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Ecuador’s umbrella indigenous organisation Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Conaie) has been a potent foe of successive governments. Major indigenous protests against the current administration have so far been avoided since President Daniel Noboa took office in November 2023, but Conaie was nevertheless fiercely critical of the government under the leadership of Leonidas Iza (2021-2024). Iza was replaced as Conaie leader on 21 July by Marlon Vargas whose rise was welcomed by the Noboa administration as an opportunity to improve relations.

Conaie has over the past 30 years launched massive protests over social, economic, and environmental issues that at times threatened to topple the governments of President Noboa’s three immediate predecessors, Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023), Lenín Moreno (2017-2021), and Rafael Correa (2007-2017) and played an instrumental role in bringing down presidents Abdalá Bucaram in 1997, Jamil Mahuad in 2000, and Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005 before them.

Whilst the indigenous organisation has so far refrained from launching widespread protests against Noboa, it has grown increasingly strident in its criticism of his handling of the economy, his interest in partially privatising the oil sector, his plans to boost mining, and his efforts to secure the return of foreign military bases that were banned under Correa.

Despite intense opposition from the Conaie rank-and-file, Noboa’s congressional coalition hinges on the support of six deputies from the indigenous party Pachakutik – the political arm of Conaie. Slammed as traitors by Iza, these legislators were expelled from Conaie on 19 July for voting in favour of government bills. Their expulsion, which took place during the indigenous congress at which Vargas was elected leader, was the last major decision taken under Iza, highlighting the organisation’s mounting tensions with the government.

The Noboa administration appears hopeful that relations with Conaie will improve under Vargas, who won the leadership election with 617 votes against Iza’s 540. The minister for government, José de la Gasca, said on 22 July that the change of leadership at Conaie is “a very good thing” and said he was hopeful of “a change of direction” after Iza’s “authoritarian and despotic” tenure at the helm.

Vargas took a conciliatory step the previous day when he met with the six expelled Pachakutik deputies, who urged him to initiate the process of having their expulsion overturned. This has set the stage for a confrontation between the more moderate faction of Conaie, led by Vargas, and the hardline wing of the party led by Iza.

Conaie’s move away from the more radical stance advocated by Iza comes as the indigenous movement seems to be losing its sway with the wider public. Pachakutik had its best electoral performance in two decades in 2021, when its candidate, Yaku Pérez, took 19% of the vote and missed out on the second round of the presidential election by a whisker. Since then, however, the vote share taken by indigenous candidates has shrunk drastically. Pérez took just 4% in the following election in 2023. In the first round of this year’s presidential election in February, Iza was the party’s candidate and took 5%.

Pachakutik and Conaie will therefore need to decide how they fit into the new political context that has been forged since Noboa took office in 2023 as a self-proclaimed outsider, breaking the traditional left-right dynamic in which indigenous candidates presented themselves, with some success, as the third-way option.

Troops rushed to Manabí

On 18 July Ecuador’s defence ministry announced that nearly 2,000 additional troops had been deployed to the north-western province of Manabí, one of the provinces most impacted by gang violence due to its location in a key drug-trafficking corridor between the Colombian border and the port city of Guayaquil. The defence ministry said that the new troops would mostly be sent to the cities of Manta and Portoviejo. Local media reported that in the 12 hours before the announcement, 15 people had been murdered in Manabí.

On 24 August the US government led by President Donald Trump partly reopened its border to livestock imports from Mexico after closing it due to concerns over the spread of the New World Screwworm (NWS) fly. However, difficulties in eradicating the flesh-eating parasite mean that the risk of new restrictions remains high.

NWS is a fly whose larvae cause serious infections in livestock and other animals by burrowing into their flesh. It had been eradicated from the US and Mexico following concerted international efforts in recent decades, but in November 2024 it was detected in Chiapas state in southern Mexico after spreading north through Central America. The US closed its border to livestock imports in response and subsequently lifted and reimposed restrictions several times as NWS flies moved progressively closer to the US, before closing the border to Mexican cattle again in July 2025. 

This has had a devastating effect on Mexico’s livestock sector. National daily La Jornada reported in July that the Consejo Mexicano de la Carne, a meat business association, had calculated that from November 2024 to June 2026 around 2.06m cattle slated for export, worth around M$34.82bn (US$2.06bn), went unsold because of the restrictions. From January-June this year some 748,000 animals intended for export were stuck in Mexico, worth a total of US$1.04bn, according to the same figures.

Rogelio Pérez Sánchez, director of strategy and international relations at the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Ganaderas (CNOG) livestock business association, added that the sector had also suffered an opportunity cost of US$2.5bn. “There was a negative impact on farmers because there was no incentive to expand their herds due to expectations of low prices,” he said, indicating that, in the face of uncertainty around export markets, producers decided to delay investments.

Given these difficulties, it is no surprise that Mexico’s livestock sector rejoiced in late July this year when the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced a phased reopening of the border from 24 August. Starting with the crossing between Agua Prieta, Sonora state, and Douglas, Arizona, the reopening is being “guided by overlapping safeguards and a science-based import protocol jointly agreed upon between the United States and Mexico,” according to a USDA statement. There were some teething troubles, with exports suspended again on 28 August as the inspection chute couldn’t handle larger animals, but the crossing reportedly reopened on 8 September. Further reopenings at the Santa Teresa and Columbus crossings with Chihuahua state will depend on “Mexico’s progress in meeting Action Plan milestones and addressing critical issues,” as well as the level of risk of NWS in Sonora or Chihuahua states, the USDA added.

As of 8 September, there were 2,083 active confirmed cases of NWS in Mexico, and 30 out of 31 of the country’s states had recorded cases of NWS. A rising caseload in the border state of Sonora was a particular cause for concern as it has been singled out by USDA for monitoring, with 39 active NWS cases in the state as of 8 September. The fact that NWS has also established a foothold in the US is a further worry, with dozens of confirmed cases in Texas and New Mexico this year, as it will make eradicating the fly once again a more difficult prospect.

Eradication efforts centre on the sterile insect technique (SIT), in which specially bred sterile flies are released in their millions to outcompete wild males and suppress successful reproduction, meaning that populations fall and ultimately die out. The issue is that an estimated 500m sterile flies per week will be needed to eradicate NWS over a vast area across North and Central America, and there are only two facilities currently producing them. The first, in Panama, can make 100m sterile flies a week, with a second plant in Chiapas state also ramping up production to an expected 100m per week by the end of the year. This means that the number of sterile flies available to be released is far short of what is needed. A planned US domestic facility is expected to start producing flies in late 2027, ramping up to 300m per week by 2028, which will make the 500m target achievable, but if the fly continues to spread to new areas before the US facility reaches maximum capacity, it is likely that even more sterile males will be needed to eradicate it.

As a result, there is no guarantee that the fly will be eradicated, and if it is, it is likely to take years to do so. It took decades to push NWS out of North and Central America during the 20^th century, and any residual populations are likely to result in a renewed spread northwards. Eradication efforts may need to extend even further south this time around, with a US congressional report from August raising the possibility that the Darién Gap, a densely forested strip of land between Panama and Colombia, would no longer act as a biological barrier to NWS as the cattle population there has boomed in recent years. Some scientific research has even suggested that sterile males are becoming less effective at competing with wild males for mates, according to the report. This would call into question the future viability of the strategy if it is proven that natural populations are increasingly able to mate despite the presence of sterile male flies.

Of course, it may be that successfully managing caseloads in Mexico’s northern states is sufficient to convince US officials to fully reopen the border to livestock imports, so NWS may not have to be completely eradicated from the country to allow livestock exports to continue. However, the thresholds governing when livestock exports can resume are being set by the US, potentially handing Washington even more leverage over Mexico at a time when the two nations are continuing to renegotiate the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade deal [EB-26-08].

This increases the likelihood that livestock exports will become caught up in wider bilateral discussions, exposing Mexico’s livestock producers to continued risk that exports will be halted once again, although so far there is no suggestion that the import restrictions are motivated by politics rather than USDA’s technical assessments of the threat to the US livestock sector. Although President Claudia Sheinbaum has pointed out that Mexican cattle previously destined for export have simply been redirected to the domestic market, livestock farmers earn around US$300 less for each head of cattle sold in Mexico than in the US, according to Mexico-based agrifood consultancy Grupo Consultor de Mercados Agrícolas (GCMA), meaning that the economic impact is reduced not eliminated.

