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  • The shadow of 2006

    05 May 2011 Hits: 375

    The decision by the newly inaugurated governor of Oaxaca, Gabino Cué, to pick as his new government secretary Irma Piñeyro, a prominent supporter of Elba Esther Gordillo, the powerful leader of the teachers' union, has major implications.

    The most alarming implication is that it puts the state government back on a collision course with a group of radical teachers, known as Section 22, which brought the state capital to a virtual standstill from May to October 2006. In 2006, Section 22 of the teachers' union, the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (SNTE), opposed Ulises Ruí­z, the authoritarian state governor from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), who was backed by Gordillo in 2006. The 2006 crisis, culminating in Section 22 barricading itself into the centre of Oaxaca for five months until it was evicted peacefully by a over 7,000 federal police, formed a backdrop to the 2006 presidential elections.

    The first big sign of the radicals' unrest came on 15 February, when President Felipe Calderón chose Oaxaca as the site for his controversial announcement that private school fees would become tax deductible from 2012. The announcement enraged the radicals, who attacked the police and vandalised the city centre. Running battles went on for about seven hours. The authorities blame the radical teachers for damaging parts of the historic (and lovely) centre of Oaxaca.

    So far Cué, who was elected on an anti-PRI platform, has avoided trying to confront the radicals in Section 22. Indeed the radicals seem to have been outmanoeuvred by cooler heads at a mass meeting of Section 22 on 18 and 19 February. At this meeting Section 22 agreed to continue talking to Cué's government and drew up an action plan for March which, the radicals said, did not envisage any more violent confrontations.

    There will, however, be a strike on 8 March, to celebrate International Women's Day. This will be followed by demonstrations later in the month and in April. These demos mark the nationalisation of the oil industry (in 1938); the birth day of Benito Juárez; the death of Emiliano Zapata (at Chinameca on 10 April 1919) and a couple of Section 22 anniversaries.

    The radicals still want two of Cué's cabinet to resign: Piñeyro and Marco Tulio López Escamilla, Cué's head of security. Section 22 also wants Bernardo Vásquez Colmenares, the director of the Instituto Estatal de Educación Pública de Oaxaca (IEEPO), to go. Vásquez Colmenares is seen by Section 22 as another Elbista.

    Cué and Oaxaca are important nationally. Cué has a high profile because he is the first non-PRI governor of the state. Technically Cué is a defector from the PRI and runs a coalition government. Radicals claim he is no different from the PRI. Oaxaca accounts for 2% of the congressmen in the lower chamber of congress and has long been a PRI bastion.

    Section 22 is not the only threat to Gordillo's domination of Mexico's education system. On 8 February a new teachers' union, the Sindicato Independiente de Trabajadores de la Educación de México (Sitem), was officially launched. The Sitem could be important for two reasons. The first is that it will break the stranglehold the SNTE has on school education in Mexico. The second is that it poses a threat to Gordillo's political influence. This may have peaked under President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) when she tried (and failed) to rally the PRI behind his political reforms in 2003.

    • Calderón's tax break for private school fees strikes at Gordillo's power. Unusually, she came out on the wrong side of the election in Guerrero on 30 January 2011 and was a bystander in the election in Baja California Sur (BCS) on 6 February.

  • GUATEMALA: Ex-PACs win compensation package

    17 November 2004 Hits: 711
    Congress finally caved in to the former paramilitaries' (ex-PAC) demands on 3 November. Several thousand ex-PAC took to the streets, blocking the main arteries to the capital and access to ports and airports, to force the government to approve a controversial bill to 'compensate' them for their role during the country's bloody 36-year civil war.

    President Oscar Berger has repeatedly vowed not to be held hostage by the ex-PAC's demands in the way that the former Frente Republicano Guatemalteco administration was. However, when push came to shove, and Berger threatened to send the security forces out to remove the blockades, congress was not prepared to take a chance. Legislators hastened through a bill, labelled 'of national urgency', promising the former militiamen Q445m (US$57.27m) for this year and the same again for 2005.

    The bill passed thanks to the backing of 127 of the 158 members of the unicameral congress. A scattering of legislators took a principled stand against the bill. Along with supporters of human rights organisations, the legislators argued that the ex-PAC was involved in some of the worst atrocities of the civil war. The ex-PAC lifted the blockades after being informed of the passage of the bill. However, it is not yet a fait accompli. The constitutional court rejected the previous bill passed by congress which awarded the ex-PAC compensation, upholding an appeal from human-rights groups.

    • Guatemala's murder rate remains worrying despite President Oscar Berger's high-profile anti-crime initiative, which was launched in July. Congress summoned the interior minister, Carlos Vielmann, earlier this month to explain why the monthly number of murders had climbed from 153 in July to 179 in October. Vielmann failed to offer a very satisfactory explanation for the trend. He attributed the increase in murders to the perennial scapegoat, the street gangs known as 'maras'. According to the Policí­a Nacional Civil (PNC) some 50% of murder cases are the result of inter-gang violence and 30% can be attributed to drug-trafficking.

     

    ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: GUATEMALA

    Inflation in the first 10 months of the year hit 7.46%, putting the rate well above the government's target of 6% for the year as a whole. Inflation is accelerating: in October the monthly rate was 0.98%, up from 0.78% in September, and well above the August rate of 0.29%, according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadí­sticas. The main reason for the jump in October was the rise in crude oil prices. This pushed up petrol prices by 7% and diesel prices by 13.5%. Food prices are also rising sharply: they were up by 1.7% in October. The price of the canasta básica, (the staples needed by a family of five) rose from US$309 in September to US$334 in October.

    Outlook

    The Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica expects the government to meet its cautious growth target of 2.6% for 2004. The government is hoping that growth will pick up to 3.2% in 2005. The central bank reckons that 3% is more likely.
    Inflation: Inflation for the year to October was 8.64%. Trade: Exports in the first 10 months of the year were up by 10% at US$2.52bn. Traditional exports (sugar, bananas, coffee and cardamom) produced US$1.02bn in the period, thanks to a 19% rise in sugar receipts, a 5% rise in coffee receipts and a 16% rise in cardamom exports.

  • CUBA: War of words over human rights

    29 March 2006 Hits: 413

    The president of the Cuban parliament, Ricardo Alarcón, accused the US of concocting an "annexationist and genocidal" programme to try and usher in democracy in Cuba. Alarcón's diatribe came the day after the annual publication by the US of its Human Rights' Report.

    Alarcón did not allude to the report released on 10 March. The head of the US Interests Section in Havana, Michael Parmley, who is intensifying the propaganda war with Cuba (see RC-06-02), made sure that it did not go unnoticed. He said Cuba was guilty of "a sinister wave of repression", inciting "mobs" to threaten Cuban dissidents. The report was slightly more measured. "In Cuba, the regime continued to control all aspects of life through the Communist Party and state-controlled mass organizations_ The regime suppressed calls for democratic reform, such as the Varela Project, which proposed a national referendum."

    * Cuba will open embassies in Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Suriname, and St Vincent and the Grenadines in April to strengthen ties with the Caribbean Community, Cuba's ambassador to Caricom, Alejandro Marchante Castellanos, said. Cuba already has embassies in the other 11 countries in the 15-member Caricom group.

