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Argentina's justice minister, Gustavo Beliz, confirmed yesterday that the Swiss judiciary has launched a full investigation into allegations of corruption against former President Carlos Menem and more than 200 former civil servants.

Beliz railed against the Argentine judiciary for the fact that Switzerland was able to investigate Menem and his cronies while local judges were unwilling to do so. He was adamant that 'there is no presumption here - [Menem's] money laundering is a certainty'. Swiss investigators are now looking into a number of bank accounts which they suspect to have been opened by former members of the Menem government with illegal funds.

Menem responded by calling the justice minister a 'liar' and 'unbalanced'. Beliz, who was interior minister under Menem for 11 months before quitting to escape what he termed 'a vipers nest', told the former president that 'instead of getting angry [he] should return the money he stole from the country'.

The controversial former dictator and evangelical Christian, General Efraí­n Rí­os Montt, was placed under house arrest by a judge yesterday. He was officially warned that he was suspected of being involved in the outbreaks of violence last July, in which one person was killed.

The decision by the judge, Victor Herrera, means that for the first time Rí­os Montt, who ran in the first round of last year's elections, will face criminal prosecution for premeditated homicide, conspiracy and making death threats. The journalist was killed after thousands of Rí­os Montt supporters swarmed around the constitutional court on 24 and 25 July in an effort to intimidate the court into allowing the general's candidacy. Eventually the constitutional court caved in and allowed Rí­os Montt to stand: he was defeated in the first round of the presidential elections on 9 November.

Rí­os Montt now no longer has immunity from prosecution. He enjoyed it throughout the last government of President Alfonso Portillo, because he was president of congress. Despite this protection he managed to see off an accusation from opposition members of congress that he had altered the budget after it had been approved by congress. A prosecution for genocide, state terrorism and torture that was launched in 1999 in the Spanish High Court by the Nobel laureate, Rigoberto Menchú, has been stalled.

President Alejandro Toledo announced yesterday that he received a call from Bolivia's President, Carlos Mesa, informing him of Mesa's decision to export Bolivia's natural gas to the US and Mexico via a Peruvian port.

Toledo called the news 'encouraging' but acknowledged that the plan will not be finalized until July when Bolivia votes on Mesa's proposal in a referendum the Bolivian President promised to organize when he came to office six months ago. 

Manuel Rodrí­guez Cuadros, Peru's foreign minister, said that if the plan is approved in Bolivia, the gas would go through Ilo, a port in the southern part of Peru. He said exporting Bolivian gas through Peru will improve common market negotiations between the two nations and encourage development in border areas.

Bolivia's plan to export gas through Peru is part of Mesa's new energy policy. Though experts say that using a Chilean port to export Bolivia's natural gas is more cost effective, Bolivia refuses to consider this option. Relations between the two countries have been strained since Bolivia lost territory to Chile in the War of the Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century. Mesa has stepped up demands for access to the Pacific, but Chile shows no signs of compromise. In Peru some worried that supporting Mesa's plan would hurt Peru's relations with Chile. However, Rodrí­guez stressed that the gas agreement is a bilateral issue concerning Peru and Bolivia, and will have no effect on Peru's relations with Chile.

Jaime Quijandrí­a, Peru's minister of energy, said that his country will grant Bolivia the necessary facilities and wished his neighbour luck with the project.

The finance minister, Antônio Palocci, said on 23 May that the government does not believe that lowering interest rates would do much to boost growth. Last week the central bank's monetary policy committee annoyed politicians and businesses by holding rates at 16%.

Palocci said yesterday that the level of interest rates was a secondary issue for the economy and its growth. He argued that what should be more important was the debate inside in Conselho Monetario Nacional, which is separate from the central bank but which sets out the government's long term economic strategy and inflation and growth targets for the next couple of years.

Palocci stressed that the CMN would not now be setting specific growth and inflation targets. These would be set by the government, but the CMN would advise it on setting these targets and ensure that they squared with the long-term strategy.

Development: President Alvaro Uribe unveiled a tax-reform programme on 29 June aimed at plugging a growing hole in the state pension fund. Under the new scheme, VAT will be extended to cover most goods and services apart from education, health, and public services, and high-level pensions will be taxed.