In conclusion, the phased reopening of the US border to livestock exports from Mexico is encouraging for the livestock sector, but it appears highly likely that the number of animals sold to US buyers will remain lower than pre-NWS levels for the foreseeable future. This could be due to difficulties in reducing caseloads sufficiently to satisfy US officials, shortfalls in the production of sterile flies, or political pressure to use livestock imports as leverage in wider trade negotiations. Other risks include the trafficking of unmonitored cattle from Central America, which will increase the risk of outbreaks in southern Mexico, as well as climate change, which is making it easier for the flies to move into new geographical areas where they previously could not reproduce. As a result, the sector is likely to continue to face headwinds in the coming months and years.

Haiti | Protests. On 29 February several thousand supporters of former leader Jean Bertrand Aristide (1991; 1994-1996; 2001-2004) took to the streets in the capital, Port-au-Prince, on the eighth anniversary of his ouster to protest against President Michel Martelly. The show of anti-Martelly sentiment – the largest since he took office in May last year – comes at time of heightened instability following the resignation of Prime Minister Garry Conille last week. The size of the crowd also suggests continued levels of support for Aristide, who, since his return to the country last year, has kept a low profile. It also follows as yet unconfirmed reports that the government is planning to investigate the former leader for alleged drug trafficking, corruption, bribery and malfeasance.

SECURITY | US businessman released. On 5 August prominent US businessman, Peter Jackson, who was kidnapped on 2 August in the southern department of Choluteca, was released. Ciriaco Díaz, a spokesperson for the local fire brigade told reporters that Jackson was found wandering on the highway between San Marcos de Colón and Choluteca in the early hours of the morning. Jackson, who owns a hotel in the northern city of San Pedro Sula and shrimp fisheries in Choluteca, is said to be “in good health” although he has since gone for a medical check-up. The local press reported that Jackson had been kidnapped by armed assailants who intercepted his car while he was driving in the San Bernando area. The two people traveling with him were subsequently found tied up inside the vehicle some 5kms from the scene of the abduction. So far the Honduran authorities have yet to reveal whether Jackson’s family paid a ransom for his release.

El canciller de Brasil, Antonio Patriota, se está acostumbrando a reprender a sus aliados anglófonos. La semana pasada, el Secretario de Estado de EU John Kerry, fue advertido del riesgo de “proyectar una sombra de desconfianza” sobre las relaciones bilaterales después de las revelaciones de las actividades de la agencia nacional de seguridad (NSA, siglas en inglés). Esta semana, después de la detención del ciudadano brasilero, David Mirando, Patriota le dijo al canciller del RU, William Hague, que este “tipo de acción intimidatoria […] no tiene lugar en una buena relación”. Aun así hasta ahora hay poca indicación de que él está preparado para tomar una acción más concreta contra ninguno de los dos países.

Miranda, el socio del periodista de EU Glenn Greenwald, fue detenido por nueve horas bajo el acta anti-terrorismo del RUen el aeropuerto Heathrow de Londres en su camino de vuelta a Rio de Janeiro de Berlín. Greenwald, un columnista para el diario The Guardian, ha sido el conducto periodístico para Edward J. Snowden, el ex contratista de seguridad quien ha estado filtrando información acerca de la extensión de las actividades de espionaje de la NSA.

Durante su interrogatorio, todos los equipos electrónicos de Miranda, incluyendo un teléfono móvil, una laptop, cámara, y cartuchos de memoria, fueron confiscados por la policía. La secretaria del Home Office del RU, Theresa May, dijo que la policía estaba perfectamente en su derecho de incautar “información robada altamente sensible, que podría ayudar a terroristas, y que podría conducir a la pérdida de vidas”. Miranda había viajado a Berlín a expensas de The Guardian, llevando información a una cineasta de EU, quien ha estado colaborando con Greenwald en archivos filtrados por Snowden.

Los abogados de Miranda ahora están cuestionando la legalidad de su detención. A su retorno, Miranda otorgó un número de entrevistas a los medios locales e internacionales, incluido O Globo. “Lo que ellos hicieron conmigo fue terrorismo”, él dijo. “Creo que esto ocurrió debido a que yo soy brasilero. Hay otras personas trabajando en esta historia, yendo de Brasil a Londres todo el tiempo, y nada ha ocurrido. No es suficiente que Itamaraty haga una declaración. Quiero conocer la posición de [la presidenta] Dilma [Rousseff].”

Una semana antes, la visita de Kerry a Brasília fue también eclipsada por el enfado del gobierno ante las actividades de la NSA. En una transcripción difundida por el Departamento de Estado, Patriota es citado como diciendo: “No debo olvidar mencionar que ahora estamos enfrentando un nuevo tipo de desafío en nuestra relación bilateral. Es un desafío que tiene que ver con grabaciones de llamadas telefónicas. […] Prácticas que violan la soberanía nacional y las libertades individuales deben terminar”, él dijo.

A pesar de la insistencia de Kerry de que la tarea de la NSA era vital para la seguridad de los ciudadanos de EU y de Brasil después de su visita un ministro del gobierno amenazó con exponer las acciones de la agencia ante la ONU. El ministro de comunicaciones, Paulo Bernardo, dijo que él no estaba satisfecho con el argumento de Kerry, comentando que el programa de la NSA no sólo era usado para combatir el terrorismo. “También involucra espionaje industrial, comercial, y diplomático,” dijo.

 Amarildo: no está muerto, aún está desaparecido

Mientras las protestas esporádicas sobre una variedad de reivindicaciones aún estallan a través de Rio de Janeiro, una campaña ha adquirido una significativa importancia. Los carteles escritos con el eslogan ‘¿Dónde está Amarildo?’ han aparecido a través de la ciudad  luego de la desaparición de Amarildo Da Souza, un padre de seis hijos de 47 años de edad y residente de la favela Rocinha, que desapareció después de haber sido detenido para ser interrogado por la policía el 14 de julio.

Como continúan las preguntas sobre el manejo de la policía de las protestas de julio, la desaparición de Da Souza ha tomado un amplio significado. El 21 de agosto, la campaña recibió un revés cuando una corte de Rio dictaminó que Da Souza no puede ser declarado muerto, pues él fue visto por última vez “en poder de los agentes del Estado, que, en sí mismos, no son una amenaza a la vida”.

• Entradas para la Copa Mundial

Los boletos de entrada para la Copa Mundial 2014 en Brasil se pusieron a la venta el 20 de agosto. Estarán disponibles alrededor de 3,3m de entradas para el torneo. Los precios de las entradas tienen un rango de US$90 para los partidos de la primera ronda, hasta US$900 para la final en el estadio Maracaná en Rio de Janeiro. Los ciudadanos brasileros de más de 60 años, los estudiantes locales, y miembros de algunos de los programas sociales pueden comprar las entradas por US$23.

President Horacio Cartes is determined to see through his plans to boost economic development. After the laboured political victory over the new fiscal responsibility law [RBS-13-10], he wasted no time in sending congress a new Public-Private Partnership (PPP) framework bill, despite loud resistance on the streets. While the new government’s commitment to economic reform is commendable, social and political discontent so early on in its term should be reason for concern.

Just hours after the fiscal responsibility law was approved on 26 September, Cartes urged congress to approve the ‘Ley de Alianza-Público Privada (APP), a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) legal framework bill. The president argues that the initiative is necessary to encourage investment in Paraguay’s woefully underdeveloped infrastructure and improve services for the general population.

The APP will for the first time allow private firms to play a more active role in key sectors that have long been managed exclusively by the State, such as the energy and telecoms sectors. Inevitably, that led to immediate suspicion in some quarters that the initiative could pave the way for a large-scale privatisation process. Unions from several state-owned enterprises, including the large telecoms (Copaco) and electricity (Ande) companies, immediately expressed their opposition, citing fears about mass layoffs. The president’s reassurances that he had no such plans and that the APP would only be used as a tool to attract investment into new projects failed to convince. Led by the public sector workers’ union, various civil society groups demonstrated against the APP proposal as it wound its way through congress.

National protests

Despite the union-led demos, on 28 October the chamber of deputies gave final approval to the bill at the end of a five-hour extraordinary session. This ignited a string of angry protests across the country, with thousands of people taking to the streets, including in the capital Asunción and the country’s two other main cities, Ciudad del Este (CDE) and Encarnación. Demonstrators blockaded main access roads into these cities (including the ‘Puente de la Amistad’ bridge linking CDE to Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil), demanding that Cartes scrap the bill immediately. Anti-riot police were deployed to clear the protestors and there were some violent clashes.