  • HAITI: Préval takes advantage of Caracas-Washington squabble

    16 May 2007 Hits: 1501

    The Haitian President, René Préval, is taking advantage of the Caracas-Washington struggle for power in Latin America to press forward the development of his country. In the past month Préval went to Venezuela, where he was promised an even more extensive supply of oil, and to the US, where he received praise for good governance and more pledges of assistance to strengthen Haiti's institutions and to fight the drug trade.  

    Préval went to Caracas in late April to participate in the presidential summit of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alba). Alba is the brainchild of the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez , and was proposed, as its name suggests, as an alternative to the liberal free trade agreements pursued by Washington. Haiti is currently an observer in the group. Significantly, in his most generous offer yet, Chávez vowed to supply all the energy needs of Venezuela's Alba partners and extended the offer to Haiti. "I have come here to propose to the member countries of Alba, and in that I already include Haiti, that Venezuela guarantee the supply of all your energy needs. One hundred percent," he declared during the summit.  

    Haiti already receives from Venezuela 7,000bpd at beneficial conditions under Chávez 's Petrocaribe initiative. The latter promise, however, is even more alluring as the Venezuelan leader seems willing to finance half of the oil bill, instead of 25% of it under Petrocaribe terms, and also create a matching fund to finance agricultural projects, food-production and small-size industries with the cash received by Venezuela's Alba partners. The offer reveals Chávez 's eager interest in Haiti as a platform to reach other Caribbean nations and lure them into his sphere of influence. Indeed, the country was one of the destinations during Chávez 's counter-tour of the US President, George W Bush, to Latin America in March. [RC-07-03]  

    A few days after the Alba summit Préval went to Washington to meet Bush. This was his first official visit to the US since being elected last year. Bush praised Préval's efforts to "bring security and prosperity" to Haiti. Bush went on to say that much had been done "on establishing the rule of law and routing out corruption". This was a clear vote of confidence in the Haitian administration aimed at attracting investors to the country. Significantly, Bush vowed to continue helping Haiti's government to boost strengthen institutions in the war-thorn Caribbean nation with more economic aid.  

    Bush also acknowledged Préval's concerns with Haitian immigrants living illegally in the US and said he had "assured [Préval] he was working hard to get a comprehensive bill passed in congress". The issue of drug smuggling, which divides the two governments, was mentioned only briefly outside closed doors. The US government deemed Haiti as an operational point in the drug trade from South America to the US. Significantly, a recent state department report claimed that clandestine planes fly from Venezuela to Haiti carrying drugs, which are then exchanged for weapons and cash. The Venezuelan government dismissed the report as a "provocation" and a "lie".  

    Playing the game
    In a daring move Préval signed the Alba declaration condemning the US for allowing a rightwing terrorist, Luí­s Posadas Carriles, to go free despite Venezuela's request from his extradition. As expected that did not play well in the US and Bush warned Préval over promises that "are not delivered". Indeed, it is yet to be seen whether Chávez is in a position to follow through with his pledge since Venezuela's oil production is down and there are not many refineries outside the US that are capable of refining it into usable products.

  • REGION: Costa Rica to join Petrocaribe?

    23 July 2008 Hits: 1
    Wecome To PageBreeze

    Costa Rica is the latest country in Central America to show an interest in joining Petrocaribe, the Venezuelan initiative which provides Caribbean and Central American countries with cheap oil. The Costa Rican government announced that it had applied for membership after a high-level delegation including energy and foreign ministers, Roberto Dobles and Bruno Stagno respectively, as well as president of the state refinery Recope, José León Desanti, attended the fifth Petrocaribe summit on 13 July in Venezuela.

    Although Costa Rica already imports the bulk of its oil from Venezuela under the San José pact of 1980, its membership of Petrocaribe would constitute a coup for Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez . Not only would it extend Venezuela's influence in the region but it would incorporate a nation whose government has been highly critical of his diplomatic tactics in the recent past.

    The renewed interest in the scheme in Central America (with Guatemala having become its most recent member) comes as international fuel prices are soaring, prompting Chávez to improve the terms of the initiative. At the recent summit, which was attended by delegations from 15 countries, he offered to revise its original terms to allow Petrocaribe members to finance up to 65% of their oil imports from Venezuela over 25 years at a 1% interest rate when oil prices are over US$100 a barrel.

    Chávez also promised that if oil prices hit US$200 a barrel he would raise the percentage of the oil bill eligible for credit to 70%. The original terms, offered when oil was around US$70 a barrel, allowed up to 50% of a country's oil bill to be financed by credit. During the meeting, Chávez claimed that Petrocaribe had saved its members US$920m since it was formed in 2005. He said the scheme had made sales of US$4.69bn and that US$2bn of that bill had been financed. 

    • Corruption in Costa Rica

    President Oscar Arias is facing the first corruption scandal since he took office in May 2006. Housing minister Fernando Zumbado stepped down “temporarily" on 9 July after allegations regarding the misuse of a US$2.5m donation from Taiwan which, while earmarked for social housing, allegedly went on consultancy fees for public officials. Zumbado maintains he received only US$1.5m. Investigations are also being carried out into the similar misuse of a US$2m loan from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCEI)

  • CUBA: Cuba's 21st Century Socialism

    15 October 2009 Hits: 388

    Economic realities have forced the Cuban government to cut spending . This austerity, advocated by President Raúl Castro, has been accompanied by efforts to incentivise workers, decentralise decision making and inch towards more targeted social spending. These are not just interim cost saving measures - they also point to an unprecedented shift away from the 'egalitarianian' ideology of the 1959 Revolution. 

    On 1 October the central government closed a handful of state-workers' canteens as part of a pilot programme to cut costs. A week later the editor of the island's main daily, Granma, suggested that the monthly ration book, the libreta, ought to be phased out. Both measures suggest that Cuba's financial situation remains perilous. The cash-strapped island, which imports up to 80% of its food (at a cost of US$2.5bn in 2008, up from US$1.1bn in 2007) simply cannot afford the bill and measures to boost domestic food output have been slow to deliver.

    In the pilot scheme, workers in four ministries (labour, finance, commerce and economy and planning) will get a daily voucher of 15 pesos (worth about USS0.57), to buy their lunch from private food stalls. Nationally, 24,700 state canteens serve around 3.5m workers, at an official cost of US$350m a year for the necessary food imports (mostly rice, grains, meat products and cooking oil).
    A local economist, Ariel Terreno, calculated that workers, whose average monthly pay is 408 pesos (US$16) a month, could increase their pay by 300 pesos a month by bringing in a packed lunch and selling their lunch vouchers. Terreno calculated that the daily luncheon stipend, if extended to all 3.5m state workers, would  cost the state a hefty 13bn pesos a year (US$500m). Along with the rumoured move to overhaul the libreta, which costs an estimated US$800m annually, these moves are clearly a shift to market-based economics.

    Raúl may not be a capitalist but he does seem to be more of a pragmatist than his brother and predecessor, Fidel. The core of Raúl's reforms lies in the management system pioneered by the Cuban military (which runs several key sector enterprises and on some estimates controls up to 60% of the economy), known as 'Perfeccionamiento Empresarial'. Beginning in the 1980s, the military introduced profit-oriented management, production-linked wages and capitalist-style accounting and efficiency standards into their enterprises.  Raúl aims to transfer these practices to other ailing state sectors, without resorting either to capitalism or even moving towards a Chinese or Vietnamese model. Rather, in keeping with the 1959 Revolution itself, Havana hopes to develop a hybrid Cuban model of its own.