Significance: Uribe said that the changes were necessary to ensure that every Colombian received a pension worth 'not less than the minimum wage' (US$142.60 per month). The president admitted that the lack of reserves in the social security fund 'is a very grave problem which we have to resolve'. The fund's reserves will run out in August, and Uribe confessed that he had 'no plan B'.

Irrespective of their importance, the measures will not be popular. Uribe wants to impose a 4% VAT on the 45% or so of products in the basic basket of goods which are currently exempt - something he has tried to do previously and failed. Uribe defended the proposed tax on products such as meat, rice, eggs, and fruits by saying that Colombia had the third least extensive VAT coverage of any country in the developing world, but this argument cut little ice either with congress or the constitutional court last year when the government tried to levy a 2% tax on such products.

The tax on pensions worth at least four times the minimum wage is also highly controversial. Uribe has said that only 5% of pensioners enjoy this 'high' level of income.

It should be remembered that the government is also pushing through a separate fiscal reform bill which it hopes will be passed when it goes to congress in July. Uribe gave no idea of when his latest package would be introduced to congress, but he said he wanted the measures contained within to be in place by the start of 2005. Colombians are going to have to deal with a double-dose of changes to the taxation system.

Unpopular though this might be, Uribe might do well to listen to the criticism levelled at him recently by Moody's ratings agency, which said that the president had failed to capitalise on his high level of support (he enjoys 80% or so approval rating) to force through tough but necessary measures.

Development: Belize's credit rating was downgraded by Moody's Investors Service on 5 August.  

Significance: Moody's decision to downgrade Belize's credit rating is likely to rule out the government's hopes of launching a US$450m bond issue. This would be Belize's third debt issue since its inaugural bond issue of US$125m in August 2002.  

Finance Minister Ralph Fonseca insists that the latest bond issue is not stalled but under review. Moody's cut Belize's country ceiling for bonds and notes to B2 from Ba3 and lowered its foreign-currency country ceiling for bank deposits to B3 from B1. Foreign-currency bond ratings were also reduced to B2 from Ba3, five levels below investment grade. It said that the downgrade is 'the result of the country's significantly higher credit risks as reflected by current external and government debt'. Moody's added that 'The debt build-up that led to the downgrade was largely a direct consequence of expansionary policies.'  

Moody's downgrade comes two weeks after the rating agency Standard and Poor's released a report on 20 July claiming that 'public-sector debt will increase to an estimated 98% of GDP at year-end 2004, up from 75% of GDP at year-end 2000.' S&P said that Belize needs US$305m -more than four times its foreign reserves- just to meet its current account deficit (the difference between what the government earns from its routine operations and what it needs to finance them), medium and long-term amortization (principal payments on loans), and short-term debt.

Development: President Alejandro Toledo revealed bold plans on 9 September to strengthen the military and the national police by channelling the proceeds from future royalties from mining projects and the giant Camisea natural gas initiative to the defence and interior ministries for 'strategic spending'.

Significance: Peru's decision has inevitably raised speculation in the national press that the government is raising the stakes in its recent war of words with Chile after the Chilean armed forces engaged in war games near the Peruvian border in August. Beefing up the military through mining and gas royalties also evokes comparisons with Chile: the Chilean armed forces receive 10% of the country's total copper sales, which amounted to US$300m last year.

Toledo said that leaders of the armed forces and the police would be free to dip into the fund for 'strategic spending'. He said that US$40m would be made available from next January and that the amount would increase each year. In a televised national address, Toledo said that the funds would be drawn mainly from gas royalties from Camisea's Block 88 and Block 56 and some mining royalties. 'We are proposing that 82% go to the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces and 18% to the Ministry of the Interior (to manage the police),' he said.

Development: Jorge Larrañaga, presidential candidate for the Partido Nacional, or Blanco, accused his rival Tabaré Vázquez of copying his policies on 12 October.

Significance: Larrañaga's criticism came after Vázquez, who is running for the leftwing Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA), outlined his policy proposals on 12 October. They were the same policies as Vázquez has stood by throughout his campaign, and include giving emergency assistance to the 100,000 poorest Uruguayans, the dedollarisation of the economy, and a refocusing on the manufacturing sector.