Afterwards José Pineda, the head of the Ande workers’ union (Paraguay’s largest public sector union), said that the union’s 5,500 affiliates would continue to protest and warned President Cartes against promulgating the bill into law. However Cartes was undeterred. Celebrating the approval of the bill, he declared it would allow Paraguay to embark “on a course of progress for all”. He added that he would not be intimidated by the protests and would sanction the bill into law as soon as it landed on his desk. True to his word, he promulgated the APP into law on 4 November. Since then, the protests have died down, but the public sector unions will be very vigilant and react quickly to any move perceived a threat to their interests.

Political costs

As well as earning him a potentially formidable enemy in the form of the unions, President Cartes’ determination to push his agenda through congress has also come at other political costs. The passage of the fiscal responsibility law had already produced some friction between the executive and congress, with some members of the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC) complaining that the new law gave the executive additional powers over the national budget at the legislature’s expense. The bill was only approved in the senate after extensive negotiations between Cartes and Senator Luis Alberto Castiglioni, the ANR-PC bench leader.

Castiglioni, a former vice-president (2003-2007), has long harboured presidential ambitions and his Vanguardia Colorada ANR-PC current is a challenge to Cartes’s political leadership. Had Cartes failed to reach an agreement with Castiglioni, there might well have been a rebellion against him in congress led by the Castiglionistas. Cartes managed to avoid this by reaching a deal with Castiglioni, but tensions with some of the other ANR-PC party factions remain in the background.

Such tensions were also evident in the passage of the APP bill in the lower chamber. The bill required two lower chamber debates before final approval, after several ANR-PC deputies joined the opposition in expressing concern that the bill in its original form allowed the executive to enter into PPP contracts without the need to secure prior congressional approval. To some deputies, this looked like another attempt by the Cartes executive to give itself extraordinary powers. The bill finally was approved by the lower chamber after the ANR-PC bench leader, María Cristina Villalba (a staunch Cartista), cracked the whip and demanded that all ANR-PC deputies toe the party line.

ANR-PC split

However Villalba’s actions generated internal discontent. The ANR-PC bench deputy leader, Walter Harms, who belongs to the Frente para la Victoria faction, was very critical of Villalba’s performance. He said that rather than impose the government line on the bench, Villalba should have sought to promote dialogue with the executive in order to arrive at an agreed consensus.

The leader of the Frente para la Victoria faction is Javier Zacarías Irún, who ran against Cartes in the ANR-PC presidential primaries. Although the faction is nominally allied to Cartes within the party, Zacarías Irún (who currently acts as Cartes’s political advisor) has also sought to challenge Cartes’s leadership on more than one occasion.

The discontent within the Frente para la Victoria was such that Cartes deployed Vice-President Juan Afara to hold talks with the deputies in a bid to ease the tension. Afara’s efforts were unsuccessful.

On 30 October, Harms announced that the 12 Zacaríista deputies had decided to no longer recognise Villalba as bench leader, in effect creating a new independent bench. This split in the ANR-PC bench is significant, as it means that the Cartes administration can no longer automatically rely on the ANR-PC’s majority of 43 seats in the 80-seat lower chamber.

Future government proposals could be defeated in congress unless the executive secures the support of the dissident ANR-PC bench. This could severely complicate Cartes’s plans to introduce the final piece of his proposed economic reforms, a new investment security law, before the end of his first year in power.

Cartes’s reassurances

On 25 September President Cartes declared himself “a staunch enemy of the sale of State assets” and said that he would step down if “a single brick belonging to the State” was sold off under the APP. However, as Deputy Víctor Ríos of the main opposition Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico remarked during the APP debate in congress, questions remain as to whether the initiative will really result in benefits for the population or whether it will only provide the private sector with profit opportunities. “The bricks will belong to us, the profits will belong to others”, Ríos complained.

• Ambassador Duarte Frutos

In what looks like another attempt to appease competing ANR-PC factions, on 30 October President Cartes appointed former president Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003-2008) as the new ambassador to Argentina. Duarte Frutos leads his own party faction and the government said it was a political appointment. The nomination encountered some resistance in the senate, where the opposition noted that, as per current law, only 50% of the country’s 43 ambassadors can be political appointees. However the majority ANR-PC bench backed Duarte Frutos’s designation. While Cartes has made at least three other political ambassadorial nominations, two career diplomats, Enrique Jara and Manuel María Cáceres, have been appointed the new ambassadors to Venezuela and Brazil.

• Acepar re-nationalised

On 7 November the government announced plans to re-nationalise the financially-troubled Aceros del Paraguay (Acepar) steelworks, privatised in 1997.

La provincia de Buenos Aires tiene una nueva fuerza policial. Daniel Scioli, el gobernador de la provincia y potencial candidato presidencial por el Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), la gobernante facción del Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronistas) en el 2015, firmó el decreto creando la nueva ‘Unidad de Policía de Prevención Local’ el 2 de julio. La fuerza ha tenido un difícil nacimiento y podría no ser capaz de hacer el trabajo que sus creadores le han encomendado.

Como sucede a menudo en la política, una gran idea ha sido debilitada por prioridades conflictivas y monótonas negociaciones difíciles. La gran idea tomó forma durante las elecciones legislativas de mitad de periodo (octubre del 2013) cuando el FPV fue superado en la provincia de Buenos Aires por el presuntuoso disidente movimiento Peronista, el Frente Renovador (FR), liderado por Sergio Massa, un exalcalde local quien había aparecido con varias populares iniciativas contra el delito.

El FR logró captar las extendidas preocupaciones del público sobre los crecientes niveles del delito. Tanto Scioli como Massa son ahora altos contendientes en la aún no declarada carrera para las elecciones presidenciales del 2015, y ambos han estado tratando de superar el uno al otro mostrando a los votantes que ellos tienen una respuesta para el problema de la inseguridad.

La gran idea de Scioli, dicen los analistas, fue lanzar una ambiciosa red provincial de fuerzas de policía locales, algo podría lanzarse con un estallido de publicidad favorable. Pero si ese era el plan, parece que algo ha salido muy mal. El primer y mayor problema es que el FPV y el FR se encontraron en un punto muerto numéricamente en la legislatura provincial y simplemente no fueron capaces de acordar y votar por la aprobación de la nueva ley.

Hubo no menos de cinco crecientemente absurdos intentos para debatir y aprobar la legislación durante un periodo de dos meses. Scioli halló que algunos de sus supuestos aliados (tales como miembros de La Cámpora, el ala juvenil Peronista pro-gobierno) fueron incorporando crecientemente inútiles enmiendas. Al final, él tuvo que abandonar todo el proceso, introduciendo la nueva fuerza por decreto.

Los críticos dicen que el resultado final no es ni chicha ni limonada. Ya hay dos fuerzas policiales que sirven a la provincia. Estas son la policía provincial (la bonaerense) y la policía municipal, la última introducida en el 2004 por Felipe Solá, el predecesor de Scioli, y desplegada en municipalidades con poblaciones de menos de 70.000 habitantes. Por lo tanto, la nueva Policía Local será una especie de estrato medio para municipalidades con poblaciones de más de 70.000.

Hay dudas acerca de cómo estos diferentes estratos se coordinarán entre sí. La nueva fuerza crecerá hasta llegar a los 10.000 agentes. Los fondos serán proveídos por la provincia y liberados cuando las municipalidades firmen acuerdos de implementación. La fuerza no responderá a la policía provincial, sino al ministro de seguridad provincial, que asignará un ‘coordinador operacional’ para cada municipalidad.

Trabajando con el alcalde y la policía provincial, el coordinador desarrollará una ‘estrategia local de seguridad’ que debe incluir elaborar un ‘mapa del delito’. El costo de la nueva fuerza aún no está claro. Un crítico, Gustavo Posse, el alcalde de San Isidro, fue cortante: “Esta no es más que la creación de oficinas locales para el ministerio de seguridad, es sólo una historia que se ha preparado para las elecciones del 2015” dijo Posse, agregando  que“mientras tanto estamos viendo cuatro homicidios por día y la policía provincial está perdiendo 5.000 agentes al año. Por lo tanto, ¿dónde iremos a encontrar los 15.000 nuevos agentes que se necesitarán?”.

Según los cálculos de Posse actualmente hay 9.000 oficiales de policía que cuidan a una población de 16m de personas esparcidas sobre 400.000kms² a través de la provincia. “Estamos tratado de incrementar el número de oficiales. Queremos cuidar a las personas. Ellos quieren ganar elecciones” él concluyó.

