All Categories

Subcategories

  • NICARAGUA: Ortega goes on the attack

    LatinNews 24 November 2011 Hits: 1804

    The government of President Daniel Ortega is accusing the Organization of American States (OAS) of participating in a US conspiracy to destabilise Nicaragua. The accusation is calculated to shift attention away from growing claims of irregularities surrounding the elections on 6 November, which saw Ortega win by a landslide and his Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) secure a two-thirds majority in congress that polls, and recent history, had suggested was unobtainable.

    Denis Moncada, Nicaragua’s ambassador to the OAS, claimed on 21 November during an extraordinary session of the permanent council of the OAS, that the OAS electoral observer mission was part of a grand plan, orchestrated by the US embassy, to destabilise his government. Moncada accused the US of “unacceptable interference”. William McGlynn, the US deputy representative to the OAS, responded that the only destabilising element in Nicaragua was the government itself.

    The OAS observer mission had actually been fairly mealy mouthed about the transparency of the elections - merely claiming that it had been barred from 20% of the sites it tried to visit to monitor the election - but Moncada accused it of providing “false information, and lacking objectivity, impartiality and transparency”. These same charges could easily be levelled at Nicaragua’s supreme electoral council (CSE), especially as it has refrained from releasing the results for each voting site (JRV) which would make independent verification from limited observations much easier. The aggression of the Ortega administration to even this mild criticism might prompt the OAS to adopt a harder stance. The European Union (EU) observer mission claimed on 17 November that the CSE had acted in an opaque and arbitrary manner and that the irregularities the mission had detected constituted a serious reverse for democracy.

    Moncada cited the comments of a retired Colonel, Víctor Boitano Coleman, who (in short) claimed he had been approached by officials from the US embassy to go to Washington and denounce electoral fraud. Boitano, a former Sandinista guerrilla who was seeking election as a deputy for the Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN), said the “visible face” of this destabilising campaign was the opposition Partido Liberal Independiente-Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (PLI-MRS). The secretary general of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, implied that Boitano was unhinged. “This is a candidate for deputy who in the past 24 months has accused three presidential candidates of trying to assassinate him; of wanting to plot with him; or assassinate someone”. Insulza might have added that in mid-October the head of Boitano’s own party, Enrique Quiñónez, denounced that he had advocated kidnapping Ortega’s daughter, Camila Ortega Murillo.

    • Business reaction

    The president of the private business federation (Cosep), José Adán Aguerri, said he would call on President Ortega to fire all of the judges sitting on the supreme electoral council (CSE), including its president Roberto Rivas, over the electoral mess. The very fact that he believes Ortega has the power to make such a blatantly unconstitutional move shows just how little institutional integrity remains in Nicaragua. Ortega certainly used his control of the CSE to flout the constitution in order to seek re-election.

  • CHILE: Piñera enfrenta una prueba de nervios clave

    LatinNews 09 January 2012 Hits: 1102

    El Presidente Sebastián Piñera terminó un año tumultuoso sopesando si buscar o no la más profunda reforma política desde que Chile el retorno a la democracia en 1990. Piñera invitó a sus cuatro predecesores a participar en reuniones a puertas cerradas (en las que ni los ministros ni asesores estuvieron presentes) a finales del año pasado y los comienzos de este. Su intención era discutir “los grandes temas”. Estos nos vienen más grandes que la abolición del sistema binominal de la era Pinochet, para crear una democracia más representativa. Si Piñera tiene la voluntad, el deseo, o el apoyo necesario para este cambio trascendental, después de un año en el cual las protestas sobre la educación diezmaron sus niveles de aprobación, no está claro, pero él podría estar calculando que, precisamente por su peligrosamente bajo apoyo popular, vale la pena correr el riesgo.

    Piñera primero se reunió con el nonagenario Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), por quien frecuentemente ha expresado admiración, y luego Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006). Lagos describió el actual sistema binominal de representación política, que perpetúa a dos coaliciones haciendo casi imposible que terceros partidos obtengan bancas en el congreso, como “un cáncer” que debe ser extinguido.

    Estas reuniones tuvieron lugar a fines de diciembre, pero por lejos el encuentro más intrigante ocurrió el 3 de enero, cuando Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) consintió reunirse con Piñera, a pesar de sentirse incómoda con las críticas dirigidas a su administración por algunos ministros de su gabinete. Bachelet es la política más popular en Chile y una fuerte apuesta para la reelección en 2014, por tanto cualquier reforma política tendría relevancia personal. Ella también pidió la eliminación del sistema binominal, así como “una genuina reforma fiscal” que provea fondos para financiar la reforma educativa. Piñera se reúne en estos momentos con el miembro final del cuarteto, Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), a quien derrotó en las últimas elecciones.

    Piñera agradeció a los ex presidentes por compartir sus experiencias y sabiduría. Insinuó que podría tomar sus consejos y reformar el sistema binominal: “La democracia es una entidad viviente, debe ser constantemente perfeccionada, de modo que sea vital, joven y legítima.” Sus reuniones se produjeron poco después de un sondeo bianual del prestigioso Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) que le otorgó a Piñera un rating de aprobación de sólo 23%, cayendo tres puntos con relación a la  última encuesta hecha hace seis meses. Su rating de desaprobación estaba en 62%. Pese a que se espera que la economía que crezca más de 6% este año, solamente 22% de los 1.559 entrevistados siente que la administración de Piñera está manejando bien la economía –la cifra más baja desde que el CEP comenzó su informe bianual en junio de 1991.

    Con tan bajos niveles de aprobación, Piñera podría verse tentado a prestar atención al consejo de sus predecesores e impulsar una reforma política profunda. En las etapas finales de 2011, su gobierno obtuvo la aprobación del congreso para pequeñas pero muy significativas reformas políticas, el estableciendo del registro automático de votantes y el voto voluntario: anteriormente los votantes registrados enfrentaban una multa por no depositar sus votos. Piñera dijo que esto “rejuvenecería, revitalizaría, y le daría nueva vida a nuestra democracia”, y apeló a la participación de la juventud del país en la política. Esto incrementará dramáticamente el registro electoral, agregando unos 4,7m de nuevos votantes, a tiempo para las elecciones municipales de octubre, asumiendo que la corte constitucional ratifique la ley este mes. Casi el 75% de estos estarán por debajo de los 30 años de edad. Solamente 10% de los 8,1m de votantes actualmente registrados están por debajo de los 30 años.

    Si Piñera decide y trata de ir un (gran) paso más adelante y termina con el sistema binomial, es probable que encuentre una feroz resistencia desde dentro de su propia coalición, primordialmente de parte de la ultra conservadora Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI). Cualquier reforma también será altamente problemática en un año electoral –la Concertación, ya entusiasmada con obtener puntos políticos fáciles contra un gobierno impopular, estará mucho más preocupada de hacerlo cuando se ponga en marcha la campaña electoral a mediados de año para las elecciones municipales de octubre. Estas elecciones han actuado históricamente más como plebiscitos sobre el desempeño del gobierno nacional y pondrá a una u otra de las dos principales coaliciones en una posición ventajosa ante las elecciones presidenciales en noviembre de 2013.

    La gobernante Coalición por el Cambio no sufrirá necesariamente el revés que podría sugerir la baja aprobación de Piñera, puesto que la encuesta del CEP deja en claro que la Concertación es igualmente impopular. Esto refleja los altos niveles de frustración con toda la clase política, como también el apoyo que Piñera podría recibir si él confronta el poco representativo sistema binominal.

    El gobierno superó el 2011 sin tener que hacer ninguna concesión realmente sustancial a las protestas de estudiantes, pero las protestas tuvieron su precio político –y no sólo en los ratings de Piñera. Piñera tuvo que designar un nuevo ministro de educación después de que Felipe Bulnes renunciara a fines de diciembre. Bulnes siguió el camino de su predecesor, Joaquín Lavín, quien sólo asumió el cargo en julio luego que las protestas acosaron al primer ministro de educación de Piñera. Bulnes fue reemplazado por Harald Beyer, un académico sin experiencia política que trabaja en el CEP, quien rápidamente se mostró como un fuerte proponente del diálogo. El ministro de agricultura José Antonio Galilea, también renunció. Fue reemplazado por Luis Mayol, presidente de la Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (SNA).

    • Popularidad

     Mientras que los hallazgos de la encuesta del CEP habrán sido una sombría lectura para el Presidente Piñera, otras dos encuestas difundidas más tarde, de Adimark y Cerc, fueron más alentadoras. La encuesta de Adimark de diciembre otorga a Piñera casi los mismos ratings de aprobación y desaprobación que la de noviembre: 34% y 60%. La encuesta de Cerc lo ubica subiendo 11 puntos, a 33%, aunque eso se compara con agosto, cuando él estaba en su punto más bajo. También tiene su rating de desaprobación cayendo 15 puntos sobre igual periodo, en 51%. La encuesta del CEP, vista ampliamente como la más confiable, ubica a Piñera en 23%. Los personajes políticos con las más altas evaluaciones fueron la predecesora de Piñera, Michelle Bachelet (82%), su ministro de obras públicas, Laurence Golborne (66%), el ministro de finanzas de Bachelet, Andrés Velasco (47%) y la líder estudiantil Camila Vallejo (44%).