According to Larrañaga, Vázquez's manifesto is just 'a bad copy' of his own programme, only 'without paying royalty fees'. 'Where is the [EP-FA] manifesto? It doesn't exist,' he said. The Blanco candidate believes this is why Vázquez is unwilling to take part in a debate with Larrañaga, as he fears that his lack of policies will be shown up.

It is obvious that Vázquez's reluctance to spar publicly with Larrañaga has riled the Blanco candidate. However, it seems unlikely that Vázquez does not have the courage of his convictions; a more probable explanation is that he realises (as does Larrañaga) that such a debate probably represents Larrañaga's only chance of overturning Vázquez's massive lead in the opinion polls.

With less than three weeks left before the 31 October presidential election, Vázquez's support is hovering around and above the 50% mark, and he therefore has an excellent chance of winning in the first round. His opponents require something dramatic to happen, but Vázquez stressed on 12 October that he is going to approach the final days of the campaign in exactly the same way as he has dealt with the rest of the contest.

Development: The Chinese President, Hu Jintao, ends his official visit to Brazil on 16 November leaving behind US$2.3bn in commercial deals. 

Significance: Jintao came to Brazil to repay President Lula da Silva's visit to China six months ago. Brazil wants to increase its exports to China, which so far this year have reached US$7bn. This sum accounts for less then 1% of the total Chinese imports; last year alone, China imported more than US$400bn. 

The Brazilian and the Chinese governments expect bilateral trade to increase to US$35bn annually by 2010. For that to happen, the Chinese trade minister, Ma Xiu, inaugurated the first Chinese commercial office in Brazil on 12 November in São Paulo. On 15 November President Jintao said he will encourage Chinese businessmen to invest more in Brazil. Jintao made it clear, however, he expects the Brazilians to do the same. 

The Brazilian government also wants to expand the number of products it sells to China. Currently soya makes up 29% of the total exports, followed by iron and orange juice. The Brazilians now want the Chinese to buy meat, timber and white goods as well. 

The 16-year US$300m technological partnership between the two countries has also started to bear fruit. Apart from opening the Chinese market to the Brazilian aerospace industry, culminating with the opening of the first Embraer plant outside Brazil in China two years ago, both countries will now sell images from their co-owned CBERS-2 satellites to five other countries, a deal worth US$2.5m annually. 

The most important outcome of Jintao's visit to Brazil, however, has been the Brazilian government conceding 'market economy' status to China on 12 November. The concession was the main condition established by the Chinese government to open China's market to Brazilian commodities. Brazil is the first large territorial country to do so, and the government expects the concession will also bring political, as well as economic, gains, not least in terms of Chinese support for Brazil's bid for a permanent seat in the UN's Security Council. 

The Brazilian government's concession to China, however, was heavily criticised by some business sectors. The Industries Federation of São Paulo (Fiesp) circulated a note on 13 November declaring China 'should not be considered a market economy'. In doing so, the 'government has left Brazilian industry vulnerable', said the Fiesp. The government answered its critics by saying that the agreement with China would not interfere with the application of anti-dumping rules. It seems that for President Lula da Silva 'the strategic relationship with Beijing' is more important than the concerns of a few businessmen.

Development: On 18 December former dictator Augusto Pinochet was admitted to hospital after losing consciousness for about 30 minutes. Doctors at Santiago's military hospital said that Pinochet had a mild stroke and would probably suffer a deterioration in his mental condition as an after-effect.

Significance: Judge Juan Guzmán's decision, on 13 December, to indict Pinochet on charges relating to one murder and nine 'permanent kidnappings' was premised more upon Pinochet's mental fitness to stand trial than the evidence stacked up against him. Pinochet's defence team's main argument is that the 89-year old former general is not fit to stand trial. Human rights' lawyers immediately denounced Pinochet's hospital visit as an attempt to manipulate the courts.

According to the director of the military hospital, Lyonel Gómez, it is likely that Pinochet will suffer after effects from the stroke, most probably in the form of 'psychological deterioration'. Last week Guzmán had ruled that, contrary to the opinion of two of the three psychiatrists who examined Pinochet as part of the judicial process, the former dictator was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. In 2000 Pinochet avoided prosecution for his role in the 'caravan of death', a paramilitary squad that roamed Chile in the 1970s eliminating leftwing dissidents, after the supreme court ruled he was suffering from mild but irreversible dementia.

