All Categories

At least 200 potential investors showed up to a 1-2 October conference aimed at luring new business to Haiti. No deals were signed, but the very fact that the meeting took place at all suggests that the country's reputation is improving internationally.

The meeting, the largest investor conference ever held in Haiti, was organised by the Inter-American Development Bank and focused on expanding Haiti's garment, agriculture and energy industries. Some big US names turned out, including Gap, American Eagle Outfitters and Levi Strauss, as well as several Latin American textile firms. International banks, namely Canada's Scotiabank and US giant Citibank, sent representatives to discuss loans. 

It is hoped that the passage of the so-called HOPE II Act last year by the US congress, which gives Haitian exporters access to the US market on preferential terms, will kick start the country's garment industry. This employed round 130,000 in the 1980s but has now shrivelled to a few thousand workers after decades of political and economic turmoil.

Former US president Bill Clinton, who was appointed the UN's first special envoy to Haiti in May, personally recruited several of the conference attendees.  In an optimistic speech to investors he pointed out that representatives of the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which insures political risk in emerging economies, were among the conference guests: "That should be an encouraging sign, although I can tell you your political risk in Haiti is lower than it has been in my lifetime".

The conference took place on the same day that Haiti's new minimum wage regime took effect. Approved by congress in September, the minimum daily salary for textile workers increases from 70 gourdes, about US$1.75, to 125 gourdes, or US$3.10. For the majority of other workers, it rises from 70 to 200 gourdes, or about US$5 a day. Haiti's extremely low labour costs are one of its main attractions for foreign investors.

• Minustah

The United Nations security council voted unanimously on 13 October to renew the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for a sixth year. The current mission's force level of around 9,000 military and police personnel will be maintained. The council also agreed to recommendations made by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to adapt Minustah's mandate to the improved security situation in Haiti. The UN chief said that it is increasingly unlikely that Minustah will have to conduct major military operations such as those carried out against the armed gangs that held sway over the Port-au-Prince suburb of Cité Soleil.

Choosing a man who presided over the worst domestic economic debacle in recent history as a presidential candidate is not normally a recipe for success. And yet the main opposition Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) elected former president Hipólito Mejí­a (2000-2004) on 6 March to run for the party in the presidential elections in May 2012.

The PRD could possibly argue that Mejí­a had won a presidential election in the past, unlike his rival in the party primary on 6 March, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, but Vargas lost the last presidential election in 2008 against President Leonel Fernández when he was in his full pomp. That is no longer the case. Fernández received a remarkable dressing down by the auxiliary bishop of the archdioceses of Santo Domingo during Independence Day mass on 27 February, and his state-of-the-nation address was sufficiently poorly received that he decided to fire two senior ministers shortly afterwards.

Under Mejí­a the Dominican Republic's foreign debt almost doubled from US$3.65bn to US$5.9bn and its relations with the IMF became strained. Reckless spending during a global economic downturn, and the bankruptcy of three major banks, helped trigger the sharp devaluation of the peso against the US dollar, and soaring inflation (as high as 43% in 2003) slashed purchasing power. Mejí­a's mandate was also punctuated by several massive strikes as frustration boiled over at the government's failure to resolve longstanding power shortages and trade unions demanded salary increases of 100% to compensate for the collapse of the peso.

In fairness Peru's President Alan Garcí­a won a second bite at the cherry in 2006 after presiding over a similarly disastrous economic downturn in Peru during his first term in power (1985-1990), and he has proven to be far more successful the second time around. But the hiatus between Garcí­a's first and second terms was 16 years; for Mejí­a it would be just half this and memories might not be short enough.

Mejí­a won the tight primary elections for the PRD by 53% (499,000) to 47% (437,000) for Vargas. Vargas, however, is not going quietly. He argues that the decision by the PRD organising committee to stop the count, after 83% of ballots had been totted up, was premature, given the slender lead of Mejí­a. He also contends that supporters of the ruling Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) had voted in the semi-open PRD primary election to support the man least likely to pose a threat to their candidate in 2012.

Vargas has not been spectacularly successful himself, of course, as party president. Under his leadership, the PRD won just one of 32 seats in the senate in the last congressional elections in May 2010. Although the PRD managed to win 75 seats in the 183-seat lower chamber, this was 30 fewer than the PLD, and Vargas faced calls to resign. But, perhaps his most serious error of judgement was offering his backing for the constitution Fernández drafted last year: at the time he reasoned that this would project him as a national statesman, looking beyond narrow partisan interests, but the positive reforms to the 2010 constitution were overshadowed by a clause further relaxing restrictions on re-election.

Mejí­a, who turned 70 on 22 February, is running under the campaign slogan “Llegó Papá" (“Dad has arrived"). The PLD will attack “Dad" hard for his mismanagement of the “family finances". Who will be leading the attack, however, is unclear. The PLD is yet to select a candidate, although there is pressure to do so now that the PRD has defined its presidential ticket. There has been considerable speculation for the better part of a year over whether Fernández might seek to exploit loopholes in the constitution he drafted to run for a third straight term, even though this would call for semantic acrobatics of a high order as it was widely interpreted at the time to bar him from standing again until 2016. A recent poll by Gallup also suggested that this would not be well received by the public: 70% of respondents rejected presidential re-election.

The most obvious alternative to Fernández is Danilo Medina, his former adviser who he defeated in the PLD primary before the last presidential elections. Medina won 62% support in the Gallup poll. Fernández would prefer the First Lady Margarita Cedeño to win the candidacy so that he could keep it in the family but she finished a distant second in the Gallup poll on 11%.

Church goes on the attack
The Gallup poll suggests that the popularity of Fernández is beginning to wane. This was reinforced in spectacular style by the ferocious criticism levelled at him by Monsignor Victor Masalles, the auxiliary bishop of the archdioceses of Santo Domingo, during the Independence Day Te Deum and mass. “The people do not live off statistics," Masalles said. This would have stung Fernández who was not only in the congregation but also delivered his state-of-the-nation speech on the same day in which he made heavy use of statistics to underline his government's achievements.

Fernández, for instance, pointed out that despite the global economic slowdown, the Dominican economy had grown by 7.8% in 2010 and extreme poverty had decreased from 11.8% to 10.4%, as a result of the government's social protection measures. Masalles said it beggared belief that that the country could grow by an average of more than 5% a year since the end of the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo in 1961 (well above the Latin American average of 3.4% over the same period), and yet perform so woefully in international league tables assessing key social indicators. He also called on Fernández to abide by his own constitution, which he frequently trumpets as the best in the last century.

Masalles said the Roman Catholic Church was duty bound to hold the government to account and would continue to do so. The Church has thrown its weight behind a campaign by civil society groups over recent months to force the government to comply with a law approved in 1997 (during Fernández's first administration) committing the government to spend either 16% of the budget or 4% of GDP on education. The government has not met this requirement, but Fernández devoted a large chunk of his speech maintaining that it was quality and not quantity that mattered in the field of education. He said the government had made enormous strides on education: distributing millions of free textbooks; expanding the school library programme; better equipping science laboratories; and becoming one of the first countries in Latin America to install computer labs and technology sections in most public schools.

The results, however, do not bear this out. Masalles pointedly referred to a discouraging report by the World Economic Forum (WEF) last year showing the parlous state of education in the country as a major obstacle to development in the Dominican Republic. The country was one of the worst performers out of 139 countries worldwide in several different tables related to education in the WEF Global Competitiveness Index (GCI).

