eligible for up to three months unemployment, equivalent to 70% of their salary (depending on seniority). They might also be offered the chance to study or retrain.

    More notably, there is to be a parallel increase in non-state employment - meaning the private sector- with an ambitious target to create 450,000 non-state jobs by the end of 2011. The government expects to issue 250,000 new licenses for self-employment (almost twice the current number), in addition to the creation of 200,000 other non-state jobs.

    The main impact of this dramatic reform will be to bring the black economy out of the shadows and legalise the thousands of self-employed workers that currently toil informally. The small legal entrepreneurial class (like barbers and hair salons) will also be able to expand and hire workers. The idea is that small start-ups would lease their shops from the government, buy supplies themselves, set their prices and keep their profits. A legal private sector is, of course, a source of tax revenue for the government.

    In practice, many of the existing state workplaces in urban areas will probably be converted into cooperatives (co-ops are already allowed in the countryside). These new workplaces will then have to learn how to be profitable on their own.

    The state employs some 85% of the Cuban workforce, or some 5.0m people. Fidel Castro nationalised all small businesses in 1968.   On current official figures, about 591,000 work in the private sector (mostly small farmers), with some 143,000 self-employed.

    The average monthly Cuban state salary is just US$20, often supplemented by illegal black market jobs and remittances from abroad.

  • Chávez's expensive bid for agri revolution

    26 October 2010 Hits: 577

    Development: On 25 October, President Hugo Chávez ordered the takeover by the state of the local arm of the US glass bottling firm Owens-Illinois.

    Significance: Food sovereignty has been a key aim of President Chávez since he came to power just over a decade ago. His government has pushed the state into an ever greater role in the entire food chain, from production right through to distribution and retail. The cost of this policy is tremendous - yet the evidence to date suggests it's neither efficient nor all that productive. Venezuela, which has never traditionally had a strong agriculture sector, is now more reliant on imports than ever, while rising food prices have underpinned the country's sustained high inflation.

    In the past month, the government has moved aggressively to increase its control over the agriculture sector. Days after the 26 September legislative elections in which his ruling Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV) failed to hold onto a targeted two thirds majority, Chávez ordered the expropriation of the country's largest agricultural supply firm (Agroisleña), an oil/lubricants manufacturer (Grupo Venoco), a large fertiliser and chemicals company (Fertinitro), as well as a beef firm and a large estate owned by a UK family. He also sent down to the national assembly (AN) an emergency law for the 'rescue' of 'unused' urban plots, similar to a previous law applied in rural areas.
     
    The US$47bn 2011 budget provides no proper expenditure breakdown, so it's almost impossible to know at a glance what the government is investing in the agriculture sector. The daily El Nacional suggests it is in the region of BF4.8bn (US$1.1bn).  The US$54bn Special Indebtedness law additionally assigns some BF9.6bn (US$2.24bn) to projects in the government's designated strategic sectors, which includes agriculture.  Some BF369.12m (US$85m) of this will go on two agriculture projects, the main one being a large irrigation scheme, Valle de Quibor. Much of the Chávez government's expenditure is actually off budget, with windfall oil revenues stashed in opaque discretionary accounts like the National Development Fund (Fonden). Other money comes from channels like the multi-billion dollar China Fund.

    The government claims, not unreasonably, that its network of state run and state subsidised supermarkets has improved the lot of millions of low income families living in poor urban barrios. Yet local private agri-producers have not benefited. They operate in a shifting business environment, characterised by high margins and low profits, and forced to carry the cost of the official price (and exchange rate) controls, which makes it very difficult to compete with the flood of imported food.

    They also operate with legal uncertainty. The National Lands Institute (INTI) claims that the government has 'rescued' some 3.0m hectares of 'unused' rural lands in the past decade and has suggested that it plans to add a further 450,000 to its tally in 2011. The central bank does not separately report agriculture output data, but admits in its annual report that overall sector productivity, both public and private, is low.

    Yesterday, it was also announced that Ecuador will sell Venezuela some 40,000 tonnes of paddy rice and 3,200 tonnes of milk, at an unspecified cost.   In July, Ecuador sold Venezuela 5,430 tonnes of rice, allegedly paid for in 'sucres', the new Alba currency. According to data from the National Statistics Institute, imports of coffee rose 76.35% year-on-year in the first half of 2010, while sugar imports rose 152% in the same period, amid local shortages. The state is also importing for the first time in many years white maize for flour processing.

    Pointer: Venezuelan banks are obliged to allocate 21% of their loan portfolio to agriculture - this amounted to some US$10.1bn between August 2005 and August 2010 according to local analysts, who based their calculations on lending figures published by the banking superintendency.

  • Farc and Uribe had secret contact

    09 December 2010 Hits: 236

    Development: On 8 December, the Spanish daily El Paí­s released several WikiLeaks cables revealing (failed) contacts between the former Colombian government of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc).

    Significance: These contacts, in the final year of Uribe's administration, were in stark contrast to his public rhetoric. The leaked cables, sent from the US embassy in Bogotá to other US embassies in the region and further afield, confirm that the government was seeking to meet Farc leaders in Sweden. The Farc publicly rejected the proposal in April 2010, prompting the Uribe government to declare that it would only negotiate with the Farc once it had been defeated militarily.