A number of visitors went to visit the general in hospital. Interestingly, the current head of the armed forces, Juan Emilio Cheyre, spent several hours with the ex-general and even helped handle the media on his behalf. Despite claiming 'institutional responsibility' on behalf of the armed forces for human rights abuses committed during the Pinochet era, Cheyre has expressed concern at Pinochet standing trial. Iván Moreira, a senator from the opposition Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), also showed up at the hospital. It was a surprising gesture of solidarity considering the deafening silence from the UDI, some of whom served in the Pinochet administration, when the ex-general was indicted last week.

Pinochet will remain in hospital today, 20 December, while the Santiago appeals court decides whether the trial can go ahead.

Development: President Carlos Mesa issued a decree on 28 January for provincial gubernatorial elections to be held on June 12. What is not clear is first whether there will be a referendum on the degree of autonomy each of the country's nine departments will have, and secondly whether each department will be allowed its own assembly. 

Significance: The protests in Santa Cruz were triggered by a fuel price increase on 30 December. At first the Santa Cruz protests were just against the fuel price increase, as were other protests across the nation. Quickly, however, the protesters lumped other issues onto their opposition to the rise in fuel prices. The government has been yielding to various protesters right through the month. On 11 January the government caved in to leftwing protests in El Alto, over a water-privatisation contract; then it rescinded most of the fuel price increase on 19 January and now it is letting the right-wing business elite in Santa Cruz determine the timetable for regional autonomy. 

The government's strategy had been to push a new hydrocarbons law through congress and then move on to autonomy issues, after a constituent assembly in May or June had reformed the constitution. Now the hydrocarbons law is in limbo (approved in principle but not in detail by congress) and autonomy is at the centre of everyone's attention.

There are persistent rumours that the Comité pro Santa Cruz, which has led the drive for autonomy, is financed by the international energy companies which do not want the current, pro-business, hydrocarbons law changed. 

What the Cruceños decided, by acclamation at a mass rally on 28 January, was that they wanted to elect their governor and also to set up a local assembly. Significantly, however, they stepped back from pushing on with unilateral elections for their governor: the elections will be nationwide and, presumably, under common rules. What is less clear is the status of the departmental assembly. It is not clear whether President Mesa has also given the go-ahead for nationwide elections for departmental assemblies. President Mesa still seems to envisage a constituent assembly to reform the constitution and, effectively, legalise what he has agreed. 

The Comité pro Santa Cruz said at the mass rally on 28 January, which met the 300,000 person target the Comité had set, that it would set up a provisional autonomous assembly, which would shepherd the department towards the new elections for governor and the assembly. The Cruceños want this provisional assembly to be composed of the 25 elected (federal) deputies; the mayors of the 56 municipalities in Santa Cruz; the 23 members of the current departmental council and the leaders of the four indigenous groups in the department. Under the constitution there is no provision for departmental assemblies, let alone rules on who can sit in them. 

President Mesa infuriated the Comité for trying to take some of the credit for the apparently peaceful transition towards greater regional autonomy. “What we have achieved despite some days of tension is a democratic solution within the bounds of the constitution," Mesa told Spanish-language CNN on 28 January. Rubén Costas, the current president of the Comité, said: “Mesa did nothing to help us organise the rally: indeed with his [hostile] positions, he helped to stimulate people to come to the rally, to protest and make this shout of anguish, feeling and yearning for autonomy."

Development: In a dramatic vote on a left-wing proposal to jack the gas royalty up to 50%, congress split exactly in half on 3 March.

Significance: The vote, which was finally taken at 10.30 pm on 3 March was expected to be close, so each deputy had to state publicly how he or she was voting. The result was that 58 of the deputies voted to back the increase, proposed by the Movimiento al Socialismo, to take the gas royalty up to 50%, while 58 voted against. The motion failed when the vice president of congress, Norah Soruco, who comes from Santa Cruz and represents the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, put her casting vote against the proposal. 

This meant that an alternative motion, proposed by the president of congress, Mario Cossí­o, to keep the royalty rate at 18% but increase the tax rate to 32% was voted on and approved. Both the MAS and the Nueva Fuerza Republicana said that they would appeal against what had happened and push again to increase the royalty to 50%. They claim that a substitute had voted against the MAS proposal illegally because the elected deputy she replaced had only asked for a four-day leave rather than a five-day one which would have allowed her to vote. The MAS said that Cossí­o had voted twice and that another deputy had been bribed to miss the session. 