• Éxito de Argentina

Loa brasileros afrontan el difícil prospecto de tener que aceptar ver a sus vecinos y principales rivales, Argentina, ganar la Copa Mundial en suelo brasilero. Argentina derrotó a Holanda por penales, el 9 de julio, en la otra semi-final del torneo y ahora enfrentará a Alemania en el partido final el 13 de julio. Los hinchas argentinos se mofaron de sus anfitriones durante el partido de su equipo contra Holanda, contando hasta siete en un tono cada vez más elevado.

El lunes 21 de septiembre marcó el comienzo oficial de la campaña electoral de cara a las elecciones generales del 25 de Octubre en Argentina. Daniel Scioli, el candidato favorito, del gobernante Frente para la Victoria (FPV), la facción del Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronistas), y Sergio Massa, el contendiente ubicado en tercer lugar del Peronista disidente Frente Renovador (FR) realizaron eventos simultáneos para esbozar sus audaces y optimistas propuestas económicas. Mientras que estos dos candidatos comenzaron sus campañas con cierta fuerza, Mauricio Macri, el candidato opositor de centro-derecha de la coalición Cambienos, quien está ubicado en segundo lugar en las encuestas, comenzó su campaña con poco más que un quejido al asistir a la inauguración de unos nuevos trenes para el subterráneo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Mientras que los alegatos de corrupción se acumulan contra algunos de los candidatos de Cambiemos, Macri se encuentra teniendo que defenderse de preguntas incómodas que parecen estar debilitando parte de la energía de su campaña.

En su evento de inicio de campaña en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, Scioli dijo que el pleno empleo sería una prioridad para su gobierno. Mientras que también prometía frenar la inflación, que es de alrededor del 25% de acuerdo con las estimaciones del sector privado, él prometió que esto no ocurriría a costa de los empleos o el crecimiento.

Scioli también expresó confianza en que su gobierno atraería US$30mm en inversiones cada año. Otra política insignia develada el 21 de septiembre fueron los planes de Scioli para aumentar el gasto en el programa del gobierno de construcción de casas, con 250.000 casas a ser construidas cada año de su gobierno.

De todos modos, Massa, un ex jefe de gabinete bajo la Presidenta Cristina Fernández, convertido en candidato centrista, fue incluso más audaz. En tercer lugar, Massa está conduciendo una campaña enérgica, en un intento por superar a Macri para llegar a una probable segunda ronda después de la votación del 25 de octubre. Como tal, algunas de sus promesas resultan casi exageradas.

Massa lanzó su campaña al comienzo de la semana prometiendo que él haría crecer la economía de Argentina un 5% cada año. Los controles sobre la moneda serían levantados dentro de los primeros 100 días de su presidencia, Massa prometió que las tarifas a las exportaciones serían eliminadas.

Macri, por su lado, se encuentra crecientemente preocupado con las preguntas sobre la manera en que conduce el gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. El 16 de septiembre, Fernando Niembro, un reconocido periodista de deportivo y candidato al congreso por Cambiemos, finalmente retiró su candidatura luego de semanas de presiones. Los medios locales habían informado que una compañía de Niembro, que no tiene empleados registrados, recibió más de Ar$21m (US$2,24m) en contratos por “servicios de auditoría” a la administración de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires liderada por Macri.

Luego, el 22 de septiembre, surgió otro escándalo involucrando a otro candidato de Cambiemos. Eduardo Amadeo, el presidente del Observatorio Social y la Asociación Argentina de políticas sociales, fue premiado con un contrato de Ar$4m del gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Como en el caso con Niembro, los contratos no fueron publicados en la gaceta oficial.

Los casos de corrupción son problemáticos para Macri, dada su posición como alcalde de la ciudad, y considerando cuánto ha atacado la oposición al gobierno central por los casos de corrupción que lo afectan durante años. Mientras aún existen notables casos de corrupción de miembros de la administración de Fernández, los cargos contra los candidatos de Cambiemos le hacen difícil a Macri utilizar esa línea de ataque. Para los votantes que esperan políticos más transparentes y honestos, Cambiemos podría comenzar a ser una decepción.

Al parecer, la energía de Massa y los problemas de Macri han producido un efecto en la carrera presidencial. Una encuesta de opinión de Raúl Aragón & Asociados, publicada el 21 de septiembre muestra a Massa con el 23% en las intenciones de votos este mes, subiendo del 16% en julio. Por su lado, Macri, ha caído del 30% al 28%, y Scioli ha avanzado un punto del 39% al 40%, ubicándose en la cúspide de una victoria en la primera ronda (ver abajo).

• Victoria

Para que un candidato presidencial triunfe en la primera ronda de las elecciones del 25 de octubre, él o ella necesitara conseguir el 45% de los votos para ganar directamente, o el 40% más una diferencia de 10 puntos porcentuales sobre su rival más cercano.

On 15 August, the CEO of Suriname’s state-owned oil company Staatsolie, Rudolf Elias, pronounced that the company would make its first significant oil discovery within three weeks. He was wrong. The Kankantrie well proved dry. And after the disappointment at Kankantrie, Elias said: “The chance of success for Suriname and Staatsolie has never been greater. Partly because of the oil discoveries in Guyana. We are in the same basin with the same parent rock where the oil was made. The chance that we or one of our partners will find oil is simply very high.” That seems likely to be right, but it won’t be in time to help President Desi Bouterse or the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) with its re-election bid in May 2020.

Nevertheless, despite its poor fiscal position, the government is stepping up its pre-election spending, especially in deprived areas, seeking to strengthen its position in these areas with spending on such things as roads and drinking water. Ministers, and the president himself, have been visiting the interior.

The NDP appears to be fearful that the Maroon-oriented General Liberation and Development Party (ABOP) of former rebel leader Ronnie Brunswijk is gaining ground in the interior. And it seems that ABOP and the National Party of Suriname (NPS) may be contemplating an electoral collaboration, although this might be to the detriment of the NPS in the city and coastal areas.

Bouterse’s main opponent remains Chan Santokhi of the Progressive Reform Party (VHP). Under Santokhi’s leadership, the VHP is trying to shed its ethnic-East Indian image and is also becoming active in the interior, which until now had been the exclusive domain of African-Surinamese parties. However, the multi-ethnic approach may put off some of its natural supporters of East Indian descent. Meanwhile, the State Press Office, which is completely staffed by NDP supporters, is increasingly openly playing the race card and warning against East Indian influence. The NDP has no candidates who will appeal to Hindu voters.

Since the first discoveries by Royal Dutch Shell in the 1920s Venezuela’s economy has been highly reliant on the oil and gas sector, a boon at times of high international prices and a curse during cyclical busts in the industry – of which there have been many. According to international estimates Venezuela has the world’s largest oil reserves, mainly concentrated in heavy crudes and oil-bearing tar sands in the Orinoco region. In 1960 Venezuela was one of the first five founders of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec). Two years after the first big Opec-led increase in international oil prices in 1973, Venezuela nationalised its own oil industry, creating a new national oil company (NOC), Petróleos de Venezuela or PDVSA. Typically, oil and gas production accounts for 25% of the country’s total economic activity, about 95% of export earnings, and for as much as 92% of government revenues.

US-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) defines Venezuela as a “failed petro-state”. It defines a petro-state as a country that is deeply reliant on hydrocarbon exports, where economic and political power is highly concentrated in a minority elite, and where political institutions are weak and unaccountable, and corruption is widespread. In reality, these criteria apply with equal force to pre- and post-1999 Venezuelan governments. All that seems to have changed is the composition of the minority elite. Petro-states are seen as becoming deeply dependent on cyclical movements in oil prices, which condemn them to an often-extreme boom-to-bust cycle.

Such states are also seen as being particularly vulnerable to the ‘Dutch disease’ a term used by economists to describe the adverse side-effects of the Netherlands’ discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the 1970s. A strong inward flow of foreign investment and increased export revenues lead to an appreciation of the local currency, which boosts import capacity. The stronger currency leads the country to import more agricultural and manufacturing sector goods, reducing the competitiveness and market share of domestic companies producing these same products. As a result, the economy becomes seriously lop-sided with the hydrocarbons sector dominating the other industries. Diversification – key to providing resilience in hard times – is sharply reduced.

The reliance on oil can indeed become a curse when international oil prices fall. At that point the non-oil sector, having lost its productive capacity and competitive edge, is often unable to provide an alternative source of activity and employment. Over time the Netherlands and other hydrocarbon-producing economies such as Norway have avoided the worst perils of the Dutch disease through active diversification strategies, counter-cyclical fiscal policies, and the use of sovereign wealth funds, all stabilisers designed to smooth out the extreme effects of oil price booms and busts.

