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President Mauricio Macri has suffered a significant setback after the supreme court (CSJN) struck down his government’s energy price increases for residential users. The Macri administration had defended the sharp increases on the grounds that the previous government’s subsidies were unsustainable and, along with a lack of investment in the energy sector, had conspired to transform Argentina from a country with abundant cheap domestic energy to one with scarce and expensive imported energy. Now it will have to hold public consultations on the matter. This week also provided an ominous development for the government with the reunification of the powerful trade union movement, Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), the scourge of non-Peronist governments.

The CSJN ruled on 18 August that the government’s gas tariffs increases for residential users were unconstitutional as it had omitted to hold “obligatory” public hearings to discuss them. It annulled the increase in gas tariffs of up to 400% introduced by the government for residential users who will now pay the old tariffs in place until last March. By contrast, large companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will have to pay the increases retroactively to April. At certain times of the year the latter group make up three-quarters of Argentina’s energy use.

The cabinet chief, Marcos Peña, sought to downplay the significance of the CSJN ruling, in a press conference alongside the energy minister, Juan José Aranguren, and the justice minister, Germán Garavano, saying it “removed uncertainty”. President Macri promptly accepted the ruling and ordered hearings to be held on 12 September (these have since been put back by four days due to the “wealth of interest” in participating). But he expressed some concern that companies and SMEs might make a fresh appeal, prolonging the debate.

The government will now set about trying to explain to the public during the consultations why the increases are necessary, and that the alternative would be other fiscal adjustments to make up what Peña predicted could be a US$1.2bn shortfall. This promises to be a very hard sell and it was little wonder that the political opposition, sensing the government’s difficulties, welcomed the CSJN ruling. The Frente para la Victoria (FPV, Kirchneristas) faction of the main opposition Partido Justicialista (PJ) was particularly happy with the ruling which it will hope to exploit to recover some political momentum after defections amid corruption allegations. The FPV was not alone, however, in arguing that the tariff increases were too onerous and had fuelled painful inflation, especially for the more vulnerable sectors of society. The more moderate PJ faction, Frente Renovador (FR), led by federal deputy Sergio Massa, also accused the government of moving too fast too soon.

Rival CGT factions fuse

Four days after the CSJN’s ruling the three strands of the CGT participated in a reunification ceremony after eight years of division. The CGT has been critical of the government’s economic policies, especially gas tariff increases. Although the three factions united behind a triumvirate of candidates selected by their respective leaders, Luis Barrionuevo, Hugo Moyano and Antonio Caló, the government will have taken some solace from the fact that no general strike was announced and representatives of only 124 of the CGT’s 213 trade unions took part. This could owe to the government’s proposed healthcare reforms, which will see AR$2.7bn (US$182m) of reimbursements to the trade unions [WR-16-32]. Several influential union leaders stayed away, including Gerónimo Venegas, head of the rural workers’ union, who has challenged the legitimacy of the new CGT authorities before the labour ministry, and Omar Viviani, head of the taxi drivers’ union in the Movimiento de Acción Sindical Argentino (Masa).

The CGT has positioned itself as a guarantor of governability, although one of the three factional leaders, Luis Barrionuevo, said it would be “difficult to sustain this government through democratic means”. This ominous prediction is because, in the CGT’s view, expressed by Juan Carlos Schmid, one of the new triumvirate, “there is a clear lurch to the Right [by the government] and the crisis is deepening”.

• Reconnecting with the public

President Mauricio Macri and senior government officials carried out a national ‘door-knocking day’ this week to speak to the public directly, following the supreme court setback. Macri made unannounced calls in the Buenos Aires municipality of San Miguel accompanied by the provincial governor, María Eugenia Vidal, armed with Danish pastries bought from a local bakery. The cabinet chief, Marcos Peña, and the education minister, Esteban Bullrich, visited the Buenos Aires municipality of Almirante Brown; the interior minister, Rogelio Frigerio and the defence minister, Julio César Martínez, did the same in the eastern province of Entre Ríos and the central province of Córdoba respectively. Martínez posted a video on social media of him sharing mate with a family. Some 25,000 volunteers from the ruling Cambiemos coalition knocked on doors elsewhere in Argentina to listen to the concerns of the public.

President Nicolás Maduro’s Christmas message from the Miraflores palace suggests that he lives in deep isolation from the rest of Venezuela. “After such battling and sacrifice, this country deserves a Christmas in peace, where love and happiness reigns, wrapped in our beautiful traditions, preparing hallacas for the Christmas meal,” Maduro declared in a short video message accompanied by the First Lady Cilia Flores and a group of children. The message, relayed on state television, was presented by Diosdado Cabello, the number two in the ruling Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV).

Hallacas, which are similar to dumplings or small wraps, made of cornmeal or cassava dough and stuffed with meat or fish, olives and raisins, are a national dish in Venezuela, typically served at the main Christmas meal, which is eaten late on 24^th December. President Maduro pledged a few weeks back on state television that there would be sufficient ingredients available to make Hallacas for Christmas, noting that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin had promised Venezuela “all the corn it needs” as part of renewed cooperation agreements. As we reported last week, Maduro later also promised that Venezuelan children would have “all the toys they wanted” – and proceeded to order the intervention of the country’s main toy importer [WR-16-49].

Unlike the real Saint Nicholas, Maduro’s track record when it comes to delivering on promises is far from impeccable; and Venezuelans could be forgiven for switching off state television this Christmas. Up to five people may have died (including a 14-year old boy officially confirmed as a victim) in violent protests and looting of shops and banks across the country last weekend. The worst violence was in Ciudad Bolívar, the capital of the southernmost state of Bolívar.

The catalyst for the protests was the Maduro administration’s plan to withdraw, in a period of 72 hours, the highest denomination and most-used note in the country (the 100-bolívar bill), before the introduction of new higher denomination notes. The bulk of the new notes, scheduled to be in circulation as of 15 December, have yet to appear.

In the face of the violent protests, borne out of fear among Venezuelan citizens that their money might soon be completely worthless as opposed to increasingly worthless as a result of stratospheric levels of inflation, Maduro was compelled to backtrack, announcing that the 100-bolívar bill would remain legal tender until 2 January. But because of the spreading panic, and the still tight deadline for the notes to be taken out of circulation, a good number of businesses continue to refuse them.

Colombian border closure

Maduro was also forced to row back from his move to shut the 1,274-mile shared border with Colombia – which went from 72 hours, as of 12 December, to 2 January, and then back again. Maduro abruptly re-opened the border on 20 December, eight days after it was closed, with his communications minister, Ernesto Villegas, tweeting the news that the frontier would be ‘gradually re-opened’ following talks between Maduro and his Colombian counterpart Juan Manuel Santos.