    • Incendios desastrosos

     Los incendios forestales han arrasado a lo largo del sur de Chile durante los últimos 10 días. El gobierno está tan nervioso y sensible acerca de su bajo rating de aprobación que el ministro del interior, Rodrigo Hinzpeter, afirmó que podría haber “motivos políticos o económicos” detrás de los incendios. El ministro de agricultura, Luis Mayol, dijo que ciertamente ellos lucen como deliberados pues es improbable que 58 incendios separados hayan surgido de otra manera. Los incendios afectaron las regiones de Magallanes, Bíobío, y El Maule, destruyendo alrededor de 45.000 hectáreas de bosque y obligando a las autoridades a cerrar la reserva natural de renombre mundial, Torres del Paine. Un turista israelí, Rotem Singer, fue arrestado en conexión con el incendio en el parque: él ha sido dejado en libertad, pero se le ordenó permanecer en Chile mientras continúan las investigaciones.

  • ECUADOR: Leaner and meaner public sector drives boom

    LatinNews 26 January 2012 Hits: 635

    In the third quarter of 2011 the economy produced 11% more than in the same period of 2010. This puts the economy on course for 7% to 8% GDP growth in 2011, though some government officials claim that the annual rate may in fact have hit 9%. Quarter-on-quarter, the growth rate in the third quarter was a healthy 1.7%.

    Crucially, the growth has not triggered inflation. In 2011 the rate stood at 5.4%.

    In the third quarter construction was the fastest growing sector, rising 0.72% on the second. Services grew at half that rate while manufacturing output was 0.34% up on the second quarter.

    One key reason for the fast growth in 2011 was the strength of oil prices. Average oil export prices in 2011 were US$97 a barrel. Another is the increase in tax receipts of about 15% (year-on-year) thanks to a clampdown on corporate tax evasion. A third reason is a tapping of cheap (so far) credit from China.

    The main driver of the economy is the public sector, which has become leaner and meaner. Indeed on 20 January the government of President Rafael Correa announced that a further 900 public officials, from 24 state institutions, are to be laid off. The government already trimmed the public payroll by 2,700 in 2011. Opposition economists sniff that since Correa came to office in 2007 he has created 100,000 new public sector jobs. Some (perhaps 20%) of this, however, is the result of the government’s expansion of the state oil companies.

    The government argues that its reshaping of the public sector is designed to make the economy more productive. It simultaneously said that it wanted to increase the number of doctors in the country by between 40,000 and 50,000, but that it had accepted the voluntary redundancy or early retirement applications from 4,000 teachers.

    Although the trade unions have protested about the public sector layoffs, the boom in the economy and the strong creation of new jobs has muted the effects of their objections. The Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos calculated that in the October and November the economy created 151,000 new jobs. Almost half of these were in commerce. The effect of this job creation was to bring the unemployment rate down to 5.1%. This was the lowest rate since 2007. Unemployment hit 9% in 2009.

    Investment: Wilson Pástor, the minister of non-renewable resources, said that the country should sign mining and oil development contracts worth a total of US$6bn in fresh investment by February. In the penultimate week of January, US$3.5bn in secondary recovery and mining contracts should be signed, while in February another US$2.5bn worth of contracts covering mature oilfields should be inked. Apparently, the imminent contracts cover four mature fields and the deals should have signed last September. The foreign subcontractors are committing to invest US$3.3bn.

    One of the mining contracts appears to be the deal with the Canadian gold mining company, Kinross, which calls for an initial investment of US$1.1bn. The government is also negotiating with Ecuacorriente, a subsidiary of Corriente Resources (also from Canada), over the right to develop the Mirador copper deposit. The government noted that in 2011 foreign investment in the oil industry was worth about US$440m.

  • Turkey edges towards intervention in Syria

    LatinNews 29 February 2012 Hits: 292

    As the campaign in the West intensifies for something to be done to stop the brutal suppression of the Syrian rebellion by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, we have been receiving indications of a greater willingness in Turkey to intervene.  If these indications are accurate, it is a significant development.

    The talk in Ankara is that Turkey is preparing to lead the setting up of a humanitarian corridor into Syria without the backing of the UN, as happened in Kosovo in 1999.  The trigger, a Turkish official says, would be if the humanitarian problems in Syria were to reach “unbearable dimensions”, and on 27 February Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) issued a statement saying that the international community should not remain indifferent to “mass massacres” in Syria.  It is thought in Ankara (and, as it happens, in Beijing) that Russia may weaken its opposition to an intervention once its 4 March presidential election is over.  Such a move would have the strong support of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states as well as of the West.

    It is important to note, however, that there is also strong opposition within Turkey to an intervention.  The idea of Turkey putting itself forward as a power “that establishes order” is considered by some, including some close to the government, as a dangerous development that could undermine the careful building of Turkish ‘soft power’ since the Arab Awakening – in which Turkey is advancing itself as the model to be emulated.  Opponents say that the fact that any intervention would be carried out under a banner of humanitarianism rather than regime change would count for little in the long-term.

    Then there is the problem of falling out with Iran, and here there are real dangers too.  Iran has been making a concerted effort to establish its presence in Turkey in order to help with sanctions-busting, but this could equally be turned into destabilization efforts.  For instance, as of 31 December 2011, there were 2,140 Iranian-funded companies operating in Turkey, 590 of which (nearly 30%) were set up in 2011 alone.  The presence of many of these companies is not innocent.

    It is also doubtful that Russia will significantly change its tune following the election.  If anything its fears about war in the Middle East have been rising since the escalation in the spat between Iran and Azerbaijan.  On 12 February, Iran accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use its territory in its campaign of assassinations against Iranian nuclear scientists.  A week later, police in Azerbaijan said that they had arrested people linked to Iran and Hezbollah planning attacks in the country.  Then, on 28 February, Iran issued furious complaints about a $1.6bn Israeli arms sale to Azerbaijan, railing against “the creeping influence of Zionists and foreigners in the South Caucasus region”.

    On 29 February, the head of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States anti-terrorism centre, Andrey Novikov, warned specifically about “destabilization in the Caspian Sea area and in the South Caucasus” as an inevitable consequence of war with Iran.  And given Iran’s strong backing for Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, a military intervention in Syria cannot be isolated from the threat of war with Iran.

  • POINTERS

    LatinNews 06 August 2012 Hits: 1968

    HAITI | Martelly secures help to build new army. On 26 July Brazil’s defence minister, Celso Amorim, announced that his country had agreed to assist Haiti in creating a new army. President Michel Martelly had requested this support from his Brazilian peer, Dilma Rousseff, when he visited Brazil last January. Amorim has agreed with his Haitian counterpart, Rodolphe Joazile, that a mission of Brazil’s three armed services will travel to Haiti within weeks to start assessing the country’s needs. Amorim has put special emphasis on plans to send Haitians to Brazil to train as army engineers, to prepare a corps able to deal with natural disasters.

    In response to press questions about the old Haitian army’s dismal human rights record, Amorim acknowledged that the matter had been raised and that he had received assurances that the new armed force would not be turned into a personal presidential militia. Brazil, the largest contributor of personnel to Minustah, whose mandate expires in October, still has about 2,000 troops in the country.

    Joazile said that due to financial constraints the initial intake of the new armed force would be limited to 1,500, less than half the 3,500 recommended by a commission set up by President Martelly. Martelly has been at pains to underline that the creation of a new armed force will not conspire against existing plans to strengthen the national police — a direct response to US pressure to concentrate solely on the latter. US ambassador Kenneth Marten has said that his country will not oppose Haiti’s plans to set up the new army, but will not provide funds for that. Joazile has said that during Martelly’s visit to Ecuador in July, his peer Rafael Correa had also promised to help with the creation of the new army.

    EL SALVADOR | Gangs promise partial disarmament. The two main street gangs in El Salvador, which agreed a truce last March, announced on 12 July that they had pledged to the two mediators, Bishop Fabio Colindres and former guerrilla Raúl Mijango, that they will surrender half of their weapons and ammunition to the authorities as a ‘goodwill gesture’. Justice & Security Minister David Munguía Payés had stated only a couple of days earlier that the government ‘has not ceased to pursue the gangs’. Its strategy, he said, ‘is integral, comprising control, repression and crime prevention.’ He noted that a survey his ministry is conducting has verified the existence of 64,000 gang members, and that this figure is likely to rise to more than 95,000.

    COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA | New cause of friction. On 2 July the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ) handed down a ruling in the suit brought by Nicaragua, condemning Costa Rica for acting in breach of international commitments with the construction of a 130-kilometre road along its bank of the San Juan River, ordering its immediate suspension. Costa Rica is not a member of the CCJ; in protest against the ruling it has announced that it will not attend meeting of the Central American integration system (Sica), the regional integration bloc, as long as Nicaragua occupies the pro tempore presidency. Separately, Costa Rica has announced that it will oppose Nicaraguan plans to build an inter-oceanic canal using disputed stretches of the San Juan River (one of several possible routes). The Nicaraguan assembly approved on 3 July a bill authorising the construction of such a canal.

  • CHILE: Strategic debates ahead of primary elections

    LatinNews 27 June 2013 Hits: 991

    Chile staged intriguing debates over the last two weekends ahead of primary elections on 30 June; intriguing not because of their content but because of their tone. The primary election within the opposition Concertaciόn is billed as a cakewalk for former president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), the clear frontrunner to win not just this weekend but also in eventual presidential elections in November. The fact that her rivals were more intent on squabbling with each other rather than taking her to task showed the importance of finishing second to maximise influence within Bachelet’s presidential campaign. The two men seeking the candidacy of the ruling Coaliciόn por el Cambio, meanwhile, seemed to have signed a non-aggression pact, promising to work together whatever the outcome to defeat Bachelet in November.