    • The role of the state media

    Throughout this year, the Cuban press has openly discussed the merits of wage reform and incentive-based work, decentralisation and a shrinkage of the bloated state system. On 9 October,  Lazaro Barredo, the editor of Granma, argued that the libreta was “an ill" preventing Cuba's economic development and warning readers to prepare for life without it. Echoing recent speeches by Raúl, Barredo urged Cubans to work harder and contemplate life without the cradle-to-grave social support that has been the cornerstone of the Revolution.  “The ration booklet was a necessity at one time, but it has become an impediment to the collective decisions the nation must take," he added.

    Some articles have been more critical of the government. A 4 October article in Juventud Rebelde entitled 'Viene de todos' appeared to represent genuine frustration with the small military gerontocracy that now runs Cuba under Raúl. The author, José Alejandro Rodrí­guez, was blunt in his criticism of the ruling hierarchy and called on it to open the doors to genuine debate, from the ground up. He declared that “the solutions to our own problems, the framework of 21st Century socialism, have to be constructed with the consensus of everyone, _so that no-one can try and quiet us by saying that 'that comes from above'. No, it comes from everyone".

    • The Libreta

    The libreta, in place since 1962, provides every Cuban (pop 11.2m) with monthly rations including rice, salt, green vegetables, potatoes, bread, eggs, sugar and some meat. Most people say it only provides 10 to 15 days of food, forcing them onto the black market. The government may seek to limit the libreta to the most vulnerable families. Economists, however, point out that without much bolder wage reforms, many already vulnerable Cubans could be tipped into outright poverty without the ration book.

  • HAITI: Run-off confirmed

    18 February 2011 Hits: 463

    After weeks of impasse; much speculation and mounting international pressure, the provisional electoral court (CEP) announced its final results from the 28 November presidential vote this month. In line with the recommendations of the Organization of American States' (OAS) electoral report, the CEP reversed its preliminary results to give pop singer Michel Martelly ('Sweet Micky'), rather than Jude Célestin of President René Préval's ruling Inité, a place in the run-off to face Mirlande Manigat. The limited basis for the OAS conclusions and the perceived foreign interference, however, may raise questions over the domestic legitimacy of the eventual winner. Meanwhile the surprise reappearance of former dictator Jean Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier after 25 years in exile and the possible return of another exiled leader, the populist Jean-Betrand Aristide, adds further intrigue and uncertainty ahead of the 20 March second round.

    The preliminary results released in December 2010 had been widely rejected by partial and impartial observers alike given the widespread evidence of fraud [RC-10-12]. This prompted Préval to call in an expert OAS mission to review the process, the findings of which were released officially on 18 January, having been leaked to the press days earlier [RC-11-01]. The main problem with the OAS report, however, was its recommendation that the CEP should simply reverse the placement of the second and third candidates without a full recount given that the study was based on a sample of 16.9% of ballots cast and accepted that irregularities took place but granted Martelly an even slimmer lead over Célestin than the CEP had granted Célestin over Martelly (0.3% vs. 0.64%). Without providing further explanation, the OAS claimed that a complete recount was not a “feasible option" as the “electoral law of Haiti does not have explicit provisions to conduct a physical recount of ballots". It also dismissed calls for a new election as it would “involve more contests and candidacies than the evidence warranted".

    Initially the CEP, which is hand-picked by Préval, stood firm, claiming that the recommendation would be “taken into consideration in the framework of the treatment of legal complaints". However, this ultimately appeared untenable in the face of mounting international pressure, in particular from the US. On 21 January, the US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, said that “sustained support from the international community, including the US, requires a credible process." The same day, the US State Department announced it was revoking visas for a dozen officials linked to Préval. This led the Inité to issue a communiqué four days later which stated that while Célestin had “earned the necessary number of votes to advance to the second round",   it agreed to see him “withdraw his candidacy" in “accordance with the politics of stability" and the threat of an “embargo" from the international community. Célestin's intransigence then prompted a one day visit to Haiti (on 30 January) by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who met Préval and the three presidential candidates. While she denied that international aid was contingent on the OAS recommendations being heeded, she was clear that she wanted to see them “acted upon". On 3 February, without providing any percentages, absolute voting figures or an explanation for its decision, the CEP followed suit.

    With the Manigat-Martelly run-off now scheduled for 20 March, the CEP's ultimate willingness to toe the international line has allowed for a resolution of another problem: the question of what would happen beyond 7 February, the end of Préval's constitutional mandate. While the opposition had called for a transitional government, Préval had long rejected this idea, invoking instead a controversial ruling by parliament the previous year, allowing him to remain in power until 14 May [RC-10-05]. The international community has accepted this solution although Edmond Mulet, the civilian head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Minustah), did remark to the local press that “if the OAS's technical recommendations had not been applied_the political situation would have been different".

    Returning from exile
    The intrigue surrounding the elections has been exacerbated by the surprise re-emergence on the political scene of two highly divisive figures from Haiti's past. On 16 January, ex-dictator Jean Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier (1971-1986) returned to Port-au-Prince from France after 25 years in exile, a move which appears to have paved the way for another exiled former leader, Jean-Betrand Aristide (1991, 1994-1996, 2001-2004), to follow suit.
        The reappearance of Duvalier, who stands accused of corruption and human rights violations, perplexed local and foreign commentators alike. While Duvalier insisted that his return, facilitated through an expired diplomatic passport, owed to a desire to “help" Haiti, theories about his motivation ranged from the possibility that Préval had invited him back (to distract from the political crisis) to a crafty ploy by the former dictator to access some US$6m frozen in Swiss bank accounts. If the latter ultimately proved the more credible (see sidebar), it has badly backfired; within 48 hours, he was charged with “corruption, embezzlement, money laundering and assassination".
        While Duvalier's reappearance initially left the commentariat floundering, Préval's 8 February decision to grant Aristide a passport - previously cited as the main obstacle preventing his return from exile in South Africa - was less bewildering. Préval was reportedly furious at the perceived interference of the US and international community in the election. The issuance of a passport to Aristide, a former ally, whose return to Haiti has been long opposed by Washington, could be construed as a final act of defiance.
        Aristide, whose party, Fanmi Lavalas, has been excluded by the CEP from participating in recent elections on technical grounds, despite its popularity, has often expressed his hope of returning, most recently citing a desire to assist with education. Such a prospect was likely to rile the US and the international community - which Aristide has long maintained, assisted in his 2004 ousting and whose interest in keeping him out of the country was documented in the January WikiLeaks release of a US embassy cable dating from 2005. The cable alluded to “continued USG insistence that all efforts must be made to keep Aristide from returning to Haiti, or influencing the political process" on the grounds that he “does not fit in with a democratic political future" in Haiti.

    • Legislative obstacles

    On top of credibility concerns given the perceived interference by the international community, the eventual victor might also struggle to assert his/her authority given that, with 56 candidates through to the second round of legislative elections, the Inité could end up with a majority in both chambers of parliament; neither Martelly's Repons Peyizan nor Manigat's RDNP, competing under the banner of Plateforme des Patriotes Haí¯tiens (Plaph), look set to win more than a handful of seats. Notably, the legislature has the authority to ratify and remove the president-nominated prime minister.

