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Development: On 14 January President Oscar Berger went before congress to talk up the successes of his administration at the halfway point of his mandate.

Significance: On the same day that Berger addressed congress a survey was released showing that 75% of Guatemalans disapproved of his rule. Shortly after he was elected Berger enjoyed an 89% approval rating.

One of the main reasons for the dramatic turnaround is that violent crime is soaring: 5,500 people were murdered in Guatemala in 2005, the highest total since the end of the civil war in 1996. While Berger stuck to his government's economic successes - 3.2% GDP growth compared with 2.7% in 2004, 8.57% inflation down from 9.23% in 2004 - this means little to most Guatemalans as it has not translated into a reduction of poverty, which remains at 60%.

Berger said that his government was doing the best it could to solve the country's many problems but "let's be clear about this_ there is no Superman that will come and sort everything out overnight." He added that "it is possible to establish the bases for sustainable development and that is what we are doing". Several thousand protesters took part in a protest on 14 January in Guatemala City calling on Berger to stick to a campaign promise to hold a referendum on his rule after two years.

Development: President Lula da Silva is still undecided over what to do with his finance minister, Antonio Palocci, ahead of the October elections, reported the economic magazine Valor on 20 February. 

Significance: Despite keeping silent over his re-election plans, President Lula da Silva has been taking all the necessary steps to avoid problems during an eventual campaign. Presidential aides have gone out of their way recently to ensure that any of Lula's - suddenly very frequent - public appearances avoid turning into political rallies which could be used by the opposition to censor the president under electoral rules. Crucially, Lula is being very careful on his picking of a campaign manager and the likely changes that his final choice will have in his cabinet. 

According to Valor, the president considers his finance minister to be "the most appropriate man" to manage the 2006 campaign. Recent articles in the Brazilian press mentioned Lula as saying that he wants someone with "a very different style from the pushy approach used by José Dirceu", his one time right hand man who fell from grace over corruption allegations, and that Palocci fits perfectly the bill. Lula's choice, however, does not come without complications, says Valor. 

For Valor, Lula is unsure of what is the best moment to take Palocci out of the finance ministry without the risk of "provoking uncertainties in the economy" during an electoral year. One of the president's alternatives would be to transfer Palocci to the head of the presidency's political relations' team in March, replacing Jacques Wagner who will leave the government to run for governor in Bahia. The move would give the government breathing space until June, the deadline to announce candidates. More importantly, to replace Palocci in the finance ministry, Lula could choose Murilo Portugal, the ministry's current executive-secretary, who was also linked to the Cardoso's administration, thus avoiding the opposition's criticism over the handling of the economy during the campaign.

Development: Colombia complained on 23 March that two Ecuadorean aircraft had entered Colombian airspace on 22 March.

Significance: The Colombian defence ministry said that two A-37 aircraft (Cessna light attack aeroplanes) had crossed into Colombian airspace in the southern department of Putumayo. The Ecuadoreans denied that this had happened and said that Colombia's radar was wrong. Ecuador has complained of at least three Colombian incursions into its airspace this year. The most recent was on 11 March when Colombian aeroplanes crossed into Ecuador and attacked targets there, supposedly in pursuit of guerrillas from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.

Ecuador's deputy foreign minister, Diego Ribandeneira, said that there was no possibility that the Ecuadorean planes had crossed into Colombia. He suggested that the two countries should harmonise their radar systems to avoid any erroneous accusations in the future.

Ecuador did accuse Colombia on 23 March of kidnapping an Ecuadorean policeman, Cirilo Taya, in the border area of Tufiño. Apparently the policeman was on the bridge over the River Játiva, which divides the countries, when he was detained by Colombian soldiers. It is not clear whether Taya crossed into Colombia or Colombian troops marched into Ecuador to detain him.

Development: On 1 May around one million protesters took part in the so-called "day without immigrants" demonstration in cities across the US to demand a reform to the country's immigration laws.

Significance: In one of the largest mass protests since the Civil Rights era, the demonstration succeeded in closing down meat-packing plants, restaurants, vineyards and hotels. The agricultural sector was among the worst affected, with many owners reporting a high level of absenteeism. The protest comes as the Congress considers reforming the country's immigration laws, and public opinion appears to be swinging against the initial hardline proposal promulgated by Republican congressman James Sensenbrenner. The Sensenbrenner bill classifies illegal immigration as a felony.