Fernández gave the first hint of backing down to pressure from the Church and civil society in the days after his address when he fired his education minister, Melanio Paredes. He brought in Josefina Pimentel, who was director of the institute of professional and technical training (Infotep), to replace Paredes. Her appointment was well received by civil society groups but, unless she manages to persuade Fernández to increase state resources for education, protests are likely to continue.

• Haiti prepares to vote

With Haiti's presidential run-off due to take place on 20 March between Mirlande Manigat, of the opposition Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes (RNDP) and pop-star Michel Martelly ('Sweet Micky') of Repons Peyizan, the provisional electoral council (CEP) is putting measures in place to prevent a repeat of the chaos which marred the 28 November first round. These include setting up a 24-hour call centre to provide information for confused voters unsure as to where to vote; firing some 500 poll workers and supervisors from the 1,500 voting centres; increasing education requirements for electoral officials and providing additional training; cleaning up the list of 4.7m voters by matching information from the CEP with the office of national identification. A strengthened Joint Organisation of American States/CARICOM [Caribbean Community] Mission made up of approximately 200 observers" (up from 120 first round observers) will also be dispatched to voting centres. This has done little to assuage local civil society groups' concerns. They cite the CEP's failure to release the breakdown of the final results of the first round, more than three months on from the vote and over a month since it reversed its preliminary results under international pressure [RC-11-02], as reason for low confidence. The decision resulted in giving Martelly, rather than Jude Célestin of President Rene Préval's ruling Inité, a place in the run-off [RC-11-02]. Pierre Esperance, of the human rights coalition Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), which sent an election observer group, said he had “no confidence in the electoral machine".

• Reshuffle

The interior and police minister, Franklin Almeyda, was also dismissed by President Fernández in his mini cabinet reshuffle. He was replaced by the industry and trade minister, Ramón Fadul. Almeyda is an aspirant for the presidential candidacy of the ruling Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD). A replacement for Fadul has yet to be announced.

• Ideological similarities

Neither Manigat nor Martelly have distinguished themselves in ideological terms during the second campaigning period in Haiti. Both socially and economically conservative, the two agree on the need to establish a national security force, (disbanded in 1995), primarily to provide jobs. Another point of agreement is the issue of dual nationality. Both advocate lifting constitutional restrictions on dual nationality - a clear attempt to court the ex pat community. These similarities suggest that the choice is likely to hinge on personality. Manigat, a septuagenarian former First Lady and academic, claims to be more of a political heavyweight, while Martelly, a popular former wild-child musician, is billing himself as a political “outsider" and separate from the perceived corruption of the political establishment.

With under a weeks to go to the municipal elections (on 31 October), President Lagos has entered the fray, backing government candidates in various regions across the country. On 19 October Lagos travelled north to lend his support, via radio interviews, to would-be Concertación mayors and councillors in Arica, Ovalle, La Serena and Coyhaique. The president knows, however, that the real political battle will be fought over the mayoralty of Santiago, and could give a strong indication of the way the wind is blowing ahead of the presidential elections in 2005. 

Joaquin Laví­n, leader of the opposition rightwing Alianza por Chile, is stepping down as mayor of Santiago. The two men competing for the position are Raúl Alcaino, a charismatic businessman of little political experience from the Unión Democrata Independiente (UDI) part of the APC coalition, and Jorge Schaulsohn Brodsky, an experienced politician from the Partido por la Democracia (PPD), part of Concertación. What makes the race interesting is that this year, unlike in 2000 or 1996, the municipal elections are only one year away from the presidential vote. An opinion poll conducted by El Mercurio and Opina SA, published on 10 October, showed Laví­n as the man most Chileans expected to be the next president. Confusingly, however, when those polled were asked who they would actually vote for, 45.7% chose the leftwing candidate Michelle Bachelet ahead of Laví­n (43.7%). Soledad Alvear, another possible Concertación hopeful, trailed both by some distance.

If Raúl Alcaino does not win in Santiago, he could return to his business interests, having enjoyed his experiences and come off none the worse. For Laví­n, however, it would be a major blow to his hopes for the presidency as many could interpret an APC failure as a verdict on Laví­n's mayoralty. It would also catapault Schaulsohn into the higher echelons of the Concertación coalition. Failure for Schaulsohn would also be tough: his party, the PPD, has always been a minor player within the coalition and the mayoralty of Santiago would provide a major boost to its standing.

President Nicanor Duarte has stated his intention to negotiate free-trade agreements with countries outside Mercosur. 

On his return from the EU summit in Vienna, Duarte said that Paraguay had been forced to look beyond Mercosur to break into new markets. The move follows severe criticism of Mercosur from Uruguay's President Tabaré Vázquez, who commented that "Mercosur is more a problem than a solution for Uruguay".

In an interview with the country's leading newspaper, ABC Color, on 15 May Duarte said that it was "inevitable" that his country would look for preferential treatment in other markets given Mercosur's failings. As well as not providing enough support for the smaller nations such as Paraguay and Uruguay the president said that the paper-mills dispute between Argentina and Uruguay had exposed the internal conflict in Mercosur, which is "not going through its best moment". Duarte also pointed towards Mercosur's difficulty in formalising a free trade agreement with the European Union as more evidence of the need to modify the regional agreement. These points were also backed up by Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim who admitted that "we have not done everything we should have done for the smaller economies in Mercosur".

Both Amorim and his Argentine counterpart Jorge Taiana said that the trade issues would be discussed at the next summit but added that there were currently rules in place that prohibited members from signing individual free-trade agreements and established that commercial negotiations should be carried out together. Duarte wants this to be made more flexible. According to Paraguay's deputy minister for foreign affairs, Belela Herrera, the country wants to remain in Mercosur but also to increase its trade. The government has shown an interest in signing commercial agreements both with the US and with Taiwan (where Paraguay remains their only political ally in South America). 

Further disagreements with Paraguay's neighbours have also occurred over the gigantic Itaipú dam which is one of the world's largest hydroelectric projects. Brazil has the dominant position regarding energy volume and rejects Paraguay's request to have a larger share of the energy produced and a sharp review of energy prices.

Since last years re-election of President Lula da Silva ideas such as "the enterprising state" and having "strategic control" over sectors of the economy have become more apparent in his administration. These ideas, however, have always been hidden in the agenda of Lula's Partido dos Trabalhadores. Indeed, despite being praised for honouring the inheritance of the previous administration - of fighting inflation, balancing accounts and maintaining free currency exchange rate - the Lula administration has also been responsible for swelling in the size of the state machine. Does this mean the PT and the government will promote a new wave of nationalisations?

Since coming to power in 2002 the Lula administration contracted more than 200,000 new civil servants. This means the government has hired an average of 162 people every day since they came into power. The federal government alone (the executive, the legislative and the judiciary) together have some 1.2m employees. On top of that, it also pays pensions to a further 1m retired employees. This incurs an annual expense of R$100bn (US$53bn). Indeed, the expenses and salaries of all civil servants working for the lower state and municipal levels of government are believed to be equivalent to 2.7% of Brazil's GDP, twice as much as that of the ratio in the US. This ratio is exaggerated for a country with low financial capacity and defective public services, say many economists.