The government hopes, however, that the Cossí­o vote will stand. Guillermo Torres, the hydrocarbons minister, said: “Finally, there is light at the end of the tunnel." The lower chamber of congress has been considering hydrocarbons reform, for which tax and royalties were the crucial issues, since November 2004. The proposal will now go to the senate.

Development: A survey published by Datafolha on 9 April showed that only 20% of São Paulo's inhabitants think that their mayor, José Serra, is doing a good job.

Significance: The poll is a blow both to Serra and to his party, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). Serra is expected to run for president against President Lula da Silva of the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in 2006, and both he and the PSDB have been trying to gain political capital by publicly criticising the previous mayor of Brazil's largest city, the PT's Marta Suplicy. Serra defeated Suplicy in last October's municipal elections by 55%-45%.

Serra's honeymoon period in São Paulo was short-lived; no mayor in São Paulo's recent history has been so unpopular after just 90 days in office. According to the Datafolha poll, taken between 6/7 April, 37% of voters rated the mayor's performance as "poor to terrible" and 35% thought he was doing a moderate job. Of perhaps greater significance, 39% of the electorate reckon Serra is a worse mayor than Suplicy against 35% who think Suplicy was worse. A massive 70% of Paulistas think Serra has done less than he promised, while 59% reckon he doesn't do much work and 60% think he pays more attention to the rich than to the poor.

Development: The health and social welfare minister, Julio César Velázquez, was sacked on 14 May.

Significance: President Nicanor Duarte fired Velázquez following a series of revelations in the media about mistakes made during his time as heath minister and amid criticism of the amount of time he has devoted to party politics. Velázquez is the main candidate to succeed Duarte as president from the ruling Partido Colorado and has been accused in the press of launching his campaign for Paraguay's highest office already.

On announcing his dismissal, President Nicanor Duarte said Velázquez “dedicated time to health but also to party political activity". Duarte has chosen Dr. Maria Teresa León, formerly head of the health ministry's epidemiology department, to replace Velázquez.

Velázquez was pushed after he refused to jump. Government sources say that on 13 May Duarte demanded his resignation as well as that of the minister of work and justice, Juan Darí­o Monges, and of Defence Minister Roberto González. Both Monges and González also have eyes on the presidency but Duarte is determined they will not campaign while they hold cabinet posts.

Monges said on 13 May that he expects to stand down “before the end of the year" but there is intense speculation he will not last the week. González, on the other hand, is thought to have changed his mind about running for president and would therefore stay on. González is a close friend of Duarte.

Development: On 19 June the secretary general of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza, left Nicaragua with little to show for his effort.

Significance: Insulza met the key players in the dispute over presidential powers in Nicaragua, which is rapidly developing into an institutional crisis. He could not persuade President Enrique Bolaños and the leaders of the main opposition parties, Frente Sandinista de la Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), to meet to resolve their differences. He described the situation in Nicaragua as “very serious". He will present his report to the permanent council of the OAS on 21 June.

If anything the two sides look further apart now than before Insulza's visit. The minister of the presidency, Ernesto Leal, said that Bolaños had two proposals to break the deadlock between the executive and the legislature. He suggested that the constitutional reforms made by the opposition-dominated national assembly, which curtail some of the president's powers, be put to a referendum either this year or early next year. He also mooted the idea of a constituent assembly with elected deputies to consider a new constitution in 2006. Neither idea appealed to the opposition. Daniel Ortega, the leader of the FSLN, said that presidential elections should be brought forward from November 2006 to November this year.

Development: On 21 July a local dissident group under the leadership of Angel Polanco Torrejón launched an initiative to eliminate Fidel Castro's communist government and replace it with a “modern capitalist" one.

Significance: The “Pro-Cambio" Committee was created in January and has since been banned by the Cuban government, but the group seems anything but inactive as some 43 separate pro-democracy organisations in Cuba and five in the US have given full backing to the plan.

Polanco seeks to “dismantle the fundamental basis of the Castro government" and replace the constitution with one that was drafted in 1940. The plan calls for no violence, and is still in the process of gaining more support through signatures from other opposition groups.