According to police figures, some 400,000 people demonstrated in Los Angeles; 75,000 in Denver; 30,000 in Florida, with many more protests in at least 50 cities across the country. The 1 May protests follow significant mobilisations in April, which appear to be having some effect on legislators. Once again, the protesters were eager to emphasise their affiliation with the US and carried placards written in English as well as Spanish.

A Rasmussen poll released last week showed that 26% of Americans hold a favourable opinion of the protests, while 56% do not. However a poll in mid April by ABC and The Washington Post found that only 20% of respondents supported the idea of treating illegal immigration as a serious crime; 60% backed the more liberal senate proposal that would allow most illegal immigrants to apply for US citizenship.

Development: On 4 June the attorney general, Isaí­as Rodrí­guez, claimed that the Colombian paramilitary leader "Jorge 40" had ordered the assassination of Danilo Anderson, killed by a car bomb in November 2004 during his investigation into the April 2002 coup.

Significance: The mystery surrounding Anderson's murder continues to deepen. The government claims that Anderson was a victim of violent opposition supporters, who killed him to hamper the investigation into the coupsters. The opposition, meanwhile, has argued that Anderson was on the take and claim he was killed by people he was attempting to blackmail. The government has long claimed a Colombian paramilitary connection, and even President Alvaro Uribe is prepared to accept that attempts to overthrow President Hugo Chávez have been planned on Colombian soil.

Speaking to the Colombian weekly magazine Semana, Rodrí­guez said, "He (Jorge 40) was the advisor to the conspiracy process as regards assassinations. It was him who warned the Venezuelan organisations that they should not lose time in killing the attorney general and the president." Rodrí­guez pointed out that political assassination was almost unheard of in Venezuela prior to the killing of Anderson.

It is not clear on what basis Rodrí­guez has claimed Jorge 40 involvement. The government's main witness, Giovanni Vázquez de Armas, a Colombian, has been widely discredited. The other source Rodrí­guez mentioned was Rafael Garcí­a, former IT chief at the Colombian intelligence services, who is now in prison for collaborating with drug traffickers.

Development: Peru's president-elect, Alan Garcí­a, said on 8 July that President Hugo Chávez only had to name a day and time and he would meet him.

Significance: This rapprochement, and the separate news that Garcí­a will not accept US military aid to combat drug trafficking or guerrillas from Colombia, suggests that Garcí­a is unlikely to be a stalwart ally of the US against Chávez .

Garcí­a was responding to Chávez 's own response to Garcí­a overture earlier in the week that he would be happy to meet Chávez to improve relations. Chávez seized on this to say, at a summit with the Colombian and Panamanian presidents, that he would forget about his row with Garcí­a: the row was prompted by Chávez 's support for Garcí­a's rival for the presidency, Ollanta Humala. After the elections Chávez called Garcí­a a "US lap dog" and claimed that Humala had won.

BRAZIL: The state-controlled Petrobrás posted a profit of R$13.63bn (US$6.05bn) in the first half of the year, 37% more than on the same period last year. 

BRAZIL: The official inflation index (Ipca) ended the month of July at 0.19%. In the previous month the Ipca registered deflation of 0.21%.

BRAZIL: The National Social and Economic Development Bank (Bndes) posted a profit of R$3.31bn (US$1.47bn) in the first half of the year, 81% higher than the same period last year.

COSTA RICA: The economy grew 7.0% year-on-year in the first half of 2006, compared with a 4.7% expansion in the first half of 2005.

ECUADOR: Net tax revenues totaled US$415m in July, up 9.8% year-on-year according to the governemnt's tax agency.

EL SALVADOR: Coffee exports fell 5.3% year-on-year in July to 93,976 60kg bags, according to the Salvadoran coffee council.

EL SALVADOR: The consumer price index rose 1.26% month-on-month in July according to the economy ministry.

GUATEMALA: Remittances totalled US$2.05bn in the first seven months of the year, the central bank revealed. July's figure was US$303m.

PERU: The trade surplus rose to US$767m in June from US$479m in the same month last year, according to the central bank.

