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Production was halted at one of the 247 oil wells in Ecuador’s Yasuní national park on 28 August, a year after a referendum in which voters backed a ban on drilling in the biodiversity hotspot. Switching off the remaining 246 oil wells will take substantially longer, with President Daniel Noboa’s government having been accused of foot-dragging over the issue.

Voters decisively backed a ban on drilling in Yasuní’s Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini (ITT) oilfields in August last year, in a referendum which was held alongside the first round of the presidential election. President Noboa said during the campaign for the election’s second round that he would respect the referendum result, but his commitment appeared to wane after taking office when he warned about the financial hit that his cash-strapped government would suffer by abandoning the ITT.

The state oil company, Petroecuador, has said that closing down the oilfields will result in losses of some US$16bn. Noboa’s former energy & mining minister, Andrea Arrobo, argued in February that the site’s closure would need to be delayed in order to avoid “a worse economic crisis than the one we are currently living in”.

Arrobo was replaced in April, and the government has since got the ball rolling on halting production at the ITT. In early May, Noboa formed a committee tasked with overseeing the “progressive and orderly winding down of all activity related to oil extraction” in Yasuní. But the five-member committee, which comprises representatives from the energy ministry, environment ministry, economy ministry, human rights ministry, and Petroecuador, seems to be in no hurry to act on the referendum result. Finance Minister Juan Carlos Vega announced on 19 August that the committee had finished its preliminary studies and concluded that ceasing production “could take three to five years”.

A five-year delay would mean that the economic impact of the ITT’s closure would not be felt until after the next two general elections. Noboa is seeking re-election in the February 2025 elections, by which point he will have only been in office for 15 months after winning the snap election called by his predecessor, Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023). The Yasuní oil question could play a significant role in that election.

Noboa will again face his second-round opponent from last year, Luisa González of the left-wing Revolución Ciudadana (RC) – the party led by former president Rafael Correa (2007-2017). In the run-up to last year’s run-off, González said that she would not act on the referendum result, arguing that the oil proceeds were needed for social programmes. Correa was adamant, while in office, that Ecuador could not afford to be “a beggar sat on a sack of gold”.

Indigenous challenge

President Noboa will face a challenge from Leonidas Iza, the president of the umbrella indigenous organisation Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Conaie). Iza is representing the indigenous party Pachakutik. Iza and the Conaie movement have led calls for the referendum result to be respected and have threatened major protests over the issue.

Electoral authority cautions Noboa amid VP dispute

The vice president of Ecuador’s national electoral council (CNE), Enrique Pita, emphasised on 2 September that President Noboa will need to take a formal leave of absence during the 2025 election campaign, in line with electoral law. Speaking in an interview with TV channel Teleamazonas, Pita pointedly said that “anyone seeking re-election must request leave”.

The issue has become fraught amid the fierce dispute between Noboa and Vice President Verónica Abad, who would be expected to take over presidential duties during this period. With tensions between Noboa and Abad reaching new heights in recent weeks [WR-24-33], government ministers have flatly rejected the possibility that she could temporarily take over from Noboa.

Diplomatic tensions erupted this week as the Venezuelan government reacted angrily to the refusal of the left-wing governments of Brazil and Colombia to recognise the legitimacy of the victory of President Nicolás Maduro over his opposition rival Edmundo González in the elections on 28 July.

Celso Amorim, the chief adviser to Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said pointedly on 29 October that “the principle of transparency was not respected” in Venezuela’s elections and “for this reason, Brazil has not recognised the results”. Amorim refused to recognise the vote tally sheets released by the opposition, however, saying it would “represent a dangerous precedent for democratic institutionalism”. Amorim also said that the Maduro government’s reaction to Brazil’s decision to block Venezuela’s accession to the Brics group of developing economies during a summit in Russia on 24 October was “to say the least disproportionate”.

• Brics bust-up

Venezuela’s foreign ministry issued a statement accusing Brazil of “inexplicable and immoral aggression”, “an anti-Latin American attitude”, “irrational behaviour”, and “unilateral coercive measures and collective punishment of the whole Venezuelan people” after it thwarted Venezuela’s aspirations to join the Brics at the summit in Russia, which Nicolás Maduro had attended in person.

The president of Venezuela’s national assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, responded to Amorim’s comments by calling for him to be declared persona non grata. Venezuela’s foreign ministry, meanwhile, hauled in Brazil’s ambassador, Manuel Vedell, for questioning. Brazil’s foreign ministry then issued a statement accusing the Maduro government of having adopted an “offensive tone” on 1 November. This prompted Venezuela’s foreign ministry, in turn, to adjure Brazil’s foreign ministry “to desist from meddling”.

Meanwhile, Colombia’s foreign minister, Luis Gilberto Murillo, said on 30 October that his government would not recognise the results unless the vote tally sheets are presented before Maduro is sworn-in for a new term on 10 January. Murillo said the left-wing government of President Gustavo Petro was motivated by the principles of “transparency and democratic legitimacy”. Venezuela’s foreign minister, Yván Gil, accused Murillo of “cowardice”, “backstabbing”, and “confected charlatanism”.

Despite the fierce criticism of the governments of Brazil and Colombia by the Venezuelan foreign ministry, their response remains mealy-mouthed. Neither government has made a concerted effort to ratchet up pressure on the Maduro government. Amorim merely said that his government was “open” to supporting dialogue if there was “willing on both sides”, adding that Brazil’s “main interest” was “avoiding tensions that threaten peace in South America”. Murillo made no mention of what measures the Petro administration would take, if any, in the likely eventuality that the tally sheets are not published before Maduro is sworn-in for a fresh term next January.

TSJ throws out fresh appeal against election result

Venezuela’s supreme electoral tribunal (TSJ) rejected another appeal on 5 November calling on the national electoral council (CNE) to publish a breakdown of the results of the presidential elections.

The TSJ’s constitutional chamber declared “inadmissible” the appeal brought by the dissident Chavista Frente Democrático Popular (FDP). It also fined the lawyer, María Alejandra Díaz, who presented the appeal for contravening an article in the organic law of the TSJ, which prohibits “disrespecting, offending, or perturbing [the TSJ] through abusive use of appeals and legal action”, and it ordered the disciplinary tribunal of the college of lawyers to take action against her. This looks designed to try and discourage any further legal appeals against the election results.

MEXICO | Bonos. El gobierno de México anunció esta semana que había ubicado exitosamente unos US$ 2bn en su última emisión global de bonos. Los bonos, que expiran en 2022, fueron emitidos con una tasa de interés de 3,71%, el rendimiento más bajo para letras mexicanas a 10 años.