Although Venezuela made some attempts to build its own stabilisers, none of them were sustained over time. Diversification attempts were frequently abandoned because of shorter-term political priorities. Domestic energy prices remained heavily subsidised, something which continued to distort the allocation of resources. This can in part be explained by the weakness of the institutions trying to manage these massive ebbs and flows of dollar earnings. Terry Karl, a professor of political science at Stanford University, notes: “Most petrostates became dependent on petroleum while, or immediately after, they were establishing a democracy, state institutions, an independent civil service and private sector, and the rule of law.”

Venezuela Oil Production and Prices

Source: CSIS

The above chart on Venezuelan oil production and prices gives a concise account of an economically lethal combination of internal and international circumstances. The key internal circumstance is that during the entire period of chavista rule oil production, despite a few plateaus, has been on a fairly steady downward path. This is because of a systematic shortfall in the investment required to develop new fields, infrastructure, and transport logistics. Matters were aggravated by the oil strike of 2002-2003, a largely political dispute between PDVSA staff and the government which led to the dismissal of thousands of qualified and managerial-level employees, many of whom subsequently left the country taking their skills with them.

What happened in 2015-2018 – the right-hand side of the chart – explains a large part of the Venezuelan economic tragedy. The trend set in those years – generally low international oil prices coupled with a calamitous fall in production – continued in 2019 and 2020. In effect, it was a kind of pincer movement which has destroyed a large part of the Venezuelan economy. In 2020 the effect was aggravated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to falling demand for oil and a global glut in supply.

At its peak in 1998 more than two decades ago, Venezuelan oil production was running at 3.4m barrels per day (bpd). In June 2020 production was 570,000 bpd, the lowest level since the 1940s. It fell further to 339,000 bpd in July. Because of low global demand, combined with oil industry sanctions and limited storage, PDVSA had been forced to shut down various wells. Industry sources estimate that crude oil export revenue in 2020 might total only US$1.5bn-US$4bn, a tiny proportion of the US$93.5bn the country earned from hydrocarbons in the boom year of 2012. No country can easily absorb a 95% fall in the value of its main commodity export, but due to earlier mismanagement Venezuela was, as we have seen, particularly vulnerable to such a downturn. With its own refineries paralysed due to a lack of spare parts, in 2020 Venezuela began to experience acute petrol shortages, intermittently alleviated by tanker deliveries from Iran.

With an initiative allowing Chileans to make a third withdrawal of up to 10% from their pension pots close to being approved in congress, on 20 April the government led by President Sebastián Piñera filed a challenge to the measure with the constitutional court (TC). This unpopular move presages conflict for the government.

The Piñera executive strongly opposes a third pensions withdrawal on the basis that it would weaken the pensions system in the long term and is not the most effective way of helping Chileans weather the economic impact of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic – a view recently echoed by the International Monetary Fund. The government had opposed the first and second withdrawals in July and December last year (even winning a challenge to the second one in the TC before backtracking), but with cross-party support for the initiatives in congress and public pressure from the streets, President Piñera was faced with little alternative but to sanction the first two withdrawals.

• IMF weighs in

On 15 April Alejandro Werner, the Director of the Western Hemisphere Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), criticised the legislature’s pursuit of a third pensions withdrawal in Chile. Werner echoed the view of the Piñera government, calling the measure “not necessary…and not the appropriate vehicle” as it does not target resources to the most needy and will carry institutional costs in the medium term. Werner went further in suggesting that the extra resources afforded by the withdrawals are unnecessary as Chile will be one of the first countries in the region to see an economic rebound.

This time around, the government has been mounting a defence, trying to offer alternatives to the opposition’s proposal of letting Chileans dip into their pensions for the third time. As well as engaging in discussions on a wider pension reform, it launched an aid package destined to support both the middle classes and Chile’s most vulnerable through the economic squeeze, as surging Covid-19 infections have forced the country back into lockdown. On 19 April, Piñera announced further measures to the tune of US$5.5bn, notably the expansion of the coverage of the emergency family income (IFE).

But the government’s attempts to block a third withdrawal by imploring lawmakers from the ruling right-of-centre Chile Vamos coalition to oppose the measure, offering alternative sources of financial aid, and threatening to challenge the measure in the TC have all been unsuccessful. Last week, the chamber of deputies approved the reform for a third withdrawal with 122 votes to 20, and four abstentions; it was approved by the senate’s constitutional committee on 19 April and is widely expected to pass the plenary of the upper house, which was debating the issue as we went to press on 22 April.   

The government therefore decided to make good on its threat to challenge the withdrawal in the courts and filed a complaint with the TC on 20 April. Juan José Ossa, the head of the secretary general to the presidency (Segpres), announced this move flanked by Finance Minister Rodrigo Cerda and the government spokesperson, Jaime Bellolio, and explained that the executive considers a third withdrawal to be “a bad public policy that damages pensions”, arguing that “there are other ways of contributing to the families of our country, and [this] is an unconstitutional initiative”.

The decision to resort to the TC is a risky one. The opposition is accusing Piñera of being disconnected from reality and ignoring the hardship of most Chileans. “The government is committing a historic error,” Raúl Soto, a deputy for the centre-left Partido por la Democracia (PPD), said. Chile Vamos lawmakers have also been critical; some had reportedly urged the executive to rethink a constitutional challenge. There is also a risk of public unrest. In a radio interview on 19 April, Mario Desbordes, a presidential pre-candidate for Renovación Nacional (RN), Piñera’s party, warned that there will be “social unease” if a TC ruling blocks a third pensions withdrawal. The deafening ‘cacerolazos’ (pots-and-pans protests) which broke out across the country after Ossa’s announcement, and continued the following day, confirmed the public’s dissatisfaction.

MEXICO | Combating inflation. The government announced on 16 May that 26 products in the basic basket of goods would be exempt from tariffs for the space of one year in an attempt to combat inflation, which reached an annualised figure of 7.68% in April, its highest level since January 2001. The products are all food (such as eggs, rice, potatoes, tuna, beef, and wheat flour) except for bars of soap. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has also pushed for increased agricultural production in a drive for greater self-sufficiency to reduce dependence on imports.

Meanwhile, the central bank (Banxico) increased the benchmark interest rate on 12 May from 6.5% to 7%.

In a speech in early June Brazil’s President Lula set out ambitious updates to his environmental policies, including a commitment to achieve zero deforestation by 2030 and a warning that the state could expropriate up to 50% of land involved in illicit activities. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the speech however was the president’s admission that criminal activity is deeply embedded in the Amazon region, remains difficult to control, and presents a major obstacle for any government trying to protect the rainforest. As part of a strategy paper called Plano de Segurança e Soberanía da Amazonia (Amazon Security and Sovereignty Plan) the president said his government would take steps to counteract the growing power of criminal cartels in the vast rainforest area. This would require tackling a “true criminal eco-system” including “drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, slave labour, contract killings and the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents”. Lula also paid tribute to British journalist Dom Phillips and Brazilian indigenous expert Bruno Pereira, murdered a year earlier when investigating illegal fishing gangs in rivers within the Yanomani indigenous reserve. In January-February this year security forces evicted illegal gold miners operating on Yanomani lands

Criminal Groups in the Brazilian Amazon in 2021

The plan calls for the creation of a dedicated environmental operations unit within the National Public Security Force (police and military). It also announces the establishment of integrated land and river-bank security bases, and the creation of an international police cooperation centre to work against trans-Amazon crime with neighbouring countries.

Also proposed is the formation of integrated command-and-control centres with more intelligence sharing. There will be upgrades to river patrol boats and border posts, and the acquisition and modernisation of aerospace systems. The strategy requires increased use of satellite imagery to identify illegal logging, ranching, and mining operations. The government also proposes to increase its technological capacity by the creation of a system able to certify the origins of wood, agricultural products, and minerals, and to establish whether they are associated with illegal deforestation or mining activity.