Historically, the Brazilian public sector has been hijacked by political interests, making true the claim that the higher the number of people working for the government, the higher the likelihood of corruption. Indeed, the federal executive alone employs over 22,000 people in so-called 'trust positions'. These are political appointees who do not need to have any technical expertise. The only competence required appears to be that they have to "know someone somewhere in the government", as the popular Brazilian saying goes. Unsurprisingly, the government uses these positions as a bargaining tool to win support. Indeed, Lula's governing coalition is made up of ideologically unrelated parties, many of them unprincipled and only concerned with guaranteeing positions in government agencies and state-owned companies, thus winning easy access to funding, legally or illegally.

The hiring of new civil servants is the backdrop for a discreet nationalisation drive by the PT government. Since coming to power in 2002, public money has, following the example of the military regime in the 1970s, become foremost in certain areas of the economy. The majority of Brazil's petrochemical sector is now under direct control of the government through Petrobras, whose management is all politically appointed. In 2002 46% of the sector was owned by Petrobras, now 63% of it is under the company's ownership. The government's control of other "strategic sectors" of the economy has also increased considerably in the period: the hydroelectric energy sector is now 44% owned by state companies, up from 11% in 2002, and fuel distribution 32%, up for 24%.

Now the government is preparing bills to help Petrobras and other public companies to win control of other sectors. The mines and energy ministry, for instance, has a bill ready to be sent to congress which centralises all key decisions of the ethanol industry under Petrobras. This decision was taken because, since the spread of the dual (flex-) fuel technology just a few years ago, Petrobras has seen its profits with the sale of petrol fall considerably. The government is also eyeing up the banking system, having already incorporated, through Banco do Brasil, regional banks that would otherwise be privatised and through the Post Office. The communications ministry, meanwhile, is preparing a bill to guarantee the state's veto in decisions taken by the not-long-ago privatised telecommunications sector. 

• Nationalising CVRD?
  The ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores approved a motion support a popular plebiscite to re-nationalised Brazil's mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) during its national convention in late August. The CVRD was privatised under the previous administration of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Since then the company became a global leader in the mining sector, and able to finance infrastructure projects which failed under the state. 
  

On 20 March President Cristina Fernández announced that almost one-third of revenue obtained from the 35% export tax on soya would henceforth be allocated to the provinces. Farm leaders and the opposition accused her of bribing the country's powerful provincial governors in a bid to erode support for the farming sector ahead of mid-term congressional elections in June (see pages 1-2). The following day, farm unions announced the launch of the sector's second strike this year, erecting roadblocks and banning the sale of grains and meat for export for seven days.

Fernández declared a “decree of necessity and urgency" (DNU) - the third one she has signed since taking office - to assign the provinces 30% of the revenues generated by the soya tax. The new “federal solidarity fund" will be worth up to Arg$6.5bn (US$1.77bn), the equivalent of more than 11% of the total funds currently allotted to the provinces by the central government. At least 30% of the new monies must be allocated to “social infrastructure" projects, such as the construction of schools, housing, water supplies and sewage works.

Farm leaders, who want the soya tax to be scrapped altogether, described the move as “political chicanery". They accused Fernández of seeking to undermine their claim that the government does not redistribute agricultural export tax revenue to the provinces, and to buy the support of provincial representatives who have thus far sided with the rural sector. Farmers also speculated that most of the “solidarity fund" would go towards financing government election campaigns in the lead up to the June ballot.

On the same day as Fernández's announcement, opposition deputies failed to force a congressional debate on phasing out export duties on soya and grains. Opposition parties and farming unions had hoped to spark a rebellion among government deputies in support of the farming sector. In order to pass the bill the opposition needed to muster at least 129 votes (over 50% of deputies). In the event, only 109 deputies - all from the opposition - turned up to the session. It is worth noting, however, that should the government lose its majority in June's mid terms, the opposition would finally be in a position to repeal the tax.

Talks between the government and the farming sector, which has provided the main challenge to Fernández's administration in recent months, are likely to founder in advance of the elections, as the Kirchners seek to polarise the dispute. In a speech in the capital on 26 March, Fernández implied that protests by farmers were a threat to democracy. At a rally across town, Kirchner reminded voters that “Cristina was elected by the people and would defend the people" and reminded the farming sector, which the government frequently accuses of greed, that “those who are lucky enough to have [wealth], must show solidarity".

ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The economy is slowing but still growing (just). In January, economic activity was up 2.3% on the same month of 2008. The month-on-month rate of growth was 0.3%, according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadí­stica y Censos (Indec). The consensus forecast from independent economists polled by the central bank is for GDP growth of 1.2% in 2009.

Early data for February shows that the slowdown is kicking in: although construction was up by 1.6% year-on-year in February, overall in the first two months it contracted 2.8%. Industrial output in February was down 1.1% overall, even though manufacturing output rose 2% month-on-month over January. Overall industrial output was down by 2.8% in the first two months of 2009.  In 2008, it rose 2.8% annually.

The government is expecting real GDP growth of 4% in 2009, down from 7% in 2008. What will pinch most is weak external demand. In the first two months of 2009, exports fell 30% to US$6.67bn. Imports were down even more (38%) at US$5.42bn. Indec said that export prices were down by an average of 14%, while volumes were down 12%. Manufactured exports, which had been holding up reasonably, had a poor February, dropping 18% year-on-year. Sales volumes collapsed (-21%) after manufacturers tried to push up prices by 3%.

The country's biggest trade partner is Mercosur (i.e. Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), which accounts for 23% of total exports and 35% of imports. Argentina managed to increase exports to Asia and the Middle East in the first two months.

On 17 October the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) and Partido Patria Querida (PPQ) announced that the PPQ's Miguel 'Michel' Carrisoza had won a popular consultation process, and thus become the ruling coalition's consensus mayoral candidate for the November 7 Asunción mayoral elections.
 
The PPQ had initially failed to undersign an agreement with the PLRA and Frente Guasú designed to determine a consensus candidate.   The PLRA and Frente Guasú decided to go ahead with the process where Franklin Boccia, from the PLRA, emerged as a winner. Immediately after that result, Boccia offered Carrisoza the opportunity to hold another popular consultation process in order to determine a single mayoral candidate in an attempt to present a unified front against the opposition Asociación Nacional Republicana -Partido Colorado (ANR-PC).  
 
Carrisoza's victory is surprising due to the fact that the PLRA, one of the country's most traditional parties, has a much broader party base than the PPQ. However Carrisoza, currently a senator, is popular in Asunción . Carrisoza is now poised to run against the ANR-PC candidate, Armando Samaniego in the upcoming elections.
 
Samaniego and the ANR-PC have been highly critical of the PPQ-PLRA-Frente Guasú attempt to consolidate an alliance through consultation processes. On 17 October, while on campaign around Asunción , Samaniego discredited the latest consultation commenting that “... people are not interested in these kinds of alliances...they are not useful when it comes to governing, or providing real solutions to people's problems".            
 
The consultation process carried out on 17 October polled 20,000 people in Asunción 's 65 different barrios (neighbourhoods). Carrisoza received 54% of the vote whereas Boccia obtained 46%. Asked about how he felt about ultimately losing the election after previously winning the PLRA primaries and the PLRA-Frente Guasú run-off, Boccia   stated that “I don't feel defeated, I feel that democracy allowed me to become a grain of sand in this example of unity... here I am fulfilling a gentleman's promise, we came to bring him [Carrisoza] our support".