The ever-patient Santos, who typically has to intervene personally with Maduro to keep bilateral diplomatic relations ticking over, took a more critical line than usual, noting that Colombia would be sending a team to Venezuela in order to analyse the currency crisis. In response to Maduro’s allegations that bolívares were being hoarded in Colombian border towns as part of “an attack” on the Venezuelan currency (designed to destabilise the country), Santos insisted that the volume of Venezuelan cash that is actually being held by Colombian currency merchants and exchange houses is in fact “very limited”. “The problem isn’t that bolívares are being hoarded here,” Santos said. “The problem is in Venezuela.”

• Light of love

“As our singer Alí Primera said of our people, there is no bitter taste that can kill our happiness”, President Maduro said in his televised Christmas message. “My wish is that this December light of love illuminates us throughout 2017, the year in which Venezuela will be victorious and indestructible”.

• Santos and Maduro

President Santos said he had pressed President Maduro to do more to tackle Venezuelan cross border smuggling (of fuel and state-subsidised food and household goods), noting that more needed to be done to cut off the smuggling trails running between the two countries. Santos also said that his government was stepping up support for Colombian border towns, such as Cúcuta, “so they don’t have to depend on Venezuela or anyone in particular, but can rely on their own strength”.

“100% false, absurd, ridiculous, Alice in Wonderland crazy”. This was the response by President Juan Orlando Hernández to claims made on 2 October that Mexican drug lord Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán Loera gave US$1m to his brother, Juan Antonio ‘Tony’ Hernández, that was intended for him. A former national legislator for the ruling Partido Nacional (PN), Tony Hernández was arrested in November 2018 on drug-related allegations. The incendiary claims by Assistant US Attorney Jason Richman, which follow allegations in August that the PN government received US$1.5m in drug-trafficking proceeds to secure Hernández’s 2013 election [WR-19-32], were made at the start of Tony Hernández’s trial which could well produce further discomfort for the President who has been facing ongoing protests since April, calling for him to step down.

In his opening remarks, Richman, who did not say when the alleged transaction with ‘El Chapo’ took place, described Tony Hernández as “untouchable” in Honduras. He said, “the defendant was protected by…his brother, the current sitting president of Honduras…who himself has received millions of dollars in drug money bribes…from some of the largest cocaine traffickers in the world…like ‘El Chapo’ and the Sinaloa cartel who…delivered US$1m to the defendant for his brother.”

The following day jurors in the trial heard testimony from Victor Hugo Díaz Morales, a Honduran former drug trafficker who, according to international press reports, said he gave US$40,000 to Hernández’s congressional campaign in 2005 at his brother’s request. According to the same reports, Díaz, who is now in US custody and cooperating with prosecutors, testified that he worked together with Tony Hernández to traffic about 140,000kg of cocaine to the US from about 2004 to 2016.

President Hernández and his brother’s lawyer, Omar Malone, maintain the allegations are a smear campaign in response to a “transnational anti-crime strategy” which began in 2010 when President Hernández was congress president. According to the President, who in June was forced to dismiss reports that he had been targeted in an investigation into large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) since “at least in or about 2013” [WR-19-22], this strategy included the approval of “over 20 laws and instruments”, including an extradition treaty.

As has been the case with the previous allegations, the latest claims are likely to raise question marks over future relations with the US. The Hernández government recently signed a contentious migration deal with the US government that could see asylum seekers at the US-Mexico border sent to Honduras [WR-19-39].

Human rights concerns

The latest incendiary claims come as President Hernández’s government has come under renewed pressure over human rights. During the 173rd session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which took place between 23 September and 2 October, various organisations denounced “brutal repression and systematic protests” taking place in Honduras in response to the protests which began in April over concerns that the government was seeking to privatise the health and education sectors.

The hearing was requested on behalf of organisations such as Coalición Contra la Impunidad, a group of local civil-society groups, the Mesoamerican Women Human Rights Defenders Initiative (IM-Defensoras) and the Centre for Justice and International Law (Cejil) who claimed that so far this year, government action has reportedly left nine people dead, 88 injured, and more than 200 criminalised. Issues raised included the militarisation of public security, excessive use of force, the indiscriminate use of tear gas and arbitrary arrests and criminalisation.

Another report

On 3 October the IACHR also released a new report on the situation of human rights in Honduras. Based on an IACHR visit to the country which took place from 30 July to 3 August 2018, as well as other visits by the IACHR and its thematic rapporteurs, the report places current human rights abuses within the context of abuses that followed the coup of 2009, which removed former president Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009) from office; the contentious electoral process in November 2017; “and the context of violence that followed the elections, which included the disproportionate use of public force”. IACHR notes that 23 people died in the suppression of the 2017 protests, for which there have been few advances in justice.

Atlantic basin seasonal forecasts warn that warm sea surface temperatures and atypical atmospheric conditions will likely give rise to above-average hurricane activity in the Caribbean in 2020.

An outlook report released on 16 April by the Weather Company, a subsidiary of the International Business Machines corporation (IBM), predicts a potentially hyperactive hurricane season. Chief Meteorologist of the Weather Company Todd Crawford anticipates that the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season, which officially begins on 1 June, will experience 18 named storms, eight hurricanes and four major-hurricanes. Hurricanes reaching Category 3 and higher (178km/h or above) on the Saffir-Simpson Wind Scale are classified as major hurricanes due to their potential for inflicting significant loss of life or damage. The predication is significantly above the 30-year normalized average (1981-2010) of 13 named storms, seven hurricanes, and 3 major hurricanes.

An earlier forecast report released on 2 April by Colorado State University (CSU) suggests much the same outlook, predicting 16 named storms, eight hurricanes and four major hurricanes. The forecast is based on a statistical prediction scheme using 38 years of past data as well as a combination of data from both the United Kingdom Met Office and the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. The report concluded that there is a 58% probability of at least one major hurricane tracking into the Caribbean, above the average of 42% for last century.

On 20 April, an official forecast from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a US federal government scientific agency predicted a 20% chance of El Niño coinciding with the peak of the Atlantic hurricane season. El Niño refers to a 12-18 month period in which anomalously warm sea surface temperatures occur in the eastern half of the equatorial Pacific.

The CSU report highlighted the El Niño forecast by the NOAA as a primary reason for predicting above-normal activity in the upcoming hurricane season. According to the institution, “El Niño tends to increase upper-level westerly winds across the Caribbean into the tropical Atlantic, tearing apart hurricanes as they try to form”.