    • Duvalier law

    With an estimated US$5m-US$6m in a frozen Swiss bank account, Duvalier's return has been linked to the so-called 'Duvalier Law' passed by the Swiss parliament in September 2010. The law took effect on 1 February and eases restitution of assets stolen by corrupt politicians to their home countries. Duvalier's apparent plan was to return to Haiti and remain there for a short time in the expectation that he would not be prosecuted. He could then use the absence of any charges against him to seek retrieval of his Swiss funds. With the Swiss government having since announced plans to start legal proceedings to confiscate Duvalier's assets, he now maintains they are not his but belong to a “foundation".

  • Quotes of the month

    28 September 2004 Hits: 1

    “We know that some say that we will make a new offer. They are wrong. This is the only offer we will make. There are distorting noises but we want to be clear and say that we will not commit ourselves to something we cannot abide by. We are on our way to being a predictable country. The challenge is also to attain domestic sustainability and to that end we need to cut inequalities."
    Argentina's President Néstor Kirchner on the restructuring of its defaulted (bond) debt .

    “The greatness of Brazil is linked to an industrialised Argentina."
    Brazil's President Lula da Silva, playing down any bilateral trade rift.

    “I always reiterated that I wanted our Argentine friends to see Chile at that moment not as part of the problem, but rather as a central element for the solution."
    President Lagos referring to the natural gas delivery dispute.

  • BRAZIL: More corruption but Lula still clean

    30 May 2006 Hits: 189

    It is hardly surprising that yet more corruption scandals have emerged as the October elections approach. However, it is notable that Lula da Silva remains untouchable.

    Opportunity knocks

    The latest scandal to raise opposition hopes that Lula might finally be found out concerned a bank called Opportunity. Opportunity has been linked to various instances of financial improprieties and shady dealings in several law proceedings, the most notoriously the fight for control of the privatised Brazil Telecom (BrT).

    However, it became a household name when the current-affairs magazine Veja said the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) "requested" US$90m from the bank in 2003. When the bank's president, Daniel Dantas, refused, he claims Opportunity became the target of a governmental campaign to destroy its reputation. According to Veja, Dantas then collected information about secret foreign accounts in the names of key government members, including President Lula da Silva and the justice minister, Márcio Thomaz Bastos.

    The article prompted the federal police to open yet another investigation into government corruption. So far Dantas has refused to talk, but through Opportunity's press office he made it clear he is ready to give his testimony if he is called by the police or congress. Veja maintains that Dantas collected the information to protect himself against blackmail from the former leadership of the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores, which was demanding "millions" during the BrT dealings. Bastos and other government-linked names vehemently deny holding foreign accounts.

    The plot thickened when Bastos confirmed on 22 May that he secretly met Dantas. The justice minister said he did "not see any impropriety" in his meeting with Dantas in Brasí­lia (which was again uncovered by Veja) and he claimed the meeting was "an informal chat". His colleague Tarso Genro, head of the institutional relations ministry, however, said that Bastos met Dantas as part of an "institutional mission" to tell Dantas that the justice ministry will not interfere in the investigations. The federal police considered the minister's action "negative" in an official statement, saying that if Bastos wanted to meet Dantas that should have been done in the open.

    Mensalão redux

    The Opportunity scandal threw the PT's financial dealings under the spotlight at an opportune moment: the former secretary-general of the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores, Sí­lvio Pereira, gave a new testimony to congress on 10 May. Pereira's testimony did not add anything new to the corruption scandal in which the PT is accused of funding its campaigns illegally and bribing allied congressmen. However, he did say that the party's former leadership, including President Lula da Silva before being elected, were the "decision-makers" about the PT's campaign strategies.

    But any pressure that was building up on President Lula evaporated on 16 May when the prosecutor general, Antonio Fernando de Souza, told reporters that he would not include Lula in his report on corruption to be presented to the supreme court. Many assumed the public-prosecutor would blame Lula for the corruption scheme mounted by the former leaders of the PT. According to Souza, there is not enough evidence to suggest Lula directly participated in the illegal financing scheme and the bribing of allied congressmen; the president's ability to dodge whatever mud is being thrown around remains impressive.

  • ARGENTINA : Esso leaves Argentina

    26 September 2007 Hits: 260

    At the end of August, Esso, the subsidiary owned by Exxon Mobile, announced its departure from Argentina. Its assets, worth some US$200 million, include a refinery, three fuel deposits and a network of approximately 500 service stations, 90 of which are their own. The multinational is also leaving Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay to focus on operations in South-east Asia.

    While the official buyer has yet to be confirmed, interested candidates include the Brazilian state company, Petrobras. However, the Argentine government recently expressed "discomfort" with the prospect of Petrobras buying the assets; planning minister, Julio De Vido warned that the Brazilian company should first honour its existing commitments. Petrol sector sources interpreted this as a clear message - that the sale of Esso does not simply involve a buyer and a seller but also a third party - the government - who can authorise the operation or not. If successful, Petrobras, which already has a presence in Argentina, would operate a network of some 1200 service stations out of a total of 4,100. 

    Esso has operated in Argentina for 96 years and the local press reported the reasons for their departure to be, among others, "complaints over lack of profitability, scarcity of demand and the controversies between the government and Shell". The latter complaint refers to the problematic relationship between the Argentine government and Shell, most recently demonstrated on 5 September as the government closed a Shell refinery in the Buenos Aires province due to purported environmental concerns. Six days later, the government lifted the ban after the multinational agreed to invest US$60 million in improving environmental practice. 

    The dispute over the closure represents only the latest in a series of clashes between President Néstor Kirchner's government and Shell, which began in 2005 after Kirchner called on the Argentine public to boycott Shell's products following an increase in prices. This year alone, some 30 fines have been levied against Shell for violations of storage legislation, causing local executives to protest that the company is being targeted by the government. Accounting for only 13% of the retail fuel market, the company has reportedly been subject to 64% of the 800-some inspections carried out by government agents this year.

    Strike
    On 24 September 4,840 customs officers went on a national day-long strike to protest the dismissal of 11 customs officials arrested last week for taking bribes. The customs union denies that the 11 customs workers had done anything wrong and said they were the victim of an institutional feud between customs workers and airport security police. The organisers of the strike also warned that they would carry out more strikes in the future and that these would be more dramatic. 

  • POLITICS: MST's 'Red Carnival' backfires

    05 March 2009 Hits: 156

    On 21 February, members of the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (Movimento dos Sem-Terra, MST) killed four guards during fresh land invasions in the northeastern state of Pernambuco, prompting renewed debate about the political future of the group.  

    “Carnaval Vermelho"
    Over the same weekend (coinciding with Brazil's annual carnival), an estimated 2,000 militants from a dissident wing of the MST invaded 20 plantations in 14 municipalities around Pontal do Paranapanema, in the east of São Paulo state, governed by the leading opposition contender for the 2012 presidential elections, José Serra of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). The militants, linked to the radical dissident José Rainha Júnior, one of the original founders of the MST, said this so-called  'Red Carnival' was designed to put pressure on the discredited National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (Incra) to speed up the process of land reform in the area. 