Oviedo
On 26 October, Lino Oviedo, the leader of the Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Eticos (UNACE), announced his intention to run in the 2013 presidential elections. While very premature, Oviedo's announcement is controversial. His UNACE has maintained a steady level of political support and is now attempting to expand its political influence. Announcing his bid, Oviedo took the time to praise the former dictator Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989), stating that Stroessner's early government was “excellent". Addressing his audience of predominantly German descendants living in the 'Colonias Unidas' area of the country, Oviedo concluded that this would be the last time he would present himself as presidential candidate, in order “to make Paraguay a second Germany".

Evo Morales is planning to replicate his party in neighbouring countries, starting with Peru in April and following with Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. He announced this in late February, days after US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had told the US Senate that she was 'concerned' about Morales's party - a remark magnified in the retelling which Morales has been playing to full advantage.

What is known about the initiative is that a Peruvian version of Morales's Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento Polí­tico por la Soberaní­a de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP, to give it its full formal name) will be launched on 9 April in Sicuani, a city just over 100 kilometres southeast of Cusco, renowned as the site where the Peru-Bolivian Confederation - the alliance on which Chile waged war - was founded in 1836. The promoters are 'a Peruvian peasant organisation', according to Carlos Cusihuari, leader of a 'civic committee' that has taken the name of that historic confederation.

Cusihuari told the press that the new party, 'basically indigenist', will seek to 'consolidate the worker-peasant-student movement'. Morales, who did not identify the organisers, said that 'they have advanced and my presence, with a strong delegation from Bolivia, will solely be to strengthen and support their initiative.' In an interview published on 25 February by the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio, Morales said that the idea behind the 'internationalisation of the MAS' is 'to promote pro-sovereignty movements based on the social movements of Latin America, to curb the arrogance of imperialism and strengthen democracy.'

When asked if this was not a new version of the 1960s efforts to 'export revolution' throughout Latin America, Morales said, 'If we are talking about sharing political instruments for the liberation or revolution of our peoples, we welcome that. But the MAS does not export militarist interventions or economic models of hunger and misery, as the US does. Nor do we export policies of submission and economic pillage of our natural resources. Our actions will be framed by democracy, the political constitutions of the states, and the conscience of the peoples.'

Morales told El Mercurio that he had planned a trip to Santiago in April 2003 to assess the prospects of creating a Chilean version of the MAS, but that his trip had been blocked by 'sectors of the oligarchy and fascism'. However, he added, 'We have close relations with the Mapuche and several social actors in Chile. At any moment we will reactivate our efforts: the MAS could be in Chile as well.' [Oddly, he did not mention his fellow Aymara of northern Chile, who his rival Felipe Quispe includes in his vision of Collasuyo, the independent Aymara homeland.]

The Llapanchik connection
Llapansuyo did not get off the ground, but a local indigenous party in Apurí­mac, Llapanchik ('All Together'), founded earlier that year, did prosper. Llapanchik emerged as an offshoot of the Frente de Defensa Regional Agrí­cola de Apurí­mac (Fedra), a local peasant organisation famous for having staged huge protests against the Fujimori régime in demand of more attention to rural problems. In the 2002 elections Llapanchik won three provinces and 13 municipalities in Apurí­mac, and its candidate was the runner-up for the regional presidency. Since then there has often been talk of a link between Llapanchik and Morales.  

The party has continued to be involved in efforts to create a broader indigenist party in Peru. In early 2003 it teamed up with parties and organisations from seven other departments (Arequipa, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Juní­n, Lima, Moquegua and Puno) to set in motion the first 'political school for ayllu self-government' - the ayllu being a present-day version of the Incas' basic communal unit. The participants also established a national coordinating body for regional parties, movements and civic associations.

In May they organised a public gathering to influence the new political parties legislation, attracting organisations from six more departments: Amazonas, Ancash, Cajamarca, La Libertad, Pasco and Piura. Contacts were also established with cross-regional organisations, such as the Coordinadora Nacional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minerí­a (Conacami) and the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Aidesep).  

Last year it seemed as if the big party would finally be launched in September, and Morales was invited to attend (but did not turn up when the initiative faltered). It is worth noting that the etnocaceristas were not invited to join in this endeavour, at any stage.

The coca link
Morales and Llapanchik do have one thing in common: just as Morales's initial powerbase was the confederation of Bolivian coca growers, part of Llapanchik's political powerbase is to be found among the coca growers of the Apurí­mac valley. Unsurprisingly, another Peruvian who has maintained contact with Morales is Nelson Palomino, the currently jailed secretary-general of the Confederación de Productores Agropecuarios de las Cuencas Cocaleras (CPACC, the umbrella coca-growers' association).  

Also often cited as part of the circle of Morales's Peruvian acquaintances is the independent congressman Michel Martí­nez, leader of the Frente de Defensa del Agro de Apurí­mac, instrumental in the creation of Llapanchik, frequent facilitator of encounters between the coca growers and the government and, more recently, would-be mediator between Antauro Humala and the authorities during the former's seizure of the Andahuaylas police station [RBS-05-01].

 

Regional groups coming together Parties & associations represented in the Coordinadora Nacional
Department	Organisation	Department	Organisation
Amazonas	Fuerza Amazonense	Juní­n	Todos por Juní­n
Apurí­mac	Llapanchik	La Libertad	Mov. Capacidad Ciudadana
Ancash	Mov. Independiente	Lima	Civic association
Arequipa	Civic association	Moquegua	Civic association
Ayacucho	Fuerza Ayacucho	Pasco	Concertación
Cajamarca	Fuerza Regional	Piura	Acuerdo Regional
Huancavelica	Tahuantinsuyo	Puno	Poder Democrático Regional
Source: Media reports.

Sensing a conspiracy
Given these connections, it comes as no surprise that Peruvian intelligence sees a vast conspiracy in the making. The 'investigative unit' of the Lima newspaper La República says it has learnt from 'police and military intelligence' that they have detected 'coordination' between Morales and leftwing Peruvian political leaders linked to the coca growers. The evidence cited was telephone and email traffic, intercepted since February 2004, between Morales and Patria Roja (an originally Maoist party that grew from the same root as the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas).

This coordination, says the paper, is part of 'a strategic plan of the leftwing parties and organisations of various Latin American countries who are seeking a comeback by creating a "Bolivarian force". With that aim, these parties of leftist leaning (of Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru) need the support of indigenist movements to be able to present themselves as defenders of peasant causes.' La República's 'high-ranking police intelligence source' is cited as saying that there are 'indications, not yet confirmed, that the leftwing parties are being financed by the Farc.'

The same newspaper had earlier cited intelligence sources as having concluded that the likeliest source of funding for Antauro Humala's etnocaceristas are the Cí­rculos Bolivarianos, the network of pro-Chávez associations Venezuela has been promoting across Latin America and beyond. In late January, the outgoing chief of the US Southern Command, General James Hill, said that Morales was being funded by Chávez .

A more elaborate version was provided in early February by a US academic, Michael Radu, in FrontPage magazine. Radu is senior fellow and 'co-chair' of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center on Terrorism and Counterterrorism. He sees, spreading throughout South America, an 'Indio-fascist' movement which embraces Morales's MAS, Felipe Quispe's Movimiento Indí­gena Pachacuti and the CSUTCB peasants' union; Ecuador's Pachakutik indigenous party, and the umbrella indigenous organisations Conaie and Ecuarunari; and Humala's Movimiento Etnocacerista, more formally known as the Movimiento Polí­tico Nacionalista (MPN) in Peru.