    More importantly, the cables revealed that in May 2009, an envoy sent by 'Pablo Catatumbo' (Jorge Torres Victoria), a member of the Farc's seven-man secretariat, met with members of the US embassy at the Episcopal Conference in Bogotá; the Catholic Church has been a trusted mediator in the conflict for decades. 'Catatumbo' didn't send a specific message but instead wanted to “establish a relationship" with the embassy that “could be useful in the future" as he believed that a successful peace negotiation would have to include the US at the negotiating table.

    Separately, the Farc yesterday released a communiqué announcing the release of five hostages. The fact that both documents came out on the same day was mere coincidence, since Farc communication systems would not allow 'Alfonso Cano' (Guillermo Sáenz), the guerrilla's supreme commander, to react or respond to news reports in real time.

    The Farc communiqué is an attempt to “make amends" and a “humanitarian gesture" towards former senator Piedad Córdoba, whom the guerrilla 'appointed' as the person to receive the hostages. It remains to be seen if President Juan Manuel Santos will allow Córdoba to perform that role. On 27 September, the Colombian attorney general's office removed Córdoba from the senate and barred her from public office for 18 years for “promoting and collaborating" with the Farc.

    The Farc had announced the end of its unilateral hostage releases after freeing Sergeant Pablo Emilio Moncayo on 31 March last. This latest announcement renews hopes for the families of the other armed forces members still in captivity.

  • More problems for Correa over referendum

    04 February 2011 Hits: 324

    Development: On 28 January a faction of Ecuador's ruling Alianza PAIS announced its withdrawal from the party citing disagreement with President Rafael Correa's determination to push on with a referendum to reform the 2008 constitution.

    Significance: The faction, Ruptura de los 25, includes one member of the national assembly and two ministers, Juan Sebastián Roldán, who runs the anti-corruption ministry, and Alexandra Ocles, who leads the racial diversity ministry (Pueblos y Nacionalidades). All three resigned.

    Key points:

    Four members of the national assembly have now broken with the ruling Alianza PAIS over the referendum. These dissidents argue that the government is resorting to a direct style of democracy, marginalising both the legislature and the judiciary. Correa and his supporters argue that the referendum represents an extension of democracy.

    In his 29 January weekly TV broadcast President Correa denied that he was marginalising state institutions. He argued that the referendum would settle the direction of the reforms, especially to the judiciary, while the detail would be refined by “representatives of the legislature and judiciary" along with the executive, over a period of 18 months after the referendum.

  • Obama charms Brazil

    21 March 2011 Hits: 330

    Development: President Barack Obama's trip to Brazil over the weekend (19-20 March), was judged a success and an important symbolic 're-set' button for bilateral political ties.

    Significance: President Dilma Rousseff may visit the White House at Obama's invitation in September, after her expected opening address to the UN General Assembly in New York. Local sources said the two formed a good rapport in a longer-than-expected private meeting on Saturday. Although the Libyan crisis was a distraction, and there was little in the way of material policy progress on issues like US trade barriers, Obama said and did all the right things, praising Brazil's democracy and economy and acknowledging its deep desire for recognition as a global player. "Let us stand together not as senior and junior partners but as equal partners", Obama declared in Rio yesterday (20 March), to several standing ovations.

    Key points:

    There was much speculation about former president Lula da Silva's decision not to accept his protégé's invitation to the five former Brazilian presidents to the official dinner with Obama on Saturday. The other four, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Itamar Franco, Fernando Collor de Melo and José Sarney, all sat at the top table with Rousseff and Obama. Lula said he had a family birthday party to attend.

    The US contingent, including Obama, apparently lobbied on behalf of the Boeing Super Hornet jets. The Rousseff government has signalled more of an interest in the US bid (Lula had favoured a French bid), but there is no timeframe for the purchase.

    Security concerns caused the cancellation of Obama's planned open speech to the public in Rio yesterday, which was moved to a smaller invitation-only indoor theatre venue. Brazilian police fired rubber bullets on anti-US protestors on Saturday (19 March), some led by left-wing radicals from the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores. Ahead of Obama's midday arrival in Santiago, Chile, today (21 March), a small bomb went off outside the Chilean-US Institute of Cultural Relations in Viña del Mar (125 km east of the capital), in the early hours. No-one was reported injured.

  • Chile's steams ahead on hydroelectric dams

    10 May 2011 Hits: 613

    Development: On 9 May, the local Aysén region environmental evaluation committee (CEA) voted in favour of the controversial HidroAysén hydroelectric project to be constructed in Chile's Patagonia.

    Significance: The government backed the project despite civil society groups and the opposition protesting against it. Chile currently imports 70% of its energy, mainly from neighbouring Argentina. To reduce this energy-dependence, the government estimates needs to increase its energy production by 80% by 2025. 

    Key points:

    The project envisages the construction of five hydroelectric dams along the Pascua and Baker rivers to produce an estimated 2,750 MW of electricity, boosting Chile's current installed capacity of 14,000 MW. The US$3.2bn investment project is to be carried out by a Spanish-Italian consortium in partnership with local firm, Colbún.
     
    Some 10,000 people protested the decision in various cities across Chile, including the capital Santiago, and Coyhaique, where the voting was held. They opposed to the flooding of 5,900 hectares in one of the world's largest natural reserves home to some unique valleys. They claim that the destruction of these would affect small and medium sized entrepreneurs that have invested in eco-tourism activities in the area. Eco-tourism is a US$72m per year industry in Chile.
     