El subsecretario de finanzas de México, Gerardo Rodríguez Regordosa, dijo que la transacción permitiría al gobierno federal fortalecer su estructura de deuda pública.

ECUADOR | El banco central pronostica declinación. El presidente del banco central de Ecuador, Pedro delgado, ha anunciado que el banco espera que la tasa de crecimiento del PIB del país decline gradualmente durante los próximos tres años después del crecimiento de 7,8% en el 2011. De acuerdo con Delgado, el pronóstico del banco para el 2012 se mantiene en 5,3%, levemente más alto que las proyecciones hechas por la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (5%) y el Fondo Monetario Internacional (4,5%). Delgado dijo que los pronósticos para el 2013 y el 2014 estaban en 4,4% y 3,3% respectivamente.

    Delgado explicó que el crecimiento en el 2011 fue conducido por unos inesperados altos precios internacionales del petróleo. Sin embargo, este año se espera que el crecimiento en el sector de hidrocarburos se vea de alguna manera dificultado pues la principal refinería de Ecuador en Esmeraldas está programada realizar obras de mantenimiento de rutina que la mantendrán cerrada por un par de meses. En cuanto a la tendencia declinante durante el próximo par de años, Delgado dijo que eso es una respuesta a un esperado decrecimiento en los niveles de la inversión. “En este momento hay muchas inversiones en sectores como la generación de energía, carreteras, etc., [...] estas concluyen el año próximo, la composición [de las inversiones] cambiará y eso causará que las tasas de crecimiento varíen,” dijo.

    De todos modos, Delgado señaló que el gobierno está manteniendo “negociaciones avanzadas” con el Banco Industrial y Comercial de China para asegurar el financiamiento de US$12mm propuesto para la refinería del Pacífico en la provincia de Manabí. Preguntado acerca de la discrepancia entre los pronósticos del banco y los de las organizaciones internacionales, Delgado replicó que su entidad tiene “mejor información que otros analistas”. Vale señalar que como fue de impresionante la tasa de crecimiento para el 2011, el pronóstico inicial del banco para ese año fue de 9%. Delgado ha culpado de la carencia de precisión del pronóstico al propio sistema de medición del PIB utilizado por el banco, del cual dijo que “no corresponde a la actual estructura de la economía ecuatoriana”.

VENEZUELA | Apuntando a más generación de electricidad. El ministro de energía, Héctor Navarro, anunció esta semana que el gobierno espera producir hasta 40.000MW de electricidad comenzando en el 2015. De acuerdo con las cifras del ministerio de energía, Venezuela actualmente tiene una capacidad instalada de 25.000MW. El país sufrió de una severa escasez de energía en el 2010, y el año pasado el gobierno tuvo que imponer una serie de medidas para reducir el consumo de electricidad a fin de evitar más problemas por insuficiencia de energía.

    Durante la presentación de una recientemente adquirida turbina Kaplan hecha en Argentina y que será instalada en el proyecto hidroeléctrico Tocoma, Navarro dijo que “nos hemos fijado a nosotros mismos el objetivo que Venezuela debe alcanzar una capacidad instalada de 40.000MW en los próximos cinco años”. Navarro agregó  que el proyecto Tocoma sobre el Río Caroní, el segundo río más largo de Venezuela con una de las tasas de descarga más altas en el mundo (4.850 m³/s), tendrá 10 turbinas Kaplan, que agregará unos 2.000MW de capacidad instalada. Él dijo que el proyecto, que se inició en el 2008, se espera que se vuelva completamente funcional para el 2014. Navarro explicó que la adición  de esta capacidad instalada llevaría la capacidad total producida por las plantas hidroeléctricas en Venezuela a 17.000MW, lo que debería permitir que el gobierno logre su objetivo.

PERU | El baile de Conga continúa. El Presidente Ollanta Humala presentó finalmente el informe con los resultados de una Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental (EIA) independiente a fines de la semana pasada sobre el altamente controversial proyecto minero de Conga, de oro y cobre. Al parecer una resolución del conflicto que afecta un proyecto de inversión de US$4,8mm, la mayor inversión en la historia de Perú, aún está lejos de concluir. En su presentación televisada de los hallazgos de la revisión, el Presidente Humala ha señalado que, tal como están las cosas, el proyecto propuesto tenía deficiencias medioambientales, y que por tanto no beneficiaría totalmente a la comunidad local. Como resultado, Humala impuso un número de nuevas condiciones que apuntan a abordar esos cuestionamientos, que deben cumplirse a fin de obtener el permiso para seguir adelante. Algunas de esas condiciones incluyen: abstenerse de secar y llenar con desechos mineros dos de las cuatro lagunas en las sierras como estaba previsto en la propuesta original; cuadruplicar la capacidad de los embalses que serán construidos; asegurar la creación de 10.000 empleos, la mayoría de los cuales deberán ser para la comunidad local; y la creación de un fondo social que será usado para desarrollar la producción y la infraestructura de irrigación de Cajamarca.

• Yanacocha

La compañía que está detrás del proyecto Conga de Perú, Yanacocha, ha dicho que analizaría los nuevos requerimientos de la nueva Evaluación el Impacto Ambiental (EIA), aunque ha cuestionado si mantener las lagunas Azul y Chica debía ser uno de ellos. Mientras tanto, el frente de defensa de Cajamarca, que agrupa a varias organizaciones sociales, políticas y de campesinos productores, ha exigido una vez más al gobierno que cancele definitivamente el proyecto, amenazando con realizar otra demostración masiva el 31 de mayo a menos que eso ocurra.

JUSTICE | New supreme court president. On 16 July Ovidio Bonilla took up his post as the new head of the supreme court of justice (CSJ). El Salvador has two justice courts at the moment. Bonilla is one of several magistrates whose appointment on 24 April by the legislature was subsequently ruled unconstitutional on technical grounds by the constitutional chamber of the CSJ, sparking a major institutional crisis. The day that Bonilla took up the post, another magistrate, Florentín Meléndez, was also proclaimed the new CSJ president, following her designation by the outgoing president, José Belarmino Jaime.

This week the Argentine government of President Cristina Fernández was forced to backtrack on a decree (1307/12) relating to adjustments in the pay scale of members of the paramilitary security forces – the gendarmerie (GNA) and the naval prefecture (PNA) – after the changes triggered massive protests, with agents claiming the measures had resulted in 30%-60% pay cuts. When announcing the decision to halt the measure and backpay the agents in October to receive the same wage as last month, Chief of Cabinet Juan Manuel Abal Medina said the government would now launch a detailed investigation to determine if the cuts had been the result of the “disastrous” implementation of the decree or if they had more sinister causes, “looking to create chaos, using those below to maintain the privileges of those at the top. We are not going to mix the just with the sinners”.