Radu says, 'The Indio-fascists are closely linked to each other, with essential outside help. Thus, in Peru, a certain indigenous group, "Llapanchik," is related to Evo Morales' MAS and, one must add, has at least one supporter, Michel Martí­nez, in the Peruvian Congress. The Humalas acclaimed Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez when he visited Peru, and they themselves traveled repeatedly to Caracas, where they also met Evo Morales [...] That Chávez supports Evo Morales, politically and financially, is known.'

The Condoleezza factor
Compared with these scenarios, what Condoleezza Rice said on 16 February was tame. Prompted by Senator Lincoln Chaffee to hold forth on what he described as the curious growth of the 'coca growers' party', she merely said she was concerned about it, as well as about President Carlos Mesa's other 'challenges', then went on to talk about US aid for Bolivia.

Morales milked what little she said for all it was worth, and more. 'This is not concern,' he said, 'it is interference in Bolivia's political affairs. [...] If anything should happen to Evo Morales's life it will be the responsibility of the US government [because] they are surely preparing some attempt on the lives of MAS leaders.' In a lighter mood, he concluded, 'Condoleezza Rice has become my campaign manager.'

 

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: BOLIVIA

The lower chamber of congress finally voted for a reform of the hydrocarbons law on 3 March. Whether the vote will stand is open to question. Two of the parties (the Movimiento al Socialismo and the Nueva Fuerza Republicana) which wanted congress to jack up the royalty on gas to 50% say that they will object to the tied vote, and the casting vote against by the deputy president of the lower chamber. The left is very unhappy at what appear to have been sharp practices by the pro-government side to stop royalties hitting 50%. The left accuses the president of the lower chamber, Mario Cossí­o, of voting twice and of a substitute deputy (for an absent deputy) voting against the left when she was not entitled to vote at all. The argument is over the split between royalty and tax payments. There is general agreement that the gas companies should face a 50% levy. The leftwingers want this to be in the form of a royalty, which would mean that the gas companies could not offset capital expenditures against the payments. The right wants most of the payment to be in the form of tax, against which the companies can put expenses. The government's view is that it can increase the tax rate and it reckons that the oil companies will accept a change that will take the rate up to 32% by 2015. The royalty would stay at 18%. The left wants the tax take jacked up to 50% immediately. Gas production: The official figures from the national statistical agency show that gas production actually increased by 39% in 2004 from 261bn cubic feet in 2003 to 362bn cubic feet in 2004. Oil production was also up from 12.2m barrels to 14.1m barrels.

The agreement between Bolivia and Venezuela, at executive level, to build military installations along Bolivia's borders is causing increasing concern in neighbouring Peru and Paraguay (surprisingly not in Chile), which complain that Bolivia is altering the balance of power in the region.

The exact details of the military agreement are so sketchy that the Bolivian Senate, in which the opposition narrowly outnumbers the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), is refusing to ratify it. This has not stopped the foreign ministers of Peru and Paraguay, José Antonio Garcí­a Belaúnde and Roberto González, from expressing serious concern at the development. Paraguay's bicameral budget commission increased the 2007 budget for the military by nearly 30% to US$103m in response to the new strategic threat ostensibly posed by Bolivia. 

When Garcí­a Belaúnde visited Bolivia on 6 October; he reported back to Peru's Senate defence committee not only his "concern about this agreement and its projection, which may imply new bases along the border" but also his concern that it could pave the way for Venezuelan troops to be called in to help Bolivia if it faced an internal conflict. This came after Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez announced that, "Venezuela will not keep its arms crossed if the Bolivian government and people are attacked from outside or within. (It) will do whatever it can so that the (next) government lasts as long as the Carmonazo," a reference to the two-day stint of Pedro Carmona after the coup in 2002.

President Hugo Chávez was appointed president of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) on 24 February. This is his new party designed to unify the different strands of Bolivarianism, which is already showing fissiparous tendencies.

Before taking over as president of the PSUV, Chávez devoted part of his regular weekly broadcast, Aló, Presidente, to an appeal for unity. He said that individual members should subordinate their egos to the collective good as only a united PSUV would win the regional elections for mayors and governors in November. Chávez was responding to a rancorous dispute between Luis Tascón, a deputy in the national assembly, and Diosdado Cabello, the governor of Miranda, which culminated in Tascón's expulsion from the PSUV. It is not clear, however, that Tascón, a radical who has been denouncing corruption, has been expelled. On 28 February Chávez was still speaking as though Tascón should be expelled from the party but had not been.

Tascón had denounced irregularities in the infrastructure ministry under Cabello's brother, José David (now head of the tax agency, Seniat), specifically the overpricing of 100 4WD cars and 200 minibuses in March 2007. Cabello did not mince his words in response. He accused Tascón of lying and of being "an instrument of imperialism". He also insisted Tascón be investigated for allegedly requesting a diplomatic passport for a Venezuelan banker accused of drug-trafficking. Another PSUV leader, Gerson Pérez, accused Tascón of planning to destabilise the country and create a revolutionary situation by planning to kill Chávez 's ex wife, Marí­a Isabel Rodrí­guez, who has become critical of her former husband.

The PSUV party coordinator, Jorge Rodrí­guez (who previously served as vice-president), said that the founding congress of the PSUV, which is meeting to discuss the party's principles and statutes, voted unanimously to eject Tascón.Tascón denies this. He claims that the decision was taken by Rodrí­guez and Cabello alone, despite neither of them having disciplinary powers. Tascón got no support from the president of the national assembly, Cilia Flores. She said he had been "self-excluded" from the PSUV for exposing Cabello to "public ridicule without proof". The opposition is backing Tascón and accusing the government of trying to cover up corruption.

Polo Patriótico

Assuming the spat does not knock it off-target, the PSUV will finish its deliberations on 2 March and elect a national committee of 281 members on 8 March. At this point, the party will be in a position to start the process of selecting candidates for governor and mayor and, significantly, re-launch Polo Patriótico, the constellation of leftist parties including the Movimiento V República and the Patria para Todos (PPT) which brought Chávez to power in 1998. Chávez floated the idea of reactivating Polo Patriótico in January in a bid to reach out to the PPT and the Partido Comunista de Venezuela which refused to be subsumed into the PSUV last year.

Crime: One of the government's key challenges in the coming months - which could determine the fate of PSUV candidates in the elections - is the issue of violent crime. Homicides were up 11% in 2007 on the previous year, to a high of 12,829. The government is adopting a twofold strategy, which consists of placing the blame on others and reforming the police. Chávez raised the issue last week when he claimed that Colombian paramilitaries were infiltrating Venezuela's barrios, selling cheap cocaine and supplying guns to local gangs.

• Tascón's list

Tascón became famous for publishing a list with the names of voters who signed a petition in favour of a recall referendum on Chávez 's mandate in 2004. The list was later allegedly used to bar those on it from holding positions in state institutions and companies or to prevent their promotion.

The main opposition candidates began launching their campaigns for the presidency in early August. They have to be registered by 7 September.

President Evo Morales, who remains more than 30 percentage points ahead of his closest rival, was more preoccupied with seeking to prevent a deal with Chile over the Silala River becoming an electoral issue.

A former president and leader of the main opposition alliance Podemos, Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga (2001-2002) announced his candidacy on 10 August. He will run as a Podemos-PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) candidate. Podemos, which was forced to seek the alliance with the PDC in January to receive legal status following an unfavourable ruling by the national electoral court last year, remains seriously weakened after the departure of the senate president, Oscar Ortiz, and his Santa Cruz allies last month. 