CSU also pointed to the warmer-than-normal sea surface temperatures in the tropical Atlantic as a reason for its prediction as the conditions provide more fuel for cyclone formation and intensification. The 2020 Atlantic basin average Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE), a measure of a storm’s potential for wind damage and destruction, is expected to be approximately 140% of its long-term average.

If the forecasts are correct, the 2020 hurricane season will be the fifth consecutive year of above-normal activity. The 2019 hurricane season was an exceptionally devastating one, bringing 18 named storms and 20 tropical cyclones. Hurricane Dorian, an ultra-intense Category 5 hurricane with winds peaking at 295km/h, gained infamy for becoming the most intense tropical storm on record to strike The Bahamas. Dorian surpassed hurricane Irma in 2017 as the most powerful hurricane ever recorded outside of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. An Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) report published in November 2019 estimated the total cost of the impact of Dorian on The Bahamas at US$3.4bn, over a quarter of the country’s GDP.

For the Caribbean, the ominous forecasts come at a particularly unwelcome time as governments in the subregion are exhausting resources to tackle the fallout from the coronavirus (Covid-19) health crisis. Ronald Jackson, the outgoing head of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) has warned that the region is facing “a perfect storm”.

Commenting on the dire prospects for the region, Jackson said: “You are managing your current debt-to-GDP ratios, you’re managing your fiscal environments, you’re dealing with social challenges, and even if you were making some headway, here comes the Covid crisis.” He then asks: “What resources are now available for traditional preparedness expenses? Your warehousing supplies, your shelter facilities – are some of them being used as isolation facilities? Things like your rainy-day funds that you may have used for Covid, will it be available in a hurricane to provide relief, resources post-hurricane, and recovery-related costs?”

Gaston Browne, the prime minister of Antigua & Barbuda, summed up the despair and fear felt by many of the region’s leaders when he told Jamaica’s Sunday Gleaner: “God forbid, and if any of our [Caribbean Community] member states suffers any devastation from hurricanes, it would be a metaphorical hellfire.” Ralph Gonsalves, prime minister of St Vincent & the Grenadines, echoed this in the same article, which was published on 26 Aprilm by warning of a possible “bloodbath” in the offing.

According to CDEMA, natural disasters in the last three years have cost the region in excess of US$118bn.

Bolivia’s interim president Jeanine Áñez was forced to admit on 3 September that her government had indeed hired CLS Strategies - a US-based strategic communications firm accused of creating fake social media accounts to promote support for a number of Latin American leaders - but denied that the company had been commissioned for this purpose, and insisted that its activities did not amount to foreign interference in Bolivia’s 18 October general election.

Two days earlier, social media giant Facebook announced that it had shut down 97 fake accounts with a total of over 500,000 followers, which it described as part of a “disinformation network” run by CLS. Facebook reported that some US$3.6m had been spent on advertising to promote these accounts, and accused CLS of violating its “policy against foreign political interference”. While some accounts had been posting in support of Áñez’s interim government, others were focused on criticising the Mexican government led by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and Nicolás Maduro’s government in Venezuela.

The allegations provoked particular concern in Bolivia, however, where the accounts were seemingly linked not to opposition groups, but to a sitting government. To make matters worse for Áñez, local news outlet Bolnews.press had already reported in August on the interim government’s relationship with CLS, revealing that after the Áñez administration came to power in November 2019, the company had been paid US$90,000 for 90 days of work, as part of an undisclosed consultancy service.

Áñez sought to get ahead of the story with her 3 September statement, confirming that CLS had been hired “in a lobbying task in support of democracy” - presumably in reference to the consultancy service described by Bolnews.press - but insisted that this had amounted only to helping improve diplomatic relations with the US. Áñez noted that no other activities had been commissioned, and claimed that the transaction had been reported to the US authorities in accordance with the country’s law.

However, a further twist came on 4 September, when CLS issued its own statement, defending itself from Facebook’s allegations of facilitating foreign interference. The company’s executive director, Bob Chlopak, claimed that the social media activities described “were not carried out on behalf of foreign entities; the work was funded and directed by clients within each country”. While Chlopak did not identify these clients, his statement seemed to contradict Áñez’s earlier claim that CLS operated only in the US.

Bolivia’s deputy communications minister Isabel Fernández was sent out to face the press following this revelation, once again insisting that “the government has not hired any national or foreign company to pay for or promote a disinformation campaign”. Fernández further suggested that the scandal had been manufactured by the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) opposition in an attempt to undermine Áñez’s presidential campaign, accusing the party of “trying to impose an agenda of fake news”.

Such an intervention by the MAS hardly seemed necessary; Áñez had been sliding in the polls long before these revelations emerged, and there is no evidence they played any significant role in her decision to withdraw from the contest on 17 September. Regardless of who orchestrated this disinformation network, however, its mere existence sheds light on the tensions and toxicity that have dominated this election campaign, and that are likely to persist beyond 18 October.

Áñez withdraws

Áñez’s candidacy had been controversial from the start, given her mandate as interim president to organise free and fair elections. Just over a month before the vote, however, concerns about splitting the vote and allowing the MAS to claim a first-round victory saw her drop out of the race. Áñez’s running mate, Samuel Doria Medina, subsequently called for “a united front to stop the return of the MAS”.

President Jovenel Moïse is facing the biggest show of unrest since the start of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. In protests organised by the opposition to mark the 214^th anniversary of the death of Haiti’s founding father Jean-Jacques Dessalines, thousands took to the streets in the capital Port-au-Prince and elsewhere, calling for the unpopular Moïse to step down. Coming less than two weeks after Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Helen La Lime issued a warning about instability in Haiti, the show of unrest indicates that Moïse’s recent appointment of a new provisional electoral council (CEP) and apparent kick-off of the much-delayed electoral process may have been well-received by the US [WR-20-39] but has far from satisfied the opposition.

On 17 October, protests took place in Port-au-Prince (where the police reportedly fired rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse protesters, resulting in several injuries), departmental capitals Cap-Haïtien (Nord department), Gonaïves (Artibonite), Jacmel (Sud-Est), and in towns like Saint-Marc (Artibonite), among other places. They were organised by Direction Politique de l’Opposition Démocratique (DPOD) which launched two days earlier. The latest attempt by the opposition to rally together, DPOD comprises at least seven major political parties, including Organisation du peuple en lutte (OPL); Ayiti an aksyon (AAA); Fusion des sociaux-démocrates; Movement chrétien por une nouvelle Haïti (Mochrenah); and Inité, among others.

