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With accountability concerns already rife following the new legislature’s dismissal in May of the supreme court’s constitutional chamber (SC) and head of the attorney general’s office Raúl Melara [SSR-21-06], President Nayib Bukele has further set off alarm bells regarding transparency. In early June he ended the September 2019 agreement between the government and Organization of American States (OAS) establishing the International Commission against Impunity in El Salvador (Cicies), the creation of which had been a 2019 campaign pledge.

Cicies already had few of the features enjoyed by its (now defunct) precursor in Guatemala – the United Nations (UN)-backed International Commission against Impunity (Cicig) – lacking for instance its ability to help prosecute cases. Until the dismissal of Melara, who, like the SC had been a prominent critic of Bukele, Cicies had, however, been investigating the health ministry’s alleged misuse of funds and irregularities surrounding public procurement contracts to combat the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, among other cases.

Bukele justified the decision to end the agreement, announced on 4 June, claiming that Ernesto Muyshondt, a former San Salvador mayor (2018-2021) for the right-wing opposition Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena), had been hired as an adviser to OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro. Muyshondt is under investigation for alleged links to gangs and misappropriation of tax revenue, which he denies; a government statement accused the OAS of “promoting impunity” as a result. This has however provoked a stinging rebuke from the OAS which, in a 7 June statement not only rejected these claims regarding Muyshondt (see sidebar) but went on to make public its differences with the Salvadorean government regarding Cicies, casting further doubt on the government’s commitment to fighting corruption.

Among other things, these include a law promulgated on 5 May for the use of products for medical treatments in exceptional public health situations caused by the pandemic, which the OAS warns will ultimately benefit people who could have participated in acts of corruption due to the immunity established in Art. 4 of said law. The OAS also cites the government decision not to publish a descriptive report on the use of public funds in response to the pandemic, which it said contained “a series of irregularities with a criminal appearance”. It also accuses the new AG’s office of “smothering” Cicies in recent weeks, completely curtailing its investigative possibilities – government actions aimed at “preventing progress in the investigations into allegations of corruption by the current administration” and the government’s “recurrent attitude of trying to induce the Cicies to investigate actions of opposition politicians exclusively.”

• Harris’s first trip

Bukele’s announcement regarding Cicies came three days after US Vice President Kamala Harris, who US President Joe Biden named to lead efforts with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to tackle illegal migration, paid her first visit to the sub-region, travelling to Guatemala where she met President Alejandro Giammattei. Key to Biden’s US$4bn plan for Central America to address the root causes of illegal migration is the need to tackle corruption in the sub-region. Following her meeting with Giammattei, Harris announced various anti-corruption initiatives. These include the creation of an anti-corruption task force by the US Justice Department, with support from the US State Department, to include US prosecutors and law enforcement experts to investigate and prosecute corruption cases with a nexus in the US, Guatemala, and the region. END BOX

• Muyshondt

In its statement, the OAS was clear that Muyshondt was “not hired as stated in the press release but was only made an offer at the time for an honorary contract, although this contract was never signed”; that prior to making the offer public the foreign ministry was notified and “at no time did it disclose any discrepancy regarding the possibility of making it”; and that “not even the hiring” would have given Muyshondt “immunity” before Salvadorean courts, much less “impunity”. The OAS statement said that “such errors in logic are inadmissible from every point of view” and the General Secretariat “does not want this to be used as an excuse for the Cicies to leave the country”.

*** GUYANA’S DIVISIONS LAID BARE. On 1 August, African Emancipation Day, Guyana’s former president David Granger (2015-2020), leader of the African-Guyanese supported People’s National Congress Reform (PNCR), said that race relations was still the country’s biggest problem. Parliamentary opposition leader Joseph Harmon went further, accusing President Irfaan Ali and the ruling People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of exacerbating the country’s racial divide. The PPP gains most of its support from Guyanese of East Indian descent.

Granger, who still doesn’t accept the legitimacy of the March 2020 general election, said: “Guyana’s biggest problem is the problem of social cohesion…The biggest problem we have is the ethnic problem and unless we solve that problem by fortifying the foundation of mutual respect, we’re not going to move forward fast enough to develop this country.” Harmon added: “Today we live under an installed regime that promotes and assures life-long insecurity for the majority of our people. Their open oppression goes beyond discrimination, racism, injustices, and economic marginalisation. It is oppression with authoritarian attributes that threatens our liberties and our democratic society.” The opposition has accused the government of discrimination against African Guyanese in the distribution of relief for Covid-19 and the recent floods. The government has proposed a One Guyana Commission to look at the issue of social cohesion, but the proposal is hampered by the opposition’s refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the PPP’s 2020 election victory.

*** CARICOM CALLS FOR END TO CUBA EMBARGO. On 26 July, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) countries wrote a collective open letter to US President Joe Biden urging an end to the economic embargo of Cuba. Caricom chairman Gaston Browne, prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, wrote that the embargo “has run its course”. He said: “Caricom sincerely believes that it should be lifted so that all the rights to which the Cuban state and its people are entitled can be respected and upheld. Under a previous US administration of which you were a part, significant strides were made in this direction, and could be advanced to beneficial effect.” Browne said that Caricom was troubled by the shortages of food, medicines, and other basic goods in Cuba “that results, significantly, from the long-standing US trade embargo and the more recent punitive measures imposed by the previous US administrations”.