Development: The Convención Nacional Democrática declared Andrés Manuel López Obrador "legitimate president" on 16 September.

Significance: López Obrador is still setting the political agenda in Mexico, despite losing the elections and seeing support for his protests ebb. López Obrador's supporters claimed that 1.025m people gathered in Mexico City's main square, the Zócalo, to acclaim their man as the legitimate president. Others say that fewer than 500,000 were present. The numbers matter: initially López Obrador was drawing 2m people to his protests against the unfairness of the 2 July presidential election in which he was edged out by Felipe Calderón Hinojosa.

What López Obrador will do as "legitimate president" is far from clear. The CND wants him to "take office" on 20 November, 10 days before Calderón receives the presidential sash. The 20th November will be the 94th anniversary of the start of the Mexican Revolution, which was triggered by what Francisco I Madero believed was an unfair election.

The CND approved a vague 12-point programme, most of which consists of posturing. More interestingly, the CND also set up three committees: one to handle political negotiation; another to prepare for a campaign of civil resistance (presumably against the Calderón administration); and a third to call a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution. These committees will report to the CND when it meets again on 21 March 2007.

Independence Day itself passed off peacefully. President Vicente Fox gave the Independence grito at the historical site of Dolores Hidalgo in Guanajuato at 11pm on 15 September. This was where the priest, Miguel Hidalgo, launched the independence movement. Alejandro Encinas, the mayor of Mexico City and a López Obrador supporter, gave the grito in its traditional site, the Zócalo.

Development: On 23 October the leading opposition candidate for the presidency, Manuel Rosales, invited President Hugo Chávez to participate in a public debate.

Significance: The move is canny. Chávez is almost certain to say no, thereby risking the same accusations of arrogance that cost both Mexican presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and Brazilian President Lula da Silva, votes in their countries' elections. Rosales's camp has been buoyed by the publication of a raft of opinion polls over the last few weeks, which vary wildly, but generally point to his support rising.

Speaking at a press conference in Caracas, Rosales invited Chávez to join him in a televised debate to discuss the country's problems. "He has to explain to Venezuelans the 90,000 killings, the unemployment, the lack of investment, the poor services, the hunger, the poverty, the laughable number of housing units constructed, he has to explain what he means by 21st Century Socialism," he said. "Let him come to the arena as I am waiting for him, the day and the hour he wishes. Ask permission of Fidel [Castro]."

Chávez is a reluctant debater; he recently turned down an invitation by the economist Gerver Torres to discuss economic issues. Part of the reason appears to be the president's seeming inability to keep his answers short. His weekly Aló Presidente! programme has no fixed timetable, it merely continues for as long as the president has something to say, and he often illustrates his political messages with long digressions into largely irrelevant personal stories.

Rosales has picked up on the current trend in Latin America for presidential debates. Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Mexico all held at least one debate before their elections, in which the performance (or, in the case of Lula and López Obrador) absence of the candidates, had a noticeable impact on the result. However, a better analogy might be the case of Nicaragua; Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, a close ally of Chávez , refused to attend the CNN presidential debate, and this has had little effect on his standing. Nevertheless, some Chávez supporters think the debate a good idea. Responding to Rosales's comments, Leopoldo Puchi, the leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo, allied with Chávez 's own Movimiento Quinta República, backed the call for a presidential debate. "This is not a ploy, but rather a stellar moment in a campaign," he said. "The people want to contrast the opinions of presidential hopefuls."

Venezuelan opinion polls continue to vary wildly, but a rough approximation of the results show that Rosales is rising, but still lagging behind Chávez . One exception to this is a poll published on 23 October by the pro-opposition Ceca which put Rosales on 41.3% of voter intentions and Chávez on 39.5%; a technical tie. This prediction seems extremely unlikely and is not confirmed by any other of the many polls produced in Venezuela. Datánalisis, another polling firm associated with the opposition, has consistently produced high figures for Chávez 's support, but now says the gap between the two candidates is narrowing. A poll published in El Universal on 23 October by Opinión Pública Consultores put Chávez on 51.5% and Rosales on 22.7% of voter intentions. Significantly, 25% of those polled said they were undecided.