    Bachelet serenely smiled while Andrés Velasco, an independent who served as her finance minister, and Claudio Orrego, who is standing for the centre-left Democracia Cristiana (DC), concentrated their firepower on each other. Velasco said Orrego represented a party elite happy to talk about change but with a poor track record on delivering it; Orrego said Velasco had no political experience (glossing over his previous senior cabinet position) and was cut from the same cloth as the technocrats with which President Sebastián Piñera has stacked his cabinet, with no ability to relate to the public.

    The fierce exchange between Orrego and Velasco prompted some commentators to ponder why Bachelet got away more or less scot free in the debate. The likely answer to this is that Orrego and Velasco have accepted that Bachelet’s lead is unassailable and are jostling for second place along with José Antonio Gómez, the president of the Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (PRSD).

    Coming second is more significant than it seems. The final positions, and votes won, of the losing candidates will have a bearing on the presidential campaign which Bachelet runs after the primaries. If Orrego performs well, for instance, Bachelet will have little choice but to make gestures to the DC. If he performs poorly, and Velasco comes second, it will give Bachelet greater freedom to pursue her current strategy of cosying up to the radical left-wing Partido Comunista de Chile as the DC would have lost influence.

    Given that Bachelet is widely predicted to win comfortably, enthusing and mobilising supporters will be a real challenge for the DC. As the largest party in the Concertaciόn, however, the DC does have an impressive party machinery. This is something which Velasco palpably lacks but, with no entrenched party interests, he can more credibly argue that he would deliver on his promise of change (see sidebar).

    Debate on the Right

    The debate within the Coaliciόn por el Cambio (CC) was a more anodyne affair. Andrés Allamand, of the centre-right Renovaciόn Nacional (RN), had been engaged in an acrimonious struggle with Laurence Golborne, the candidate for the right-wing Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) earlier this year for the CC candidacy until the latter was forced to step aside in the face of embarrassing revelations [WR-13-17].

    The new standardbearer of the UDI, Pablo Longueira, is, like Allamand, a veteran politician. The two never really squared off, possibly calculating that the debates (a new feature) would not capture the popular imagination and, as such, would have little impact on the public. After the divisiveness of the Golborne-Allamand struggle they seemed more intent on evincing the unity of purpose within the CC in readiness for the forthcoming tussle with Bachelet in November.

    Protests break out ahead of primaries

    Dozens of schools designated as polling stations for the primary elections on 30 June are being occupied by students, although the government insists that they will be evicted in time for the vote. Tens of thousands of protesters participated in a nationwide mobilisation, organised by the umbrella student confederation (Confech), on 26 June, the largest taking place in Santiago.

        University and secondary school students have been protesting periodically since 2011 to demand free education and an end to for-profit universities. They have staged four such protests so far in 2013. These protests were different, however, as they received support, inter alia, from the trade union Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), dock workers from the Federación de Trabajadores Portuarios, and the Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC), an umbrella trade union including contracted workers for the state copper giant Codelco, who shut off some ports and mines and pushed their own agendas, such as better union rights and wages.

        Many of the protesters found common cause in calling for the ‘renationalisation’ of Chile’s copper industry, with student leaders arguing that “Free education in Chile is possible because we have copper”.

        The protests were largely peaceful, although a small minority of hooded protesters clashed with Carabineros, burning barricades set up in the capital, and were dispersed with tear gas and water cannon.

    • Velasco

    Andrés Velasco argues that constitutional reform is essential, including changing the binomial electoral system, which he says is obsolete. The Harvard-educated Velasco co-authored a book in December 2011 entitled “Contra la desigualdad”, which served as an advanced electoral manifesto. The main premise of the book is that inequality of employment amplifies inequality of income. It calls for economic policies that promote access to jobs, especially in the poorest sectors; broadening subsidies for young workers; and opening up the labour market to women.

    • Pacific Alliance

    On 20 June Colombia’s export promotion agency, Proexport Colombia, said that Chile had benefited the most from the first business round to be hosted by the Pacific Alliance regional trade bloc which took place in Cali, Colombia. According to the agency’s figures US$90.8m of business deals were agreed during the two-day event that started on 22 June, with Chile securing 31% of all deals followed by Colombia (26%), Peru (22%) and Mexico (21%). The sector that produced the largest level of potential deals was the foods sector (53%), followed by manufacturing (25%), textiles (13.8%) and services (7.1%).  

  • RASTREANDO TENDENCIAS

    LatinNews 07 October 2013 Hits: 374

    MÉXICO | El costo de las tormentas. El ministro de economía y finanzas, Luis Videgaray, reconoció el 27 de septiembre que el impacto de las tormentas tropicales ‘Ingrid’ y ‘Manuel’ reduciría una décima de punto porcentual el crecimiento del PIB en el 2013, rebajando el pronóstico oficial a 1,7%. Esto es ahora menos de la mitad de la predicción de 3,5% hecha por el nuevo gobierno cuando asumió el poder el Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto el pasado diciembre. Videgaray dijo que M$17,5mm (US$1,33mm) estaban disponibles para la reconstrucción, principalmente en el estado de Guerrero. De este total, M$12,5mm (US$948m) provendrán del fondo para desastres (Fonden) y otros M$5mm (US$379m) de los gastos que habían sido reservados para el revestimiento de carreteras. Él dijo que ya estaba trabajando con los diputados para enmendar el presupuesto a fin de proveer más recursos para la reconstrucción. La asociación de aseguradoras de México estima que los costos totales de la reconstrucción llegarán a M$75mm (US$5,69mm).

    Analistas del banco local, Ve por Más, difundieron una nota investigativa el 25 de septiembre afirmando que las tormentas tendrían un significativo impacto negativo sobre el crecimiento del PIB en el tercer trimestre, que ellos esperan que será de solo el 0,9%, mucho menos que del 1,4% pronosticado previamente. Señalando que el desempeño de la economía interna ha sido “desalentador” a lo largo del año, la nota agrega que esperan que el crecimiento para fin de año ahora será de solamente el 1,2%. Igualmente, el coordinador de estudios económicos de Banamex, Eduardo González, dijo en su propio informe que las tormentas reducirían la tasa de crecimiento proyectada del PIB para el tercer y cuarto trimestre en dos décimas de punto porcentual, llevando el pronóstico de crecimiento de Banamex para el año un aún más bajo 1,1%.

    A pesar del hecho de que Videgaray ahora ha realizado tres revisiones hacia en el pronóstico de crecimiento consecutivas, él rechazó la idea de que la economía mexicana se dirige a una recesión. Él reconoció que la actividad de la economía interna sufrió “una aguda caída” este año, pero dijo que esto se debió a “factores de shock transitorios”, y que la actividad economía se elevaría en el cuarto trimestre, en particular cuando se inicien los esfuerzos de reconstrucción.

    • Reducen pronóstico de crecimiento

    El ministro de finanzas, Luis Videgaray, atribuyó sus tres consecutivas revisiones hacia abajo en el crecimiento económico a un número de factores internos y externos: una caída en las exportaciones como resultado de la continuada crisis económica global; una demanda interna más débil de lo esperado en la primera mitad del año; y más recientemente, las tormentas tropicales que golpearon las costas de México en septiembre.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    LatinNews 11 December 2014 Hits: 741

    PERU | One step closer to joining OECD. On 8 December Peru signed a mutual understanding and cooperation agreement with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), part of the process that will allow the country to join the international organisation by 2021 as envisioned by the government led by President Ollanta Humala.

    Back in May, Peru was invited to begin the process to become the fourth Latin American country to join the OECD, following in the footsteps of its fellow Pacific Alliance partners Mexico and Chile (which are full OECD members) and Colombia (which is currently in the final stages of the adhesion process).

    The agreement was signed by President Humala and the OECD’s secretary general, Angel Gurría, on the sidelines of the XXIV Ibero-American summit held in the eastern Mexican city of Veracruz on 8 and 9 December. The agreement outlines a series of measures, part of a so-called ‘Country Programme’, that are to be adopted by Peru over the next seven years in order to comply with OECD standards.

    An official Peruvian government statement said that the signing of the agreements “represents the start of phase one in Peru’s relations with the OECD and shows Peru’s commitment to attaining the good governance and public policy design standards upheld by this organisation’s members”.

    Peru’s economy & finance minister, Alonso Segura, hailed the signing of the agreement as a “historic milestone” for his country. Segura explained that Peru is commercially integrated to the world via all kinds of trade agreements, but that the latest agreement seeks to “incorporate knowledge of best practices employed by developed economies”. He added that the accord signed by Humala would serve as a “catalyst” to continue adopting economic reforms that would help Peru reach developed economy status. Indeed Segura said that the measures could help Peru’s domestic economy to overcome its current slowdown and lead to sustained growth in the medium term.

    After posting decent growth of 5% in 2013 the Peruvian economy is forecast to grow by 3.6% this year. The Humala administration maintains that thanks to the various economic stimulus measures it has recently implemented, the economy will recover strongly. However, Segura admitted that the 5.5% growth target set for next year is now looking unlikely and that he expects the economy to rebound to 5% growth in 2015.

    COLOMBIA | Puerto Brisa. On 7 December Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos inaugurated a brand new US$70.9m multipurpose port near the town of Dibulla in the north-easternmost Caribbean border department of La Guajira. The Puerto Brisa deep-water port terminal is capable of handling up to 5,000 tonnes (t) of cargo per hour and accommodating vessels with up to 18.5m draughts capable of freighting up to 180,000t of cargo.