 As part of that process, the heads of the two forces - Commander General Héctor Schenone (GNA) and Prefect General Enrique Julio Congolani (PNA) – resigned. The appointment of two new heads of relatively low seniority with their rank – Commander General Enrique Zach (GNA) and Prefect General Luis Alberto Helier (PNA) – means that at least 10 other senior officers in each force have been passed over for the posts and effectively sent into retirement. Security Minister Nilda Garré has yet to identify those officers.

The agents insist that their protest action is “pacific” and related only to the salaries issue. Yesterday they voted down a proposal to march onto the main Plaza de Mayo, because of the public association such a move would have with a coup attempt. Raúl Maza, one of the most vocal of the protesting gendarmes, stated, “Let no-one be mistaken. This is not a coup d’état. No-one has weapons” and he asked that a flag remembering the late Carapintada failed coup leader, Mohamed Alí Seineldín, be removed from the demonstration. Nonetheless, the protests clearly indicate that the chain of command has been broken, not only within the hierarchy of the forces but also at a political level; the PNA and GNA agents should heed Minister Garré’s call to return to active duty, but instead, the GNA has declared a nationwide strike until Tuesday (9 October), leaving all posts, which includes all border crossings, until they receive an answer from the government about a joint six-point petition with the PNA they have given the ministry. Both forces will camp outside their headquarters until then.

The decree in question aimed to “regularise” pay scales and “formalise” [i.e. for tax purpose] some of the bonuses that agents receive for extended shifts or working away from their home provinces, etc. It also sought to eliminate altogether various bonuses. The upshot was a serious reduction in salaries, depending on seniority and pay scales. That triggered an initial protest by the PNA in the city of Buenos Aires on 2 October, which quickly extended to other forces and other parts of the country. The security ministry hurriedly backtracked from the scheduled pay cuts for the GNA this month, but the GNA has joined the protest in solidarity with the PNA.

Yesterday, the protests included the prefecture’s headquarters at the Edificio Guardacostas in Buenos Aires City and the port of Rosario, in Santa Fe province. The GNA also staged demos in Buenos Aires province (Zárate, Dock Sud, La Plata, Ensenada, Mar del Plata and Quequén); Barranqueras (Chaco); Posadas (Misiones); Paso de los Libres (Corrientes); Jesús María (Córdoba); San Juan (San Juan); Mendoza (Mendoza); Comodoro Rivadavia (Chubut); and Río Gallegos (Santa Cruz). A similar decree (1305/12) for the armed forces is pending implementation and as we go to print, some members of the navy are demonstrating outside the force’s headquarters in solidarity with the PNA and GNA. According to local reports, some members of the federal police (PFA), the army and the Policía Bonaerense have also joined the protests (albeit not at an institutional level).

• The GNA-PNA demands

In addition to leaving their salaries untouched, the forces have asked for:

1. guarantees that there will be no disciplinary, administrative or judicial sanctions taken against those who protest;
2. a comprehensive discussion regarding pay scales and a guaranteed minimum wage of AR$7,000 (US$1,488) after tax;
3. a committee to be set up, with the participation of low-ranking members, to discuss the pay scale of active and retired members;
4. the inclusion of agents in a work-related risks insurance (ART) programme;
5. freedom to choose what pre-paid healthcare insurance agents belong to;
6. the government’s recognition and adherence to all judicial injunctions and rulings in relation to their salaries.

In a by-election on 15 October, the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) led by Prime Minister Perry Christie franked its 7 May general election victory over the Free National Movement (FNM), now led by Hubert Minnis, by claiming the North Abaco constituency held until his resignation following the general election by former FNM prime minister Hubert Ingraham.  The PLP now holds 30 out of 38 seats in the House of Assembly.

The PLP’s continuing electoral revival comes against a run of bad economic news.  At the beginning of September, the International Monetary Fund issued a warning about The Bahamas’ debt-to-GDP ratio being “much higher than expected” at 54%, or possibly over 60% if the liabilities of public corporations is included. This was followed by a warning from Standard & Poor’s on 24 September that The Bahamas faced a downgrade if it does not come up with a credible debt-reduction plan.  Such a plan does, in fact, exist in embryo, but it is unlikely to be popular as it is a plan to introduce income tax.  It may also, according to Standard & Poor’s, take years to implement.

A National Symposium on Tax reform is to be held from 25-26 October, and even if change will be slow to come, the direction of change was clearly indicated by the prime minister’s adviser, James Smith, in early September who said: “Five years ago, income would have been off the table.  But I suspect it will come up.  The time has come to look at all options...The Bahamas has stopped promoting itself as a tax-free jurisdiction.  I think we can begin to move away from that model.”

Originally formed in 1953 to represent the disenfranchised black constituency, the PLP is the party that led the country to independence in 1973 under Lynden Pilling.  The FNM, on the other hand, had its origins in the establishment-oriented United Bahamian Party, albeit with a leavening of PLP dissidents such as Ingraham himself.

Following the by-election disaster in North Abcote, which Ingraham had represented for more than 30 years, the feeling within the FNM is that Hubert Minnis may not survive for long as leader.  He had played a prominent part in the by-election, agreeing the choice of Greg Gomez as candidate and saying that he would get more votes than Ingraham, so he cannot easily escape the fact that Ingraham’s win by 379 votes in May was turned into a 2,367 to 1,513 rout for Gomez in October.

Minnis’s reaction to the by-election defeat was to say that it marked the end of the Ingraham era.  The party, however, doesn’t seem ready to accept this verdict.  Immediately following the defeat, acting-chairman Darron Cash sent out a memo to the FNM’s general election candidates saying: “Even as the mantle is passed to us, a new generation of FNMs, it is imperative that we remember how we got here and who brought us here...I stand on the shoulders of Hubert Ingraham, Tommy Turnquest, and Cion Foulkes...I trust these and all of our wise men will be around and available to me for many years to come.”

The impression is that Minnis’s comment that the “Ingraham era is over” has sparked anger amongst party stalwarts and his leadership is now in jeopardy.  If he is ousted, then deputy-leader, Loretta Butler-Turner, is his most likely successor.

VENEZUELA | Confrontando la escasez. El ministro de alimentos & agricultura, Félix Osorio, anunció el 13 de mayo que en cuestión de días Venezuela recibiría 760.000 toneladas de productos comestibles, con un costo de US$600m, para constituir el primer mes de provisión de reservas de alimentos. Los productos en cuestión incluyen aceites comestible, leche, azúcar, y atún en latas. Osorio dijo que este embarque fue el resultado de acuerdos  alcanzados durante la reciente gira del Presidente Nicolás Maduro en Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay.