    Environment minister, Marí­a Ignacia Bení­tez, welcomed the decision stating that it reflected years of planning to ensure that the proposal met “the strictest measures". Similarly, President Sebastián Piñera stated that “If the HidroAysén project is approved it is because it meets Chile's environmental legislation 100%". Moreover, Piñera explained that hydroelectric energy is one of the cleanest sources of renewable energy and that if the dams were not built, Chile would have to build more carbon-powered electric plants that would further damage the environment.

    The CEA voted in favour of the project first presented in 2006, with a final vote tally of 11 votes in favour and one abstention, culminating almost three years of investigations, by the CEA. However, the decision can be overruled by the cabinet, but this looks unlikely.

  • Difficulties

    26 May 2010 Hits: 1

    China has now swung behind US policy, which is against the enlargement of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. This move has disappointed Brazil which had hoped for Chinese support for its application to become a permanent member. China's view is coloured by its opposition to granting Japan a permanent seat on the Security Council.

    China's move has thrust Japan and Brazil into a closer alliance on UN reform. President Lula da Silva visited Tokyo at the end of May to underline the development. His trip to the Far East also took in Seoul. 

    Brazil's rapprochement with Japan could have economic implications. In the 1970s, Japan became the third-largest investor in Brazil as it took stakes in raw material producers and basic industries such as steel and petrochemicals. Since then Brazilian-Japanese links have frayed: Japan is now only the 10th largest foreign investor in Brazil.

    President Lula is keen on diversifying the range of Brazil's exports to Japan away from raw materials and commodities. He claimed that Japan could become a significant market for Embraer's mid-range jets, Brazilian software and its cleaner alcohol-based fuels. 

    In 2004 Brazil's exports to Japan were worth US$2.7bn. Brazil's imports from Japan came to US$2.8bn. Brazilians are Japan's third-biggest national minority after Chinese and Koreans. The biggest Brazilian community is in Nagoya.

    Brazil and Japan say that they are both members of the so-called Group of Four. The other two countries which feel that they deserve permanent seats on the UN security council are Germany and India. 

    Peru: President Alejandro Toledo of Peru paid an official visit to China at the beginning of June. Peru was one of the first countries in Latin America to establish diplomatic relations with China: it did so in 1971. In December 2004 both countries elevated their bilateral relationship to an Association of Complete Cooperation. China is Peru's second-biggest trading partner. Peru runs a heavy trade surplus with China, thanks to its large exports of metals. The other important Peruvian exports are fishmeal and cotton yarn. In 2004 China imported US$1.23bn worth of goods from Peru and exported about US$705m. Trade between the two countries increased by 80% in 2004. 

    The most tangible result of Toledo's visit was the gift of US$133m worth of seismographs from China. 

     

  • 2 February 2005

    02 February 2005 Hits: 88

    MEXICO: US seeks to mend relations

    OAS: Derbez tries to tap into anti-Americanism

    CUBA: US concern at EU lifting sanctions

    VENEZUELA: Rodríguez responds to US criticism

    ECUADOR: Trade minister seeks deal on flowers and tuna

    MEXICO
    President George Bush called President Vicente Fox on 1 February to try to end a row caused by comments made by the US ambassador to Mexico on Mexico's floundering efforts to deal with organised crime. These comments were compounded by an alarmist warning issued by the State Department about the dangers of travelling to the north of Mexico. In the half hour call, President Bush confirmed his invitation to Fox to come to meet him in Washington in early March. The Canadian prime minister, Paul Martin, will also be part of that encounter. According to President Fox, he made another appeal to Bush to implement a deal to improve the rights of immigrants in the US and to encourage them to migrate there legally. Fox said that Bush had promised to send his proposal to congress. However, as Bush also said that he will discuss the proposal during Fox's visit, it seems that it is still some way from going to congress. The US effort to soothe bruised feelings in Mexico was reinforced by a conciliatory briefing from the State Department. The State Department was asked to comment on a statement from Santiago Creel, the interior minister and Fox's candidate to succeed him as president.

    On 31 January Creel said that certification [by the US] should not be reinstated because Mexico is fighting the drug trade and arresting drug barons; while the US has not even identified its own drug barons. Creel added that the US was not bothered about the money generated by the drug trade in the US. The State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, replied: " I don't really have any comment. I hadn't seen his particular comments, but this is not a matter of argument between the US and Mexico. It's a matter of cooperation between the US and Mexico. We've done a lot together to fight drugs. We know we've got supply problems, demand problems, and we both need to address both, all these aspects. And our emphasis with Mexico on the drug problems is to fight them together, to cooperate in law enforcement, to cooperate in policy issues, and that's the way we'll keep handling these things."

    OAS
    The Mexican foreign minister, Luis Ernesto Derbez, tried to tap another seam of anti-Americanism by promising to end the perception that the Organization of American States was manipulated by the US. Derbez is running for the job of OAS Secretary General. The US candidate for the job is the former president of El Salvador, Francisco Flores. The other candidate is the former Chilean foreign (now interior) minister, José Miguel Insulza. Derbez said that he did not believe that the US manipulated the OAS but he admitted that this was a widespread perception. The US has not formally opposed either Derbez or Insulza. Derbez claims that Flores is not the consensus candidate from Central America that he claims to be: Derbez said that Panama, Honduras and Belize all oppose Flores.