Separately, the Venezuelan police detained a man in connection with a bomb scare at the US embassy on 23 October. The suspect had allegedly placed two small pipe bombs near the embassy which contained flyers expressing support for the Hezbollah militia.

Development: On 29 November Rafael Correa gave his first full interview to the press since becoming president-elect.

Significance: He said that his first act on becoming president, on 15 January, would be to promulgate a referendum on a constituent assembly. His second would be to cut the presidential salary from US$8,000 to US$4,000. Correa also said he plans to send the first batch of Ecuadorean crude for refining in Venezuela on 16 January.

Asked by the Quito daily El Comercio about the chances of success for the constituent assembly, Correa said there were around 40 congressmen sympathetic to the idea, but that congress was an institution that had lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the Ecuadorean people. Correa said he was open to dialogue but would not compromise on the convening of an assembly. He gave as examples of successful constituent assemblies those held in Colombia and Venezuela.  

The interviewer pointed out that the assembly in Bolivia is currently deadlocked and that the Ecuadorean experience of constituent assemblies was not a happy one. Ecuador held an assembly in 1997, following the crisis provoked by the ouster of President Abdalá Bucaram from office, but its reforms were not particularly wide-ranging, concentrating mainly on expanding the legislature and the president's period of office.  

Correa said the congress could continue working while the assembly was sitting but its powers would be limited. The president-elect also said he wanted to put a limit on the amount of money that could be deposited abroad by Ecuadoreans. As regards oil, Correa said on the 16 January Ecuador would start sending its oil to Venezuela to be refined and begin to renegotiate the government's contracts with foreign oil companies. Correa also expressed hope that the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Atpdea), the deal which allows Andean products access to the US market at preferential tariffs, would be extended.

Development: An official from the ministry of mines and energy announced on 12 January that the government intends to reactivate Colombia's one nuclear reactor.

Significance: The IAN-R1 reactor at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá is being reactivated for the same reasons it was mothballed in 1998: financial logic. While the government of nine years ago believed that the reactor was too expensive to run, the current administration has calculated that it would cost more to dismantle the reactor and decontaminate the area than it would to put it back to work. The dismantling would also take around 20 years.

The IAN-R1, acquired from the US in 1965, is one of the smallest nuclear reactors in the world: its output of 30 kilowatts is nowhere near enough to boost the domestic electricity supply. However, it has important uses in mining, particularly for the detection of gold and for determining the quality of coal. At present Colombia has to carry out these tests in the US or Canada.

Another factor in the decision to reactivate the reactor is pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been demanding to know what Colombia intends to do with the three kilograms of enriched uranium still under tight security at the reactor.

Development: On its 18 February edition a Brazilian newspaper blamed “a succession of errors" for Brazil's worst-ever plane crash. 

Significance: According to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, the main cause of the crash over the Amazon last September, which killed all 154 passengers on board a commercial airliner, could have been the lack of understanding between Brazilian air-traffic controllers in the tower in Brasí­lia and the American pilots of a small Brazilian-made jet. The two planes collided at an altitude of 37,000 feet. The pilots of the small jet managed to land safely in a farm airfield while the airliner nose-dived into the jungle. 

Folha de São Paulo had access to the transcriptions of the two planes' black boxes and the recordings from the tower, which are being analysed by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB is helping Brazilian authorities to determine the cause of the accident. For Folha de São Paulo, however, it is clear that the control tower and the American pilots could not communicate properly in English. This failure to understand each other prevented the American pilots “on three different occasions" from clarifying whether they should change their altitude. 

For Joe Sharkey, a New York Times reporter on board the smaller jet, however, the article in Folha de São Paulo is trying to find an excuse for the “mess that is Brazil's air-traffic control system". Sharkey excused the American pilots claiming that “the poor-quality English spoken by Brazilian air-traffic controllers is notorious". One thing remains unanswered by the transcripts, however: the reason why the pilots of the smaller jet failed to turn on the aircraft's anti-collision equipment.

Development: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the narrowly defeated leftwing candidate in the presidential elections in 2006 filled the Zócalo in Mexico City with a rally on 25 March.

Significance: López Obrador again did not directly challenge President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, even though López Obrador claims that he was cheated of victory in the election and is the “legitimate" president. What López Obrador did was warn Calderón against privatising the state oil company, Pemex. López Obrador did not try to rally his supporters behind a strike, by employees of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico, against the government's controversial scheme to privatise part of the state pension system. 