A dramatic warning over security issues in the Brazilian Amazon was delivered earlier this year by Alexandre Saraiva, a former senior Federal Police officer who worked for a number of years in the region. He said that the rapid spread of organised crime groups could turn the Amazon into a vast conflict-stricken hinterland plagued by Colombian style criminal insurgents (armed groups motivated by a mix of ideological and criminal aspirations). Saraiva also suggested an alternative scenario where drug-trafficking mafias might spawn a decades-long conflict like the one currently in progress in the city of Rio de Janeiro where criminal groups repeatedly clash with police-backed vigilantes in poor shanty towns. “I experienced how the state lost control of public security in Rio de Janeiro” Saraiva said, adding: “And in the Amazon today – if nothing is done in terms of public security – we are facing a continent-sized Rio de Janeiro, with the aggravating factor of borders with major drug producers and an extraordinarily difficult jungle setting.” He suggested that criminal leaders could control territory in parts of the Amazon and develop their own private armies, in a manner similar to the Colombian insurgents. There would be “areas of conflagration” with groups trying to control logging and illegal gold mining, while victimising indigenous communities and taking advantage of the security forces’ major logistical difficulties across vast and isolated areas.

According to research by lobby group Brazilian Forum on Public Security FBSP, there were over 8,000 intentional homicides in Brazil’s nine Amazon region states in 2022, roughly 50% higher in relation to population than in the rest of Brazil. In Amazonas state the rate was 74% above the national average. The number of people killed in encounters with civil and military police in 2016-2021 rose by 71% in the Amazon, reaching roughly double the 35.1% rate in the rest of the country during the same period. The Amazon states also had much larger and more overcrowded prison populations than the rest of the country. Brazil’s two main criminal gangs, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which originated in São Paulo, and the Comando Vermelho (CV), from Rio de Janeiro, now have a presence throughout the nine Amazon states. There are at least 15 other regional crime groups in operation.

FBSP says the Amazon region now contains 10 of Brazil’s most violent municipalities, some of which are key mining and drug-smuggling hubs. Environment minister Marina Silva has expressed her concern over the “overlapping of multiple forms of criminality” in the region and high levels of violence which she describes as “a hallmark of the predatory occupation of the Amazon”. She has called for a stronger presence of the state throughout the region.

Another warning over growing security challenges in the Amazon came in December last year from Supreme Court Justice Luis Roberto Barroso, who said the country is running the risk of losing control of the region. Barroso suggested that environmental experts, investors, and local governments should come together to agree plans for sustainable development for the benefit of the region’s 25m population. He said: “There is a real risk of losing the sovereignty of the Amazon not to any other country, but to organised crime.” Barroso added that the government would need to confront environmental crimes including illegal logging, mining, deforestation, land grabs, and the murder of “defenders of the forest”.  He wanted the “best minds in the world” to discuss alternative approaches such as developing a “bioeconomy” that would create livelihoods capable of preserving, rather than destroying the forest. 

Over a month after São Paulo state deployed a massive police force of around 600 personnel to the Baixada Santista metropolitan area, targeting suspected members of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) on 28 July, the state’s public security secretary, Guilherme Derrite, announced the end of the controversial Operation ‘Escudo’ on 5 September. The state government has denied that the operation, one of the deadliest series of police raids in the past two decades, involved excessive use of police force, despite widespread concern from NGOs and human rights groups about alleged police brutality.    

The São Paulo state government reported that Operation Escudo had resulted in 958 arrests and the seizure of around one tonne of drugs and 117 firearms. According to a state government press release, 28 suspects had “reacted” to the police presence and “ended up dying” in the confrontations. The state’s civil and military police will investigate the violent clashes.

However, independent investigations into police conduct during Operation Escudo has revealed possible evidence of extrajudicial executions and other human rights violations carried out by police operatives. On 1 September a report on the news website G1 cited testimony from residents presented to the federal government’s human rights council, Conselho Nacional de Direitos Humanos (CNDH), which included at least 11 reported instances of police brutality.

The CNDH called for the state authorities to suspend the operation on 1 September and present a report on police conduct within 20 days, including daily schedules, objectives, and the equipment used by each police unit, among other information. The council also requested explanations as to why some police units were allowed to be deployed without body cameras.

The human rights NGO Conectas Direitos Humanos, along with the São Paulo state public ombudsman’s office, even filed a lawsuit on 4 September for judicial authorities to oblige the government to install body cameras on all police participating in Operation Escudo, or to suspend the operation if cameras could not be installed.

Commemorations for Marielle Franco

Outside the federal police regional headquarters in Rio de Janeiro on 2 September, demonstrators held a vigil to commemorate 2,000^th day after the unpunished murder of Marielle Franco, the city councillor assassinated in March 2018. Franco was a vocal critic of police brutality and backed various legislative initiatives in Rio de Janeiro aimed at increasing the use of police body cameras and community-based non-violent policing practices.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva knows a thing or two about elections – this year will be his seventh presidential campaign and he has won three.  His approach is straightforward, to choose a few simple messages that will resonate widely. This year one of his main battle cries going into the October presidential race will be to reduce working hours.

The proposal he has endorsed as one of his major campaign promises is to reduce the maximum work week permitted by law from 44 hours to 40 hours, a practice some sectors have already adopted. “It’s not fair that workers only have one day off a week,” Lula said last December. “The most valuable thing a human being has is time, time outside of work, time to rest, take care of the family and watch the children grow up.”

Movements to reduce the work week have come in waves, first to 48 hours in the 1930s, then to 44 hours through the 1988 constitution. The latest drive to chip off another four hours began around 2010, with several proposals still lingering in congress. But the issue only regained momentum when social media influencer Ricardo Azevedo posted a series of videos venting about his workload at a pharmacy in Rio de Janeiro. He founded the Movimento Vida Além do Trabalho (VAT), a movement that aimed to improve working conditions and increase leisure time.

Azevedo was elected to the Rio city council for the left-wing Partido Socialismo e Libertade (PSOL) in October 2024. Federal deputy Erika Hilton, also of PSOL, submitted a constitutional amendment proposal (PEC) in 2025 to reduce the work week to 36 hours, triggering further media attention, union activity, and marches, and ultimately the attention of Lula.

But what looked to be a political slam dunk that would easily win overwhelming support, turned out to be more complicated. Business leaders started to warn that working less would drive up labour costs and make Brazil’s economy less competitive. There is not just one single formula governing maximum working hours that is appropriate for all sectors. While much of the work force already works around 40 hours, almost one third works more than 44 hours. That is true mostly in the retail and services sectors, such as supermarkets, bars, and restaurants.

Industry concerns

The Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC), the national retail lobby, argued that a reduction of the work week ought to be gradual and negotiated between workers and employers. If the agreement were to work five instead of six days, then that reduction ought to be deducted proportionately from an employee’s salary, said Fabio Bentes, chief economist at the CNC.

The head of the business lobby Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), Ricardo Alban, cited statistics from the International Labour Organization (ILO) showing that Brazil ranked 90^th out of 180 countries in terms of labour productivity. In addition, it remained unclear how businesses would hire more workers to offset the labour reform if unemployment was already at record lows in many industries. “This dynamic causes the loss of production, labour and income and, consequently, the Brazilian GDP,” said Alban. A CNI study published on 23 February also showed that working four hours less per week could increase payroll costs by around 7%.

Different legislation

In addition to Hilton’s constitutional amendment proposal (PEC), there are other PECs under review in congress that propose gradually reducing the work week from 44 hours to 36 hours, including proposals that were submitted in 2015 and 2019 by lawmakers from Lula’s left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Yet the government would likely prefer an ordinary bill instead of a constitutional amendment because it is faster to get through congress and requires fewer votes. Also, a PEC does not require Lula’s signature to be promulgated, thereby depriving him of a key photo opportunity. In an election year such details matter.

Development: On 29 April a Peruvian National Police (PNP) non commissioned officer (NCO), Luis Astuquillca, arrived in the town of Kiteni, Cusco, after being lost in the jungle area of the valley of the Apurímac and Ene rivers (Vrae) for 17 days.

Significance:  Astuquillca was one of the two security forces personnel unaccounted for after attacks sustained by the security forces in the Vrae during ‘Operation Freedom’. That Astuquillca has emerged from the jungle alive, though wounded, undermines claims made by the self-proclaimed leader of the armed group that assumed responsibility for the kidnapping that they had killed a larger number of security forces personnel than the government had admitted. This is a boon for the government of President Ollanta Humala, which maintained that the two members of the security forces were “missing” and kept a search operation in place. 

Key points:

• The mayor of La Convención, Fidia Castro, was the first to announce that Astuquillca had arrived at the small town of Kiteni, where he received medical attention for two bullet wounds on his arm and leg. According to Castro, on 28 April Astuquillca appeared in the village of Postaquiato, where a police helicopter had come under attack and was left behind by the security forces on 12 April. Astuquillca got help from a villager who offered to drive him to Kiteni.