    CUBA
    The US State Department expressed concern on 1 February at the decision by the European Union to lift diplomatic sanctions on Cuba. The sanctions were imposed in June 2003 after 75 political dissidents were rounded up and imprisoned without trial. "We remain concerned that suspending the restrictive measures without achieving the goals for which they were put in place will embolden regime hardliners and dishearten the peaceful opposition," the spokesman for the State Department, Richard Boucher, said. He also urged the EU to continue to push the government of President Fidel Castro on human rights issues. "Our experience in terms of watching what's happened with Cuba and the Castro regime is that a productive dialogue with the Castro regime is simply not possible," Boucher said. "Past efforts by the Europeans and others have yielded neither political nor economic reforms, and therefore we believe that the kind of pressure that has existed in the past is the only approach, the best approach, to trying to secure change in Cuba. But we will continue to work with the Europeans on how best to promote human rights in Cuba and how best to support the democratic opposition," he added. The EU will review its decision to restore high-level visits by European officials to Cuba and increase its participation in Cuban cultural events in July.

    VENEZUELA
    Venezuela's foreign minister, Alí­ Rodrí­guez, warned that the US's “serious concerns" about the government of President Chávez could be the prelude to more Washington-backed “outrages" in the Latin American country. Rodrí­guez made his comments on 1 February in response to a briefing by Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, who expressed concern over media and political freedoms under the Chávez government. The foreign minister argued that “everybody knows the consequence of such concerns_The US's fears are about the Venezuelan people who in the course of nine consecutive elections have thrown out the opposition and given their firm and faithful support to President Chávez ." Today, 2 February, marks Chávez 's sixth anniversary in power.

    ECUADOR
    Ivonne Baki, the minister for foreign trade travelled to the US on 1 February in order to seek better conditions for entry into the US market for Ecuador's burgeoning flower and tuna exports. Baki's trip coincides with the final stages of the negotiations for a free-trade agreement between the US and the three Andean countries of Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Around 66% of the flowers Ecuador exports go to the US.

  • Washington Watch - 24 June 2010

    25 June 2010 Hits: 131

    HAITI: On 17 June the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC), set up to oversee the US$5bn in post-quake aid pledged to Haiti by the international community, held its first working session. Chaired by Haiti's Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and former US president and UN Special Envoy Bill Clinton, the IHRC's inaugural session took place amid growing frustration over the lack of progress since the devastating earthquake of 12 January. Only a fraction of the money pledged has been delivered. The spending projects confirmed at this meeting were: a US$20m investment fund to help create jobs by supporting small- and medium-sized Haitian businesses; US$1m from the Clinton Foundation for buildings that can be used as storm shelters in the quake-ravaged towns of Leogane and Jacmel; and US$45m from Brazil and Norway to be allocated in direct funding for the Haitian government.

    CUBA: On 18 June the third round of migration talks took place between officials from the US and Cuba. The US delegation was led by the deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Craig Kelly, and was also attended by representatives of US government agencies involved in managing migration issues. Kelly said that the meeting "reaffirmed the US commitment to promote safe, legal and orderly migration". In a press conference the state department spokesman, Philip Crowley, said that the meeting had tackled efforts aimed at "ensuring that the US interests section in Havana is able to monitor the welfare of repatriated migrants and gaining Cuban government acceptance for the repatriation of Cuban nationals who are subject to removal from the US on criminal grounds". A point of difficulty for both sides has been the case of Alan Gross. Gross worked for a non-government organization contracted by the state department to supply computer and communications material to civil society groups on the island when he was arrested in Cuba and accused of spying. The Barack Obama administration called for his immediate release. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said ahead of last week's meeting US officials would tell their Cuban counterparts that Cuba's detention of Gross was "harming" ties between the two countries.

    ECUADOR: On 17 June the US Treasury targeted the Ecuadorean support networks of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc's) 48th Front by blacklisting six Ecuadoreans. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) "designated the 48th Front's finance chief Olidem Romel Solarte Ceron and key leaders of the Jefferson Ostaiza Amay drug trafficking organization as specially designated narcotics traffickers of acting for or on behalf of the Farc. Adam Szubin, the OFAC's director, said that the publication of the names would "build on [the] Treasury's longstanding campaign against the Farc by exposing their key support networks in Ecuador and Costa Rica." This is part of the on-going US drive to counter terrorism. The list cites three Ostaiza bothers as alleged narco-traffickers.

    MEXICO: The US embassy in Mexico denied allegations that the US Border Patrol's refusal to allow four Mexicans who had swum across the Rio Bravo (Rio Grande to the US) to rest led to them drowning in the river. The four Mexicans drowned on 20 June after being part of a large group which set off from the Mexican side of the river on 19 June. The US embassy put out a strongly worded statement that the US Border Patrol had not forced the Mexicans to swim back to Mexico. The statement said the US officials found five Mexicans who had crossed the border illegally and that four of them had no right to be in the US, so they returned voluntarily to Mexico. The fifth Mexican did have papers, but they were not in order, so he was arrested and deported.

  • The Week Ahead - 25 April 2008 ...

    25 April 2008 Hits: 174

    The Week Ahead

     

    FRIDAY

    Mexico: Final day of a meeting of international organisations including Unesco, Reporters without Borders and the World Radio Association to discuss attacks against journalists.

    Panama: Final day of the third inter-sectorial meeting of Central American agriculture, environment and health ministers.