    Subsequent to the killings, the MST said its members were acting in self defence, arguing that armed police militias were embedded with the guards. The group also responded rather polemically to questions as to why it had been bearing arms in the first place - asserting that arms were necessary “tools of the trade" against the contract thugs hired by landowners. 

    The killings in Pernambuco prompted the president of the supreme court, Gilmar Mendes, to speak out. He harshly condemned the group's actions, called for prosecutions and, more controversially, accused the federal government, led by President Lula da Silva, of indirectly promoting violence through its financing of the MST, which has historically had tight connections with Lula and his ruling leftwing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).  

    Mendes said the MST had the right to protest, but must respect the rights of others and should not invade public or private land. He was also critical of what he said was “an excess of tolerance and a certain paternalism" on the part of Brazilians towards the group in the past. Implying that the PT government is still too indulgent of the group, he made it clear that any such lenience “damages the constitution" and called for firm action against the group by the authorities. 

    Adding fat to the fire, he went on to suggest that militant groups linked to the MST and operating under the guise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were receiving public funds illicitly, warning that the government could be held responsible if found to be indirectly subsidising such groups, which, he noted, is illegal.

    The financing of NGOs is already a sore point with the government which, following a review last year, controversially stripped some organisations of their federal funding and set much stricter compliance rules for the future. The move was widely slammed by NGOs, which accused the Lula administration of attempting to silence its critics, particularly on the environmental front.

    Mendes' statement, which he later insisted was in an official (and not personal) capacity, left the government openmouthed and sparked renewed debate about the parlous state of relations between the executive and the judiciary. 

    The administration initially went on the offence against Mendes, defending the MST's right to federal financing and denying that any funds were being diverted to illicit militant groups. The agrarian development minister, Guilherme Cassel, accused Mendes of making a “political statement" against the MST, unbecoming of his position as the highest judge in the land. However, it didn't help that the recently-elected heads of the congress and the senate, Michel Temer and José Sarney of the allied Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), as well as the National Agriculture Confederation (CNA), all took Mendes' side. Some conservative rural representatives in congress extravagantly compared the MST to the leftwing guerilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). 

    Under political pressure, and with the opposition press happily blowing up the story, on 2 March Lula spoke out. He said the MST's argument that it was acting in self defence was “unacceptable justification" for the four killings and that justice must be done. He also warned the group, which with he has had increasingly frayed relations in recent years, that they were “old enough now to know the difference between legal and illegal". Cassel also promised an investigation into the financing allegations.

    For the MST, its latest actions - which some felt were designed not only to put pressure on the government but also (rather perversely) to give the impression to the electorate that the Lula/PT government was the only authority capable of dealing with the group - well and truly backfired.  Some opposition commentators were clear that it was no coincidence that the 'Red Carnival' took place on José Serrra's home ground of São Paulo state. 

    As Mendes indicated, Brazilians may still have a soft spot for the MST, which was a prominent agitator for social change in the 1980s, but the group is no longer the political force it once was. This is partly due to the fact that its social causes have been co-opted by the Lula government -  for example analysts point out that the government's Bolsa Familia welfare scheme, which reaches around 11.2m low-income families (some 44m people), has weakened part of the group's raison d'être .

    Notwithstanding social progress under Lula, the sensitive issue of land reform has not gone away in Brazil. However, the MST and the government remain at odds over the scale and pace of reform efforts. MST leaders still fume that Lula reneged on a 2002 electoral promise to re-settle one million families on unused lands. In reply, Lula points out that a record 43m hectares of idle or unused lands have been expropriated by his administration, with 520,000 families resettled since 2002, more than under any other government. 

    The truth is that the MST now needs Lula and the PT more than they need it. The MST, for all its bickering with Lula, would be loath to see the PT lose power, for fear that an opposition-led government would take a much tougher approach towards the group - and potentially cut off its funding.

    This latest incident, however, demonstrates the waning public tolerance for radical militancy, and will thus put pressure on the PT to re-evaluate its political relationship with the group ahead of the 2012 elections.

    • MST on the back foot

    Of late the MST, which recently marked its 25th anniversary, has grappled with something of an identity crisis, having recast itself as part of the broader anti-globalisation movement.  It is heavily involved in the annual World Social Forum in Belén, Brazil, which Lula helped found in 2001 as a counter-movement to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The MST leadership is under also pressure as a result of its latest actions, which sparked fears that it is not in control of its various factions.

    • Invading Dantas' lands

    In the past year, the MST has targeted lands run by the Opportunity Group, owned by the disgraced banker Daniel Dantas, for invasion, alleging that they were acquired illegally, possibly for money laundering purposes. Since July 2008, the MST has invaded 13 properties belonging to the group, the majority located in eastern São Paulo state, including several of the farms occupied in the recent 'Red Carnival'. In 2008, local media reports suggested that Agropecuária Santa Bárbara (owned by the Opportunity group) illegally purchased five ranches in southeastern Pará. The MST alleges that the lands had been assigned for re-settlement by the state government and thus were not legally eligible to be sold. Dantas allegedly owns some 450,000 head of cattle, grazing on 510,000ha in Pará.

  • ARGENTINA: Where is <em>Kirchnerismo</em> going without Kirchner?

    04 November 2010 Hits: 495

    President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner has no time to mourn. Her husband and predecessor, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), suddenly died on 27 October of massive heart failure, leaving her alone to fight the next general election in October 2011. Until now, the ruling Frente para la Victoria (FPV) faction of the Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) had taunted adversaries with the tease that its presidential candidate in 2011 would be “a male or female penguin". With Kirchner gone, the FPV is now rallying behind the only obvious option: Fernández.

    With the loss of the man behind the Kirchnerista model, Argentina's political chessboard changed overnight and, as one opposition legislator quipped shortly after the news broke: “no one is going to make a move until she [Fernández] makes hers". The reaction in Argentina, which was as if a sitting president had died in office, is telling, both of the nature of Kirchnerismo and the current administration. Kirchner was perceived as the real power behind the throne; the man who controlled some 80% of government decisions, not least on the economy - he was sometimes referred to as the minister of economy “in the shadows".

    His death created a true power vacuum. That is not to say that Fernández is unable to operate in her own right. She built an independent political career as a provincial and national legislator before running for president in 2007. She had also presided over the country for close to three years before her husband's death and she understands well the complex decision-making process within the Argentine political system. Nonetheless, Kirchner was the pin holding together the cogs of the complex PJ 'clock'.

    Without Kirchner's 'omnipresence', Fernández will have to familiarize herself with numerous areas of government she did not handle before, such as overseeing economic data to its smallest detail, and has immediately been forced to depend on numerous advisors that previously worked directly for Kirchner. Furthermore, it's unclear if anyone else knows of all the various verbal agreements Kirchner regularly made with trade unionists, businessmen and local politicians, or whether these will be honored in his absence.

    The depth of Kirchner's involvement in the government was (unintentionally) revealed by Fernando Grey, the mayor of Esteban Echeverrí­a, a municipality in greater Buenos Aires, when he commented that he spoke, “with Néstor, at least three times a week. He would call to check if the funds had arrived and to see how public works were progressing". Grey wanted to demonstrate Kirchner's commitment to politics and to the country, instead he inadvertently showed how deeply involved he was at all levels of administration, even down to a small municipality of just 300,000 inhabitants.