Neither the local nor the federal police put a figure on the size of the rally, which followed a demonstration along the capital's main avenue, Reforma, but both said that the rally was smaller than the last two López Obrador called on 20 November and 1 December 2006. López Obrador again called Calderón an usurper for cheating him of victory. Calderón won by 233,000 votes in an election in which 41m votes were cast. 

The rally, which calls itself the Convención Nacional Democrática, agreed to meet again on 20 November, over-riding calls by some of López Obrador's supporters for rallies on 2 July (the anniversary of the elections in 2006) and 16 September (Independence Day).

Development: The head of the army, Mario Montoya, confirmed on 27 April that the government is in the process of excavating US$8bn in drug money believed to be buried in the central department of Cundinamarca.

Significance: If the money is recovered it would represent a major fillip to the country's finances: Colombia's foreign reserves currently stand at just over US$19bn. However, not all the money will go to the state: in order to track down the money the government has enlisted the help of 23 people formerly employed by José Gonzalo Rodrí­guez Gacha, a drug baron killed in 1989.

Rodrí­guez Gacha, otherwise known as 'The Mexican', was the second most powerful member of the Medellí­n cartel behind Pablo Escobar. The US$8bn which the government is hunting for dates back to when the cartel offered to pay off the country's debt in exchange for judicial immunity. The story goes that Rodrí­guez Gacha collected the money at his 248-hectare farm in Pacho, where it was hidden in a bunker of reinforced concrete awaiting the government's acceptance of the offer.

According to the military this story was confirmed in 2005 by 23 of The Mexican's henchmen, who offered to divulge the location of the money in exchange for a cut. Under the terms of an agreement leaked to Colombia's leading daily, El Tiempo, the state will receive 39.6% of whatever is found, the tax agency 22.5%, and the henchmen 37.9%. The mayor of Paco, Uriel Enrique Mora, optimistically demanded on 29 April that the money be given to his municipality.

The El Tiempo report states that the heavily guarded team of geologists and engineers found evidence of an underground bunker in January. As a result, the newspaper claims that a "final phase" of digging began last week and should produce results within 45 days. The interior minister, Carlos Holguí­n Sardi, reportedly gave his blessing to the excavation after a meeting with the informants.

Development: On 5 June Cuban television broadcast the first interview with Fidel Castro since he ceded power to his brother Raúl last July.

Significance: Compared with other images taken over the past 11 months Castro appeared much healthier. In the interview, which was pre-recorded on 4 June and lasted 50 minutes, the Cuban leader spoke slowly, focussing on past events rather than his recovery or his plans for the future. Indeed, Castro even hinted that he was tired of public appearances and expressed his enthusiasm for writing editorials. During his convalescence, Castro has written 14 articles for the Communist Party mouthpiece, Granma. Some analysts believe that his role now will be as a non-executive president, advising the new government as it begins to take shape.

Castro was interviewed by Randy Alonso, anchorman of the "Round Table" discussion programme. Wearing a red, white and blue tracksuit adorned with a Cuban flag rather than the olive green military uniform he usually wore before his illness, Castro spoke only briefly about his recovery towards the end of the interview. "A human being's health is always facing threats, lurking dangers_I tell my compatriots, I'm doing now what I ought to be doing," he said. "There are no secrets." In fact, Castro's exact condition has remained a state secret since he announced he had to have emergency intestinal surgery.

Much of the interview focussed on the recent visit of the Vietnamese Communist Party leader, Nong Duc Manh. Castro, who had appeared in a brief broadcast alongside the Vietnamese leader over the weekend, also read from a notebook about the number of teachers and other public employees in Vietnam. According to local media reports today (6 June), Castro and his brother Raúl have accepted an invitation to visit Vietnam, although no dates were given.

Castro meandered from one topic to the next, much as he did before his illness. After about 40 minutes Castro mentioned US President George W Bush for the first time, in the context of the imminent G-8 meeting in Germany. Castro also spoke about biofuels, a subject he has written about several times in his editorials, criticising the US for promoting the use of maize which the Cuban leader argues will drive up world food prices.