En respuesta a lo que Maduro describió como “agudo desabastecimiento”, el gobierno está estableciendo hasta 2,3m de toneladas de una “reserva de alimentos”, calculadas para cubrir tres meses de déficit de provisión.

Osorio también anunció que los largamente subsidiados precios del pollo, la carne vacuna y los productos lácteos se elevarían un 20%, y que los precios internos serían revisados trimestralmente de ahora en adelante.

El ministro de comercio, Alejandro Fleming, anunció que el gobierno importará 50m de rollos de papel higiénico para contrarrestar la supuesta retención de este producto en el mercado. Él dijo que Venezuela consume normalmente 125m de rollos al mes, pero que actualmente hay un ‘exceso de demanda’ que requiere la importación de unos 40m de rollos adicionales.

El 11 de mayo, en una transmisión el Presidente Maduro acusó públicamente a Empresas Polar, el mayor productor de alimentos de Venezuela, de reducir su producción y acaparar productos para crear una situación de desabastecimiento. El propietario de Polar, Lorenzo Mendoza, desde hace tiempo ha sido retratado como un enemigo del gobierno. En el 2010, el fallecido presidente, Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), la acusó de complotar para derrocarlo a él. Dos años más tarde, el gobierno expropió tierras pertenecientes a Polar para un proyecto de viviendas.

Maduro anunció que, “Resolveremos esta cuestión de la guerra económica y el agudo desabastecimiento de algunos productos, pero estructuralmente, no con parches. El pueblo no debe bajar su guardia ante este sabotaje económico que amenaza con empeorar”.

VENEZUELA | Una delicada advertencia. El 13 de mayo, el Presidente Nicolás Maduro saludó la visita del Vicepresidente de China, Li Yuanchao, proclamando: “La alianza estratégica que comenzó de cero ya sobrepasa los US$19mm en comercio”. Al día siguiente, mientras visitaban las obras en construcción de una planta láctea en Miranda, en la cual China ha invertido unos US$52m, Li estaba de humor menos festivo. Él dijo: “Debemos asegurar que estos proyectos son efectivos y eficientes, en el sentido de que ellos pueden tener un impacto positivo sobre el empleo y sus efectos económicos y sociales. Espero que los factores de eficiencia sean tomados en consideración [...] El éxito en este proyecto servirá como un ejemplo”.

Esto se viene en la estela dejada por informes de que los inversionistas chinos en Venezuela no están contentos con el lento progreso y la ineficiencia en las empresas emprendidas conjuntamente con el gobierno de Venezuela, hasta el punto de que las autoridades están reconsiderando la extensión de arreglos de préstamos existentes.

VENEZUELA | La inflación en alza. Un efecto de la escasez y la devaluación de cerca del 32% del Bolívar ha significado un incremento más en la inflación, del 2,8% en marzo, al 4,3% en abril –cuando la tasa acumulada de este año llegó al 12,5%. El gobierno había asumido en el presupuesto de este año, una tasa de entre el 14% y el 16%, que ahora luce inalcanzable, con el incremento acumulado en los 12 meses hasta abril en un 29,4%.

Esto vuelve probable una reversión de la tendencia hacia la baja del 27,6% en el 2011 al 20,1% en el 2012. Vale señalar que estas tasas han sido mantenidas bajas desde hace tiempo por los precios controlados y las bajas tasas de cambio para la importación de productos alimenticios.

Development: On 24 October Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro announced the creation of a new deputy ministry to oversee the various social missions created since 2003 by the socialist government.

Significance: The new structure – grandly titled the deputy ministry for the supreme social happiness of the Venezuelan people – will be run by Rafael Ríos, a former national deputy. All this is part of the effort by Maduro to re-connect his government with the late former president Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) ahead of the 8 December municipal elections, which is the first electoral test for the new administration. The election is already being spun as a day of homage to Chávez, with Maduro asking people to vote in a gesture of loyalty to the founder of the Bolivarian Revolution. That is a tacit admittance that – as in April – people weren’t voting for Maduro but for Chávez, who Maduro likes to suggest is ‘within him’.

Key points:

• The  missions, which began in 2003 when Chávez was facing an opposition-led recall referendum, apparently were the brainchild of Chávez’s mentor, Fidel Castro, who recommended rolling out small existing social schemes on a grand scale. Often spontaneous presidential initiatives – regularly decreed live on air or out on the street by the former president – it has long been unclear who actually oversees the programs (they do not sit under any single ministry) and what exactly is spent on them every year.  It is hard to even know how many are in existence at any one time – in August State media listed 25, although other sources suggest there have been up to 34 in existence. These have included the likes of: Misión Árbol, Misión Asfalto, Misión Barrio Adentro, Misión Ciencia, Misión Identidad, Misión Milagro, Misión Música, Misión Sonrisa, Misión Niño Jesús, and of course, Misión Che Guevara.

• There are also seven ‘big missions’, launched by Chávez in 2011 ahead of the 2012 election period. These include the big housing mission (Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela), the flagship mission of the 2012 presidential campaign, which claims to have built 456,795 new homes between 2011 and 2013; the big agriculture mission (Gran Misión AgroVenezuela) aimed at food sovereignty; and Gran Mission En Amor Mayor, aimed at protecting retirees and vulnerable older people in society. The Venezuelan opposition used to complain that the missions were mere ‘handouts’ to voters, only to pledge to keep and improve them in the 2012 campaign.

• In early August, Maduro had already tweeted the ‘re-launch’ of the missions through the Sistema de Misiones y Grandes Misiones, which he said would seek to unify all the missions so as make them more efficient, with the target of zero poverty by 2019, when the current term ends. Part of the Sistema’s remit would be to statistically quantify their social impact, he added. The likes of the World Bank have praised the social impact of the missions, albeit noting a lack of transparency in their financial management.

Juan Carlos Navarro, el derrotado candidato presidencial del opositor Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), renunció como secretario general del comité ejecutivo nacional del PRD la semana pasada. El anuncio de Navarro, un ex alcalde de la Ciudad de Panamá (1999-2009) y uno de los políticos más reconocidos de Panamá, resalta la creciente crisis del que tradicionalmente ha sido el principal partido político de Panamá, el cual se ha visto en dificultades desde su derrota electoral en el 2009.

Navarro llegó tercero en las elecciones presidenciales del 4 de mayo, con el 28% de los votos, detrás de Juan Carlos Varela del Partido Panameñista (PPA), el tradicional rival del PRD, quien obtuvo el 39% de los votos y de José Domingo Arias, de Cambio Democrático (CD), el partido del ex presidente Ricardo Martinelli (2009-2014), quien tomó el 31%.