    On 27 October, the PJ also lost its party president. Peronism's strong verticality has always created problems for the movement. Absent a strongman at the top, it falters. Moreover, Kirchner left an already divided party which could now turn in on itself, amid a major internal power battle for the party leadership ahead of 2011. The party's new president, the governor of the province of Buenos Aires Daniel Scioli, is under increasing pressure to hand over that leadership role to Kirchner's widow.

    Until Fernández took office in 2007, when in power the PJ had always been led by the country's president. There was, however, no reason for Fernández to take that role, since Kirchner embodied her administration. In his absence, Fernández now has to ensure that party rallies behind her government, especially since Scioli has been sitting on the fence and is well positioned to challenge Fernández at the polls in October 2011 if he wishes to do so.

    On 1 November, Scioli attempted to address these concerns and convened a meeting of 91 local mayors and 24 provincial legislators to express the need to maintain the PJ's “unity" and “commitment" to defending Fernández's administration. However, the move appeared to backfire when Juan José Mussi, mayor of Berazategui, asked the governor to make his position known saying: “Daniel, you have to come out and say that Cristina has to be the presidential candidate in 2011...I want to go out and plaster my district with signs: Cristina President, Scioli Governor".

    The Peronistas Federales
    The Peronistas Federales (PF), led by the former president Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003), and fierce rivals of Kirchner's FVP, had been expected to present their own presidential candidate independently of the PJ in 2011. In the days following Kirchner's death, this strategy came into question as members of the FPV signalled that the ruling faction was willing to dialogue with the PF.

    However, during a meeting on 2 November, the principal leaders of the PF rejected a proposal to participate in general PJ primaries, thus ending the speculation that they might run in the primaries and simultaneously try to wrest control of the PJ. According to one of the attendees interviewed by the daily La Nación, “Federal Peronism will continue to fight in favour of the institutions and will not stop denouncing the criminals in the government even though Kirchner is no longer present."

    The next “generation-K"
    The political credentials of Máximo Kirchner, the couple's eldest son, were not widely spoken about in Argentina until his father's death.  Máximo grew up with both parents in prominent positions: he was 10 when his father became mayor of Rí­o Gallegos; at 14 his father became governor of Santa Cruz, a position he retained for 12 years when the family relocated to the presidential palace. Meanwhile, his mother was provincial and national legislator.

    Máximo founded the Peronist youth (JP) organisation La Cámpora in 2003 and has been the link between his parents and a younger generation of political militants. On 1 November, Santa Cruz's governor, Daniel Peralta, said: “I expect that a kid who lived next to such tremendous parents will have an important political responsibility in the future."

    The wake and burial
    Hundreds of thousands of Argentines poured onto the streets adjacent to the Casa Rosada, the seat of the executive, to pay their final respects to Néstor Kirchner during a two-day closed casket wake held in the room of Latin American Patriots. Fernández and her two children, Máximo (32) and Florencia (19), sat by the coffin for most of that time. Alicia Kirchner, Néstor's sister and Fernández's minister of social welfare, stayed by her brother's side throughout, taking over her sister-in-law's position at the head of the casket whenever Fernández had to take a break.
    The wake was a parade of hardcore Kirchneristas including members of the FVP and the PJ; human rights defence groups like the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (who placed their symbolic white headscarves next to the Argentine flag on top of the casket); trade unionists; actors; singers; writers; journalists and even the iconic footballer, Diego Maradona. All the South American presidents, with the exception of Peru's Alan Garcí­a, attended the wake. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez also travelled to Rí­o Gallegos, the capital of the Patagonian province of Santa Cruz, to accompany Fernández during the private burial ceremony for Kirchner in his hometown.
    The chief of cabinet Aní­bal Fernández was instructed by Fernández to tell her estranged vice-president Julio Cobos and Eduardo Duhalde not to attend the wake. Other members of the opposition that did attend were not received by Fernández and were insulted by the thousands of militants gathered on the Plaza de Mayo.

    • Killed by his personality

    Néstor Kirchner's poor health was an open secret for year and allegedly he didn't run for re-election in 2007 because of health problems. This year alone, he had undergone two surgeries to unblock major arteries, the carotid and the coronary, and was advised by his doctors to slow down his extremely active and combative political agenda. When the news of his death emerged, some local analysts said that Kirchner had been killed by his personality and his inability to step back and delegate.

    Memorable Kirchner quotes

    “No one holds a Peronómetro in his hand" - 2010

    “I am Cristina's Soldier" - 2008

    “There is life after the fund [IMF]" - 2005

  • Economic Overview

    24 April 2007 Hits: 190
    ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: COLOMBIA

    The consensus among economists is that the peso will actually weaken this year by about 5.5% against the dollar. In 2004, it appreciated by about 14% in real terms. The 5.5% depreciation would take the currency down to 2,544 at the end of 2005. The worry about the strength of the peso, and the danger of Colombian exports being priced out of the US, their biggest market, is prompting the government to consider measures to boost the dollar. The latest is a requirement that every foreign exchange transfer of over US$200 should be reported.

    OUTLOOK

    Inflation: The rate for January was 0.82%. This was the third-lowest rate for any January, when wages are usually increased, for the past 35 years. Food prices increased by 1.45% and transport and telecommunications prices rose by 1.28%. The target for this year is an inflation rate of between 4% and 5%. In 2004 the rate was 5.5%.
    Unemployment: The unemployment rate at the end of 2004 was 12.1%. This is equivalent to 2.44m people. The government pointed out that the number was 110,000 below the rate at the end of 2003. On the other hand, the employment rate fell from 54.8% to 52.4% over the year.
    Farc finances: The ministry of finance reckons that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia had revenues of US$77m in 2003. The ministry reckons that the guerrilla group spent US$35.6m.
    The Venezuelan trade embargo: The Venezuelan trade embargo caused problems for border departments, notably Arauca. The department had been buying 6MW a day from the Venezuelan gird to supply power to the capital. This supply was interrupted at the end of January, though it was restored before Presidents Uribe and Chávez of Venezuela were due to meet.

  • Economic Overview

    24 April 2007 Hits: 186

    In the first eight months of 2006 the country ran a trade surplus of US$1.1bn on exports of US$8.27bn and imports of US$7.18bn. Exports were up 8% in volume and 19% in value in the first eight months. Oil exports were up 4.4% in volume and 36% in value. The trade surplus was the highest since 2000. One problem for policymakers is that that exports are heavily dependent on the US. In August, 56% of the country's exports went to the US; the next biggest market was Peru with 9%. Regionally the Andean countries bought 16% of the country's exports. The European Union bought 11%.

    Energy problems: Petroecuador, the state oil company, is talking about importing 20m gallons to diesel to meet looming problems in electricity generation. The country is coming up for the dry season when water levels in its maIn hydro-electric plants falls, hitting electricity output. The president of Petroecuador, Galo Chiriboga, claimed that the shortages were not caused, by inefficiencies at Petroecuador but rather by the smuggling of diesel out of the country. Diesel in Ecuador is substantially cheaper than in Colombia and Peru.