    Brazil: IX German-Brazilian symposium to address "domestic security and democratic society in Brazil and Germany".

    Peru: Spanish foreign minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos will participate in a meeting of donor countries in Peru.

    Argentina: Official data regarding Argentina's construction sector in April will be published.

     

    SATURDAY

    Argentina: Spanish foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos will visit Argentina as part of his tour of the region.

     

    SUNDAY

    Guatemala: Guatemala's President Álvaro Colom will travel to Washington for a three day visit during which he will meet his US counterpart, George W. Bush.

  • Guatemala to keep army performing police duties

    12 October 2006 Hits: 151

    President Óscar Berger has decided to continue using the military in support of the police until the end of next year, despite the reservations expressed by Guatemala's donor countries in late September — and the fact that the deployment of the military has failed to check the rise in violent crime. Human rights organisations say he is opting for militarising the police function instead of spending on strengthening the police and the public prosecution service.

    In April Berger created a joint military-police unit baptised the 'citizen security squadron', assigning 2,400 army personnel to patrol duty next to officers of the Policí­a Nacional Civil (PNC), the body which under the peace agreements of 1994-96 was meant to be the sole internal law-enforcement service. This was meant to last until the PNC had been strengthened — an effort for which the government started to retrain former members of the military.

    Berger has also deployed the military for other policing roles. In August 200 soldiers accompanied 950 PNC officers in a drive to eradicate opium poppy plantations in San Marcos department. In late September 700 soldiers were deployed alongside 240 PNC officers in a campaign to destroy clandestine airstrips used by drug traffickers in Petén department and, separately, 1,200 soldiers took part with 1,700 police officers and 100 prison officers in a raid to wrest back from the inmates the control they had been wielding for most of the past decade over the Pavón prison complex.

    It was around this time that the ambassadors of Guatemala's donor countries held a meeting with Vice-President Eduardo Stein to express their concern over the use of the military for policing duties. As put by Netherlands ambassador Bea ten Tusscher, 'They are quite different, soldiers and policemen: they have different functions in society. Both are important functions, but different ones.' After the meeting the government suggested that the diplomats had been satisfied with 'the pertinent explanations' offered. In any case, on 30 September Berger announced that he would keep the same number of troops in police support functions over the coming 15 months, that it, until the end of 2007.

    The PNC's budget will be raided to pay for 1,200 of the soldiers on police support duties, and the defence ministry's budget is to be increased by about 9% to cover the remainder of the salaries and other costs. This has revived criticism from rights organisations that the government is beefing up the military instead of strengthening the police. Mario Polanco, of the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), says, 'Insisting on keeping the army out on the streets is to want a militarised state, at the cost of not professionalising the PNC.'

    On 9 October Berger announced the deployment of 300 soldiers from the army's reserve group to provide security for public transport, a sector which of late has become a frequent target of violent crime.

    The deployment of the military to strengthen the police has not, so far, translated into a decline in violent crime. Indeed, the number of homicides has continued to rise, albeit not as dramatically as in 2005. In the first nine months of the year there were 4,506 reported homicides. Projected over the year as a whole, this trend would produce a 12.6% increase, leaving Guatemala with a murder rate of 49 per 100,000, up from 43.4 in 2005.

    There is a widespread consensus that an important factor in the rise of violent crime is impunity. This, in turn, is attributable to widespread corruption which recent 'purges' of the law-enforcement agencies have not rooted out, and the insufficiency of resources in both the police and the public prosecution service. The PNC has just over 20,000 people on its payroll, equivalent to an average of 1.58 per thousand inhabitants (and not all of the PNC personnel is devoted to active policing). This compares to a ratio of 2.3 in the US (countrywide, with higher figures in big cities), and of 20-plus in successful stabilisation efforts (such as that conducted by the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland). Peaceful populations are reckoned to need ratios ranging from 1 to 4.

    The investigative agency, the Servicios de Investigación Criminal (SIC) has fewer than 100 officers spread out over 15 departments (which leaves seven departments unattended). Plans under way envisage training 200 investigators, which will still leave the SIC under-equipped.

    Public prosecutors handle on average about 200 criminal cases of all kinds each. With scant investigative backup, in the first nine months of the year it only achieved 102 arrests of people suspected of involvement in the 4,506 reported homicides. Last year it only recorded 115 successful prosecutions for homicide, out of a reported 5,338 cases.

  • Mexico & Nafta

    17 January 2005 Hits: 97

    US economic policymakers on the US side of the border with Mexico are just as keen as their Mexican counterparts on dissuading companies from moving to China.

    Nancy Boultinghouse, the marketing director for the McAllen Economic Development Corporation, argues that lots of US companies have realised that the logistical problems created by moving to China more than outweigh the savings they make by shifting production to China. She argues that as logistics have a major impact on the final cost of goods sold in the US, the benefits of shifting from Mexico to China are far from clear cut. 

    Boultinghouse admits that McAllen and southern Texas as a whole have suffered from Mexico's loss of maquiladora jobs to China. Economists reckon that hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost: in fact Mexico's maquiladora employment has dropped from 1.3m at the end of 2000 to 1.1m in 2003 before recovering to 1.2m in 2004. The more telling change is probably that between 1995 and 1999 employment in maquiladoras doubled from 600,000 to 1.2m. The official figures show that 900 maquiladoras closed between 2000 and 2003, costing 292,000 people their jobs.