The protests came days after La Lime, who heads the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (Binuh), warned the UN Security Council (UNSC) that Haiti was on the “brink of instability”. Providing an update to the UNSC on 5 October, La Lime alluded to the instability stemming from the political crisis in which President Moïse has been ruling by decree since January, when legislators’ terms lapsed after elections failed to take place in October 2019. While underlining the need to address key aspects of the electoral process, such as the framework and calendar to “reduce the risk of contested elections and further violence”, she also acknowledged problems surrounding the new CEP. She noted that this had “elicited strong reactions” from the supreme court which failed to swear in its members, “purportedly because of its lack of representativeness and scope of mission” [WR-20-39].

La Lime also warned of more general insecurity, highlighting the recent assassination of Monferrier Dorval, the head of the Port-au-Prince bar association, which she said epitomises the weak state of the rule of law” [WR-20-35] as well as “gangs challenging state authority” in the capital, and the actions of Fantômes 509, a “fringe group of disaffected police [PNd’H] officers bringing disorder to the capital”.

Fantômes 509

Last month hundreds of PNd’H officers staged protests in Port-au-Prince, setting vehicles and tyres ablaze. They were demanding the release of Jean Pascal Alexandre, a member of the anti-narcotics squad (BLTS), arrested in May on suspicion of charges including murder and arson, and five members of a PNd’H specialised unit (Udmo), detained for failing to properly guard Monferrier Dorval’s property. The PNd’H protests were reportedly led by Fantômes 509, a group associated with the police and former PNd’H members, linked to the violent protests earlier this year and which Justice & Public Security Minister Lucmane Delille declared a terrorist group in May. The five Udmo officers were released but were to be investigated for the possible commission of administrative errors, while Alexandre was also released at the end of September.

Binuh’s mandate extended

On 15 October the UN Security Council opted to extend for another 12 months the mandate of Binuh, which is tasked with strengthening political stability and promoting good governance in Haiti. Binuh is not itself a peacekeeping mission but took over from previous peacekeeping missions such as the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (Minujusth, 2017-2019) and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah, 2004-2017).

Cuba’s economy minister, Alejandro Gil, was replaced as part of a ministerial reshuffle announced on 2 February, which also involved changes in the ministries for the food industry and for science, technology, and the environment. Gil’s departure came amid rising tensions over government austerity plans, which include five-fold increases in fuel prices.

President Miguel Díaz-Canel dismissed Gil and appointed Joaquín Alonso, who had been serving as head of the central bank (BCC), to replace him. New ministers were also appointed in charge of the food industry (Alberto López, governor of Santa Clara province) and science, technology, and the environment (Eduardo Martínez, president of a state-owned pharmaceutical company). There was no official explanation for the changes, but they are likely linked to the country’s deep economic crisis and an internal conflict over the latest austerity measures. Official newspaper Granma said only that Gil had been “released from his duties”.

In December and January Gil, who was also deputy prime minister, had announced controversial plans to drastically cut back energy, transport, food, and medicine subsidies in an attempt to narrow the country’s fiscal deficit, which according to some estimates by experts cited by Spanish daily El País in a piece published on 12 February, is as large as 18.5% of GDP. A five-fold increase in petrol prices had been scheduled for 1 February. However, the authorities claimed a cyber-attack from abroad had forced a delay, shifting the date forward to 1 March, when the price for regular petrol surged to CUP132 (US$1.10) from CUP25. Gil’s dismissal suggests the plan remains hotly contested.

Gil had been economy minister since 2018 and was seen by many as the architect of failed policies, including tinkering with currency reforms and exchange controls, and banking restrictions. He had promised an economic recovery for 2023 but GDP is believed to have fallen by an estimated 2%-3% after earlier coronavirus (Covid-19)-related fluctuations (2020-2022). Inflation is running at around 30%. The outlook for this year is grim. Agriculture and food production has slumped. In the last week of February, the government said 34% of the power grid was offline and that it could not guarantee supplies of flour for bread.

Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, a former director of studies at Havana university, was cited by El País as saying Cuba in 2018 was “a better place” than now: “Cuba was receiving almost four million tourists, the purchasing power of the population was greater, there were no difficulties with fuel, the fiscal deficit was 8% with respect to GDP, and the basic food basket was accessible” he noted.

A 5 February briefing for World Politics Review by Robert Looney, a Cuba expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, says efforts to reform the Cuban economy date back to 2010 when then-president Raúl Castro (2008-2018) sought to scale back the bloated state sector and introduce a limited form of “market socialism”. However, reform policies were inconsistent and resisted by the political elite. Growth averaged only 1% per annum in 2010-2022. In a more recent period (the three years to 2022), GDP has contracted by an average of 2% each year. Without bigger political changes it is hard to see a sustainable and successful outcome.

Looney says that the political old guard aims simply “to restore some semblance of macroeconomic stability in order to maintain the Communist Party’s grip on power in the face of recent signs of popular discontent, including the mass protests that spontaneously erupted in July 2021”.  

Probe announced into Gil

On 7 March, the Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC) government announced an investigation into Gil. State mouthpiece Granma reported that he is accused of “serious errors in the performance of his duties”. While no further details were given, Granma says “the leadership of our party [PCC] and government has never allowed, nor will it ever allow, the proliferation of corruption, simulation and insensitivity”.

Emulating Vietnam

Interestingly, in the briefing for the World Politics Review, Robert Looney suggests Cuba might have tried to emulate the successful Vietnamese Communist Party economic reforms which began in 1986, but that would have involved granting a bigger role to the private sector, offering better conditions for foreign investment, and accepting greater domestic inequality of income – all steps that are resisted by the party leadership.

The president of Venezuela’s national assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, this week called for the maximum 30-year prison sentence to be handed down to “the traitor” Tareck El Aissami, the recently arrested former oil minister, who stands accused of involvement in a corruption network in the state-run oil firm Pdvsa. No fewer than 66 people have now been arrested in connection with the alleged corruption scheme, which the attorney general, Tarek William Saab, has conflated with a purported conspiracy, including prominent members of the opposition and US authorities, to crash the economy and topple President Nicolás Maduro.

Rodríguez named a special commission, which he said would be presided over by the first vice-president of the national assembly, Pedro Infante, to establish “the political responsibility” of El Aissami and others implicated in the alleged scheme to siphon off hundreds of millions of US dollars from Pdvsa, while the attorney general’s office proceeds with the legal case against them. El Aissami, who resigned in March last year amid a spate of arrests when the alleged corruption scheme was first revealed [WR-23-12], was arrested on 9 April along with a former economy and finance minister, Simón Zerpa, and a businessman, Samark López, accused of treason, misappropriation of public funds, and criminal conspiracy. Rodríguez said they sought to bring the economy to its knees through “the destruction of the national currency and astronomical increase in the unofficial US dollar exchange rate”.