    In a speech Santos said that the port would help boost the country’s exports, in particular hydrocarbon and coal shipments as the port has been specifically designed to cater for ships that transport oil, coal, natural gas, and other petrochemicals. Santos added that the project also included a second and third phase that involve the construction of a new 523km railway linking the port to inland areas, as well as the construction of five additional piers at Puerto Brisa that would increase its capacity to handle general cargo containers.

    Santos said that the project would help Colombia to overcome its lack of port infrastructure resulting from decades of lack of investment in the Caribbean coastal areas especially. As part of its efforts to reverse this, the Santos administration has launched infrastructure investment programmes targeting La Guajira department in particular which in recent years has seen the construction of three ‘mega ports’ - Puerto Bolívar Cerrejón Zona Norte, Sociedad Portuaria La Península (Pensoport S.A.) and Puerto Brisa - a total investment of US$234.39m.

    The problem for the Santos administration is that its efforts to develop Colombia’s port infrastructure come as the commodity boom cycle appears to be over, with the prices of oil and minerals falling in international markets for the first time in years. Finance Minister Mauricio Cárdenas recently admitted that the lower price of oil, for example, could lead to the slashing of the official 2015 GDP growth forecast of 4.7%.

    • La Paz wonder city

    On 8 December Bernard Weber, the founder and president of the New7Wonders foundation revealed that, along with Cuba’s capital, Havana, Bolivia’s capital, La Paz, has been selected as one of the seven new wonder cities of the world. Since 2000, the New7Wonders foundation has conducted global polls to select new wonders of the world from lists compiled by experts. According to Weber after a lengthy selection process that began in 2011 and included 1,200 cities, the public voted to include La Paz, Havana, Beirut (Lebanon), Doha (Qatar), Durban (South Africa), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) and Vigan (Philippines) as the new wonder cities. The reaction of La Paz’s mayor, Luis Revilla, was to announce that his government will now seek to attract more investment to the city’s tourism sector.

  • RASTREANDO TENDENCIAS

    LatinNews 24 April 2015 Hits: 703

    BOLIVIA | Adaptándose al cambio climático. El 21 de abril Nemesio Quispe, el director de la Autoridad Plurinacional de la Madre Tierra de Bolivia, anunció que el gobierno boliviano invertirá B$205m (US$29m) en proyectos que ayudarán al país a adaptarse al cambio climático. De acuerdo con Quispe, los proyectos, que se concentrarán principalmente en los departamentos de Pando y La Paz, incluyen planes para contrarrestar el efecto invernadero a través de la manejo sostenible de los bosques locales.

    Quispe explicó que las iniciativas están relacionadas con “el manejo integral y sustentable de los bosques y las plantaciones de cacao y café para desarrollar productos que respetan los derechos de la Madre Tierra y de los pueblos indígenas”. Y agregó que las iniciativas serían financiadas en parte por las agencias de cooperación de Dinamarca y Suecia, y por el Programa de de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD).

    ECUADOR | Nuevos contratos petroleros. El Ministerio Coordinador de Sectores Estratégicos de Ecuador anunció la semana pasada que las firmas petroleras estatales de Chile y de Bielorrusia habían firmado dos nuevos contratos de joint venture con la firma petrolera estatal local, Petroamazonas, que traerán unos US$100m en inversiones para el sector petrolero de Ecuador en los próximos cuatro años.

    Una declaración ministerial expresa que uno de los contratos incluye el otorgamiento de una concesión para explotar el Bloque 28, localizado en la provincia amazónica de Pastaza, a un consorcio compuesto por Petroamazonas EP (que tendrá una participación del 51%); Enap Sipetrol de Chile (42%); y Belorusneft de Bielorusia (7%). De acuerdo con la declaración del ministerio, las tres firmas han acordado invertir unos US$25m iniciales para explorar el Bloque 28; y unos US$375m adicionales para explotar cualquier depósito que se encuentre que contenga hidrocarburos recuperables. Petroamazonas cree que el Bloque 28 podría contener entre 30m – 50m de barriles de petróleo.

    Por otra parte, el segundo nuevo contrato incluye una modificación al existente contrato de provisión de servicios para la exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos que Enap Sipetrol tiene vigente con Petroamazonas en el Bloque 47 del campo Paraíso Biguno Hauchito e Intracampos (PBHI), también localizado en la provincia de Pastaza. Estas modificaciones extienden el contrato de provisión de servicios de Enap Sipetrol hasta el 2034, a cambio del cual la compañía ha prometido invertir unos US$80m para perforar dos nuevos pozos en el PBHI; y construir nuevas instalaciones de producción y un nuevo oleoducto.

    PERÚ | Fortaleciendo los lazos con Corea del Sur. Los gobiernos de Perú y de Corea del Sur anunciaron el 20 de abril que habían firmado cinco acuerdos bilaterales de cooperación, cubriendo áreas de administración pública, aduanas, industria y tecnología, y salud. Los acuerdos fueron firmados durante una reunión entre el Presidente de Perú, Ollanta Humala, y su contraparte surcoreana, Park Geun-hye, durante la visita de cuatro días de la última a Perú.

    En una conferencia de prensa conjunta, Humala dijo que las relaciones bilaterales con Corea del Sur habían alcanzado “su mejor momento” y que los acuerdos ayudarán a estimular aún más los lazos, que actualmente se concentran en “fortalecer la capacidad [de producción] de Perú, a través de creativos mecanismos de transferencia de tecnología”. En este sentido, Humala dijo que ambos países actualmente estaban “desarrollando un corredor tecnológico basado en la tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones”.

    Park coincidió en que los dos países se habían “acercado más” en los últimos años y dijo que ella tuvo una “profunda discusión [con Humala] sobre cómo enriquecer nuestra mutua cooperación [...] ambos nos decidimos a ir más allá del comercio tradicional y expandirnos hacia otros campos”.

    Perú y Corea del Sur firmaron un tratado de libre comercio en el 2011, y el comercio bilateral se ha estado incrementando de manera constante desde entonces, llegando a US$2,59mm el año pasado. Sin embargo, Humala dijo que el objetivo de su gobierno era que Perú esté entre los 20 principales socios comerciales de Corea del Sur.

    El día siguiente, Humala y Park entregaron el primer avión de una flota de aviones de entrenamiento militar desarrollado en forma conjunta por los dos países para la Fuerza Aérea Peruana (FAP). El aeroplano ‘KT-1P’ fue desarrollado por la FAP con la ayuda de Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) como parte de un acuerdo de transferencia de tecnología de US$208m [IL-14-21]. Según Humala, la producción del KT-1P es un “logro industrial histórico para Perú [y] es el resultado directo del programa de co-producción que estableció los parámetros para los esfuerzos de la futura cooperación, innovación y transferencia de tecnología” con Corea del Sur.

    La visita de Park a Perú es parte de una gira suramericana más amplia que ha incluido una parada previa en Colombia y que también la verá yendo a Chile.

    • AMX-1

    El 14 de abril Claro Colombia, la subsidiaria del gigante mexicano de las telecomunicaciones América Móvil, inauguró su cable submarino de fibra óptica ‘AMX-1’, el cable de más alta capacidad de su clase en América Latina. El cable AMX-1 de 17.500kms y de US$500m comienza y termina en Puerto Colombia, en el departamento Atlántico, pero se extiende a través del área del Caribe, con conexiones con la República Dominicana, Puerto Rico, Guatemala, México, Estados Unidos, y Brasil. De acuerdo con Claro Colombia, el AMX-1 incrementará las velocidades de conexión a través de Internet de Colombia 50 veces, así como también soportará 846m de llamadas telefónicas simultáneas. Claro Colombia agregó que el nuevo cable ayudaría a cubrir la actual demanda de Colombia por más telefonía móvil 4G e Internet de alta velocidad. El ministro de tecnología de comunicaciones & información de Colombia, Diego Molano, dijo que el AMX-1 ayudaría “a reducir la brecha digital de Colombia”.

     

  • CHILE: New targets of arson attacks in Mapuche conflict

    LatinNews 29 April 2016 Hits: 706

    A recent series of attacks on churches and a university has triggered fresh concerns vis-à-vis the long-running Mapuche conflict stemming from land-related demands in the southern Araucanía, Los Ríos, and Bío Bío Regions. Previous attacks have mainly targeted agricultural machinery and trucks. A new group calling itself “Weichan Auka Mapu” is claiming responsibility for the latest attacks, distinguishing itself from the radical Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) which has traditionally assumed authority for such incidents. This has led religious figures to call on the government led by President Michelle Bachelet to address the violence which has also been attributed in part to the arrests at the end of March of 11 people, including 10 Mapuche. The arrests are linked to the January 2013 murders of a landowning couple in the Araucanía which had signalled a new low in the conflict [SSR-13-01].

    The most recent attack took place on 26 April on an evangelical church in Padre Las Casas, Araucanía region. According to the local media, a pamphlet left at the scene was signed “Weichan Auka Mapu” and alluded to a decision taken the same day by the supreme justice court to reject appeals presented by the 11 people arrested at the end of March in relation to the January 2013 murders of Werner Luchsinger, a landowner and wealthy forestry businessman, and his wife Vivianne McKay. So far one person has been convicted of the crime – Celestino Córdova, a Mapuche who in February 2014 received an 18-year prison sentence.