El PRD, que retuvo la presidencia entre el 2004 y el 2009 bajo Martín Torrijos, ha tenido dificultades desde que dejó el gobierno, con divisiones que se han tornado incluso más pronunciadas entre una facción liderada por Navarro y la vieja guardia del partido. Esta última incluye a Torrijos; el ex ministro del trabajo, Mitchell Doens (1994-1999) –quien recibió con beneplácito la decisión de Navarro anunciada el 3 de julio de renunciar; Balbina Herrera, la candidata presidencial del PRD en el 2009; y el primo de Navarro, Samuel Lewis Navarro, quien actuó como canciller y vicepresidente bajo Torrijos.

Mientras que la debilidad en el PRD podría ser de gran ayuda para Varela, también podría plantear preguntas acerca de la disciplina dentro del partido opositor, que firmó un acuerdo de “gobernabilidad legislativa” con el PPA poco después de que asumiera Varela [IL-14-26]. Este acuerdo es considerado esencial para el nuevo Presidente, teniendo en cuenta que el PPA, que lidera la coalición El Pueblo Primero (EPP), tendrá 13 bancas en la nueva legislatura nacional unicameral de 71 miembros –ante 30 para CD y 25 para el PRD.

• Molirena pone fin a su alianza con CD

El Presidente Juan Carlos Varela pudo haber sido capaz de explotar el colapso de la alianza de cinco años entre Cambio Democrático (CD) del ex presidente Ricardo Martinelli (2009-2014) y el opositor Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (Molirena), que también fue anunciada la semana pasada por el presidente de Molirena, Sergio González Ruiz. Molirena tiene dos bancas en la nueva legislatura de 71 miembros.

Ecuador’s national assembly unanimously ratified the Convention on Maritime Delimitation between Ecuador and Costa Rica on 8 March. The convention, signed by both parties in 2014, is significant because it represents the final step in Ecuador’s mission to establish mutually recognised boundaries with its three neighbours, Peru, Colombia, and Costa Rica.

According to Ecuador’s foreign ministry, the governments of Costa Rica and Ecuador have been in consultations regarding their shared maritime boundary since 1978. In 1985, both countries signed a convention on the delimitation of maritime and sub-maritime areas, but it was not ratified due to the concerns of Costa Rica’s legislative assembly that some terms of the agreement were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

With Ecuador’s accession to UNCLOS in September 2012, bilateral technical consultations were relaunched, which culminated in the signing of the Convention on Maritime Delimitation on 21 April 2014. At the time of the signing, Ecuador’s vice president Jorge Glas discussed the “historic importance” of the convention given that it was completed without third-party involvement, and argued that the new borders would become “points of union, convergence, and integration of neighbouring peoples”.

The convention resolved issues regarding the overlap of the countries’ maritime spaces, which project 200 nautical miles from Ecuador’s Galapagos Islands and Costa Rica’s Cocos Island. Under the convention, Ecuador gains at least 100km of maritime territory. The agreement also establishes a special zone 10 nautical miles wide on each side of the sea boundary. In this zone, the accidental presence of fishing vessels of either country will not be considered a violation of sovereignty, although the convention does not make provisions for fishing or hunting rights in the zone.

Before the ratification vote, Ecuadorean government officials involved in the convention’s negotiation process, including the commander of the navy Ángel Sarzoza and the director of the Naval Oceanographic Institute (Inocar) Humberto Gómez, presented data and information to the legislators. Gómez explained that with the new maritime boundaries, Ecuador has the chance to expand its sovereign rights and emphasised that the country’s maritime territory is 5.8 times larger than its land territory. (Ecuador has a land area of 276,841km²).

Following the ratification, the president of the national assembly, Gabriela Rivadeneira, and the body’s vice president, Rosana Alvarado, submitted the convention’s text to Ecuador’s foreign minister Guillaume Long and to Costa Rica’s ambassador to Ecuador Leda Zamora Chaves. In a statement, Costa Rica’s government congratulated Ecuador’s assembly, and noted that the ratification will allow for the “strengthening of historic relations of friendship and cooperation between both countries”.

Costa Rica’s foreign minister Manuel González Sanz said that the convention’s ratification provides the basis for further collaboration on issues of mutual interest, such as a joint initiative for the extension of the limits of the countries’ continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles. The president of the Ecuadorean national assembly’s commission on international relations, María Augusta Calle, announced on 8 March that Ecuador now has its “full skin”.

• Commercial and economic development

The treaty’s ratification has been lauded for the opportunities that it provides for commercial and economic development. Ecuadorean legislator Rocío Valarezo noted that maritime space has enormous biological and mineral resources which are currently unknown, and argued that Inocar should conduct new investigations to discover the true potential of Ecuador’s continental shelf. In a press statement, the national assembly also discussed the ratification’s significance for Latin American and Caribbean integration and the construction of a “region of peace”, through deeper political and commercial relations. In 2014 the value of commercial trade between Ecuador and Costa Rica surpassed US$88m.

Oi, Brazil’s fourth largest mobile operator, reported a narrower third quarter loss as it struggles to emerge from bankruptcy protection. The government has so far said it will not intervene to bail out the company.

Oi said it had a third quarter loss of BRL1.015bn (US$298.7m), a small reduction on the comparable year-earlier period. Its CEO, Marco Schroeder, said that there had been a 10% cut in operating costs, although revenues were also down by over 6% to BRL6.4bn (US$1.88bn). The fall in revenue reflected a purge of the client base, particularly in the pre-paid mobile and fixed line segments. The company was able to boost pay-TV and broadband subscribers however, part of a strategy to build higher-value services.

Since seeking bankruptcy protection in June, the company has been trying to restore profitability, so as to attract potential buyers. Schroeder says that cash flow has improved, partly because the company has stopped servicing its debt (part of the bankruptcy protection process), and partly because it is reducing operating costs. Total debt stands at BRL41.2bn (US$12.13bn) and the company has been in talks with its creditors over a rescheduling programme.

Brazil’s communications minister Gilberto Kassab has said that the federal government led by President Michel Temer is keen to see Oi emerge from bankruptcy, but is not yet considering any form of intervention, as it favours a “market-based solution”. In September, Mexico-based América Móvil expressed an interest in acquiring some or all of Oi’s assets. The Egyptian telecoms entrepreneur Naguib Sawiris has also expressed an interest.

President Jimmy Morales announced this month that he was ending a state of emergency decreed in May in Ixchiguán and Tajumulco municipalities, San Marcos department. The decree had been declared in response to violence linked to both a decades-old land dispute and turf war in the area which is used to cultivate opium poppy [SSR-17-06]. While the conservative Frente de Convergencia Nacional (FCN-Nación) government has unveiled various initiatives aimed at boosting productive development in the area, and drawn up a bill which sets out new boundaries, it remains to be seen how far this will ultimately go in ending the unrest.