Saab alleged that opposition politicians Leopoldo López, Julio Borges, Carlos Vecchio (all in exile) and Carlos Ocariz were part of a political conspiracy, which aimed to “dissolve the state by any anti-democratic means” in cahoots with El Aissami and the US. The lynchpin, Saab claimed, was James Story, the former US ambassador to Venezuela (2018-2023) based in Colombia. Saab claimed that US involvement was “totally confirmed and proven”, with details to be provided in due course. Maduro has denounced myriad elaborate conspiracy theories over the years based on ‘incontrovertible evidence’ that never materialises.

Corruption

Nicolás Maduro promised on 13 April to be “implacable” against those guilty of “betraying the people through corruption” and proposed a constitutional reform to include life imprisonment so that they “spend a lifetime rotting in a cell”. Colonel Marino Lugo, one of those arrested for involvement in the alleged Pdvsa corruption scheme, was found dead in his cell on 17 April, according to the attorney general’s office. Entrenched corruption is a feature of the Bolivarian government. Periodic displays of zeal to root it out have previously been part of internal power struggles.

On 25 November, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, women’s groups in Central America, as in other parts of the world, took to the streets to demand justice, effective public policies, and an end to impunity underpinning gender violence. Despite claims of progress, Honduras continues to have the highest femicide rate in Latin America according to a new report by the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac). Another UN organisation, UN Women, highlighted in 2023 that subregional trends in the Americas between 2017-2023 show the rate of intimate partner or family member femicide is consistently higher in Central America compared to other parts of the Americas.

Released on 22 November, the Eclac report shows Honduras as having the third highest number of femicides (380) and the highest femicide rate in the region (7.2 cases per 100,000 women) in 2023. This is up from 2022 when the rate was 6.0 (still the highest in the region) and the absolute figure was 309. Yet at the start of November, Security Minister Gustavo Sánchez released a statement claiming a 44.5% reduction in femicides in the first ten months of 2024 compared with 2023 (albeit citing a different absolute figure to Eclac – of 359). Sánchez attributed the decline to government initiatives such as Línea 114- Mujer “Vivir Sin Miedo”, an emergency number launched in January 2024 by the police for women living with violence and seeking help and support.

While El Salvador and Nicaragua did not feature in the latest Eclac report, the country with the next highest rate of femicides was Costa Rica, which had a rate of 0.9 per 100,000 women and an absolute figure of 22 femicides in 2023. This is up from 0.7 per 100,000 women in 2022 when the total number of cases was 19, and comes as Costa Rica more generally has been facing rising violence, which has been widely attributed to the presence of international drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) [SSR-24-01].

Costa Rica was followed by Panama which registered 0.7 cases in 2023 and 15 femicides, down from 1.1 cases in 2022 and 21 femicides. However, a statement dated 16 December by the Panamanian observatory against gender violence, which is attached to the ombudsman’s office, warned of an “alarming rise in femicides”, noting that as of 15 December, 20 women had been murdered in Panama so far in 2024, up from the 15 registered in 2023.

Guatemala, where the centre-left reformist President Bernardo Arévalo recently unveiled plans to tackle gender violence, also registered a decline in femicides, with 0.5 cases per 100,000 in 2023, down from 1.0 per 100,000 in 2022. Total femicides were 45 in 2023, down from 91 in 2022.

• Efforts to eradicate gender violence in Guatemala

On 25 November Guatemala’s President Bernardo Arévalo revealed plans to bolster the national plan for the prevention and eradication of violence against women (Planovi), the launch of a campaign led by the presidential secretariat for women (Seprem) aimed at promoting respectful practices, and a doubling of the budget assigned for survivors of gender violence in 2025 – from Q25.9m (US$3.36m) to Q52m. He also announced new rules to stamp out sexual harassment in the armed forces.

As regards El Salvador and Nicaragua, which did not feature in the latest Eclac report, women’s groups warn of rising femicides and violence. On 22 November a Salvadorean women’s group, Red Feminista Frente a la Violencia Contra las Mujeres (Red Fem), released a statement which tallied 130 femicides in El Salvador between June 2023 and May 2024, up from 128 from June 2022-May 2023. More generally Red Fem cites data which shows that between June 2023 and May 2024, there were 20,950 incidents recorded as femicides, sexual violence, physical violence, psychological violence, and economic violence, representing a 15% increase in violence against women from the period of June 2022 to May 2023.

The Red Fem statement also highlights that while homicides have declined in El Salvador due to the crackdown on gangs by President Nayib Bukele, violence against girls, adolescents and women remains almost unchanged, affecting their right to live free from violence.

As regards Nicaragua, on 25 November the local media cited figures from a local women’s rights group Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir (CDD) which put the number of femicides up to November 2024 at 76 – above the 72 registered in the whole of 2023. Meanwhile a report published on 25 November by Nicaraguan media outlet Divergentes highlights the impact of the crackdown on dissent by the authoritarian government led by President Daniel Ortega on women’s rights more generally, among other human rights. It cites Mesoamerican women’s rights organisation Iniciativa Mesoamericana de Defensoras de Derechos Humanos (IM-Defensoras), as saying that over 200 Nicaraguan organisations which defend women’s rights have been stripped of their legal status by the Ortega government, which it says has resulted in an increase in lethal violence against women.

Across a range of mining sector analysts there is agreement that a global boom in demand for critical minerals has been taking shape in recent years. Lithium demand, based on the high-powered batteries that are needed by the world’s growing fleet of electronic vehicles (EVs), is expected to surge by 400%-500% over the next ten years. Copper use in renewable energy could jump by 300%. Achieving the UN’s global carbon net zero target by 2050 could require a six-fold increase in critical mineral inputs by 2040. The underlying economic model suggests that every US$1bn invested in upstream mining generates US$3bn-$4bn in downstream manufacturing.

It needs to be stressed that, however promising, REEs and critical minerals development in Latin America are at a very early stage and starting from a small base. It is predicted that regional REE production could grow at a compound annual rate of 7.4% in 2025-2030, but the value of production in 2030 will be only around US$32m. At the other extreme there are claims that the regional mining/refining value chain could eventually reach a value of US$154bn.

Stages of rare earths projects across the Americas

Source: The Northern Miner

Brazil, Latin America’s economic powerhouse, has set itself some super-ambitious targets. It currently accounts for 0.02% of global REE supply and wants to boost that to a 5%-8% market share by 2030, relying on integrated mining and processing. To help make that possible it has promised the equivalent of US$500m in investment in transport infrastructure, including railways and ports.