    On 20 April the local media circulated a communique signed by “Weichan Auka Mapu” which claimed responsibility for “over 30 acts of sabotage” since May 2013 – including arson attacks on four chapels since March 2016. These latest attacks have prompted concern from religious leaders. On 15 April evangelical bishop Emiliano Soto met Interior Minister Jorge Burgos and deputy interior minister Mahmud Aleuy to express his concerns. Three days later, Soto, president of the Chilean council of bishops and pastors Bishop Jorge Méndez, and president of the national council of evangelical churches Bishop Eduardo Durán, met Araucanía governor Andrés Jouannet to discuss the attacks.

    Also attracting recent headlines was an incident which took place on 18 April in which a technology centre at the Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción private institution in Cañete commune, Bío Bío, was set alight, resulting in damage worth Cl$500m (US$757,000). The attack, which Rector Christian Schmitz described as “unprecedented” was carried out by eight individuals, according to the Carabineros police, who reportedly left calling for the “liberation of comuneros” – a reference to the 11 arrested.

    Violence

    Despite the concern over attacks on religious institutions, on 18 April the local press reported the findings of a survey carried out by the local private sector lobby, Multigremial de La Araucanía, on attacks with an “an indigenous connotation” which showed a decline of nearly 50% in complaints regarding such incidents in the first three months of 2016 compared with the same period the previous year.

    According to the survey, there were 58 complaints in the Araucanía, down from 105 over the same period in 2015, while in Bío Bío the number of complaints dropped to 19 from 28. Los Ríos, however, bucked the trend with ten complaints registered, up from three in the first quarter of 2015.

    According to the same report, in the first three months, there were a total of 50 fires in all three regions. These affected: 23 lorries; 12 items of forestry equipment; nine forests; three vehicles used for transporting forestry workers; five churches; and two harvesters, among other things.

  • CHILE: Still struggling to appease protests

    LatinNews 12 December 2019 Hits: 984

    The Chilean government has taken more steps this week to try to put an end to the social protests that have been raging in the country for over a month now. These have included more initiatives designed to address some of the protest demands, such as improving pensions and tackling other issues that entrench social and economic inequality in the country. But with the main initiative previously tabled to try to resolve the discontent – the drafting of a new constitution – still stuck in congress, the highly damaging social mobilisations look set to continue.

    President Sebastián Piñera has announced a series of different initiatives aimed at appeasing the protests since these broke out. These include a ‘social agenda’ of measures designed to offer economic relief to low income earners and improve their access to social services; a ‘public security agenda’ of measures to reinforce public security and protect private property amid the violent demonstrations; and a commitment to work with the political opposition to draft a new constitution that incorporates more individual rights and guarantees. Yet none of these announcements have succeeded in convincing protest groups to abandon the public protests. Although all these initiatives have been sent to the national congress and the government has even secured a commitment from the opposition to support some of the measures, the public protests have continued.

    Not even the approval of some of these measures have succeeded in easing the public discontent. The government had hoped that after the senate gave final approval on 4 December to a bill that increases pension pay-outs, this would help to ease some of the social tensions [WR-19-48]. The government said that it was an important step in improving pensions but acknowledged that more needed to be done and that the next step would be to work with congress to approve increases in pension pay-outs for all other groups of pensioners.

    However, the approval of the pensions bill has not silenced the calls for a wider pension reform. Protest group ‘No+AFP’, which has been demanding the replacement of the privately managed public pension model since 2016, has staged further demonstrations pressing for a comprehensive pension reform. Not all in the opposition are convinced by the new pension bill. Democracia Cristiana (DC) has tabled another bill in congress that seeks to increase pension pay-outs by even more than the recently approved bill. With the demonstrations continuing, Piñera decided to announce yet another set of initiatives that his government will send to congress in a bid to address all of the issues that concern protesters.

    • DC proposal

    The DC pensions bill, presented to congress on 9 December, proposes increasing taxes on big business to raise an additional US$5bn to fund the pensions system. A DC statement said that the proposal will not supplant the recently approved government-sponsored bill but supplement it, so as to significantly and immediately increase basic level pensions. The statement adds that the proposal, which does not involve a major reform of the existing system, would have “an overwhelming impact on the life of Chileans… while maintaining all the positive aspects of the individual capitalisation system”.

    Piñera unveiled the so-called ‘anti-abuse’ agenda on 9 December. He said that this agenda includes a series of legal reforms designed to better combat corruption and economic crimes such as collusion, tax evasion, and insider trading. These include introducing tougher punishments for those guilty of such crimes and giving prosecutors more powers to investigate them. Piñera explained that the objective of the anti-abuse agenda is to improve consumer rights by introducing stronger deterrents against crimes that affect them.

    “In recent years we have seen indignant and sensible cases of collusion and abuse in important markets such as those for medicines, toilet paper, and chicken that have affected the immense majority of Chileans,” Piñera said emphasising that the anti-abuse agenda is part of his government’s commitment to address public demands “for a more just Chile”. But the unveiling of the anti-abuse agenda has not persuaded protest groups to end their mobilisations. No+AFP and other organisations have said that they will continue to protest until the government heeds all of their demands including for a comprehensive pension reform and an expedited constituent process with broader public participation.

    The demand for an expedited constituent process comes as disagreements have emerged between the ruling centre-right Chile Vamos coalition and the opposition over the constitutional reform bill that is currently being discussed in congress. These disagreements revolve over some technical aspects of the bill which the opposition claims would give Chile Vamos an undue say in the process of drafting a new constitution and that it wants to change.

    The opposition complains that the proposal for convening a constituent convention tasked with drafting a new constitution [WR-19-46] that has been drafted by a cross-party technical commission and presented to political parties on 6 December includes some provisions that would result in Chile Vamos being overrepresented in the convention. These include the drawing of new electoral districts from which convention members would be elected, and limiting the number of elected members to 155, but not including quotas for women and indigenous communities. Chile Vamos has dismissed these complaints as nothing more than an attempt to delay the constituent process after a broad political agreement on it had been reached. 

  • COLOMBIA: Can a replay of 2018 be avoided?

    LatinNews 18 February 2021 Hits: 4519

    Seven left-wing political parties announced a “historic pact” on 11 February, to build a political coalition capable of winning a majority in next year’s presidential and congressional elections. But it is not yet clear if it can avoid a replay of the 2018 elections, when divisions between the left and the centre-left opened the door to a victory for the right.

    In the first round of the 2018 presidential race, right-winger Iván Duque won 39.1% of the vote, followed by left-winger Gustavo Petro with 25.1% and centre-left candidate Sergio Fajardo in third place with 23.7%. In theory at least, Fajardo could have thrown his support behind Petro, strengthening his chances of winning in the second round. But the two men did not get on and were unable to overcome their political differences. Fajardo failed to endorse Petro, famously opting instead to take time off to go whale-spotting. This contributed in June 2018 to Duque’s victory in the second-round run-off ballot, when he took 54% of the vote against 41.8% for Petro.

    As the next general elections begin to approach (the first round is due in May 2022, 15 months from now) the question is whether it could all happen again. These are still early days, and the situation is fluid, but the Petro-Fajardo division remains an important fault line in Colombian politics. The seven-party left-wing alliance that has just been announced includes Petro’s Colombia Humana, Unión Patriótica (UP), and the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) led by Senator Iván Cepeda, as well as other smaller groupings. Comunes, the party of the demobilised Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc), says it too wants to join.

    The coalition says it will compile joint lists of congressional candidates and will aim to win 55 seats in the senate and 86 in the chamber of deputies, the numbers necessary to achieve a majority. The precise mechanism for choosing the coalition’s presidential candidate is not yet clear, but Petro is clearly the favourite.

    Politicians of the centre are beginning to position themselves for the race. There has been a lot of preparatory movement. Through his Compromiso Ciudadano movement, Fajardo, the former governor of the north-western department of Antioquia and mayor of its capital Medellín, has been involved in talks on a “Coalición de la Esperanza” coalition, which includes the left-of-centre Alianza Verde (AV).

    The mayor of Bogotá, Claudia López, who has an impressive 61% approval rating, is a well-known supporter of another Fajardo presidential run. But her party appears less unanimous, with its congressional deputies publicly disagreeing on whether it has or has not been involved in exploratory talks with the pro-Petro coalition. A lot of other names are also in play as potential centrist candidates. They include Senator Ángela María Robledo, Petro’s former running mate who said she felt there was no room for her feminist views within Colombia Humana and has since defected to join the AV.

    Other potential centrist candidates include Humberto de la Calle, the former chief peace negotiator with the Farc who ran unsuccessfully for the centrist Partido Liberal (PL) in the 2018 presidential elections, and Senator Roy Barreras from the Partido de la U (PU), a fierce critic of Duque and his ruling right-wing Centro Democrático (CD), especially over the implementation of the peace accord with the Farc. Meanwhile, on the right, the search for a candidate to succeed Duque is still at an early stage.

    Campaign proposals

    Senator Clara López, who was the Unión Patriótica (UP) presidential candidate in 2018, says the new coalition will support wide-ranging reforms, including the introduction of universal basic income, as well as pushing for the full implementation of the 2016 peace agreement with the Farc.

  • PARAGUAY: The growing cocaine business

    LatinNews 04 June 2021 Hits: 4398

    Paraguay has taken on a new, more active, role within the international drug trade. The landlocked country, traditionally a major marijuana producer, is now a busy transit hub for cocaine shipments to Europe and has even become a producer of the Class A drug. 