• According to reports by a local daily, El Comercio, Astuquillca has told his superiors that César Vilca, the other missing NCO, is also alive though seriously wounded in the abdomen and legs. El Comercio reports that Astuquillca and Vilca were together, but Astuquillca left Vilca in the jungle close to Postaquiato to get help.

• Astuquillca’s survival has been hailed by the government, which said that official training had enabled his survival. The authorities have also pointed out that his survival “exposed the lies” presented by Martín Quispe Palomino ‘Camarada Gabriel’ in a televised interview.

POLITICS | Cabinet departures. On 6 June Interior Minister Andrés Chadwick announced the resignations of Social Development Minister Joaquín Lanvín and Culture minister Luciano Cruz-Coke. Both Lanvín and Cruz-Coke tendered their resignations in order to join join the campaign teams of those candidates bidding to become the ruling Coalición por el Cambio’s presidential candidate ahead of the 17 November elections. The candidate will be decided in 30 June primaries. Lanvín will join the campaign team of the former economy minister, Pablo Longueira (2011-2013), who is running in the primaries for the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI, the senior partner in the Coalición); while Cruz-Coke will join the campaign team of the former defence minister, Andrés Allamand (2011-2012), the presidential pre-candidate of Renovación Nacional (RN, the junior partner in the Coalición).

Latest homicide data puts Brazil in seventh position in the ranking of the world’s most violent countries, illustrating the continued scale of the internal security challenge in the country. Increased wealth has brought with it more crime against personal property, while drug-related crime is also on the up. Brazilian police remain trigger happy in comparison to their compatriots in other countries. Brazil women continue to endure extreme violence against them in and out of the home with more reported rapes than registered homicides last year and a continuing problem with domestic abuse across social classes.

Brazil’s total number of homicides topped 50,000 in 2012, the highest since 2008, according to the latest annual report from the Brazilian forum for public security (FBSP), which compiles the figures for the national public security secretariat (Senasp). Citing the report, the daily O Estado de São Paulo said there were 50,108 homicides in 2012, including manslaughter (47,136), deaths from assaults (1,810) and deaths from bodily injury (1,162). The estimated homicide rate was 25.8 per 100,000 inhabitants.

The (poorer) north and north east of the country registered the highest homicide rate, led by Alagoas state, with a rate of 61.8 (that was down 14%), followed by Pará (44.0), Ceará (42.5), Bahia (40.7) and Sergipe (40). Crimes against personal property are also on the increase, with a rise in burglaries, car theft, bank theft, lorry theft etc., again led by the north and north east. There were also more illegal drug-related incidents (including police apprehension of people carrying drugs), which the report suggested was evidence of the growth of drug trafficking in the country.

Brazil is also incarcerating more people, with a prison population of over half a million (515, 482), the fourth highest in the world after the US (2.24m), China (1.64m) and Russia (681,600). Brazilian police killed 1,890 people in 2012, according to the FBSP, an average of five a day. The numbers are concentrated in São Paulo, Rio Janeiro and Bahia and the figures cover 23 of the 27 states, so the actual number is likely higher. By way of comparison, in the US (where the population of 317m is 63% bigger than Brazil’s 200m), 410 people died in police-related incidents in 2012 (mostly shoot-outs).

Rousseff leads shock reaction to rape figures

President Dilma Rousseff tweeted in reaction to the news that the number of (reported) rapes in Brazil in 2012 was greater than the total official number of homicides. According to the FBSP report, there were 50,617 cases of reported rapes in the country last year, up 18.2% over 2011 and just above the estimated number of homicides.

“Violence against women is a disgrace that Brazilian society needs to overcome”, she said in a series of tweets on 5 November, noting that the reported figure is, “unhappily, underestimated”.

The president stressed, however, that the increased rate of reporting is partially thanks to the ‘180’ telephone service for the victims of sexual violence run by the women’s policy secretariat. She also stressed that the federal government will begin to roll out from 14 March 2014 (International Women’s Day) new ‘Women’s Houses’ in 26 state capitals. These new victims’ support units will incorporate under one roof a women’s commissariat, judges, legal teams and social workers to support victims, which can also be provided with on-site accommodation. Rousseff also noted the importance of the María da Penha Law, implemented by former president Lula da Silva in 2006, which for the first time put in place harsh sanctions for domestic abuse.

The president announced the ‘Women’s Houses’ initiative on 27 August before congress, having received a final report on gender violence running to over 1,000 pages prepared over 18 months by a congressional committee. Rousseff called for the report recommendations to be implemented so that women “get the support and protection of the state”. The senate president, Renan Calheiros, assured her that the parliament would work quickly to push through new 13 draft bills that among other things codify femicide as a crime.

The task facing the Brazilian authorities is immense. According to a brand new survey* examining public perceptions of violence against women, released in August by Data Popular and the Instituto Patricia Galvão, 70% of Brazilians feel that women suffer more violence in their own homes than in public places, with 50% believing that Brazilian women feel more unsafe at home than in public.

Over half of respondents (54%) said they knew a women that had been subjected to violence by a male partner and 56% knew of a man that had abused his female partner.

In terms of reporting domestic abuse, 86% said the María da Penha Law (which a full 88% of respondents had heard of) had encouraged more women to come forward. However, 85% also said that women denouncing crimes risked being killed by their abusers. Respondents also felt that despite the oficial efforts to penalise transgressors, by and large they still have impunity.

Notably, 69% of respondents said that that violence against women does not only take place in poor homes, illustrating the scale of the problem.

*For the survey, Percepção da Sociedade sobre Violência e assassinatos de mulheres, Data Popular surveyed 1,501 adults in 100 municipalities across the country on 10-18 May. The full survey is available at: http://www.spm.gov.br/publicacoes-teste/publicacoes/2013/livro_pesquisa_violencia.pdf

• Abortion

Abortion can only be legally performed in Brazil if the pregnancy puts the life of the woman in danger or if the pregnancy is the result of rape. In her election campaign in 2010 Dilma Rousseff was forced by conservative evangelicals to backtrack on her abortion stance (she considers it a medical issue and would widen the existing legislation). The daily O Globo noted on 6 November that there are only 65 medical centres in Brazil where rape victims can legally terminate unwanted pregnancies resulting from the crime.

Rio - over 700,000 security cameras ahead of 2014

A new report released on 11 November put the number of security cameras in Rio, host city to the 2014 FIFA World Cup, at over 700,000, or one for every nine residents, with cameras “on every corner in the city centre”; in all high end and mid-level residential buildings and increasingly also in poorer areas including the city’s main ‘pacified’ favelas.

Indeed, police in the favela of Rocinha suspected of killing a local resident in July (whose body has yet to turn up) deactivated cameras that the police themselves had installed in the neighbourhood in an effort to cover up their crime.

Most security cameras (700,000) are private, with only about 1,000 installed by the city authorities, prompting some debate about the right to privacy. The report was compiled by Ser-Tel, a local Rio de Janeiro security consulting company.

PERÚ | Reorganizan junta de directores de Petroperú por derrame de petróleo. El 24 de julio, el gobierno peruano liderado por el Presidente Ollanta Humala cumplió con su promesa de reestructurar la junta de directores de la compañía petrolera contralada por el Estado, Petroperú, después de un derrame de petróleo en el departamento de Loreto en el nordeste. El derrame tuvo lugar el 30 de junio después de que un tramo corroído del oleoducto norperuano de Petroperú comenzara a derramar petróleo crudo en el terreno cerca de la localidad de Cuninico, en el distrito de Urarinas. Una cantidad desconocida de crudo (se estima en unos 10.000 barriles) fue vertida, afectando a más de dos hectáreas de tierras bajas en la jungla amazónica y a 549 habitantes locales, quienes consumieron agua y pescados contaminados. El incidente se convirtió en un escándalo después de que el programa de TV local, Panorama, reveló que en un aparente intento por reducir el descontento local, Petroperú contrató a miembros de las comunidades indígenas locales –incluidos menores– para ayudar a limpiar el derrame, pero sin proveerles del equipamiento de seguridad necesario. Panorama también alegó que los cercanos Ríos Cuninico y Marañón también habían sido contaminados por el derrame, lo que Petroperú niega vehementemente. Sin embargo, el 22 de julio, Manuel Pulgar Vidal, el ministro del medioambiente de Perú, anunció que su ministerio lanzará una investigación y que Petroperú enfrentaría las multas más altas posibles si se halla que es responsable de cualquier manera por el daño medioambiental causado. Poco después del anuncio de Pulgar Vidal, el ministro de energía & minas, Eleodoro Mayorga, anunció la reestructuración de la junta de directores de cinco miembros de Petroperú. Mayorga dijo que la decisión se debía al hecho de que la junta “no estaba cumpliendo con los objetivos establecidos por la firma” y que el gobierno sentía que eran necesarias mayor “transparencia” y “experiencia” para manejar los futuros proyectos de la firma –comentarios que fueron tomados como una referencia al manejo del derrame en Cuninico. La principal cabeza en rodar fue la del presidente de la junta, Héctor Reyes Cruz, nombrado en enero del 2013 y quien fue reemplazado por Pedro Touzet, un ex presidente de la junta de Petroperú (1997-2000). El vicepresidente Luis Baba Nakao y otro miembro de la junta, Jorge Luis Parodi Quesada, también fueron reemplazados.