MEXICO | Tourism up in May. Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) released its latest figures on tourism on 10 July, showing that the country received 8.36m international tourists in May, marking a 5.3% annual rise and an increase from 8.29m tourists in April.

Of the total number of international visitors to Mexico in May, 3.92m stayed at least one night in the country, while 4.44m visited as day trippers. Revenue from international tourism in May totalled US$2.61bn, down 0.3% year-on-year.

The latest figures come as last month Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum stated the country had received a “historic record” number of foreign visitors in the first four months of 2026, with 34.5m international visitors to the country between January and April.

The government will hope that June and July international visitor figures will be further boosted by Mexico’s co-hosting of the Fifa World Cup. The tournament was forecast to bring an extra 5.5m tourists to the country, although this total may have been diminished by security concerns and disruption caused by protests.

MEXICO | Industrial activity falls. Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) released its latest report on industrial production on 10 July. The data reveals a 0.8% contraction in industrial activity for May compared with April, while year-on-year growth flatlined. This downturn follows a 2.1% monthly expansion in April, a 0.5% decline in March, and a 0.4% rise in February in monthly terms. On an annual basis, May’s stagnant performance contrasts with a 1.8% expansion in April, a 1.4% contraction in March, and a 1.3% decline in February.

The monthly contraction in the index of industrial activity (Imai) was driven by a 3.7% drop in construction, a 0.5% decrease in utilities (encompassing electricity generation and transmission, as well as water and gas provision), and a 0.1% decline in both the mining and manufacturing industries. On an annual basis, mining expanded by 4.0%, whereas utilities fell by 0.8%, construction decreased by 0.6%, and manufacturing slid by 0.5%.

Development: On 10 August Senator Liliana Rendón stated on a local TV show that a woman beaten up on Saturday (6 August) by the (now former) manager of the Colombian national team, Hernán Darío ‘Bolillo’ Gómez, must have done something to deserve his violent reaction.

Significance: The woman beaten up by ‘Bolillo’ has not filed a formal complaint and the case only became public after other people in the bar at the time of the event informed the local media. Following Rendón’s statements, the victim is unlikely to come forward. Local women’s rights activists say that fear and social acceptance of violence against women pose the main challenges to tackling the practice in Colombia. Gender-based violence in the country is alarmingly high and Rendón’s comments highlight that it still has a long way to go to resolve this issue. Several women’s rights advocates, female senators and public personalities decried Rendón’s position as an “embarrassment to the nation”.

Key points:

• “We have to look at what triggered the reaction, there is a conduct, a female pathology, that incites, that provokes... Something happened, something provoked him and as I’ve said: to provoke we [women] are in a league of our own, we are fatuous and, when we decide to be irritating, no one can stop us and we provoke reactions like the unfortunate one ‘Bolillo’ had”, said Rendón, who then went on to say, “if he [her husband] beat me up, it was because I deserved it”.

• According to the 2010 ‘Forensis’ report by Colombia’s national institute of legal medicine, three out of every 1,000 women (over 10 years old) in Colombia are subject to violence causing serious injury by their partners; one out of every 1,000 by a close family member. Furthermore, women are the victims of 55% of all violent deaths, with 8.66% of the total killed by a family member. Most of the victims, whether battered or killed, worked in their homes and could not escape their attackers due to their lack of financial independence.

• According to a 2010 UN report, one in every three women in Colombia will be beaten, raped or subjected to some other form of abuse at some point in their lives.

MEXICO | Calderón acusa al PRI. En una entrevista el 15 de octubre con el New York Times (NYT), el Presidente Felipe Calderón acusó al Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) de considerar llegar a acuerdos con las organizaciones de traficantes de drogas. Esta fue la primera vez que Calderón ha acusado al PRI de desear retornar a las llamadas “viejas prácticas de la corrupción” y de acuerdos por debajo de la mesa con esas organizaciones de traficantes de drogas.

El PRI reaccionó de inmediato y calificó los comentarios del Presidente como ataques pre-electorales y como una interferencia en la sucesión presidencial. El gobierno, puesto a la defensiva, envió un mensaje oficial afirmando que los comentarios de Calderón fueron interpretados erróneamente por el NYT.

Calderón afirmó que algunos dentro del PRI respaldan su política de seguridad (que involucra el despliegue de militares en apoyo de la policía) pero dijo que él temía que esa política no pueda seguir si el PRI triunfa en el 2012.

COSTA RICA | Exports surge. Exports increased by 12.5% to US$15.38bn in 2011 compared with the previous year. The foreign trade minister, Anabel González, said this broke the historic record for exports and exceeded the government’s target by US$779m. The industrial sector, which includes the Intel microprocessor facility, represented 74.5% of the total. The agriculture sector amounted to 23.1% of the total; and fishing, 2.4%. The main export market was the US (38.6%) followed by the Netherlands (7.1%) and China (6.9%).

CUBA | Pushing for 3m tourists. Cuba received 2.72m foreign tourists in 2011, a new record and an increase of 7.3% on 2010. More than 1m of the tourists came from Canada. The government has set the target of breaking the 3m barrier in 2012.

EL SALVADOR | Remittances bounce back. Remittances from Salvadorean expatriates increased by 6.4% in 2011 on the previous year, reaching US$3.64bn, according to the central bank. Remittances amounted to 16% of El Salvador’s GDP. They fell well short of covering the trade deficit, however, which reached US$4.37bn in the first 11 months of 2011, up 20.9% on the same period in 2010.

REGION | Trade grows under Cafta-DR. The Dominican Republic-Central America-US Free Trade (Cafta-DR) Commission recently met in Miami to review progress made under the multilateral free trade agreement. According to a statement subsequently released by the Commission, trade between the US, the Central American partners and the Dominican Republic reached US$54bn in the first eleven months of 2011, 23% up on the same period in 2010. Meanwhile intra-regional trade among Central American countries and the Dominican Republic reached US$3.8bn in the first half of 2011, an 18% increase on the same period the previous year. The Cafta-DR was signed in 2004 and entered into force for the US and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during 2006; for the Dominican Republic on 1 March 2007; and for Costa Rica on 1 January 2009.