    Inflation: In September, inflation was 0.57 %, up from August's 0.21%. This brought the rate for the past 12 months to 3.21 %. In 2005, the rate had been 4.4%.

  • Uribe ignores regional outrage

    06 March 2008 Hits: 1545

    President Alvaro Uribe's decision to launch an air strike against a leader of the Farc on Ecuadorean territory has left Colombia completely isolated in Latin America. Ecuador is furious at the violation of its territory, while Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez claims to fear that Colombia might try the same in his country. The rest of Latin America has united to condemn Colombia for an action which poses such a risk to regional security. Uribe, however, is unrepentant. Moreover, he considers himself to be more sinned against than sinner.

    Correa's response

    From the moment Rafael Correa discovered that Uribe had lied to him about the hot pursuit, the Ecuadorean president has acted with considerable pragmatism. Believing that the raid is not a bilateral issue but a regional concern, Correa promptly embarked on a whistle-stop tour of Latin America. He first visited Peru - one of Colombia's strongest allies in the region - before heading on to Brazil where he met President Lula da Silva. He will also call on Venezuela, Panama and Nicaragua before ending his tour at the Rio Group summit in the Dominican Republic on 6 March.

    Correa was encouraged by the attitude of Peru's president, Alan Garcí­a, who said that he would not tolerate Colombia doing the same thing on Peruvian territory and asked Uribe to apologise. The other countries on Correa's itinerary are similarly sympathetic to his cause. An emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) underlined the united condemnation of Colombia in the hemisphere: only the US was willing to defend Uribe.

    It now appears likely that the OAS will call for an investigation into the raid in which Reyes was killed. Neither Colombia nor the US favour this outcome, for fear that an investigation would fully expose the techniques and technology that the US has passed on to Colombia's military. At the time of writing the ongoing emergency OAS meeting has failed to reach an agreement, though the organisation has already arranged a further foreign ministers' meeting on 17 or 18 March. Before then, however, Colombia will almost certainly face more regional reproach at the Rio Group meeting.

    Correa's response stands in marked contrast to that of Chávez . The Venezuelan president is entitled to worry that Colombia might consider attacks on Venezuelan soil, but his approach to the situation has been far less constructive than Correa's. Chávez sent ten battalions to the border with Colombia where Correa only mobilised forces already in the north of Ecuador. Chávez was also quicker than Correa to sever ties with Colombia, and needless to say the Venezuelan president was also much more forthcoming with belligerent talk and insults. Chávez also held a minute's silence for Reyes on his weekly broadcast, 'Aló, Presidente'.

    Computer defence

    Notwithstanding, Correa and Chávez have adopted a similar line in ridiculing and largely ignoring Uribe's counter accusations. The Colombian government claims to have discovered three computers at the camp where Reyes was killed which show that Correa was indirectly involved in negotiations with Reyes and that Chávez had offered to donate US$300m to the Farc.

    The first documents released by the Colombian authorities concerned a meeting between Reyes and Ecuador's security minister, Gustavo Larrea. After these achieved a partial success (see page 5), the Colombian government published more documents from the computers which, it claimed, were even more explosive. By far the most noteworthy is a series of communications between the Farc's top leaders which reportedly indicate that Chávez has promised to donate oil worth US$300m to the Farc this year.

    Uribe's defiance when faced with the region's wrath is based entirely on the alleged contents of the computers. This is despite there being two major flaws to his argument. First, there is no corroborating evidence regarding the contents of the computers; there is nothing to say that Colombia's intelligence services haven't manipulated what documents were there. Secondly, Uribe cannot justify his attack on Ecuador on the basis of computers found at the site of the raid after it had occurred.

    Yet this has not deterred Uribe from his accusations. On 4 March he announced that Colombia will go before the international criminal court to accuse Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez of "sponsoring and financing genocide". Moreover, he and his government are using the evidence on the computers to argue that the raid was legitimate on the basis of Article 51 of the United Nations charter and UN Resolution 1373. Article 51 recognises "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence". Resolution 1373, which was approved after the 9/11 attacks on the US, states that nations should refrain from providing financing, support or safe haven to terrorist organisations.

    Uribe must know that the chronology of events undermines his legal basis for the strike and that the best way to appease the OAS would be to apologise to Ecuador. His refusal to do so suggests that Uribe is playing to his domestic audience. There are numerous short-term reasons why he would do this: the release of four of the Farc's hostages on 27 February underlined that Chávez rather than Uribe is the most likely avenue for a prisoner swap, while an anti-paramilitary protest planned for 6 March has threatened to revive the parapolitical scandal. In the longer term, however, Uribe might be trying to engineer the kind of "hecatombe" - catastrophe - that he said last year might persuade him to run for a third term in office.

    • OAS emergency

    The OAS rarely calls emergency meetings. The last occasion was during the 1993 crisis in Haiti, though there were also emergency meetings after the US invasions of Panama and Granada and the outbreak of the Falklands War (Guerra de las Malvinas). In order for a resolution to be approved by the emergency meeting it must secure the support of two thirds of the 34 OAS members in an open vote.

    • Hostages freed

    On 27 February the Farc handed over four of its hostages: Gloria Polanco, Orlando Beltrán, Luis Eladio Pérez and Jorge Eduardo Géchem Turbay. The Farc has unconditionally released six hostages so far in 2008 , but its munificence is at an end: upon freeing the four former members of congress, the guerrilla group stated that it will not free any more of its 40 remaining high-profile hostages until the government demilitarises for 45 days an area of 800 square kilometres in the municipalities of Pradera and Florida in the western department of Valle.

  • ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

    23 July 2009 Hits: 161

    The inflation rate is easing, suggesting that demand in the economy is falling as government spending is cut. In the first six months of 2009 consumer prices rose 10.8%, well below the 15.1% registered in the first six months of 2008. The annual rate in June was 26%. In calendar 2008 inflation was 31%.

    Crucially, food price inflation is much lower than overall inflation. In the first half of 2009 the index of food prices rose by 4.5%. In the first half of 2008 the same index jumped by 19.3%. The big inflation engines in 2009 have been healthcare and transport.

    For the month of June the increase in the CPI index was 1.8%, down from 2% in May and 2.4% in June 2008. It fell in seven of the 13 sub indices (notably transport, home furnishing, restaurants & hotels, utilities, health care, and other services). The indices covering alcoholic beverages & tobacco, food & beverages, and clothing all rose while the indices covering rent, communications, and educational services were unchanged. .

    Unemployment: The national unemployment rate was 7.7% in April and 7.8% in May. Just over 1m people are unemployed. From January to May the average unemployment rate was 7.9%. In 2008 the average unemployment rate was 7.4% - it peaked at 10.2% in January and was at its lowest level of 6.1% in November.

  • POLITICS: Galán confirms Bogotá candidacy

    11 March 2011 Hits: 1985

    Following the early February announcement that Enrique Peñalosa will run for the Partido Verde (PV) in the race for the mayoralty of Bogotá, the second most important government position in Colombia, Bogotá councilman Carlos Fernando Galán of the Partido Cambio Radical (PCR) confirmed that he is the party's candidate in the 30 October regional elections. Galán sought to be politically inclusive in his launch statement, announcing that the PCR had not ruled out a coalition or the possibility of backing a joint candidacy with one of the major political parties, with the notable exception of the ruling Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA).