After President Morales declared the state of emergency in May (subsequently extended in June and July), some 1,040 military officials, 1,200 police (PNC) officers, and 450 anti-drugs officials were deployed to the area with the declared aim of recovering State control. As part of efforts to resolve long-running tensions between the two municipalities, which date back to 1933 following the creation of Ixchiguán as a municipality, on 24 May representatives from local communities, along with officials from the land registry office, the national geographic institute (IGN), and the human rights ombudsman (PDH), began a process of demarcating boundaries in the area. This has since provided the basis for the government to draw up a legislative bill aimed at setting out these limits once and for all which was sent down to the 158-member unicameral legislature in early August and which, at the time of writing, had yet to be approved.

As well as announcing the legislative bill, the government, which confirmed on 7 August that it would not be extending the state of emergency, has unveiled other initiatives aimed at quelling the tensions. These include proposals to offer technical training courses to create cooperatives in the area, with support from national technical institute of training and productivity (Intecap) and the economy ministry (Mineco), which would advise on accessing new markets. Mineco has also promised 100 new jobs for residents of Ixchiguán and Tajumulco municipalities while the government has announced US$250,000 will go on promoting productive community projects.

As part of efforts to boost agriculture in the area (as an alternative to growing illicit crops), on 3 August the agriculture ministry (Maga) announced that it would hand over 120 submersible irrigation pumps to 120 families in Tajumulco. It has also announced the launch of a new project to store rain water to benefit 200 families along with plans to implement 1,500 micro irrigation systems. Meanwhile Health Minister Lucrecia Hernández Mack on 7 August pledged to increase the number of health care professionals in the area, telling reporters that, in September, three clinics would be overhauled in Ixchiguán and five in Tajumulco. The social development ministry (Mides) has announced that those who do not receive social assistance will receive a food security hand-out worth Q1,500.

Congress fails to ratify another decree

The national legislature has ratified President Morales’ decree with regard to the two municipalities on three occasions. However, it refused to provide the necessary votes for a decree that he announced on 17 July invoking a 30-day state of public calamity. The move, which he said was necessary to address the collapse of the country’s road infrastructure, would have suspended procedures under the public procurement & state contracting law. At the time that he announced the decree, the communications, infrastructure, and housing ministry (Micivi) also revealed plans to purchase machines and equipment, with the military to provide assistance in tasks such as repairing potholes. President Morales made his announcement three days after the United Nations (UN)-backed anti-impunity commission in Guatemala (Cicig) and attorney general’s office (AG) revealed another massive corruption scandal, this time involving a criminal network (see box) led by Alejandro Sinibaldi a former head (2012-2014) of the Micivi, who served under disgraced former president Otto Pérez Molina (Partido Patriota [PP] 2012-2015), himself forced to resign in 2015 over corruption.

Congress however rejected the decree on 20 July by 67-37 votes, with deputies from the main opposition Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) party, and the also opposition Todos, claiming that it was not appropriate as a state of calamity should be only used in cases of natural disasters or catastrophes. President Morales also announced that he will present two legal initiatives to congress – one to reform the law on public procurement & state contracting and the other to liquidate those construction companies with outstanding legal issues.

Micivi scandal

On 14 July Cicig’s chief, Iván Velásquez, and other top officials revealed details of the corruption network led by Sinibaldi, for which so far 17 people have been arrested. Arrest warrants are out for 15 others, including Sinibaldi, whose whereabouts are unknown.

Velásquez made his announcement after some 40 raids were carried out in the departments of Guatemala, Sacatepéquez, and Izabal. The investigation, which is divided into four planks (business carried out by Micivi, money laundering, illicit electoral finance, and obstructing justice), found that Sinibaldi had allegedly created a series of shell companies to launder money that he collected in bribes from construction companies contracted by the Micivi, some of which was allegedly used to illegally finance the 2011 and 2015 PP electoral campaigns.

• Progress report

In its most recent progress report (issued on 10 July), Guatemala’s security ministry (Minseg) reported that, in 49 days of operations in San Marcos department, security forces had destroyed more than 260m opium poppy plants, spanning 527,109 hectares worth Q6.5bn (US$887m), in seven municipalities in the area.

• New human rights ombudsman

On 19 July Guatemala’s 158-member unicameral legislature elected Jordán Rodas Andrade, a lawyer, as the country’s new human rights ombudsman (PDH) to replace Jorge de León Duque whose five-year term is due to end in August. Rodas, who received 131 votes, has highlighted as his priorities the need to address chronic malnutrition, health, insecurity, and conflict.

The Dominican Republic has formally established diplomatic relations with mainland China following its decision in May to break off its longstanding relations with Taiwan. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited the country for the first time on 21 September to mark the start of bilateral diplomatic relations with the opening of a new embassy in Santo Domingo. The Dominican government justified the shift of diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing on economic reasons. But the move has been questioned by the US government and could affect the country’s relations with the world’s largest economy.

The government led by President Danilo Medina explained its decision to ditch Taiwan for China as part of its efforts to gain access to more international markets for Dominican exports. Soon after the announcement, Beijing said that Wang would visit the Dominican Republic to open a new embassy and formalise the start of diplomatic relations. During his visit, Wang was greeted by his Dominican peer, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, and was also received by Medina. Afterwards Wang and Vargas held a press conference in which they announced that they had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) formally establishing a mechanism of political consultation by which both countries are to hold consultation meetings at ministerial level periodically to address bilateral issues.

Wang and Vargas celebrated the new diplomatic ties and justified them on the economic benefits that this could bring for both countries. Wang noted that the Dominican Republic and China had established social development cooperation agencies back in the 1990s and that through these they have been working together to promote each other’s economic development. Wang pointed out that in the last 20 years the Dominican Republic has become China’s main commercial partner in the Caribbean sub-region, with bilateral trade averaging around US$2bn a year (with the balance heavily favourable to China). Vargas noted that China boasts 20% of the world’s population and that having formal relations with Beijing would help to open up this market to Dominican exports.

Vargas also said that his country could now benefit from increased Chinese investment and visits from Chinese tourists. In fact, Vargas said that he and Medina had discussed promoting trade investment opportunities with Wang, as well as the possibility of easing visa requirements for Chinese visitors to the Dominican Republic. Vargas revealed that the three also discussed plans for Medina to conduct an official visit to China next month.