PANAMA | Canal strike lifted. The government of President Ricardo Martinelli has brokered a deal between construction workers employed on the US$5.2bn Panama Canal expansion project, who staged a six-day strike demanding better wages and back pay, and the Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC), the consortium in charge of carrying out the works. The GUPC, which is led by Spain’s Sacyr Vallehermoso, has the US$3.12bn contract to construct a new set of locks – the biggest contract under the expansion plan which began in 2007 and is due to be completed by October 2014. Under the deal which ended the strike, (which did not affect the running of the Canal through which 5% of global trade currently passes), workers will see their hourly pay increased by 15%, from US$2.90 to US$3.34; skilled workers will receive a 12.5% increase, from US$3.52 to US$3.96. The unions had initially been calling for an hourly stipend of US$4.90 and US$7.10, respectively. The GUPC also agreed to meet worker demands to cover delayed overtime and weekend pay, which it had blamed on book-keeping errors.

Development: Venezuela’s oil minister, Rafael Ramírez, wants the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) to set an oil price band of US$80 to US$120 a barrel to stem crude’s recent tumble, reviving a policy scrapped seven years ago.

Significance: West Texas Intermediate, the reference barrel for Venezuelan oil, is now trading just below US$80/b. Professor Douglas Ungredda of the Central University of Venezuela raised the spectre of a sovereign debt crisis in Venezuela, according to a report in an opposition daily published today (28 June). “The government bet all its cards on a rising cycle of oil prices that it thought would never end”, noted Ungredda.

Key points:

•  According to the daily El Universal, Ungredda told a recent conference that he put the country’s total consolidated debt at 66% of GDP (on the current official exchange rate of BF4.30/US$ and not including pending international arbitration cases). He warned that a devaluation to BF8.60/US$ would take total debt levels to over 100% of GDP, which could trigger a debt crisis, noting that central bank international reserves had fallen to 32.7% of GDP at end-2011, down from 63.1% in 2005, the year that the government set up the off-budget national development fund (Fonden), which takes ‘excess’ reserves (above US$30bn).

• He added that Brent crude prices at the current level of US$90/b would create “inconveniences” for the government led by President Hugo Chávez and might force it to reconsider its regional petro diplomacy. Ungredda calculated that at US$100/b, traditional full-price oil exports to the US and Europe, which have been falling in line with official efforts to diversify sales to preferred partners (that tend not to pay full price), generate US$34.5bn a year for the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa). However he put Pdvsa’s annual outgoings at US$119.6bn, translating into an US$85m loss, typically financed by new debt emissions. He estimates that Pdvsa sells just 38% of its daily production at full price. He suggests total daily production is 2.425m barrels, compared to the officially declared 3.0m.

• Pdvsa is relying heavily on debt and external financing from strategic partners like China to develop the country’s vast Orinoco oil belt.

MEXICO | Seeking to avoid a tomato war. On 2 October Mexico’s economy ministry (SE) issued a statement urging the US to refrain from adopting “protectionist measures” by cancelling a 1996 bilateral agreement on tomato exports. SE’s statement came after the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) announced on 27 September that after conducting an extensive investigation into tomato dumping allegations it was considering cancelling the agreement. The agreement sets a minimum price at which Mexican tomatoes may be sold in the US, but US producers, particularly those in Florida, the US’s largest tomato producing state, have nonetheless complained that the market has been flooded by Mexican tomatoes, putting many of them out of business. It is estimated that nearly half of all tomatoes sold in the US come from Mexico. According to the Florida Tomato Exchange, since the agreement was put in place, its sales have dropped from US$500m a year to US$250m. In contrast official data from the SE show that the value of Mexican tomato exports to the US since 1996 have tripled to US$1.8bn. This situation led US producers to ask the USDOC to launch an investigation. In its statement, the SE warned that Mexico was prepared to “adopt a strong and decisive defence of our commercial interests and of our tomato industry”. The statement added that the cancellation of the agreement would not only harm bilateral commercial relations but also “producers, workers, exporters, importers, traders and consumers on both sides of the border”. In this way the SE was reminding the US that Mexico could choose to adopt retaliatory measures, as it did in 2009 amidst the trucking row between the two countries which saw Mexico impose punitive tariffs on US potatoes, pork and toilet paper, which severely hurt US exporters. The tariffs were only dropped last year after the two countries finally managed to resolve the dispute in July 2011. The trucking row only affected Mexican truckers, which presumably represent a smaller proportion of the working population than the 350,000 people that are estimated to be employed by Mexico’s tomato industry.

MEXICO | Considering making public listings for banks obligatory. On 1 October Mexico’s finance minister, José Antonio Meade Kuribeña, revealed that the government was discussing with the country’s banks the possibility that they should be required by law to be listed in the local stock market. Meade explained, “We like the idea that Mexican banks trade in the stock market, as we feel that this will provide better quality supervision of the banking sector”, as it would allow Mexico’s national banking and stock exchange commission (CNBV) to completely monitor banks’ financial activities. Meade highlighted that in recent years Mexico has gone from having a very restrictive stock market law, that offered little protection to investors, to having one of the most modern stock market legal frameworks in the region and as a result increasingly attracting more firms list in the Mexican stock exchange (BMV). Meade’s revelation came days after the local subsidiary of Spanish bank, Santander, successfully launched a simultaneous initial public offering (IPO) at the New York Stock Exchange and the BMV on 26 September. The IPO managed to raise over US$4bn, the biggest-ever listing of a Mexican company and one of the largest in the world so far this year. In fact the performance of the IPO exceeded all market expectations as Santander Mexico CEO, Marcos Martínez, had pointed out that the company expected to raise US$3.5bn.

MEXICO | CFC calls for all sectors to open up to foreign investment. Mexico’s federal competition commission (CFC), the country’s anti-trust agency, said on 2 October that it was in favour of opening up all sectors of the economy currently restricted from receiving foreign investment, including the telecommunications and transport sectors. The CFC president, Eduardo Pérez Motta, said that in his opinion “there must be a complete opening [to foreign investors] in all sectors” of the Mexican economy as the level of competition in some sectors still has “enormous deficiencies”. In this context Pérez Motta praised the federal government announcement that it will seek to change the country’s existing foreign investment law, which forbids foreign ownership in certain sectors such as TV broadcasting and restricts it in others such as phone services; and said that “without a doubt the telecommunications sector must be included”. Pérez Motta explained for example that “it makes no sense that there are no restrictions for mobile phone services but yet there are on fixed phone services”. He pointed out that such reforms would not only maximise competition in all markets to the benefit of consumers, but also promote job creation.

• Facebook to float on BMV

On 1 October the US social media firm, Facebook, announced that it was preparing to launch an initial public offering (IPO) of its shares on the Mexican stock exchange (BMV). According to a Facebook statement, the company decided on this after confirming that there was a strong demand for the shares in the BMV. Facebook launched an IPO in the US in May this year, but its stock performed less than spectacularly since then and the company is seeking to raise more funds on international markets through a proposed global issue.