On 11 August one of the country's richest businessmen, Samuel Doria Medina, a cement magnate, launched his campaign. Doria Medina is Morales's closest rival in the polls, and president of the second largest party, Unidad Nacional, which has also seen splits in recent weeks. Under the slogan “putting Bolivia to work", Medina's manifesto is based on “economic development" and job creation for “all Bolivians".

Also on 11 August, Ví­ctor Hugo Cárdenas, a former vice-president in the first government of the now exiled right-winger, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997), reiterated his intention to run for the presidency. Cárdenas was among the first of Morales's opponents to announce his presidential ambitions, back in March. However, with Santa Cruz his support base, his prospects have been adversely affected by the announcement both of Ortiz's new political outfit, Consenso Popular, and the candidacy of Germán Antelo, a Santa Cruz civic leader chosen as the candidate for Sánchez de Lozada's former party, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR). Cárdenas has yet to announce on which ticket he will run. By law, candidates require the endorsement of a legally recognised party or movement in order to register.

The most recent national survey by Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado put Morales at 45% (a conservative estimate given that it polled only urban dwellers and Morales counts on the rural population for much of his support); Doria Medina on 11%; Quiroga on 7%; and Cárdenas on 6%. The other main contender is the former prefect of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa (8%).

As the economy is doing pretty well with growth likely to be around 4% this year and central bank reserves currently equivalent to 80% of GDP, the opposition sense that attacking Morales for comprising either on Bolivia's sovereignty or discouraging foreign investment is its best option.

One odd issue is Bolivia's agreement with Chile over the Silala River. The deal established that Bolivia owns at least 50% of the river - which rises in Bolivia but is used as a water source by Chilean-based mines - with the remainder to be subject to a four-year study. Morales's opponents do not see this compromise as equitable.

Another odd election issue is how to develop the lithium deposits in the Salar de Uyuni. The government wants to develop the lithium to produce at least batteries for electric cars or even perhaps the cars themselves. It believes that the project will cost at least US$800m to develop. As the central bank is sitting n over US$8bn in reserves, the country actually has the money to buy the technology it needs.

• Miss Peru

Relations with Peru have yet to recover from the acrimonious exchanges which ensued in the aftermath of the Bagua violence in June  despite the return of Peru's ambassador Fernando Rojas at the end of July. The latest spat has the unlikely backdrop of the Miss Universe contest: the Bolivians are considering filing an appeal against Peru before international courts over the use of Miss Peru's national costume “la Diablada" which, the Morales government argues, is copied from Bolivian folklore.

• Remittances

Remittances in the first six months of 2009 fell by 8.4%, year-on-year to US$486m.

• Gas revenues

In the first five months of 2009 the country's hydrocarbon tax revenues fell by 15%, year-on-year to US$209m. Revenues from the Impuesto Especial a los Hidrocarburos y sus Derivados fell from US$94m to US$25m while revenues from the Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos rose from US$76m in the first five months on 2008 to US$89m in the same period of 2009. Hydrocarbon exports fell by 26% in the first five months of 2009 to US$862m.

China's interests in Colombia and Ecuador are comparatively modest, yet very much in line with its policy towards the region, aimed at expanding its export markets and procuring natural resources (particularly in the energy sector).

China's ministry of commerce (MOFCOM) estimates only slight increases in Chinese FDI stock in Ecuador (from US$89m to US$90m) and Colombia (from US$14m to US$15m) between end-2008 and end-2009. Both countries combined make up a little over 1% of Chinese FDI stock in Latin America. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean, Colombian exports to China increased between 2000 and 2009, but only gradually, to 2.9% of Colombia's total exports in 2009, up from 0.2% in 2000. Nonetheless, China became Colombia's fourth largest export partner and its second largest import partner in 2008.

In contrast, Ecuador's exports to China actually decreased, falling to 0.9% of its total exports in 2009, from 1.2% in 2000, the only country in South and Central America to register a decrease in sales to China. However, in the same period China became Ecuador's second largest import partner. Ecuador's trade deficit with China is estimated at over US$500m. Columbia's is even higher, at almost US$1.8bn.

Crude oil is the top export product to China for both Colombia and Ecuador, (with oil accounting for 94% of Ecuador's exports to China and 50% in Colombia's case). In August 2010, the China Development Bank gave Ecuador a US$1bn loan in return for 96,000 barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) for two years. This came just weeks after the Exim Bank of China and the Ecuadorean government agreed a loan deal for a new hydroelectric project worth an estimated US$1.7bn (with a 6.9% interest rate supplemented by oil). Ecuador's oil exports to China were 36,000 bbl/d in 2009 (12% of its total oil exports) and Colombia's export agency reported a 500% growth in Colombia's oil exports to China in 2009, which were worth US$364m.

• WikiLeaks US diplomatic cables dated November 2009 suggest that following President Hugo Chávez 's visit to China in 2006 Chinese companies were told to invest in Venezuela. However, the cable claims that many companies were reluctant, preferring to invest in Colombia due to its economic “openness" and political “stability".  One cable cites a meeting between the-then charge d'affaires at the US embassy in Beijing, Daniel Piccuta, and the Colombian Trade Commissioner, Alejandro Ossa, in which Ossa said that while Colombia was interested in Chinese investment" (particularly in infrastructure and certain consumer goods) it was unlikely to enter into a Free Trade Agreement with China, given the competition in many sectors. Moreover, Ossa claimed that Colombia was “suspicious of China's environmental and labor practices". In the same year Chinese, investment in Colombia had grown 114.4%.

Apuestan a que Berger irá a una segunda ronda con Alvaro Colom; la estrategia tiene un par de fallas riesgosas.

Alentados por el pobre desempeño del retirado General Efraí­n Rí­os Montt en las encuestas de opinión, nueve de los 11 candidatos que competirán por la presidencia en las elecciones del 9 de noviembre decidieron unir fuerzas para bloquear la elección del conservador y actual favorito, Oscar Berger.

Las partes de este acuerdo son, Jacobo Arbenz de Democracia Cristiana (DCG), Francisco Arredondo de Unidad Nacional (UN), Rodrigo Asturias de Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), Alvaro Colom de la coalición Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), Manuel Conde de Cambio Nacional (CN), Fritz Garcí­a-Gallont del Partido Unionista (PU), José Angel Lee del Partido Democracia Social Participativa (PDSP), Leonel López Rodas del Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), y Eduardo Suger de Desarrollo Integral Auténtico (DIA).

En conjunto, cubren un espectro polí­tico que va de la centro-derecha hasta las ex guerrillas de la URNG, pero sólo uno de ellos aparece en las encuestas atrayendo una porción significativa de las preferencias: Alvaro Colom, cuya coalición UNE puede ser descrita como de centro-izquierda, que está segundo en las encuestas con 18,2%. Colom, debe señalarse, ha estado avanzando firmemente desde que apareció por primera vez en las encuestas, con 7% de apoyo.

Lidera el campo por mucho, Oscar Berger, un empresario que compite bajo la bandera de la Gran Alianza Nacional (Gana), una coalición estructurada con tres pequeños partidos de derecha y de centro: Partido Patriota, Partido Reformador, y Solidaridad Nacional. En la actualidad atrae 37,8%.

Rí­os Montt, del gobernante Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), está lejos en tercer lugar con 11,4% de las preferencias de los votantes.