Chinese tourism

Following the announcement that the Dominican Republic would establish formal diplomatic relations with China, three Chinese airlines announced their interest in opening new routes to the country. According to the Dominican national civil aviation board (JAC), on 10 September Air China, Southern China, and Eastern China expressed an interest in operating in the country “as soon as bilateral air transport agreement is in place”. The JAC noted that the adoption of such an agreement would be very beneficial for the Dominican economy as it is estimated that it could lead to some 2m Chinese tourists visiting the country per year.

The Dominican Republic is one of three countries in the Central America and Caribbean region, along with Panama and El Salvador, to switch allegiances from Taipei to Beijing since June last year. This led Taiwan to accuse China of bribing these countries to abandon their diplomatic support for Taiwan, a view shared by the US, which was sufficiently concerned by the shift that on 6 September it recalled its ambassadors to the three countries back for consultations over the issue. In the case of the Dominican Republic, in particular, US concerns may stem from the fact that the country is due to join the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a temporary member in January 2019 for a two-year term. Notably, during their joint press conference Vargas said that he and Wang had discussed how to promote “peace and international security from the UNSC”. Vargas has said that establishment of diplomatic relations with China should not have “any repercussions” on its relations with the US. But this will likely depend on Dominican actions at the UNSC.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been visiting Barbados again. A team was in the country from 5-8 February to discuss the implementation of the Barbados Economic Recovery and Transformation (BERT) plan, and the end-of-visit messages were positive.

Barbados currently has the benefit of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) from the IMF, and the mission reported that “all indicative targets for end-December under the EFF have been met”. It also said that “good progress had been made” in meeting the structural benchmarks, including the passing in early 2019 of two key pieces of legislation: the Public Financial Management Act, and the Town and Country Planning Act.

*** BELIZE-GUATEMALA BORDER TENSIONS REPORTED. In late May there were reports of attempts by the Belize Defence Force (BDF) to evict Guatemalan squatters in the area of Santa Cruz, San Luis municipality. It is not thought that there is any threat of a serious escalation, but it is a reminder of the unresolved nature of the Belize-Guatemala dispute. The dispute is now in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but a definitive ruling is still some years away. Guatemala submitted its ‘memorial’ to the ICJ in December and Belize now has until mid-2022 to submit its response. There will then be another chance for Guatemala to rebut Belize’s counter arguments with a ‘rejoinder’, which in turn will be followed by a further submission from Belize.

It is thought that the best that Guatemala can hope for is compensation for a never-built railway line from the coast that the British promised in the 1850s in return for Guatemalan recognition of British sovereignty over the territory that is now Belize. The treaty was signed in 1859, but in 1940 Guatemala declared the treaty null and void due to the failure of Britain to build the railway line. Guatemala’s 1945 constitution declared Belize to be an inseparable part of Guatemalan territory. Belize became independent in 1981 and was admitted to the United Nations as a member state.

In March 2021, the foreign ministers of Belize and Guatemala (respectively Eamon Courtenay and Pedro Brolo Villa) met in person on the shared border and agreed to reopen the Belize-Guatemala Joint Commission to manage relations between the two countries. They also agreed to abide by the 2005 confidence building measures and to implement the Partial Scope Trade Agreement (PSA) to boost bilateral trade.

On 9 May, the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (Cofcor) of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) issued a statement saying: “The Cofcor urged Belize, Guatemala and the OAS [Organisation of American States] to respect and implement fully the Confidence Building Measures as agreed under their Framework Agreement of 2005, pending a resolution of the case before the ICJ. They further urged both countries and the OAS to reinvigorate their efforts to engage in the design and development of a mechanism of cooperation for the Sarstoon River, which remains outstanding…The Cofcor recognises and supports the OAS’ crucial role in the process aimed at resolving the dispute, arising from Guatemala’s claims on Belize, and called on the international community to continue supporting the OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone.”

In a timely development for Belize, Caricom has appointed Dr Carla Barnett, a Belizean, to be its new secretary-general from August this year. She will serve for five years.

*** GUYANA PROPOSES REGIONAL ENERGY CORRIDOR. On 22 May, Guyana’s President Irfaan Ali told a conference of expatriates that “the strategy of Guyana is to become a major player in the energy corridor of Brazil, Guyana, and Suriname”. Expounding on the idea, Ali said: “Our own demand locally and the spinoff of our own investment that will see more export, would require greater logistics planning. The integration of Suriname and Brazil, creation of that new corridor, making Guyana an important shipping hub for the region, requires careful planning and development of a logistics hub and industry. And that by itself brings a stream of benefits. It’s not only what is happening in Guyana.”

At a press conference on 28 April, Ali had talked about Guyana and Suriname supplying energy to northern Brazil and French Guiana. The concept for such an integration was explored in two Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) studies on the Arco Norte Electrical Interconnection in 2016 and 2017.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin spoke over the phone on 10 June, during which they discussed, among other topics, Brazil and China’s joint statement released last month which called for peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. On 7 June Brazil’s vice president, Geraldo Alckmin, concluded a trip to China, where he held a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, although Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine was not the main topic discussed, as Alckmin was leading a delegation of government officials and business representatives whose priority was to deepen economic cooperation. 

International summits to discuss a potential peace plan for the war in Ukraine were held last year, and Brazil sent representatives to some of these events, such as the ones hosted by Denmark in June and by Saudi Arabia in August. However, for the upcoming Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland due to take place on 15-16 June, President Lula has declined his invitation and will reportedly send Brazil’s ambassador to Switzerland to attend in his stead. As of 13 June, India has yet not confirmed whether its prime minister, Narendra Modi, would attend or whether it would just send a diplomat. But the other leaders of the original member states of the Brics group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are not attending. 

Having some representation from the Indian government at the summit could be a small victory for Ukraine’s efforts to garner support among developing countries of the Global South. However, Brazil’s foreign ministry has maintained its stance that any peace negotiation must involve dialogue with Russia.

On 23 May Lula’s chief foreign policy adviser, Celso Amorim, visited Beijing where he signed a joint statement with China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, on the war in Ukraine. Brazil and China called for an international peace conference to be “held at a proper time that is recognised by both Russia and Ukraine” and which has “equal participation of all parties as well as fair discussion of all peace plans”. The statement also called for “no expansion of the battlefield” and “no escalation of fighting”, but there was a marked absence of any calls for all invading Russian troops to withdraw from Ukrainian territory – a key prerequisite demanded by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky for peace talks to begin. 

In their 10 June call, Lula and Putin also discussed Alckmin’s recent visit to China. President Xi hosted Alckmin in a special event at the Great Hall of the People, the seat of China’s legislature, but at the meeting Xi only made an indirect reference to the Ukraine peace plan, hailing Brazil and China’s efforts towards “world peace and stability”. At a press conference in Beijing on 7 June, Alckmin focused on areas such as trade, infrastructure investment, and agriculture.