    A series of drug hauls in recent months confirm Paraguay’s growing role in the cocaine trade. The most eye-catching was in February this year, when European authorities seized a combined 23.2 tonnes (t) of cocaine in the German port of Hamburg and the Belgian port of Antwerp. The 16t of the drug seized in Hamburg were concealed in a shipment of paint from Paraguay, while the 7.2t uncovered in Belgium were found hidden in blocks of wood, reportedly arriving from Panama. This record haul led to the launch of an anti-narcotics operation by authorities in Paraguay, with raids on several addresses in the capital Asunción. One of the exporting companies targeted in the raids, Pinturas Tupa SA, said it had been a victim of transnational organised crime.

    In early April, port authorities in Antwerp seized a further 11t of cocaine in a shipment of blue leather, believed to have left the Paraguayan river port of Villeta in February. Again, Paraguay’s anti-narcotics secretariat (Senad) reacted by carrying out searches at a number of local private companies understood to be responsible for the goods in which the drugs were concealed. At the time, the Senad reported that Belgian authorities had informed them that one of the companies involved in the leather shipment, Artis SA, had also been responsible for a shipment of soya flour in which 1.1t of cocaine had been found at the port of Antwerp in June 2020. 

    Meanwhile, police are also regularly seizing drugs on Paraguayan territory. On 10 May, the Senad reported the seizure of 404kg of cocaine in a lorry supposedly transporting foodstuffs from Bolivia to Asunción. Also in May, at least two drug encampments were discovered and raided, one in the Paso Bravo national park in Concepción department, and one in the Presidente Hayes department in the Paraguayan Chaco. In Paso Bravo, police seized 55kg of cocaine and 110 packages of pressed marijuana, as well as uncovering a cocaine processing laboratory and three landing strips; this was part of a wider operation during which seven landing strips found inside the national park were destroyed. Meanwhile, in the Chaco, three landing strips – including one which was one kilometre long and equipped with lighting – were found, showing signs of “intense” use, along with 449 kilos of cocaine, estimated to have a value of US$3m in Paraguay and US$6m on international markets. 

    An evolving market

    There is no question that Paraguay is now much more than merely a transit country for the Brazilian market where the cocaine trade is concerned. Specialist website Insight Crime notes that, as controls in both Brazilian ports and Europe have been ramped up, Paraguay emerged as an appealing new route for drug trafficking – “a landlocked country somewhat under the radar, but with a river port infrastructure”. Maritime transport is key for exporting large quantities of drugs, although networks of traffickers using air travel links to traffic cocaine have recently been busted (see below). As well as having maritime transport links, Paraguay is home to the vast and sparsely populated expanse of the Chaco lowlands in the west of the country, where it is easy to conceal landing strips, encampments, and laboratories. The country currently lacks the infrastructure and equipment to effectively control the region. 

    Carlos Peris, a sociologist at the Universidad Nacional de Asunción, believes Paraguay has become “an active link” in the cocaine production chain. “Today, [Paraguay] is in an era of businesses where the production, transport, and distribution [of cocaine] are all linked under the logic of leasing and providing services,” the Paraguayan news site Última Hora explained in a 10 May piece citing recent research by Peris.

    Although the transnational drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) responsible for the cocaine trade in Brazil – notably the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – are well established in Paraguay, Peris believes local businesses with no apparent links to the PCC are increasingly involved, as the operations following the large European drug hauls would suggest. Peris also says that corrupt officials sustain drug trafficking activities in Paraguay; and that the country is an attractive place for criminals to launder their proceeds from drug trafficking. Corruption and money laundering are two perennial challenges for the Paraguayan authorities, which could face growing pressure to up their efforts to tackle them as attention increasingly turns to Paraguay’s role in the global drug trade.    

    A narco-state in the making?

    The scale of the recent European drug seizures arriving from Paraguay, and the budding scrutiny of the cocaine trade in the Southern Cone country have led some in Paraguay to worry that their country is on the way to becoming a ‘narco-state’. National daily Última Hora raised this in a 11 May editorial, which stressed that measures to prevent Paraguay from going the way of “other Latin American countries” must be taken “urgently”.

    Trafficking cocaine by air

    On 11 May, Paraguay’s Senad detained four employees of the country’s national civil aviation authority (Dinac), suspected of being part of a drug trafficking network that shipped cocaine to Spain by air. The employees were arrested after 23kg of cocaine were found in suitcases at Asunción’s Silvio Pettirossi international airport. Senad said it is investigating the possible existence of a network of corrupt employees, whose job it is to slip the drugs into cases after they have passed through the X-ray and drug controls at the airport in Paraguay. The drugs were then presumably retrieved by airport officials in Spain.

  • TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Moody’s take a negative view despite IMF support

    Patrick de Courcy 10 December 2021 Hits: 994

    Trinidad & Tobago’s finance minister, Colm Imbert, has sought to justify the country’s policies despite the 23 November downgrade by international credit ratings agency Moody’s from Ba1 to Ba2. In response to the downgrade, he said: “This decision by Moody’s collides with the policy advice we have received from all international organisations to protect our country and support the recovery in the current circumstances…[The use of fiscal policy] helped avoid destruction of the economic and social fabric and was both sensible and sensitive in our view.” The problem for Imbert, however, is that there is not necessarily any incompatibility between Moody’s assessment of increasing risk and the fact that his policies have generally been in line with the advice of “all international organisations”, by which he primarily means the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The fact that the IMF and others believe that Trinidad has been doing what it must do to protect the country’s economic and social fabric in the face of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic is not incompatible with the conclusion that these policies involve increased risk for the country’s creditors.

    Moody’s justified its decision by saying: “The Ba2 rating reflects the sovereign’s [TT’s] diminished shock-absorption capacity in the aftermath of the pandemic, evidenced by a materially higher general government debt burden of 85-90% of GDP over the next three years, up from 62% in fiscal 2019.” The agency added: “A higher debt burden will result in a weaker credit profile even with a strong economic recovery in 2022 (of 5.9%) and GDP growth of about 2% in 2023-24 driven to a large extent by both higher energy prices and hydrocarbon production levels.” Moody’s main concern, over the longer term, is the “mature profile of the hydrocarbon sector” and the “limited progress in economic diversification”. However, despite the downgrade, Moody’s did give Trinidad a “stable” outlook based on its view that the government’s efforts “will prove effective in improving the fiscal position by increasing non-hydrocarbon revenue and curtailing spending”.

    The present increase in the debt burden is a result of pandemic-related fiscal support “which drove the fiscal deficit to 11.2% of GDP last fiscal year and 9.2% this year” plus economic contractions every year since 2016. After a projected recovery of 5.9% in 2022, Moody’s is projecting annual GDP growth “of about 2% in 2023-24” against the government’s projections of growth above 3.5% in 2023 and 2024.

    Two days before Moody’s passed its latest judgement on the Trinidad & Tobago economy, the IMF had issued the preliminary findings on its 2021 Article IV Consultation, and these did support Imbert’s contention that his policies had the IMF’s seal of approval. The IMF statement, issued on 21 November, said: “Trinidad and Tobago faced unprecedented challenges in 2020-21. The combined effects of Covid-19, energy production cuts, and price shocks pushed the economy further into recession. The authorities’ decisive policy response helped contain Covid-19’s spread, protect lives and livelihoods, and pave the way for a strong recovery.”

    Imbert couldn’t really have asked for more than that, although the key IMF recommendation was that “once the recovery is firmly in place, policy attention should focus on reducing public debt levels and rebuilding fiscal buffers, supported by a credible fiscal framework”.

    Both Moody’s and the IMF point to an estimated economic contraction of 1% in 2021, following the 7.4% contraction in 2020. For 2022, the IMF is projecting growth of 5.7%, slightly below Moody’s projection of 5.9%. On the fiscal deficit, Moody’s is looking for a 9.2% deficit this fiscal year (ending 30 September 2022), falling to 5.8% the following year. The IMF is working on slightly different figures, saying: “The fiscal deficit is projected to narrow to 7.5% of GDP in FY 2022, reflecting a combination of higher revenue mobilisation and modest spending cuts. Over the medium term, the fiscal deficit is projected to gradually narrow and reach balance by FY2027.”

    The IMF says that public debt, which reached 87% of GDP in FY2021, will “remain above the soft target of 65% of GDP over the projection horizon”.

    With regard to the outlook, the IMF sees the risks “tilted to the downside”, largely due to risks beyond the country’s control such as a resurgence of the pandemic with new strains emerging, weakening energy demand and prices, and “unexpected supply-chain or logistics issues [that] could affect levels of energy production”. The IMF is urging the government to prepare a contingency plan and to publish a full report on its Covid-19 related spending.

    The IMF is by no means taking a hawkish line on Trinidad’s policy dilemmas. Indeed, it specifically states: “Careful planning and coordination will be essential to withdraw support gradually and avoid undermining the recovery”. It also says that the government’s plan to keep expenditure at last year’s levels is appropriate and justified because “the availability of fiscal buffers allows continued temporary high spending to mitigate the effects of the pandemic”.

    The IMF also says that the medium-term fiscal plan should be “growth-friendly and inclusive” while at the same time aiming to reduce public debt and rebuild buffers. It calls on the government to improve revenues through “tax reforms and expenditure rationalisation”. On the expenditure side, the IMF is urging the government to “streamline” transfers to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and to “phase out” subsidies.