The verbal battle against the Castro regime will “use all possible forms of non-violent diplomacy, including internal and external pressure," and will take advantage of the economic embargo. The group says it currently has 350 members, and has additional ties to other dissident groups. Though Castro won't allow it, the group plans to hold a referendum to install an interim government for a year, after which general elections can be held.

Some critics of Castro say his failing health will eventually lead the way to democracy, but how much the “Pro-Cambio" Committee will achieve remains a question.

Development: On 23 August the finance ministry bowed to the local consensus from independent economists and cut its forecast for growth this year from 3.8% to 3.5%. 

Significance: The finance ministry, unlike most local analysts, still believes that the economy will pick up in the second half of the year. The local consensus is that the economy had a much better first half than economists expected. The figure for second quarter growth (3.1% year-on-year) was disappointing and well below the 4% the finance ministry had been expecting.

The director of planning at the finance ministry, Alejandro Werner, said that he expected the economy to pick up in the second half of the year as the US economy picked up steam. This may be wishful thinking: there are signs that US economy is running into problems and that the rise in oil prices is pumping up inflation there which may lead to higher interest rates and thus a reduction in domestic demand. 

The Mexican car industry, which is something of a weathervane for the broader economy, is running into problems. Exports of vehicles to the US in July were down by 13% (compared to July 2004) at 64,000. For the first seven months, vehicle exports to the US were down by 6.5% on 2004.

ARGENTINA: Industrial activity increased by 7.6% in August compared with the same month in 2004.

BRAZIL: There was a fiscal deficit of R$3.24bn (US$1.4bn) during the first eight month of 2005, according to government officials.

MEXICO: The subsidiary of the Germany company DHL will invest US$12m to refurbish its domestic transport fleet and to improve links with other Latin American countries.

MEXICO: During the next six months, the government will invest M$42m (US$3.7m) to modernise the country's highway network because 50% of them do not meet global standards.

MEXICO: Economic activity increased by 2% in July in comparison with the same period in 2004, according to Inegi.

PANAMA: The 2005-2006 cruise season will bring 287,650 tourist to Panama, which will spend approximately US$40m in the country, according to the Panamanian institute of tourism (IPAT).

URUGUAY: The trade deficit was US76.9m in the first seven months of 2005, according to the central bank.

Development: A US reconnaissance squadron was sent, on 31 October, to guard 30km of the border between New Mexico and Mexico.

Significance: The move underlines the determination of the Department of Homeland Security to make the border less porous. The detachment, from the 14th Cavalry, was sent from Fort Lewis in Washington state. It will patrol the border with Strykers, the new US armoured personnel carriers. 

The soldiers will not be allowed to arrest any undocumented migrants they find, because the US constitution prohibits the use of soldiers as policemen. The soldiers will alert the Border Patrol if they detect anything suspicious. 

The 14th Cavalry detachment will be under the command of the Joint Task Force North, which is based at Biggs Air Force base in El Paso, Texas.

Development: The São Paulo police announced on 3 December that they wanted to question Jose Dirceu about bribery and murder in the municipality of Santo André.

Significance: Dirceu's expulsion from congress on 30 November means that he has lost his congressional immunity so police forces can investigate him. It is politically significant that the São Paulo police are first to have a go: both the state and city police answer to governments controlled by the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, the main opposition party. 

The police in São Paulo want to question Direu about the Celso Daniel case. He was mayor of Santo André and was found dead in January 2002. According to Daniel's brother, João Francisco, Celso was killed because he had found out about corruption involving bus companies: the scam delivered money to the Partido dos Trabalhadores, which was used for financing election campaigns. João Francisco said that Direcu was the recipient of the money from the scam. 

There is considerable doubt over João Francisco's reliability as a witness. He said that he was told about the scam, which apparently delivered R$1.2m in cash to Dirceu by Gilberto Carvalho. João Francisco said Carvalho told him at Celso's funeral, when Carvalho was the number two in the Santo André administration. Carvalho in now President Lula da Silva's top personal adviser, controlling access to president. Carvalho, a former seminarian and devout Roman Catholic, denies the conversation with João Francisco ever took place. 

The original police investigation into Celso Daniel's murder concluded that he was just an unlucky victim of common criminals.