*** ST KITTS AND NEVIS GETS TOP RANKING ON PASSPORTS. The 2021 Henley & Partners Passport Index ranks St Kitts and Nevis (SKN) as the best Caribbean passport to hold. In the global ranking, SKN ranks 24^th out of 199 countries, with visa-free travel to 157 countries. The ranking is a boost for SKN’s Citizenship By Investment (CBI) scheme. Those with similar schemes in the Caribbean were ranked as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, 29; St Lucia, 31; Grenada, 33; and Dominica, 34.

*** BARBADOS TO BECOME REPUBLIC ON 30 NOVEMBER. On 26 July, Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley announced that Barbados will become a republic on 30 November. She said: “On November 30 this year, our great nation which we love shall become a parliamentary republic. The Cabinet has accepted the recommendations of the Forde Commission, with minor modification, [and] our parliamentary republic shall have a non-executive president. [The president] shall be elected by the Electoral College of both houses of Parliament, and that president shall be entitled to serve initially for a period of four years, and thereafter can be reappointed for another term.” Consultations on a new constitution will begin on 1 December.

In an attack claimed by the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerrilla group, 13 police officers were injured by a bomb in Cali, the capital of Colombia’s south-western department of Valle del Cauca, on 7 January.

The bombing targeted a truck carrying members of the riot police (Esmad), initially prompting speculation that the attack was linked to last year’s major wave of social unrest. That unrest found its epicentre in Cali, where Esmad officers led a lethal crackdown on protesters [WR-21-19].

An ELN statement claiming responsibility for the attack praised the protest movement, but it said that the bombing was in retaliation for the September killing of the commander of the group’s western front, Ogli Ángel Padilla (‘Fabián’) [WR-21-38], and it warned that “disproportionate use of force by the regime legitimises a forceful response from our side”.

However, Defence Minister Diego Molano Aponte declared on 10 January that the ELN’s statement provides the “ultimate proof” that the ELN was “behind the acts of vandalism and roadblocks of last year”. He announced that the military’s presence in Cali would be doubled to 684 troops in light of the attack, and that controls would be carried out at 22 checkpoints across the city.

Molano’s efforts to link the bombing with the protest movement may have been a preview of the government’s campaign strategy ahead of the legislative and presidential elections in March and May, respectively. President Iván Duque’s administration has repeatedly claimed that the protests were hijacked by the ELN, but it has offered little in the way of concrete proof. With a leading ally of the protesters, Senator Gustavo Petro of the left-wing Colombia Humana, enjoying a comfortable lead in the polls, the government will be hoping that associating the social unrest with the guerrilla group will offer a means of reeling him in for Oscar Iván Zualaga, of the ruling right-wing Centro Democrático (CD).

Farc dissidents

Dissident units of the disbanded Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrilla group carried out two attacks on the security forces in the past week. The first, in Lejanías municipality in Colombia’s central Meta department, saw two police officers killed on 11 January. Meta governor Juan Guillermo Zuluaga said that a dissident group had claimed responsibility, but he provided no further information on the suspects. The following day, the military blamed the Farc’s dissident 33^rd Front for a grenade attack that injured three soldiers in Tibú municipality, in the eastern department of Norte de Santander.

If the first wave of the energy transition is the shift to greater use of renewable energy in the electricity grid, the second is the reduction of fossil fuels in transport and their replacement by alternatives such as hydrogen. Uruguay can claim to be ahead of the game in both of these areas.

Uruguay has taken big strides to make its electricity greener. In the years 2017-2020, 97% of its total electricity consumption came from renewable sources (44% hydroelectric, 32% wind, 18% biomass, and 3% solar). However, fossil fuels still play a big part in the primary energy balance, which includes the transport sector and other activities. In that balance renewable energy accounted for 63% of total consumption, while fossil fuels provided for the remaining 37% (36% oil and 1% gas).

In April, Uruguay’s position was recognised in an index produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) which measures which countries have advanced furthest in the transition to renewable energy. As might have been expected the top end of the global ranking was taken by European economies, with Sweden in the number one slot, followed by Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria. Uruguay was ranked 13^th globally, making it the leader in Latin America, ahead of Costa Rica (26^th) and Colombia (30^th).

President Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou’s government appears committed to also latching on to the more transport-related second wave of the energy transition. Much of this concerns building up local capacity to produce, distribute, and eventually export green hydrogen, which is manufactured by using renewable electricity to hydrolyse water, splitting the hydrogen (H2) molecules from the oxygen ones (O). Green hydrogen can be used as a store of energy, can be transported by pipeline or by ship, and can power fuel cells to drive cars and trucks.