Estrategia de dos pasos
Los nueve candidatos agrupados para bloquear a Berger decidieron no hacerlo desde el principio: competirán por separado en la primera ronda y en la segunda pedirán a sus seguidores que voten por cualquiera de los dos candidatos que permanezcan que no sea Berger (o, para ser cauteloso, Rí­os Montt).

La razón de este enfoque de dos pasos es simple: la primera ronda permitirá a los partidos reclamar porciones de poder, sobre la fuerza de los votos logrados para sus candidatos legislativos y de gobiernos locales -se asume que el ganador estará agradecido a ellos y usará la primera ronda como medida para compartir puestos en el gobierno.

Si las actuales posiciones duran relativamente sin cambios, habrá una segunda ronda, el 28 de diciembre, pues ningún candidato atraerá más del 50% de los votos válidos, y la segunda ronda será entre Berger y Colom. Pero hay obvios problemas en lo asumido por la coalición anti-Berger/Rí­os Montt. El primero es que hay seguridad que logren obtener el 32,6% de los votos no comprometidos con los tres candidatos lí­deres: Colom necesitará sumar ese porcentaje a su actual caudal para sumar suficientes votos para ganar en la segunda ronda. Berger, por otro lado, sólo necesita 13,6% extra (los votantes del FRG podrí­an preferir apoyarlo a él más que al candidato de centro-izquierda).

El segundo es que no hay previsiones para la perspectiva de una segunda ronda entre Berger y Rí­os Montt -aunque se puede pronosticar que muchos de los que votaron por Colom preferirí­an a cualquiera que no sea Rí­os Montt.

El escenario Rí­os Montt
¿Es concebible que Rí­os Montt llegue a la segunda ronda desde un punto de partida tan bajo? Algunos analistas locales piensan que es factible, por dos razones. Una es que las encuestas estén subvalorando las opiniones de los guatemaltecos rurales, la gente entre las cuales el FRG tiene apoyo -por tanto, su punto de partida puede no ser tan bajo como parece.

La otra es que el FRG puede recurrir a trucos sucios para inclinas las elecciones a su favor. La semana pasada, el tribunal supremo electoral (TSE) advirtió sobre la probabilidad de incidentes violentos durante las elecciones en al menos 205 de las 331 municipalidades, donde los alcaldes actuales buscan la reelección. De las 205 consideradas en riesgo, 103 son controladas por el FRG, en áreas rurales.

La advertencia del TSE al menos en parte se basa en experiencia anterior de violencia electoral en los mismos lugares. Algunas juntas electorales locales no sólo expresaron temores similares, sino que pidieron al gobierno que despliegue el ejército para proveer protección extra. Las autoridades, sin embargo, están decididas a respetar la ley electoral, que prohí­be esa clase de participación del ejército. La seguridad permanecerá en manos de la policí­a nacional de 20.000 hombres, que no fue muy eficaz en evitar la violencia polí­tica hasta ahora, o hallar y arrestar a los responsables de ella.

El Presidente Lula da Silva no sólo está por ofrecer un par de puestos en su gabinete al Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) de centro derecha, al que en el pasado él trató de 'corrupto' y 'reaccionario'; sino que abrió negociaciones para extender la alianza de gobierno al derechista Partido Popular (PP), al que los miembros del partido de Lula aún consideran 'el epí­tome de todo lo que es retrógrado en la polí­tica brasileña.'

Llevar al PMDB al gabinete es la recompensa prometida por el apoyo de ese partido en el congreso, a la reforma de la legislación -aunque varios analistas polí­ticos sugieren que también tiene que ver con la aspiración del Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) para expandir su presencia en las municipalidades en todo el paí­s a través de las elecciones locales en octubre. Ya hubo conversaciones sobre acción conjunta a ese nivel. La alianza propuesta con el PP puede ser con igual propósito -pero puede resultar costosa.

El PP es el heredero polí­tico de Arena, el partido pro-gobierno creado por los militares durante sus 21 años de gobierno (1964-85). Entre los lí­deres del PP cuya prominencia polí­tica tiene su origen en esa época están el ex ministro de finanzas Delfim Neto y el ex alcalde de São Paulo (e insistente aspirante a la presidencia) Paulo Maluf, que ahora afronta cargos de corrupción.

La noticia que el gobierno estaba negociando con el PP fue hecha pública el 13 de enero por el vocero de ese partido en el congreso, Pedro Henry -que dejó en claro que el PP desea al menos un ministerio, mientras el jefe de la casa civil de Lula, José Dirceu, sólo les ofreció posiciones de bajo rango en el gobierno. Las negociaciones siguieron en la semana, y Henry proclamó: 'Si ellos no nos dan un ministerio, no seremos tan sumisos con el gobierno y continuaremos actuando independientemente.'

Aunque si le ceden un ministerio, Lula puede perder uno de sus aliados de centro izquierda, el Partido Popular Socialista (PPS). Su presidente, el diputado Roberto Freire, dijo: 'He defendido siempre las alianzas con los partidos de centro, con grupos que respetan la democracia, pero el PP no está entre ellos. Es imposible imaginar a Maluf formando parte de un gobierno que se presenta como de izquierda.' Chico Alencar, diputado izquierdista del PT, dijo: 'Las alianzas tienen un lí­mite, y nuestro lí­mite es el PMDB.'

El factor municipal
En octubre, los brasileños irán a las urnas para elegir nuevos alcaldes y concejales en las 5.560 municipalidades del paí­s. El PT controla ahora sólo 187 gobiernos municipales. Su meta de este año, según João Paulo Cunha, presidente de la cámara de diputados, es presentar candidatos en todas las municipalidades y triunfar en 850 de ellas. Los estrategas del PT reconocen en privado, que igual que en el congreso, necesitan toda la ayuda que puedan obtener.

Otros ya han comenzado a formar alianzas tan imprevisibles como la del PT con el PMDB y PP. Un caso es el pacto entre el Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) y el Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) para unir fuerzas en octubre, donde por separado no tengan suficiente capacidad para superar al PT.

El PFL es el más conservador de los grandes partidos de Brasil, y estuvo aliado con el Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso durante sus ocho años en el poder (1995-2002). Es ferviente partidario que las fuerzas del mercado gobiernen la economí­a y de la privatización de las empresas del estado. El PDT, es miembro de la Internacional Socialista, es opuesto a las privatizaciones y pro-intervención del estado. Apoyó a Lula en la segunda vuelta presidencial e inicialmente apoyó su gobierno, pero luego pasó a la oposición afirmando que las polí­ticas económicas de Lula eran una mera continuación de las polí­ticas de Cardoso.

Horas extras en el congreso
Muchos legisladores federales han anunciado que intentarán competir por cargos municipales en octubre, que no es algo inusual en Brasil. Temiendo que esto estorbe la agenda legislativa federal, y en particular la aprobación de su propuesta de reforma de la justicia, Lula persuadió al congreso que interrumpa su receso y lleve a cabo sesiones extraordinarias entre el 19 de enero y el 13 de febrero, que todaví­a les dejará un par de semanas libres antes que comience el periodo de sesiones ordinarias.

El gobierno no espera que ninguna pieza de legislación complete todo el proceso en el congreso en tan corto lapso de tiempo, pero espera que el mes adicional permitirá a los legisladores hacer considerables avances en cuestiones como las leyes que regulan las reformas de pensiones aprobadas el año pasado.