    The maquiladora industry began to recover in 2004, and in June recorded its best ever month for exports with sales of US$7.7bn. Maquiladora monitors claim that the industry has already committed to investing US$4.5bn this year (2005) in either expanding existing plants or setting up new facilities. 

    These maquiladora monitors say that companies are coming back to Mexico because they have had unfortunate experiences in China. Some say that China's infrastructure lags behind Mexico's. Several claim that China's chequered record in respecting intellectual property is another drawback. Others say that the strength of the Mexican peso against the US dollar means that the local market is more attractive to them than China's. Mexican policymakers have also done their bit by delaying the introduction of tariff changes which could have deterred Asian companies from investing. 

    Boultinghouse told a Mexican newspaper, Reforma, that the main reason for the pickup in maquiladoras was simply logistics. It was much cheaper to ship goods from Mexico to the US than to ship them from China. She said that the heavier the product, the more competitive Mexico became. She claimed that Mexican-built cars were cheaper than Chinese-made ones because of the cheaper delivery costs and that the same was true for fridge-freezers.

  • Guy Philippe

    25 February 2004 Hits: 221

    PEOPLE PROFILE is published every Tuesday and describes the professional background of key people emerging in the political and economic scenario.


    Who is Guy Philippe?
    He is the leader of the armed rebels who have seized half of Haiti. After the fall of the country's second-largest city, Cap Haí¯tien, on 22 February, he confidently predicted that in less than 15 days the rebels would control all of Haiti.

    Why watch him?
    Philippe will coordinate the rebel advance on the capital, Port-au-Prince, within days. He is the man who will be calling the shots if the rebels are successful in their bid to oust President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

    Born: 1968

    Public life: Served as police commissioner in Cap Haí¯tien.


    Timeline

    1991-1994: Trained by the US Special Forces in Ecuador during the 1991-94 military dictatorship in Haiti, along with other influential police chiefs known as the `Ecuadoreans'.
    1995: A senior security official under President Réne Préval.
    2000: Flees to Ecuador accused of involvement in a plot to overthrow President Préval in October 2000. Promptly deported to Panama, from where he was again deported. Somehow sidestepping an entry ban, he went into hiding in the Dominican Republic. He arrived at Las Americas airport in Santo Domingo in December.
    2001: Accused of masterminding an attack on Haiti's national palace in December that killed twelve people.
    2004: On 5 February, Philippe returns at the head of the Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales, an assortment of former military associates.


    Strong points:
    Philippe would be the most powerful figure in the country in a post-Aristide era. Young and smooth-talking, he appears to be very popular with the populace, who refer to his troops as 'the army' (officially disbanded in 1995) and seem to expect them to restore order to the country. He does not have the black reputation of other prominent rebel figureheads such as Louis-Jodel Chamblain, a former leader of paramilitary death squads during the 1991-1994 dictatorship.

    Weak points:
    He has no political experience. He is discredited in the eyes of the international community. Whether he seizes power or installs a puppet president, or even tries to hold fresh elections, it will be seen as illegitimate. The international community, led by the US, France and Canada, has refused to talk to the rebels, preferring instead to try and thrash out a peace plan between the government and the opposition as if the rebels are a minor irritant that will soon go away.

    Prospects:
    Philippe maintains that he has no intention of setting up a military dictatorship. He said the rebels have no political objective; they just plan to remove Aristide and put the president of the supreme court in power. Even if he is true to his word, it is doubtful whether he will be able to persuade other rebels to put away their guns and melt away. The likes of Chamblain are likely to demand a more active role in the running of the country.

    The rebels are united in their desire to remove Aristide. If they accomplish their task, they could well fall out. Philippe and Chamblain are hardly blood brothers. Indeed, they were on opposite sides a few years ago as the Préval government hunted down members of the ousted military junta.

  • People Profile - José César Nava Vázquez, Mexico

    11 August 2009 Hits: 252

    Who is he? César Nava is the new president of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN).

    Why watch him? The PAN, which has been in the ascendant for the past 20 years (and won the presidency in 2000 and 2006), suffered a major drubbing in the mid-term elections on 5 July 2009 and looks on course to lose the presidential elections in 2012 unless Nava can pull it around.

    Date of Birth:   16 July 1974.

    Birthplace: Morelia, Michoacán.

    Education:   Law graduate from Mexico's Universidad Panamericana; Master's in Law from Harvard.

    Public life: Taught law at the Universidad Panamericana then became private secretary to President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, from mid-2006 until November 2008.

    Time Line:

    1988: Joins PAN.

    1995: Elected head of the PAN's youth wing. Calderón was first secretary general.

    1998 to 2000: Legal director for the PAN's national executive committee when Calderón was party president.

    2000: Elected a federal deputy.

    2001: Quit congress to advise the state oil company Pemex on legal issues

    2002 to 2004: Head of the energy ministry's legal affairs department when Calderón was energy minister.

    2005: Calderón's top spokesman during the presidential election campaign.

    2006: Appointed private secretary to Calderón.

    2008: Resigned as Calderón's private secretary to run for Congress.

    2009: Elected to congress again, for a seat in Mexico City.

    2009: Elected president of the PAN

    Strengths: Nava is very close to Calderón. They first met when Nava was 14 but became friends during the 1994 presidential campaign of Diego Fernández de Cevallos, a maverick panista. Fernández, bizarrely, stopped campaigning when he looked on the verge of winning, allowing the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) candidate, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, to win. Nava was President Calderón's candidate for the party presidency.