    Galán's candidacy ended three months of speculation within the PCR leadership but it didn't clarify if the PCR will enter an alliance with the Partido Liberal (PL), from which the PCR originally emerged, to run a joint ticket. If Galán were to reach election day on his own, he would become the first PCR candidate to run for mayor of Bogotá, thus continuing the party's trend of firsts, which in May 2010 saw its presidential candidate (now minister of interior and justice), Germán Vargas Lleras, come in third place with a strong national performance (10.15% of the vote in the first round).

    Carlos Fernando Galán is the son of Luis Carlos Galán, the PL's first-choice presidential candidate in the 1990 election, who was assassinated by Pablo Escobar's hit men as he prepared to lead a rally in Soacha, Bogotá's most populous suburb, in August 1989. After Galán's death, his family rallied behind the candidacy of César Gaviria (1990-1994), then leader of Galán's debate team, who went on to win the 1990 vote. The Galanistas are still a very strong political grouping within the PL and the PCR and it is possible that his father's name will give him a higher level of support than he would enjoy if he weren't a Galán - similar to the situation of the current Argentine presidential pre-candidate Ricardo Alfonsí­n.

    Nonetheless, Carlos Fernando Galán is considering at least three possible scenarios in addition to running on his own: first, the PL and the PCR may hold an intra-party consultation to back a single candidate to be decided between Galán and the PL's David Luna; second, all the parties that make up President Juan Manuel Santos's coalition of national unity (Partido de la U [PU], Partido Conservador [PC], PL and PCR) could hold an intra-party primary to replicate the national coalition in Bogotá and rally behind one candidate; or third, the coalition consultation could also include the Partido Verde (PV). In other words, the PCR is open to proposals from all camps bar the PDA, whose position is increasingly weak due to the allegations of corruption against its serving mayor, Samuel Moreno Rojas (see sidebar).

    • Moreno suspended
      On 7 March, the ethics and guarantees' committee of the PDA suspended Senator Iván Moreno Rojas from the party for three months pending corruption investigations into public tendering processes in Bogotá. Moreno's suspension by the seven member committee is a clear break with the party line. When in October 2010 the former PDA presidential candidate, Gustavo Petro, denounced the alleged participation of the Moreno brothers, Iván and Samuel (the incumbent mayor of Bogotá), in the scandal, the party's directorate unanimously voted to stand behind the Morenos, which eventually led to Petro's exit from the PDA. The latest move has created fresh divisions within the party, with at least one member of the ethics committee refusing to endorse the decision with his signature.

  • ARGENTINA: Menem promete 'reconstruir' al PJ

    17 February 2004 Hits: 804
    El ex Presidente Carlos Menem anunció su intención de 'reconstruir' al gobernante Partido Justicialista (PJ). La semana pasada, hablando desde su casa en la provincia de La Rioja, acusó al Presidente Néstor Kirchner de 'destruir el paí­s' y actuar en manos de los Comunistas. Afirmó ser 'el único que gobernó y no fracasó', y abogó por la restauración de las relaciones cercanas con EU que habí­a forjado durante sus 10 años en el poder.

    El jefe de gabinete, Aní­bal Fernández, respondió: 'Ya no hay nada más para destruir, aunque quisiéramos. El [Menem] ya lo destruyó todo.' Agregó que el único lí­der de hecho del PJ es el Presidente Kirchner.
  • Rastreando tendencias...

    17 February 2004 Hits: 2
    VENEZUELA | En juego autonomí­a del banco central. El Presidente Hugo Chávez , acompañado con demostraciones callejeras de sus seguidores, intenta presionar al banco central para que dé un préstamo de US$1bn al ejecutivo, de sus reservas internacionales (actualmente en US$21,3bn) a fin de financiar el desarrollo agrí­cola. El persigue este objetivo desde noviembre pasado, y ahora amenaza con llevar el caso ante la corte suprema, si el directorio del banco 'al menos no se sienta a discutir el asunto' para el 15 de enero. El banco central ha reiterado su posición, que la constitución especí­ficamente le prohí­be otorgar esa clase de préstamos (en realidad, le prohí­be dar préstamos para apoyar el déficit en los gastos, y dar préstamos directos a empresas).

    El banco dice que puede, sin embargo, elevar la capacidad de préstamos del sistema bancario ví­a redescuentos. El gobierno ha pensado en esta opción, con nueva legislación que obliga a los bancos a elevar sus préstamos a las actividades agrí­colas -pero recientes acontecimientos sugieren que en cambio ha elegido presionar al banco central. La oposición dice que esto provee un nuevo ejemplo del 'desprecio autocrático por la ley', de parte de Chávez .

    PERU | 'Desdolarizando' la economí­a. El presidente del banco central, Javier Silva Ruete está decidido a reducir aun más el grado de dolarización de depósitos del banco este año, luego de reducirlo a 63% para fines de 2003. También dice que espera que la inversión extranjera directa supere los US$2bn, que significarí­a 5,6% de incremento sobre 2003. Más de la mitad de esta meta parece asegurarse por dos proyectos: el desarrollo de los depósitos de gas de Camisea (US$847m) y el de la mina de oro de Alto Chicama (US$340m).

    La meta de crecimiento económico de Silva Ruete para este año es 4%. Esto podrí­a repetir el desempeño de 2003 (cuando, dice Silva Ruete, 'pudimos haber crecido en un punto más si no se hiciera tanto ruido polí­tico'). Su único temor este año: 'La economí­a', dice, 'está vinculada de cerca a la polí­tica, y por tanto, si los medios, las declaraciones y los centros de análisis comienzan a subrayar situaciones negativas, esto desalentará o retrasará algunas inversiones.'

  • EL SALVADOR: Piden retiro de tropas de Irak

    07 April 2004 Hits: 1
    El ejército salvadoreño ha sufrido sus primeras ví­ctimas en Irak. En los primeros cuatro dí­as de abril, fue muerto un soldado y 15 fueron heridos en dos ataques separados contra la base Al Andalus de la brigada Plus Ultra bajo comando español en Najav.

    El incidente más serio fue el 4 de abril, cuando un gran contingente de milicias de la brigada al-Mahdi atacaron la base con una serie de armas en la creencia que un clérigo Shiita estaba retenido ahí­. En la batalla, además de un paracaidista salvadoreño, Natividad Méndez Ramos, un soldado de EU y alrededor de 25 iraquí­es resultaron muertos.

    El batallón Cuscatlán, de 380 hombres de El Salvador, ha estado en Irak desde principios de febrero, cuando relevaron al primer contingente enviado. Deberí­an quedarse hasta julio, pero desde que llegaron las noticias de las ví­ctimas a El Salvador, el opositor Frente Farabundo Martí­ para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), ha estado exigiendo su inmediato retiro de Irak.

    Dos otros paí­ses de la Cuenca del Caribe tienen unidades militares en Irak: Honduras y la República Dominicana. Nicaragua no envió un segundo grupo al finalizar el periodo del primero porque no pudo obtener donantes que paguen los gastos. Ahora ofrece a las unidades que fueron entrenadas para ir a Irak, para que actúen como miembros de la fuerza de la ONU que debe ser desplegada en Haití­ cuando venza el mandato de la fuerza interina dentro de dos meses.