    Both Moody’s and the IMF agree that diversification of the economy is essential. Moody’s notes that the hydrocarbons sector accounts for about 25% of GDP and “close to 80% of exports”, but it is a mature sector and the “significant reliance on hydrocarbons for government revenue and export earnings leaves TT highly vulnerable to price and production downturns”. As the agency points out, the risk can already be seen in the fall in per capita income levels from US$29,053 in 2015 to US$23,359 this year.

    But if the answer for Moody’s is diversification, it also warns that “economic diversification takes time” and structural factors including skills, mismatches in the labour market, high import dependence, and shortages of foreign exchange “will likely limit diversification prospects”.

    The IMF equally urges the need for diversification, saying “policies to develop the non-energy sector are critical to support medium-term inclusive growth and enhance resilience”. The reforms it says are necessary to achieve this include removing obstacles to doing business and improving education and vocational training “to help address skills mismatches and boost productivity and stimulate entrepreneurship”.

    Although Imbert has enthusiastically cited the IMF in defence of the country’s Covid-19 response, and as an attempted rebuttal of the Moody’s downgrade, he has been equally adamant that there can be no formal recourse to IMF aid. In his 3 October budget speech, he warned against the downsides of entering an IMF programme, adding that, other than surveillance, technical assistance, and capacity advice, “we see no need to seek any…form of assistance from the IMF at this time on in the near future”.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    Lewis Harrison 19 May 2022 Hits: 3198

    EL SALVADOR | Bukele resolute on bitcoin. The collapse of the cryptocurrency bitcoin by some 60% from its zenith in the space of one week has been greeted with knowing sighs from economists in El Salvador and abroad. El Salvador has accumulated 2,301 bitcoins for more than US$100m since September last year. Rather than cutting his country’s losses, President Nayib Bukele doubled down on his bet on bitcoin, with an additional purchase of US$15.3m. His Twitter account has been uncharacteristically silent on bitcoin since the crash.

    The international credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded El Salvador’s sovereign debt rating on 4 May, arguing that “even if the government finds a way to manage near-term financing pressures from the upcoming 2023 bond maturity [an US$800m Eurobond repayment]…the sovereign will continue to face funding pressures that would compromise its ability to service its debt commitments in full”.

  • Gol forced into Chapter 11 after ongoing struggle

    Ira Lee 29 February 2024 Hits: 1172

    Another Latin American airline filed for bankruptcy in January amid ongoing financial troubles. The good news is that Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes, Brazil’s second largest airline with roughly a third of the domestic market share, will continue flying and stands a reasonable chance of surviving. The bad news is that it may not be a pretty outcome for everybody involved.  

    Gol is the second Brazilian and fourth Latin American airline to file for bankruptcy protection since 2020, which would suggest there is something systemically wrong with the region’s aviation industry.

    Operating in a highly volatile political and economic environment undoubtedly has its particular challenges. Fluctuating currencies, haphazard fuel prices, and higher borrowing costs all played a role, as did consumers who are more susceptible to higher interest rates and inflation than in more advanced economies.

    But it’s also true that unlike their European or North American counterparts, Latin American airlines were not bailed out by their host countries in the wake of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic and had to find their own resources to rebuild. “The most significant component of the economic shocks resulting in the debtors’ current liquidity crisis was the Covid-19 pandemic,” Gol said in its statement to a New York court.

    Unlike Latam, Aeroméxico, and Avianca, which all filed for Chapter 11 back in 2020, Gol tried a piecemeal approach, opting for no less than 10 separate capital increases since then. The straw that broke the camel’s back was the tight credit situation on global markets and the temporary grounding of the Boeing 737 Max 8, which made up more than a quarter of the airline’s fleet last year and was to be the foundation for its expansion plan.

    The objective now is to restructure debt, which late last year amounted to R$20.18bn (US$4.2 bn). To lend credibility to that objective, Gol has obtained a US$950m cash injection from members of the Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders of Abra and other Abra bondholders. Abra is the holding company that controls both Gol and Avianca.

    “Gol will use this process to restructure its short-term financial obligations and strengthen its capital structure for long-term sustainability,” the company said in a regulatory filing to the Brazilian securities commission CVM. “The company expects to emerge from this process with a significant capital investment, including the new US$950 million in DIP financing,” it said, referring to the term ‘debtor in possession’ which means it holds assets that can satisfy creditor claims during the Chapter 11 process.

    Gol reported a loss of 25 cents per share in the third quarter of 2023, compared with a loss of 75 cents a year earlier. So while customers will keep flying, the company may survive, and its owners come out on top, those risking the biggest haircut are creditors. Bonds have already fallen from 65 cents on the dollar six months ago to around 15 cents and shareholders too face a serious haircut.

    A small but important boost could come from the Brazilian government which is mulling the creation of a fund that could put up collateral for loans to the airlines – but whether that will be big enough and soon enough to help Gol remains to be seen.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    Abbi Dicker 08 October 2026 Hits: 438

    BRAZIL | Unemployment decreases year-on-year. Brazil’s unemployment rate in the rolling quarter of June-August 2026 stood at 5.3%, equivalent to 5.8m unemployed people, according to the national statistics institute (Ibge). This remains unchanged from the jobless rate registered for May-July, but it marks a decrease compared with 5.6% unemployment in June-August 2025.

    Since the February-April quarter of 2026, Brazil’s unemployment rate has remained below 6.0%, and the latest 5.3% figure represents a significant decrease compared with the 7.9% unemployment rate registered for October-December 2022, the final quarter during which Brazil was governed by the previous administration of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), and compared with the 8.8% jobless rate in January-March 2023, the first quarter of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s term. He has sought to highlight the decline in unemployment in recent years as an achievement under his government.

    PARAGUAY | Inflation creeps up. Paraguay’s central bank (BCP) released the consumer price index (IPC) for September on 2 October. The figures showed monthly inflation of 0.1% in September, up from zero inflation the previous month and monthly deflation of 0.1% in July. Annual inflation stood at 1.7%, up from 1.5% in August and 1.6% in July.

    The BCP said that the September inflation results were driven by month-on-month increases in the price of food items, particularly beef and vegetables. It also noted a rise in fuel prices, particularly diesel fuel. However, it said these were somewhat offset by the drop in prices for imported durable goods.

    URUGUAY | Economy minister urges growth. Uruguay’s Economy and Finance Minister Gabriel Oddone has stated that the country needs GDP growth of over 2.5% to maintain its model of social cohesion.

    Speaking at a forum organised by the Asociación Cristiana de Dirigentes de Empresa (ACDE), a Christian business leaders’ association, on 6 October, Oddone said that Uruguay’s current “stable” economy and public policies were failing to generate “a dynamic of growth”. Oddone said that the government must create conditions to boost private investment to move the economy forward.

  • ECUADOR: El gobierno decreta el “estado de emergencia” judicial

    LatinNews 23 September 2011 Hits: 853

    El 5 de setiembre, el gobierno del Presidente Rafael Correa emitió un decreto (872) que permite mantener el sistema judicial funcionando mientras simultáneamente lo reforman. La ambiciosa propuesta de reforma judicial del gobierno es la primera vez, al menos en los 50 años pasados, que un gobierno latinoamericano ha tratado de hacer una revisión total del sistema judicial nacional desde arriba hasta abajo. La reforma judicial de Bolivia, que también está en marcha, cubre solamente a las altas cortes.

    La oposición en el congreso está hablando acerca de tratar que el decreto sea anulado por el congreso, pero eso es improbable debido a que la oposición no maneja una mayoría. Como el decreto involucra algunos gastos significativos del gobierno, el congreso tendrá que estar involucrado en alguna etapa. Bajo el decreto, el gobierno está ahora presupuestando US$600m para la reforma. El actual presupuesto del ministerio de justicia para todo el año actual es de US$22m. El gobierno, que inicialmente esperaba que la reforma tome solamente 18 meses, ahora espera que el proceso esté completado para 2015. Los ecuatorianos dieron su aprobación  para esa reforma en el referéndum del 7 de mayo, incluso aunque los oponentes de Correa afirman que él apunta a politizar el sistema legal.

    Bajo el decreto 872, el gobierno también ha confirmado el mandato del Consejo de la Judicatura de Transición (CJT), que debe expirar en febrero de 2013. El CJT es responsable de la implementación de las reformas.

    El estado de emergencia (técnicamente, excepción) durará 60 días y cubre a todos los que trabajan en el sistema judicial. El decreto dará al gobierno el poder de mudar a jueces y otros funcionarios alrededor del sistema a fin de cubrir brechas creadas por renuncias y despidos. El gobierno justifica el estado de emergencia diciendo que sin eso, el sistema judicial estaba en inminente peligro de colapsar.

    El presidente de la CJT, compuesto de tres personas, Paulo Rodríguez, pidió al gobierno que emita el decreto después de hallar el caos en el actual sistema judicial, y afirma que se habían perdido 215.000 casos. El informó que hay acumulados un retraso de 1,2m de casos en el sistema de la corte incrementado 40% entre 2002 y 2008.

    El cambio central dentro de la reforma será la creación de una nueva Corte Nacional de Justicia (CNJ). Para la fecha tope del 4 de setiembre, 666 personas habían presentado sus solicitudes para las bancas de jueces, 21 jueces plenos y 21 jueces asistentes. Además de varios prominentes oponentes al gobierno de Correa, el actual presidente de la corte, Carlos Ramírez, y Benjamín Cevallos, un ex presidente del consejo nacional de jueces, también han presentado solicitudes de bancas. La CJT revisará los CV de todos los solicitantes y resolverá si son elegibles para los puestos en los próximos 10 días. Todos los candidatos serán elegidos por méritos y serán indicados 100: de estos, 30 serán otorgados por calificaciones académicas y psicológicas. Los otros 70 serán seleccionados en tres categorías: teoría (30); un prueba práctica (30); y por desempeño en una audiencia pública (10. Todos los candidatos tendrán el derecho de cuestionar sus marcas.