    Weaknesses: Nava has done little else in his life besides serve Calderón and the PAN. This immaturity worries some of the PAN's old guard who fear that their well-meant and constructive criticism of Calderón will be dismissed as dissidence. Calderón's dominance of the party, the old guard fear, will lead to another electoral disaster in 2012. The old guard say that Nava is not very different from Calderón's first choice as party president, Germán Martí­nez Cázares. Martí­nez took the blame for the electoral disaster of 5 July this year when the PAN's representation in congress was cut from 207 to 143 seats.

    Prospects: Uncertain. Nava avoided the embarrassment of being defeated in the election for the party presidency in which he was the only candidate but he failed to be elected unanimously. He did win easily though: he won 290 votes, far more than the 250 he needed, but 39 members of the 349 members of the PAN's national executive who turned up to vote abstained from supporting him. Nava's big problem is that he is a stopgap. He is serving out only what remains of his predecessor's term and therefore faces re-election at the end of 2010.

  • Chávez returns but big questions remain – and not just for Venezuela

    07 July 2011 Hits: 588

    "A Bolívar for our times"; "a Latin American liberator". This extravagant praise in Cuba's communist mouthpiece Granma was the send off from Havana for Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez as he returned to Caracas on 4 July. It sounded eerily like an elegiac obituary. Chávez appeared on the balcony of the Miraflores palace in time for his country's bicentennial celebrations, but great uncertainty continues to surround the state of his health after he broke his 18-day silence on 30 June by revealing that he had been diagnosed with cancer and had been operated on for a cancerous tumour.

    Neither Chávez nor his government has elaborated on the message he delivered on state television on 30 June so it remains unclear what type of cancer he has, or whether it has metastasized (or spread), which would provide a fair indication of the severity of his illness. How much treatment will Chávez require in the weeks and months ahead and where will this take place? In the absence of this information, it is difficult to know what his chances are of even surviving until the presidential elections in December 2012 let alone standing in them.

    In the short-term at least it is clear Chávez will not be able to continue with his customarily demanding schedule of public appearances, media commitments and foreign travel. His weekly broadcast Aló, Presidente will need to be seriously curtailed or suspended; likewise his prolix public speeches. Chávez is the lifeblood of the Bolivarian Revolution: without his physical omnipresence, there will inevitably be a leadership vacuum. The fact that his Vice-President, Elías Jaua, reacted to the revelation by instructing supporters to maintain "unity" and "maximum discipline" clearly implies there is concern at the top echelons of government that uncertainty could lead to infighting within the ruling Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV), if not a potential challenge from within. This might explain in part why Chávez felt the need to hurry back for Venezuela's bicentennial celebrations against the advice of Cuba's Fidel Castro.

    There is, however, clearly no obvious successor to Chávez. Even his chief lieutenants have conspicuously failed in elections where the vote is about the PSUV and the abstract concept of 21st Century Socialism, rather than Chávez. One close confidant of Chávez, Diosdado Cabello, lost the governorship of the state of Miranda to opposition figurehead, Henrique Capriles, in regional elections in November 2008, while another, Jesse Chacón, even contrived to lose the Caracas municipality of Sucre, a Chavista stronghold which includes the Petare slum, home to nearly one-third of the capital's residents.

    The announcement
    Chávez might personally have been too ill to speak during some of the near three-week news blackout between his surgery on a pelvic abscess and his announcement that he had cancer, but his government could and should have released more precise information during this hiatus. If US President Barack Obama had been taken ill, it would have been inconceivable that he could have kept secret the severity of his illness for so long - and the Venezuelan government would have been quick to denounce the US for undemocratic practices and lack of transparency if he had. The stage-managed proof-of-life videos released in Cuba before Chávez's announcement were more reminiscent of Colombia's Farc guerrillas than the actions of a democratic state.

    At best the whole episode shows that the country's state institutions simply do not function without Chávez; at worst it shows a blatant disregard for constitutional procedure. When Paraguay's President Fernando Lugo left the country to undergo chemotherapy in Brazil during his fight against lymphatic cancer he transferred power to his Vice-President Federico Franco, a politician who he distrusts because he is openly critical of Lugo. Chávez did not transfer one iota of power to Jaua, and he is a staunch loyalist. Fernando Soto, the head of the national assembly, a key organ in any democracy, had categorically denied that Chávez had cancer and insisted he would say so if he had. Either he is an outright liar or he was simply not kept informed of the true nature of Chávez's illness. The latter seems more likely and must have caused some disenchantment among senior Chavistas who now realise they were not as close to the throne as they might have thought.

    The return
    Chávez managed to address supporters amassed beneath the balcony of the Miraflores palace for about half an hour on 4 July. "Here I am in the epicentre of my greatest love," he said, adding that he could not possibly be absent on the occasion of Venezuela's independence celebrations. He said he had overcome "the first stage" of his battle, experiencing some "very difficult hours", but he disabused supporters of the notion that his presence indicated that the battle was won. He said that "strict medical treatment" lay ahead and that he would behave with the discipline of a new recruit henceforth on the medical front. Still, his failure to attend the military parade a day later on 5 July fuelled speculation about how challenging his forthcoming struggle is likely to be. Instead, he briefly met Lugo as well as Bolivia's President Evo Morales and Uruguay's José Mujica, who travelled to Caracas to attend the celebrations.