The question Castro failed to address was whether he would return to power. US Spanish-language TV stations that were broadcasting the interview live broke off their coverage after half an hour when it became clear the leadership question would not be answered. Instead Castro spoke about his recently acquired habit of writing editorials, saying that it gave him satisfaction and was a "way of expressing oneself, in depth or in brief".

In late May Castro wrote in one of his columns that he did not intend to appear much in the media from now on. "For video and photos, they have to be cutting my hair all the time, trimming my beard and my moustache, and fixing me up every day; I don't have time for that now," he wrote.

Development: On 8 July US Defense Secretary Robert Gates cancelled his four-nation visit to El Salvador, Colombia, Peru and Chile.

Significance: The four-nation visit, due to begin today (9 July) was to be Gates' first to Latin American since he took charge of the Pentagon in December 2006. However, Gates has stayed behind in order to help the White House administration with its report on the situation in Iraq, which is due to be delivered to Congress by 15 July.

The Pentagon said that Gates will go ahead with the tour at an unspecified later date. This might well be too late for the defense secretary to guarantee El Salvador's continued support for the US campaign in Iraq; the current mission to Iraq ends in August and although the legislature has approved an extension until the end of this year President Tony Saca has yet to confirm the dispatch of more troops.

Development: Brazil's federal police arrested an alleged Colombian drug-trafficker Juan Carlos Ramí­rez Abadí­a on 7 August.

Significance: The police claim that Ramí­rez, also known as Chupeta, is one of the most powerful drug-traffickers in the world. Ramí­rez figures on the most-wanted list compiled by the US Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA). According to the DEA, he is an "heir" to the infamous Cali cartel and boss of the Norte del Valle cartel, currently the most powerful drug gang in Colombia.

The DEA claims the Norte del Valle cartel has sent more than 1,000 tonnes of cocaine to the US in the past five years. Fernando Francischini, who led the police operation, said that Ramí­rez is accused of "over 300 murders in Colombia and at least 15 more in the US".

Brazil's federal police have recently launched an operation to dismantle international drug gangs operating in Brazil, which apart from serving as a transit rout for drugs going to Europe has also recently become a favourite place for money laundering. Large quantities of money made by international drug gangs are now being invested in real state, hotels and vehicles in Brazil, Francischini reported.

The police said that Ramí­rez owns at least 15 luxury properties in Brazil as well as "several front businesses". He was actually caught in a luxury condominium near Rio de Janeiro. In order to avoid the police Ramí­rez had undergone plastic surgery on his face.

The DEA claims that Ramí­rez has amassed a fortune worth US$1.8bn though his illicit activities. The US government offered a US$5m reward for information that led to his arrest. The US government has already said it will pay the reward to Brazil's federal police.

A New York court has issued a warrant for Ramí­rez. Ramí­rez has already been arrested twice in Colombia but extradition requests to the US had been refused. The Brazilian judiciary, however, is likely to send him to the US if requested.

Coup plot allegations rattle the Dominican Republic

High-ranking officials in the Dominican Republic have dismissed claims by a former constitutionalist guerrilla, Claudio Caamaño, that a group of serving colonels are plotting to stage a coup against President Leonel Fernández in order to establish a régime inspired by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez . Despite the denials regarding the veracity of the rumor reaching the echelons of the presidency, the government has still ordered an investigation into Caamaño's allegations.

Former police major Claudio Caamaño is the nephew of the legendary Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó, who briefly occupied the presidency when Juan Bosch was ousted in September 1963 by a US-backed military coup. After a brief period of exile in Cuba he returned to the Dominican Republic intent on launching a guerrilla war -broadly inspired by that of Fidel Castro- and overthrow the government of Joaquí­n Balaguer, elected in the wake of a US invasion. Colonel Caamaño was wounded in a clash with government forces and later executed without the benefit of a trial. Claudio Caamaño survived to fight on for a short while as a guerrilla, before fleeing into exile.

On 1 September in a radio interview, Claudio Caamaño said that he had been contacted eight months earlier by a group of serving colonels, who told him they were plotting a coup and invited him to join them. He said he had refused and sought to dissuade them, but he claimed that as recently as a month-and-a-half ago he had been approached again by the group, with the same outcome. He said the colonels had said they intended to emulate Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez , who has publicly praised the late Colonel Caamaño as a hero.

