Turkey’s Erdogan confirms Mideast’s strategic fluidity
Last Friday (25 January), Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Turkey was now seeking an alternative to membership of the European Union (EU) and that this could be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that links Russia and China with the former Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Few comments could have provided such a perfect illustration of how profoundly the Middle East is changing – and not in the direction so widely anticipated in the West when the Arab Spring broke out two years ago.
In his remarks, the Turkish prime minister said: “If we get into the SCO, we will say goodbye to the European Union. The SCO is better – much more powerful...” Then, when asked to confirm that the SCO is a genuine alternative, Erdogan said: “The Shanghai Five is better and more powerful and we have common values with them.” The SCO was originally known as the Shanghai Five when founded in 2001 without Uzbekistan. The common values to which Erdogan alluded clearly include Islam and the Turkic nature of the Central Asian republics. But opponents have also said that he is attracted by the largely non-democratic nature of the organization and its members.
It is possible to dismiss Erdogan’s remarks as just late-night ramblings on a television programme that reflect no more than frustration with the EU, but well-placed sources in Ankara say they should be taken seriously. For instance, Ozdem Sanberk, president of the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) in Ankara, says: “I don’t think he was bluffing when saying that Turkey is seriously considering the SCO. Turkey’s remarks may lead to a great strategic change in the world order because a Nato member country, Turkey, will become a member of an anti-Nato bloc which will include Russia and China.”
Joining the SCO is not an entirely new thought for Erdogan. He raised the issue with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin during the latter’s visit in July. However, at the time officials in Ankara dismissed the remarks as jocular, saying: “Erdogan was joking when he asked Putin if they would accept Turkey as a member of the Shanghai Five.”
Those who support this interpretation say that Erdogan is just putting a shot across the EU’s bows because of the lack of movement on Turkey’s membership. This is the view of former foreign minister Yasar Yakis, who commented: “Erdogan’s remarks show that Turkey has many alternatives to the EU. But Turkey is still continuing its efforts in the EU accession process. I don’t think that Turkey will consider the SCO unless it faces a serious problem in its EU track. If it becomes definite that Turkey will not become an EU member, Turkey will start to consider its alternatives, of which one is the SCO.”
That cautious view may be justified, but it is worth noting that there are even some within the military who favour the SCO option. On the face of it this seems odd, given the benefits to the military being Nato membership (which might be undermined) and the fact that hankering after closer links with Central Asia has an Islamic element to it that would not appeal to the secular military. But as long ago as 2002, the now disgraced General Tuncer Kilinc suggested links with Central Asia as an alternative to the EU. This was no doubt based on the military’s distrust of the EU’s insistence on full democratization for Turkey.
It is also worth noting that Yakis accepts that Turkey may go in this direction if it is eventually rejected by the EU - and that is a much more likely prospect than Yakis appears to acknowledge.
For Erdogan, the motives are clear. First of all, he is not naturally a European. He sees Turkey’s orientation as predominantly Islamic, and popular opinion is moving his way. Recent opinion polls show that only 20% of Turks believe Turkey will join the EU, and only 40% still support it as an objective. Trade with the EU has dropped off at the same time, with the EU now accounting for about 40% of Turkey’s trade rather than the 55% it was in 2003.
A re-orientation away from Europe accompanied by a renewed emphasis on Central Asia has a dual purpose for Erdogan. The first part of the equation reinforces his determination for Turkey to play a greater role in the Middle East, particularly as a leader of the Sunni cause in Syria and Iraq, while the second potentially puts pressure on Iran, which is deeply at odds with Turkey in both Syria and Iraq and may well be seeking to use the Kurds as a weapon against Turkey. Iran would not like Turkey joining the SCO if it were itself excluded from membership.
What this move says about Turkey’s relations with Russia is also interesting. Turkey has multiple problems with Russia (over Syria, Armenia/Azerbaijan, missile deployment), yet a Turkish move towards the SCO would require enthusiastic Russian support, which presumably Erdogan believes he could secure.
If nothing else, Erdogan’s comments on the SCO have once again emphasized the huge uncertainties now roiling the Middle East. The major trends, none of which yet have settled outcomes, include:
- Turkey’s re-orientation, which began with its ditching of its alignment with Israel, continued with its strong support for the Sunni Arab cause in Syria and Iraq, and could now include a further drift away from Europe (and even Nato) but, perhaps also, a further deterioration in relations with Iran.
- The Muslim Brotherhood’s push for control of the post-Arab Spring Sunni Arab states, which is opposed by Iran in Iraq and Syria; by Jordan and the conservative Arab monarchies of the Gulf (except for Qatar); by the Western-backed liberal revolutionaries currently threatening civil war in Egypt; and by Israel (and Fateh) in the Palestinian territories.
- The Kurdish struggle to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the Arab Spring, which is complicated by Turkey’s attempts to co-opt the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Masoud Barzani in Iraq (by providing it with an outlet for its energy resources that by-passes Baghdad) – and by Iran’s efforts to counter Turkey’s inroads in Syria and Iraq by supporting hardline anti-Turkish Kurdish elements.
- The struggle to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates entrenching their presence in North Africa and the Sahel, the Sinai, Somalia, and Yemen, which has escalated in recent weeks through the French intervention in Mali.
- The ongoing battle to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear-weapons’ capability, which may or may not have included recent sabotage of the uranium-enrichment plant at Fordow.
By any standards this all represents an extraordinarily fluid geopolitical environment. And this is significant not just because of the uncertainty of outcome, but also because it is impossible to imagine, in this environment, that Israel (under whatever government emerges from last week’s elections) will be prepared to make the concessions necessary to defuse the ever-present and ever-growing Palestinian frustrations. JdeC.