    Carrión: El 6 de setiembre, una corte en Quito desestimó una apelación del gobierno contra la decisión de la corte, hecha en mayo, para absolver al Coronel César Carrión del cargo de tratar de matar al Presidente Rafael Correa durante el motín policial de setiembre de 2010. Carrión comandaba el hospital donde estalló el motín. Confusamente, la corte revirtió su decisión original de absolver a otros tres oficiales de policía. Ellos fueron sentenciados a dos años de prisión.

    • Cely

    La cancillería confirmó el 5 de setiembre que había pedido a EU que apruebe a Nathalie Cely, la ministra coordinadora de la producción, como embajadora ante EU. Ecuador no tiene embajador en Washington desde abril de este año después que fue expulsado el embajador de EU en Quito el 5 de abril. El 6 de setiembre, el canciller de Ecuador, Ricardo Patiño, dijo que el gobierno había aceptado la nominación del gobierno de EU de Adam Namm, el director interino del Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations en el Departamento de Estado, como el nuevo embajador de EU en Quito.

  • Revival of speculation about Israeli strike against Iran

    LatinNews 21 October 2011 Hits: 309

    It will be recalled that in January former Mossad chief Meir Dagan caused a stir by saying, on the day of his retirement, that Iran would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon until 2015.  Then in early May he told a conference in Israel that a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be “a stupid idea”.  At the beginning of last week, Dagan returned to the fray, saying: “The military option is still far from being the preferred one for Israel.  As of now, there are still tools and means available that are far more effective.”

    Dagan’s remarks coincided with a visit to Israel by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, and the suspicion in some circles is that Dagan’s remarks and Panetta’s visit may have been prompted by concerns that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was edging closer to a move against Iran.  This suspicion has been further fuelled by this week’s news that Netanyahu has agreed a deal for the return of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in return for the release of 1,000 Palestinian prisoners.  The thesis is that this could be a deck-clearing move.  We have no inside intelligence on Netanyahu’s deliberations, but it is clearly still a live debate within Israeli policymaking circles.  Our own assessment is that the more cautious view will prevail for now for two main reasons.

    The first is that the 2015 date probably is accurate, and so that does give more time for Dagan’s “other means” to succeed.  The second is that it is still possible, as Panetta is arguing, that the hardline regime in Iran will be weakened by the knock-on effects of the Arab Spring.  We have argued strongly since the start of the Arab Spring that it would be a mistake to assume that all its consequences would be positive.  In particular, we have argued that it is likely to make the Israel-Palestine dispute more difficult to resolve.

    On the other hand, the argument advanced by Iran, that the Arab Spring is an Islamist revolution, is equally untrue.  The Muslim Brotherhood will undoubtedly gain in influence and stature in Egypt, Jordan, and - if Assad falls - Syria.  But that is not the same as saying it is an Islamist revolution, and ordinary Iranians are not buying into the ayatollahs’ propaganda.  They are also fully aware that Iran is siding with the ancien regime in Syria, not with the revolutionaries.  And, as we have reported elsewhere in this issue, Turkey is strongly supporting the Arab revolutions but distancing itself from Iran.  So, while it is still possible that the Iranian regime will emerge from the regional turmoil unscathed, perhaps even strengthened if Assad hangs on and Shia influence is increased in the Gulf States, it is too early to make that judgement.  We believe those around Netanyahu arguing for a policy of ‘wait-and-see’ will prevail for now.


  • VENEZUELA: Capriles dispara rápido contra el flanco más débil de Chávez

    LatinNews 08 June 2012 Hits: 519

    Sin lugar a dudas, la inseguridad es el área principal donde la oposición política podría sacar provecho antes de las elecciones presidenciales de octubre. Es el flanco más débil del gobierno –y el Presidente Hugo Chávez lo sabe. De regreso en el Palacio Miraflores él anunció el inminente lanzamiento de una nueva “misión” para tratar de abordar el problema. Por su lado, el candidato presidencial de la coalición opositora, Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), Henrique Capriles Radonski, presentó su plan para combatir la inseguridad en Venezuela –y esta vez se lanza directo a la yugular.

    Hay una desconfianza residual entre los Chavistas desilusionados en el sentido que Capriles pueda cumplir sus promesas de mantener las “misiones” sociales que son el rasgo más popular de la Revolución Bolivariana y la principal razón del fuerte apoyo que el Presidente Chávez aún disfruta. Los venezolanos estaban también acostumbrados a una inflación elevada bajo los gobiernos previos, por tanto la situación actual realmente no es diferente que antes de Chávez. Sin embargo, la seguridad definitivamente se ha deteriorado.

    Capriles buscó embestir sobre ese punto durante la presentación de su plan de cuatro puntas para tratar de resolver la violencia y la inseguridad, alegando que nada más importa en Venezuela si hay un alto riesgo de ser asesinado. Dijo que un venezolano era asesinado cada 30 minutos, y secuestrado cada ocho horas. Él sostiene que entre 153.000 y 159.000 personas han sido asesinadas entre 1998, cuando Chávez llegó al poder, y el 2011 y que la tasa de asesinatos estaba en 64 por cada 100.000 habitantes, subiendo de 19 por 100.000 en 1998. Las cifras exactas están abiertas a la disputa, pero la tendencia no.

    Capriles, quien ha sido acusado por algunos miembros de su propia coalición de ser demasiado blando con Chávez, condenó el récord del actual gobierno. Dijo que Chávez tenía la actitud de negación total de la escala de la crisis de seguridad. Acusó a la administración Chávez de ser una parte fundamental del problema, alegando que la policía y los jueces eran leales a la revolución y no servían al pueblo, mientras que el gobierno estaba más preocupado en defenderse a sí mismo más que al pueblo. “El gobierno propone ‘Socialismo o muerte’” dijo. “Aquellos que no comparten su visión, ¿merecen la muerte?”

    Capriles dijo que había elaborado propuestas para crear 3m de empleos estables y bien pagados, con seguridad social, durante el curso de su mandato [IL-12-17] y de conferir estatus legal a las ‘misiones’ (algo que Chávez contrarrestó esta semana pidiendo que se les dé estatus constitucional). “Pero,” dijo Capriles, “la conquista más importante es la seguridad”. Y dijo que su plan, elaborado a través de consultas con una veintena de especialistas locales e internacionales durante el curso de los últimos tres meses, se concentrará en la prevención, vigilancia y control, justicia, y reforma de prisiones. Él dijo que su primer desafío será arrancar de raíz la corrupción en la policía y en la justicia. Prometió que aquellos que resulten ser cómplices de delincuentes, sufrirá todo el peso de la ley: “terminará la complicidad del Estado”. Capriles casi llega a proponer una reforma judicial total, de raíz, pero prometió resolver el “desastre en las prisiones”, dentro de un año, no en 14 o 20, agregó, lanzando un golpe a Chávez.

    El gobierno designó a Iris Varela como ministra de prisiones el año pasado, para que tome el control de cuestiones relacionadas con la crónica superpoblación y para reducir el número de reclusos en prisión sin sentencias (64% de acuerdo con Capriles), pero el progreso ha sido limitado. Chávez está prometiendo un nuevo código orgánico de procedimiento penal en junio. Y dijo también que una nueva ‘misión’ llamada “A toda vida” será lanzada apuntando a la prevención del delito, como también modernizar el sistema de prisiones, creando un sistema nacional que ayude a las víctimas y refuerce los cuerpos de seguridad ciudadana existentes.

    Preocupación creciente

    Incluso Aporrea, un medio de comunicación venezolano que lleva el subtítulo ‘comunicación popular para la construcción del Socialismo del Siglo 21’ en su sitio en Internet, pide que la nueva misión “A toda vida” para combatir la inseguridad sea aplicada de manera rápida y eficiente. Alega que la inseguridad ha permitido que la oposición ataque al gobierno. Notablemente, parece ser indirectamente crítico del Presidente Chávez: “muchas personas me han dicho que votaron por Chávez en 1998, convencidos que como militar, él atacaría la inseguridad,” comienza la columna. Un artículo, con ribetes nerviosos, publicado por Aporrea a comienzos de mes lanzado a los 4m de nuevos votantes en Venezuela, expresaba que los mismos estaban obsesionados con “centros comerciales, ropas de diseño, Ipad, playas, siliconas y regaetton” en vez del fervor revolucionario.

    BOA presiona por ruta española

    El 24 de mayo, la aerolínea Boliviana de Aviación (BOA) de propiedad del Estado, reveló que está en proceso de obtener los permisos de servicio de aeropuertos en España. El gerente general de BOA, Ronald Casso, reveló que la compañía ya está en contacto con las autoridades españolas y contrataron representantes legales en España para ayudar en el proceso a la compañía. El anuncio de BOA se produce en momentos en que la aerolínea más grande de Bolivia, AeroSur, está enfrentando una quiebra segura y se ha visto forzada a parar todos sus vuelos, incluido su lucrativo servicio a Madrid. El gobierno boliviano ha rehusado rescatar a AeroSur, de propiedad privada, lo que ha hecho que crezca la especulación que su objetivo es que la industria de las aerolíneas esté dominada por una firma de propiedad del estado una vez más.