Los legisladores no sólo recibieron incentivos polí­ticos (como las alianzas que se están finalizando); también serán retribuidos generosamente por trabajar 'horas extras'. La tasa para las sesiones extraordinarias es el doble de las ordinarias, así­ ellos tendrán derecho a cobrar poco más de US$9.000. Chico Alencar, que cree que esto no será bien visto cuando que el salario mí­nimo es sólo US$87 por mes, ha estado alentando a los votantes que escriban a sus representantes diciendo: 'Sr. Legislador, no se guarde el salario extra, porque nosotros no somos tontos. Lo recordaremos el dí­a de las elecciones.'

Paridades
Moneda local por US$1
PAIS -	MONEDA-	Año previo	Previo	Actual
		04.04.03	02.04.04	16.04.04
Argentina	peso	2,93	2,87	2,82
Barbados	dollar	2,00	2,00	2,00
Belice	dollar	2,00	2,00	2,00
Bolivia	boliviano	_	7,92	7,92
Brasil	real	3,03	2,98	2,97
Chile	peso	713,00	...	700,00
Colombia	peso	2.951,35	2.679,61	2.619,59
Costa Rica	colón	389,61	428,73	429,41
Cuba	peso	1,00	1,00	1,00
Rep. Dominicana	peso	24,39	45,86	44,06
Ecuador	dollar	1,00	1,00	1,00
El Salvador	colón	8,75	8,75	8,75
Granada	EC dollar	2,70	2,70	2,70
Guatemala	quetzal	7,95	8,10	8,06
Honduras	lempira	17,37	18,20	18,23
México	nuevo peso	10,80	11,25	11,26
Nicaragua	córdoba oro	15,04	15,90	15,83
Panamá	balboa	1,00	1,00	1,00
Paraguay	guaraní­	6.920,00	5.840,00	5.690,00
Perú	nuevo sol	3,47	...	3,46
Uruguay	nuevo peso	29,40	30,10	26,60
Venezuela	bolí­var	1.600,00	1.920,00	1.917,75
Fuentes: EFE; Bank of America

Inflación en la región
Paí­s	Fuente	Diciembre	Enero	Marzo	Ult. 12m	Ene-Dic 2003
Argentina	Indec	0,20	0,40	0,60	2,30	3,70
Bolivia	INE	0,90	0,62	-0,27	4,25	3,94
Brasil	FGV	0,52	0,76	0,93	4,94	26,41
Chile	INE	-0,30	-0,20	0,40	-0,70	1,10
Colombia	Dane	0,61	0,89	0,98	6,21	6,49
Costa Rica	DGEC	1,25	1,70	0,46	11,34	9,87
Ecuador	Inec	-0,04	0,41	0,70	3,98	6,07
El Salvador	Min.Ec.	0,20	1,11	0,64	2,99	2,50
Guatemala	BCG	0,58	1,53	0,72	6,57	5,85
Honduras	BCH	0,30	0,90	0,40	7,20	8,10
México	Bco.Mx	0,43	0,62	0,34	4,23	3,98
Nicaragua	BCN	0,76	1,59	1,24	6,92	6,48
Paraguay	BCP	0,90	0,30	0,50	3,00	9,30
Perú	INE	0,56	2,19	0,46	2,80	2,48
Uruguay	DGEC	0,65	2,19	0,02	9,07	10,19
Venezuela	BCV	1,80	2,50	2,10	23,60	27,10
EU	DOL	0,58	0,50	0,50	1,70	1,60
Previo: IL-04-15

Las bolsas de la región en números.
Mercado	Indice	02.04.04	19.04.04	Variación (%)
Buenos Aires	Merval	1197,54	1166,52	-2,59
São Paulo	Bovespa	22948,95	21597,52	-5,89
Santiago	IPSA	1488,92	1458,13	-2,07
Bogotá	IGBC	3393,72	3378,16	-0,46
San José	BCT	9710,34	9878,40	1,73
Quito & Guayaquil	Interinvest	65,85	70,26	6,70
México	BMV	10713,54	10690,30	-0,22
Lima	ISVBL	3074,23	3007,55	-2,17
Caracas	BC	22203,95	25633,21	15,44
Fuente: Informes diarios

Bastó el rumor que el gobierno estaba por abolir la educación libre para los maestros de Ayacucho, para iniciar una protesta que en cuestión de dí­as se convirtió en disturbios y descontrol. El gobierno culpó a 'infiltrados' de Sendero Luminoso, provocando una nueva ronda de demostraciones de protesta. El malestar parece probable que crezca hasta un pico a mediados de julio, cuando varias organizaciones han convocado a una protesta nacional, que coincidirá con el torneo de fútbol por la Copa América en siete ciudades.

No está claro cómo se inició el rumor, pero lo tomó el ala radical de Sutep, el sindicato de maestros, liderado por Roberto Huaylanaya. Aderezado con informes que la nueva legislación educativa habí­a sido 'elaborada por el Departamento de Estado de EU', se volvió la bandera para la toma, el 26 de junio, del consejo de Ayacucho y el ministerio regional de educación. Cinco dí­as después, la policí­a desalojó a los manifestantes, y eso provocó disturbios en los que los edificios tomados, la corte y dos hoteles, fueran saqueados e incendiados.

El gobierno envió 150 oficiales de una unidad de elite de la policí­a para restaurar el orden. Javier Reátegui, ministro del interior, afirmó que la violencia habí­a sido provocada por 'un grupo infiltrado de Sendero Luminoso'. Como evidencia, el gobierno desplegó secuencias de videos que mostraban leyendas ensalzando a Sendero. La fiscal para delitos terroristas, Sonia Medina Calvo, ha iniciado procedimientos contra Huaynalaya y otros tres lí­deres de Sutep.

Revaluando a Sendero
Mientras que el año pasado el gobierno tendí­a a minimizar los informes sobre un 'resurgimiento' de Sendero, en los últimos tiempos lo ha acusado tentativamente por una serie de incidentes, como el linchamiento en Ilave y emboscadas sobre la que se informó a patrullas de la policí­a y el ejército.

El 24 de junio, el ejército informó que un soldado habí­a sido muerto en un ataque senderista sobre un pequeño campamento de ingenieros militares en Huanta, Ayacucho. El ministerio de defensa anunció luego que se harí­a una segunda autopsia debido a sospechas que la muerte del soldado pudo deberse a otras causas. Esto no impidió que un senderólogo, el retirado General Eduardo Fournier, exprese que el ataque confirmó los temores que Sendero está embarcado en un proceso de 'reorganización polí­tica y militar'.

Otro observador de Sendero, Carlos Tapia, sugiere que debe prestarse atención al trabajo ideológico desarrollado por los senderistas. Las nuevas generaciones, dijo, abandonaron la vieja estrategia de atacar a la población civil -y mientras que las fuerzas de seguridad tienen la experiencia de derrotar militarmente a Sendero, pueden ser tomados desprevenidos por el giro en la estrategia polí­tica.

Condena polí­tica
El surgimiento de la violencia fue condenado por el Foro del Acuerdo Nacional, el esquema establecido como medio para las discusiones entre el gobierno, los partidos polí­ticos y las organizaciones sociales. El vocero del Foro, Ví­ctor Andrés Garcí­a Belaúnde, casi repite la lí­nea del gobierno sobre infiltración de senderistas, pero mencionó como causas 'la manipulación por algunos partidos interesados, la ignorancia y la intención de construir una protesta más grande.'

El Foro pudo responder con tanta rapidez a los hechos, porque ya estaba reunido -con el propósito de discutir la protesta nacional planeada para el 14 de julio. Con su atención desviada, no llegó a tratar ese tema.