DIPLOMACY| Piñera puts UDI in its place. On 21 January the government of President Sebastián Piñera recognised that Cuba’s President, Raúl Castro, enjoyed “immunity”. The announcement followed a threat by the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), the senior partner in the ruling coalition, to take unspecified “actions” against the Cuban leader in relation to the 1991 assassination of Senator Jaime Guzmán, the UDI’s founder. The UDI claims that Cuba is harbouring Guzmán’s killers.  On 20 January Patricio Melero, the UDI president, announced that he had new information about the investigation. Castro is due to visit Chile to participate in the 26-27 January summit of the European Union (EU) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac).

COLOMBIA | Pacific Rubiales forecasts record production. On 9 April Canadian oil firm, Pacific Rubiales, announced that it was expecting to post a new record for its oil production in Colombia for the first quarter of the year. In a statement the firm, which concentrates the majority if its oil production in Colombia, said that it was expecting production for the first quarter to show an increase of 30% year-on-year with between 126,000 and 128,000 barrels of oil equivalent being produced per day. Pacific Rubiales CEO, Ronald Patin, said that “I am very satisfied with this strong start to the production year”. Pointing out that the reference price for Colombian crude, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), had remained stable at US$94 per barrel throughout the first quarter; Patin said that he expected that the company’s oil would fetch a price of between US$100 and US$103 per barrel. All of which will help to ensure that Pacific Rubiales’ first quarter financial report, due to be released on 8 May, will show positive figures.
    In this vein Patin added that he also expected that the measures adopted by the company to reduce its operating costs in Colombia, such as the construction of a new energy transmission line connecting Rubiales’ oil fields in the Llanos Orientales area to Colombia’s national energy grid (expected to be completed in the coming weeks), will also help the firm improve its operations in Colombia.
    The statement also points out that over the past 12 months it has conducted 10 exploration activities in Colombia and Brazil, six of which have resulted in the discovery of hydrocarbons. The announcement is good news for Colombia’s oil sector which continues to expand. Just the day before Pacific Rubiales released its statement, Colombia’s mining & energy ministry released its March oil production figures. According to the ministry, production in the month totalled 1.03m barrels per day, a 7% increase on the same month last year. The ministry said that the March figure showed that the production levels have responded positively to the national government’s long-term sustainability policies which have allowed for “increased exploratory activity” to be carried out in the country.

PERU | Expecting increased trade with China. On 7 April the president of Peru’s congressional foreign relations commission, Víctor Andrés García Belaunde, said that as a result of President Ollanta Humala’s tour of Asia in which he has made his first official visit to China between 6 and 8 April, the government expected that bilateral trade between Peru and China is to increase by 15% a year for the next couple of years.
    Humala’s visit to China has been questioned back in Peru due to the fact that the delegation accompanying the president was exclusively comprised of cabinet members and did not include any Peruvian businessmen. However, the government has defended the trip pointing out that its main objective was to attract Chinese investment which will help Peru to further develop its economy, allowing it to increase trade with all its economic partners including those in Asia.
    As Humala himself said during a meeting in Shanghai, “Since 2011 China has become Peru’s main trade partner... however today our economic growth demands a series of service and infrastructure and [public] works. This is why we are working from within government to create the conditions to promote private investment from Asia and China”. Pointing out that during its participation in the Bo’ al Forum for China, the Peruvian delegation signed a strategic agreement with the Chinese government which will increase the scope of bilateral cooperation, García Belaunde said that Chinese investors were already coming to Peru encouraged by the positive economic conditions and the various investment opportunities. According to García Belaunde this investment inflow will continue to stimulate bilateral trade.

BOLIVIA | Regional natural gas exports surge. On 8 April Bolivia’s state-owned oil firm, YPFB, revealed that its exports of natural gas to Brazil and Argentina totalled 47.4m cubic metres per day, a 21% increase compared to the same month last year. YPFB president, Carlos Villegas, explained that this was the result of YPFB achieving a new production record allowing it to satisfy the demand from both Brazil and Argentina which have been requesting increased imports as a result of the low levels of energy production in Brazil due to the low levels of water in its reservoirs; and lower levels of hydrocarbon production in Argentina due to oil infrastructure maintenance work.  

Correa’s birthday gift to himself

On 6 April Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa issued a new executive decree freezing all the salaries of high-ranking government officials including himself for the next two years. Correa explained that the measure aims to reduce the executive’s expenses and to make the government’s budget more manageable. “We are going to lead by example” Correa said claiming that “Ecuador currently has the best salaries in the entire Andean region”. He also recalled that back in 2007 when he took up office the president’s salary was US$8,000 but that he reduced it by half, bringing it in line with the rest of the government’s top officials. Correa, who was turning 50 on the day, concluded by joking “What a birthday gift!” 

ECONOMY | FTA with Israel. On 10 June Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced the signing of a free trade deal with Israel after 15 months of negotiations. The agreement was signed during a ceremony at the official residency of Israel’s President Shimon Peres, during a visit by Santos to Jerusalem. As well as boosting the amount of bilateral trade which currently totals US$680m, the Colombian government is hoping to diversify exports by increasing cooperation in technology. Colombia’s exports to Israel are mainly coffee, carbon and flowers while Israel sells high-end manufactured products. The bilateral partnership will include technology for agriculture and information technology for defence.

NICARAGUA | Construction to begin on delayed Tumarín project. On 13 July Roberto Abreu, the general manager of Centrales Hidroeléctricas de Nicaragua (CHN), a subsidiary of Brazil’s state electricity company Eletrobras and Brazilian private company Queiroz Galvão, announced that construction of Nicaragua’s biggest hydroelectric project, Tumarín, would begin in October, once the rainy season is over. According to the government mouthpiece, el19digital, the US$1.1bn dam, which will be built in the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS) is expected to have an eventual capacity of 253MW.

    Work on the plant, which will take four years to construct, has been delayed for two years. According to el19digital, among the various sources of finance, Eletrobras and Queiroz Galvão will stump up 47% of the cost of the plant, Brazil’s national development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) will provide a loan of US$342m, while the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (Cabei) will provide a US$252m loan.

    The construction of the plant is in line with the declared aim of President Daniel Ortega of reducing dependence on oil imports in favour of renewable sources. El19digital cited Energy Minister Emilio Rappaccioli as saying that renewable energy is expected to account for 50%-53% of the energy matrix by the end of the year, up from 40.5% in 2012. The government is aiming to raise this to 90% by 2026.