ECUADOR | Nuevo código bancario. El 24 de julio la asamblea nacional de Ecuador aprobó un nuevo código monetario y financiero (Comf) diseñado para regular el sistema financiero nacional. El nuevo código ya ha provocado preocupaciones por parte de la oposición política y del sector bancario local debido a su énfasis sobre la administración dirigida por el Estado del sector financiero interno. El Comf contiene provisiones que apuntan a incrementar la capacidad del gobierno central para regular el sistema financiero nacional y proteger a los ahorristas de tener sus cuentas bancarias congeladas durante crisis de liquidez bancarias (como ocurrió en Ecuador en 1999). El nuevo código también limita la remuneración de los ejecutivos de las instituciones financieras y establece un esquema de depósito de seguridad que cubrirá a los bancos privados, al sector público y a las cooperativas. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de una nueva junta reguladora de la política financiera y monetaria, que bajo el Comf se encargará de la supervisión general del sistema financiero, ha probado ser altamente controversial. La junta –que tendrá el poder de establecer los requerimientos mínimos de liquidez para las instituciones financieras; limitar los holdings de activos extranjeros por parte de los bancos; y la cantidad de los préstamos y créditos que pueden ser adjudicados a cada sector– no tendrá ningún representante del sector bancario privado y estará bajo el control efectivo del ejecutivo. Según el diputado opositor, Luis Fernando Torres, esto permitirá a la junta “convertirse en uno de los más poderosos cuerpos públicos en el territorio ecuatoriano”, que podrá “legislar sobre diferentes materias bajo la pretensión de promulgar actos normativos”. Igualmente, César Robalino, el presidente de la Asociación de Bancos Privados de Ecuador (ABPE), se ha quejado de que “una cosa es supervisión, otra es el dirigismo del Estado al máximo”. Según Robalino, el Comf introducirá un “espantoso intervencionismo de Estado” en el sistema. El Comf también introduce una tarifa de 0,5% sobre todas las transacciones financieras de crédito, que será recolectada por el ministerio de salud pública a fin de ser desembolsada a la Sociedad de Lucha Contra el Cáncer (Solca) de Ecuador. Marcos López, un ex miembro de la junta del banco central (BCE), remarcó que la tarifa haría más costoso el crédito en el país, mientras alivia el presupuesto del Estado. El Comf también ratifica la dolarización de la economía interna de Ecuador e impide el uso de Bitcoins y otras monedas digitales ‘apátridas’, pero establece nuevas directrices para la creación de una moneda digital ecuatoriana bajo el control del BCE.

• Starbucks aterriza en Colombia

El 16 de julio la cadena de cafeterías de EU, Starbucks Corporation, abrió su primer local en Colombia. La apertura de la primera cafetería de Starbucks en el centro de Bogotá ha causado controversia, pues algunos se quejan que esto podría socavar a la emblemática cadena de cafeterías local, Juan Valdéz Café, que es propiedad de la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (Fedecafé). Pero el CEO de Starbucks, Howard Schultz, afirmó que “hemos venido a Colombia con el mayor respeto y humildad, muy concientes de la cultura del café del país […] y sólo serviremos café colombiano en el local [… y] sentimos que complementaremos el gran trabajo hecho por Juan Valdéz y Fedecafé”. Howard agregó que Starbucks planea invertir US$5m para abrir 50 nuevos locales y contratar 1.000 personas en Colombia en los próximos cinco años.

Hubo otro recordatorio de la debilidad del gobernante Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) de Brasil esta semana. El 22 de abril, la cámara baja federal del congreso aprobó, en su segunda lectura, un proyecto de ley que permitiría a las compañías brasileras contratar externamente todas sus actividades, a pesar de la concertada campaña del PT y sus aliados sindicales de la Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) para intentar frenar su progreso. Ahora la ley pasa al senado para su aprobación, donde podría encontrar una oposición más dura. Sin embargo, si es aprobada, la Presidenta Dilma Rousseff estará bajo una severa presión para vetar la ley.

Aunque la Presidenta Rousseff ha dado pasos para enmendar su relacionamiento con el aliado clave del PT en el congreso, el Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), principalmente designando al Vicepresidente Michel Temer,  como el enlace entre el ejecutivo y la legislatura, muchos dentro del PMDB están en abierto desafío de Rousseff, lo que significa que ella necesita del robusto apoyo del PT. Pero el mismo PT está crecientemente dividido, con muchos activistas disgustados con las opciones políticas asumidas por Rousseff desde el inicio de su segundo mandato.

El PT finalmente se deshizo de su tesorero, João Vaccari Neto, después de que este fuera puesto en detención preventiva por su rol en el escándalo de corrupción en Petrobrás (el Petrolão), pero se vio en problemas para encontrar un reemplazante. Eventualmente, escogió al ex diputado federal, Marcio Macedo, pero sólo después de que otras tres personas rechazaran la oferta del presidente del partido, Rui Falcão. El partido también ha tratado de salir adelante del escándalo al declarar que ya no aceptará donaciones de compañías privadas para sus campañas electorales, aunque esta decisión será puesta a votación en el congreso nacional del partido, entre el 11 y 14 de junio en Salvador de Bahia.

Sin embargo, asumir un elevado enfoque tiene su precio. A inicios de esta semana, Rousseff fue criticada por no vetar una ley que triplica los fondos estatales disponibles para los partidos políticos. Originalmente, el gobierno estableció el techo en R$289,5m (US$95m), pero esto fue enmendado por el patrocinador de la ley en el senado, Romero Jucá, del PMDB, quien elevó la cifra a R$867,5m (US$285m). La decisión de Rousseff de no vetar la ley, va en contra de los esfuerzos de su gobierno de poner riendas en los gastos en otras partes, pero hacerlo hubiera hecho la vida extremadamente difícil para el PT.

Petrobrás cuenta sus pérdidas

El 22 de abril la compañía petrolera estatal de Brasil, Petrobrás, finalmente publicó sus largamente esperados resultados auditados para el 2014, calculado cuánto había perdido debido a la corrupción. Basado en declaraciones de testigos de que entre el 2004 y el 2012, Petrobrás pagó un 3% sobre el valor real de sus contratos con 27 firmas de construcción, la compañía calcula las pérdidas causadas por esa corrupción en R$6,2mm (US$2mm). La misma compañía admitió que esta cifra era “conservadora” y “provisional”.

También ha asumido un pago por deterioro de R$44,6bn por demoras y otros problemas en proyectos emblemáticos como el Complexo Petroquímico do Rio de Janeiro (Comperj) y la refinería Abreu e Lima. Estas pérdidas fueron un resultado de “problemas de planeamiento”, así como también de la caída en el valor de los activos, el Real y los bajos precios del petróleo.

Petrobrás también dijo que había tenido una pérdida neta el año pasado de R$21,6mm comparado con una ganancia neta de R$23,6mm en el 2013. El resultado del 2014 fue el peor para la compañía desde 1991, cuando informó de pérdidas de R$1,21mm, de acuerdo con la firma consultora, Economática. En su primera presentación ante los inversionistas, el nuevo presidente de Petrobrás, Aldemir Benedine, se disculpó en nombre de los trabajadores de Petrobrás por lo que había ocurrido en la compañía. “Desde este momento, Petrobrás abre una nueva página”, dijo Benedine.

• El escándalo de Petrobrás

Paulo Roberto Costa, el ex titular de abastecimientos en Petrobrás, ha sido sentenciado a siete años y seis meses de prisión domiciliaria por su participación en el delito organizado y lavado de dinero. Alberto Yousseff, el tratante de dinero del mercado negro, fue sentenciado a nueve años y dos meses de prisión por lavado de dinero. Ambos recibieron sentencias reducidas debido a su cooperación con las autoridades en la ‘Operação Lava Jato’, las investigaciones oficiales sobre la corrupción en Petrobrás.