President Leonel Fernández promptly summoned the armed forces minister, General Ramón Aquino Garcí­a, and Admiral Sigfrido Pared, chief of the DNI, the investigative police, to an emergency meeting to consider Caamaño's claims. Though presidential spokesman Rafael Núñez proclaimed that coups were a thing of the past, the military were ordered to investigate the allegations. Admiral Pared, without waiting for this to happen, sought to calm public opinion by stating that current conditions in the Dominican Republic would not allow a coup attempt to prosper. He also said that he doubted whether the group of colonels even existed.

On 4 September Claudio Caamaño was summoned to a meeting with the chief of army intelligence, General Valentí­n Jáquez López, at which he reiterated his claims, but refused to name the colonels involved. Later Caamaño said he did not know for certain if the colonels had decided to go ahead with their scheme or had desisted from it.

The only visible sign of anything resembling military unrest was a statement issued by a group of retired generals criticising the Fernández administration and warning that the government might attempt to rig the 2008 elections, in which Fernández intends to seek reelection.

Sceptics are claiming that Claudio Caamaño may have concocted the coup plot story as a means of promoting his recently launched book, Caamaño, Guerra Civil 1965, the first volume of which is an account of his uncle's rebellion. If so, he misjudged the media, which chose to ignore the book and give full play to his conspiracy allegations.

Development: President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela threaten to "turn Bolivia into a new Vietnam" on 14 October.

Significance: In his weekly broadcast in homage to the revolutionary left posterboy, Che Guevara, transmitted directly from Cuba, Chávez accused the US and the Bolivian "oligarchy" of trying to stage a coup against his ally, President Evo Morales. Chávez , however, warned that "if the Bolivian oligarchy, God forbids, attempts to oust Evo or kill him, they should know that the government of Venezuela and Venezuelans will not cross their arms. Be careful, because what you will see is not going to be the Vietnam of ideas [...] it will be, God forbids, the Vietnam of arms, the Vietnam of war".

To be fair, Chávez 's declaration was once again provoked: a day earlier former Bolivian president, Jorge Quiroga, accused Chávez of "erecting a wall of oppression and tyranny" in Latin America during a visit to Caracas. Quiroga was taking part in Venezuela's rightwing Primero Justicia party conference. According to him, Chávez is "the biggest threat to democracy and freedom in Latin America's history". Quiroga went on to accuse Chávez of using Venezuelan resources to finance "social convulsions" in Latin America and "to bring governments, like Bolivia's, into submission [...]] in a clear and marked meddling".

Chávez , however, accused the US of meddling in Latin American affairs, for being afraid that "a union of Latin American nations" would be detrimental to its hegemony in the region. Chávez said that he had already spoken about Bolivia and its constitutional impasse to Brazil's President, Lula da Silva. Chávez claimed that the US was behind the impasse so that it have an excuse for a coup against Morales. Yet the Brazilian press showed no sympathy for Chávez 's declaration: the influential newspaper O Estado de São Paulo ran an editorial on 15 October accusing Chávez of "militarism", claiming that "his 21st century socialism conceals a caudillo dictator".

Development: On 14 November a judge in Bogotá sentenced a paramilitary chief, Ramón Isaza, to 11 years in prison.

Significance: Isaza is the first paramilitary leader to be sentenced since the paramilitary peace process. However, he is unlikely to serve the full 11 years: the 86 year-old will almost certainly appeal, and even if the sentence is upheld he cannot be imprisoned for more than eight years because he has subscribed to the peace and justice legislation.

Even so, Isaza's trial is noteworthy because the judge, José Reyes Rodrí­guez-Casas, refused to accept that Isaza's crimes were in any way political. The judge said Isaza belonged to "a group of common criminals whose motives were far from political or altruistic" and that Isaza was leader of a paramilitary organisation committed to "assassination and private justice".

In this context, the 11-year sentence which Rodrí­guez-Casas handed down to Isaza for "conspiring to commit a crime" appears lenient. Rodrí­guez-Casas confirmed that Isaza, who led the 1,000 strong Magdalena Medio paramilitary group which demobilised in February 2006, became the most senior leader of the AUC after Salvatore Mancuso lost power.