During the trip, the Chinese government reportedly reiterated its interest for a free trade deal between China and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) regional trade bloc. Alckmin said that he told Chinese officials it was not up to Brazil to decide the direction of the group.

While Uruguay, which will assume the six-month rotating Mercosur presidency in July, has long been a vocal proponent of deepening China ties, it is uncertain how enthusiastic the governments of Argentina and Paraguay will be. Argentina’s diplomatic priorities are leaning more towards shoring up US relations, while Paraguay maintains its strong support for Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Belt and Road speculation

Ahead of Vice President Alckmin’s trip to China, federal deputy José Guimarães, the leader of the governing coalition in the lower chamber of congress, suggested that Alckmin would confirm Brazil as an official signatory of the Belt and Road Initiative, a key pillar of Chinese foreign policy which involves funding infrastructure projects in the Global South. However, Alckmin contradicted Guimarães at a press conference last week, saying that discussions were ongoing but that a final decision would not be made during this visit.

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro has announced a drip feed of cabinet changes over the course of this week, the most significant of which was at the interior ministry. Petro followed the dismissal of his interior minister, Luis Fernando Velasco, by announcing a renewed endeavour to convene a constituent assembly to reform the constitution.

President Petro announced Velasco’s departure as interior minister, the go-between with congress, on 29 June. By the time he confirmed his replacement on 3 July, Petro had made various other cabinet changes. Velasco made public his opposition to Petro’s call for a constituent process. He makes way for Juan Fernando Cristo, a prominent member of the centre-left Partido Liberal (PL).

• Cabinet changes

President Petro named Ángela María Buitrago as his new justice minister, replacing Néstor Osuna of the Partido Liberal, who had held the post since the start of his administration. Buitrago had been on the shortlist of three candidates for attorney general. María Constanza García takes over as transport minister, replacing William Camargo. She had been serving as deputy infrastructure minister. Jhenifer Mojica was replaced as agriculture minister by Martha Carvajalino.

Ahead of Cristo’s appointment, Petro said that the incoming interior minister would be tasked with paving the way for a constituent process “in this or the next government”. Upon assuming the position, Cristo said he had been appointed with the express aim of meeting different political parties to strike a national accord “to explore the future possibility of convening a constituent assembly”, although he pointedly said that it would not meet until “the next government”.

On 4 July Petro proposed nine points to be included in the national accord: universal right to education, health and pensions; agrarian reform; economic and social development in former conflict areas; adaptation to the climate crisis; judicial reform; political reform; and “judicial truth and social forgiveness for a definitive peace”.

Cristo’s appointment is eye-catching. He is not a radical leftist but rather a long-serving senator and minister in the government of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018). It looks calculated to assuage concerns in the opposition about Petro’s intentions. More moderate opposition parties might be won over, but the right-wing opposition Centro Democrático (CD) made its position clear from the outset. Former president Iván Duque (2018-2022) said on social media that the constituent assembly’s sole purpose would be “to perpetuate the current government in power”, criticising “the so-called national accord” as “a façade”.

The recent opening of the Chancay mega-port in Peru has raised hopes of an economic uplift in neighbouring Bolivia, which is struggling with shortages of fuel and US dollars. The prospect of a significantly shortened shipping route between Peru and China has sparked speculation that Bolivia could also receive a boost to its exports. The signing of a lithium production contract with China’s CBC Investments Ltd on 26 November was the latest sign that President Luis Arce’s government views increased trade with Asia as the best route out of the economic quagmire.

The Chinese-funded Chancay deep-water port, which will reduce the shipping route from Peru to Shanghai by 10 days, is also set to transform trade between China and Peru’s neighbours. The development has caused particular excitement in Bolivia. Samuel Doria Medina, a cement magnate and presidential candidate in next year’s elections, said on 21 November that, if elected, he would build a new road linking Bolivia with Chancay as part of an overhaul that would also transform the city of El Alto (La Paz department) into a duty-free zone.

The president of the Bolivian private sector lobby Cámara Nacional de Indústrias (CNI), Pablo Camacho, has also highlighted Chancay’s potential to deliver a boost to Bolivia’s exports, but warned that the current political instability could undermine this if highways continue to be blocked, as they have been in recent weeks by supporters of former president Evo Morales (2006-2019).

This instability could also deter a greater inflow of Chinese money into Bolivia, although President Arce claimed, following a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in Rio de Janeiro on 19 November, that Xi is interested in the possibility of a new rail route linking Brazil and Bolivia with Chancay. China’s state-owned Cosco shipping company has also highlighted the significance of the Chancay port for Bolivia; the company’s director for Chancay, Carlos Tejada, travelled to La Paz in May to outline details of the port to representatives from the business sector, government, and congress.

There is also considerable interest from China in Bolivia’s nascent lithium industry, which government officials claim will drive the country’s development in the coming decades. China’s CBC Investments signed a contract on 26 November with Bolivia’s state lithium company YLB that will see it build two lithium extraction plants with a combined annual output of 35,000 tonnes. Following a previous agreement signed in September with Russia’s Uranium One Group for the construction of another lithium plant, Bolivia’s lithium sector is already tilted heavily towards Asia. Assuming that the two contracts are approved by Bolivia’s congress, the new trade link via Chancay will take on even more significance.

Extradition approved for former counter-narcotics chief

Bolivia’s supreme court (TSJ) issued a ruling on 27 November approving the extradition to the US of Maximiliano Dávila, who headed the country’s counter-narcotics agency (FELCN) in the final months of the Evo Morales administration (2006-2019). Dávila’s extradition was requested in February 2022 after he was accused by US prosecutors of working “in partnership with Bolivian drug labs…to send more than 1,000kg of cocaine to the United States”. Dávila has been detained in Bolivia since January 2022, when he was arrested while attempting to flee to Argentina after being charged with drug trafficking and illicit enrichment.

Government presents optimistic budget for 2025

The government’s draft budget for 2025, which was unveiled on 26 November, plans for B$369.3bn (US$53.3bn) in total spending. This is up by 8.5% compared with the 2024 budget, with the government planning for a fiscal deficit of 9.2% of GDP. The government predicts growth to rise to 3.5% in 2025, driven by a 7.6% increase in tax revenue. These forecasts are optimistic given Bolivia’s current economic predicament. Shortages of fuel and US dollars, in addition to the recent roadblocks, have hit economic activity and driven up inflation, which hit 7.94% in October – its highest level since November 2011. The government’s 3.5% growth forecast for 2025 is also significantly higher than the 2.2% predicted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).