    Chávez might be hoping that the shockwaves in Venezuela in recent weeks, and his fortitude in the face of a genuinely mighty foe, might drive up his popularity. To put it crudely could "the cancer effect" be used in the same way that Argentina's President Cristina Fernández has tapped into the death of her husband Néstor Kirchner to see a surge in her popularity in the polls and all but ensure her re-election in October? Probably not. Polls were already suggesting that Chávez would require a vigorous campaign to stave off the challenge of even an emasculated opposition in December 2012 and there must be real doubts about whether he will be fit enough to do that. Paradoxically, even though the chances of the opposition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) winning next year would be immeasurably strengthened if they faced any rival other than a fully fit Chávez, a debilitated Chávez is more likely to preserve the unity of the MUD, which is its only hope of emerging victorious.

    Foreign repercussions
    Fidel Castro had more at stake than the loss of a close friend when he sought to nurse President Chávez back to health over the last month. If Chávez were to die he could well take the Cuban Revolution with him to his grave. Not only does Venezuela provide nearly 100,000 barrels of crude per day to Cuba but it also pays inflated costs for the services of Cuban doctors in Venezuela. If the umbilical cord to Venezuela were cut Cuba would face a more serious crisis than the not so special period after the dissolution of the USSR (see sidebar).

    • Ortega

    Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega was also quick to send Hugo Chávez a "get well soon" message: Venezuela has provided some US$500m in cooperation to Nicaragua over the last three years that has enabled Ortega to roll out social initiatives to alleviate poverty and strengthen his chances of re-election in November. Intriguingly, the head of the Dominican central bank, Vicente Bengoa, also publicly expressed the concern which must be felt across the Caribbean by all the recipients of Venezuela's discounted oil scheme Petrocaribe. Bengoa said cheap oil through Petrocaribe was instrumental in helping the Dominican Republic weather the 2008 global slowdown. He said it showed the sort of "solidarity" alien to the IMF, which had the government "on its knees" demanding tough austerity measures. He urged Dominicans to pray for Chávez's health.

  • DR slams US over human trafficking

    28 June 2011 Hits: 501

    Development: On 27 June the Dominican Republic's foreign minister Carlos Morales Troncoso, criticised the US for the State Department's 2011 Trafficking in Persons report.

    Significance: Troncoso's strong remarks (in which he said it was "inappropriate that Washington should appoint itself international "arbiter" given its own problems with human trafficking) were the more telling because the US upgraded the Dominican Republic, removing it from its blacklist of countries that are failing to make significant efforts to eliminate people trafficking. The upgrade (from Tier 3) was unusual because the US increased the number of countries in this category from 13 to 23.

    Key points:

    • The State Department report analyses conditions in 184 nations, including the US – which was included for the first time in 2010 - and ranks them in terms of their effectiveness in fighting what many have termed modern-day slavery, from Tier 1 (whose governments fully comply with the Trafficking Victims' Protection Act (TVPA)'s standards for the elimination of trafficking to Tier 3 where countries "are not making significant efforts".

    • The Dominican Republic was upgraded from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 Watch List because of improved prevention measures under its 2010 National Anti-Trafficking Action Plan. With the removal of the Dominican Republic, only Cuba and Venezuela feature on the blacklist – the latter returned to the lowest rank having been upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List in 2009. Tier 3 countries may be subject to certain sanctions, whereby the US government may withhold or withdraw non-humanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance.

    • As well as the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua in Central America registered improvements moving from Tier 2 Watch List to Tier 2.

    • Costa Rica, however, was downgraded from Tier 2 to the Tier 2 "Watch List" for the second time in a decade. According to the report women and girls from Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and other Latin American countries have been identified in Costa Rica as victims of sex trafficking and forced servitude.

  • Electoral concerns build in Nicaragua

    06 May 2011 Hits: 2

    Development: On 4 May a local watchdog, the Instituto Para el Desarrollo y la Democracia (IPADE), issued a report on Nicaragua's electoral process ahead of the 6 November general elections.

    Significance: The report is the first by the watchdog for this voting cycle and was damming.

    Key points:

    • The report criticised the partiality of the supreme electoral court (TSE) which is headed by Roberto Rivas, a close ally of President Daniel Ortega.

    • The Ipade also raised concerns about access to cédulas (national identity cards) which are necessary to vote.  Voting itself is not mandatory. According to the Ipade, of the 80 municipalities which it had sent observers to, only 18 (22.5%) had delegations set up to issue the cédulas.

    • This adds to existing controversy regarding the CSE's decision in August last to increase the price of cédulas by 600% to C$300 (US$13). This is in a country where 44.7% and 9.7% of the population were described as living in poverty and extreme poverty in 2009 (on US$1.60/day and US$0.64/day respectively). In its annual human rights report released last month, the US State Department cited local civil society groups as warning that the move disguised an attempt by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) to manipulate voter lists and that "government and political party resources were used to purchase large numbers of cedulas [sic] for party members".

    • A December 2010 poll released by M&R Consultores claimed that more than 460,000 citizens (12% of the eligible population), lacked cédulas and that 70% of these people were either members of opposition parties or independents.

    • Aside from ongoing concerns about Ortega's refusal to allow international and respected local watchdogs to oversee the November vote, Ipade also highlighted as a problem Ortega's April decree changing the electoral boundaries in a clear move to benefit his FSLN.