Aside from the obvious requirements – notably plentiful supplies of wind, solar power, and water – setting up a supportive environment for a hydrogen industry needs a lot of other things that Uruguay seems to have. Officials note that Uruguay scores well on having an open economy, a freely convertible currency, and a strong rule of law, as well as predictable politics and stable investment regulations. The current investment promotion law defines the production of green hydrogen as a “high level manufacturing technology” which attracts corporate tax breaks. The government has just announced a US$10m investment fund to back various H2 pilot projects, focused on other hydrogen-based fuel variants including green methanol, kerosene, and fertilisers.

There is a sense that record fossil fuel prices, triggered by the war in Ukraine, are also providing something of a window of opportunity. Xavier Costantini, a senior partner at consultancy McKinsey which has just opened an office in Uruguay, says that because of the war a range of Russian and Ukrainian energy products and foodstuffs are no longer flowing into Europe – a long-term shift that creates a gap in the market for alternative suppliers. “Moving fast is key,” he says, adding that “the window of opportunity is open right now”. 

Uruguay’s industry minister Omar Paganini says the country must establish itself as a player in green hydrogen before 2025, when the current government reaches the end of its five-year term in office. On a recent visit to Montevideo, Carlos Torres Vila, chief executive of Spanish bank BBVA, said Uruguay was setting an example for the rest of Latin America in terms of the energy transition. He noted that the cost of running electric vehicles is rapidly becoming more competitive.

Some projects are already under way. In the Tambor Green Hydrogen Hub in the department of Tacuarembó, Enertrag of Germany and local partner SEG Ingeniería are building 350MW of wind and solar farm capacity with an associated electrolyser. The partners say the unit will produce 15,000 tonnes of green hydrogen per annum, which will be converted into e-methanol, which will be able to replace about 10% of the methanol that is produced in Germany using soon-to-be banned Russian crude oil.

The company says that in the long term Uruguay could produce green hydrogen “to gigawatt scale” covering Germany’s entire demand for methanol. CSI, another local company which is working with a US partner, is considering an initial US$200m investment to build a methanol plant using organic waste from Montevideo and Canelones, that would ultimately power eight container ships operated by Danish shipping line Maersk.

While hydrogen looms large, Uruguay is also looking at promoting electric vehicles (EVs). Last year EVs represented 1.2% of total vehicle sales in the country, up from 0.5% in 2020. Santiago Guelfi, local representative of Chinese automaker BYD, says he expects the EV share of vehicle sales to double every year. Although starting small, there are good prospects for EV expansion. At the moment the fleet in Uruguay includes 35 public buses operating in Montevideo and Canelones, 80 taxis, 297 utility vehicles, 41 trucks, and 500 sports utility vehicles (SUVs).

The hype surrounding the economic potential from the so-called ‘lithium triangle’ in the central Andes over the past year has taken on near-epic proportions. Optimistic growth projections show the ‘white gold’ replacing beef, soy, or wine as a top export item, and there was even talk of Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia forming a ‘Lithium Opec’ to dominate the world market.

Attention has focused particularly on Argentina, where proven reserves have grown more than eightfold and government efforts to develop a lithium-based battery industry are gaining momentum with the inauguration of the first production facility. That could add real value, and rather than exporting another unprocessed commodity like soy or beef, become a game changer for the struggling Argentine economy.

The battery project is being driven by a joint venture between the Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP) and Y-Tec, a unit of the state-run energy company YPF. Late last year machinery was being installed in the new facility on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. Production was slated to begin shortly, according to the ministry of science and technology.

“Unlike how YPF works in the world of hydrocarbons, the objective is the vertical integration of the value chain in the case of lithium. We have decided to integrate the lithium industrialisation process, and also to reach as far as the battery,” Hernán Letcher, from YPF Litio (Argentina), told an international conference at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSM) in October.

Y-Tec and its sister subsidiary, YPF Litio, are also working on a 20,000-hectare lithium prospecting project in Fiambala in the western Catamarca province, in partnership with local mining firm Catamarca Minera y Energetica. They will be joining several dozen separate ventures currently underway in a virtual stampede to get the white gold out of the ground and into car batteries for the booming electric auto industry.

Out of those, 19 projects in the provinces of Jujuy, Catamarca, and Salta are in an advanced stage and have an installed capacity of around 38,500 tonnes of Lithium Carbonate Equivalent (LCE), according to Fundar, a centre for studies and design of public policies related to sustainable development.

JPMorgan Chase bank has said in a report that Argentina will likely overtake Chile by 2027 to become the world’s second-largest producer after Australia. By 2030 it could supply 16% of the world’s lithium, up from 6% in 2021, the bank estimates. Indeed, by expanding the country’s two current operations and adding new ventures already in the pipeline, production could reach around 255,000 tonnes, converting lithium and its derivatives into one of Argentina’s top export chains, according to Víctor Delbuono, a researcher with Fundar.

Argentina is currently a distant fourth among the world’s leading producers of lithium with only 6,200 tonnes of output per year. At 55,000 tonnes, Australia accounts for almost half of the global output, followed by Chile with 26,000 tonnes, and China with 14,000 tonnes, according to the US Geological Survey 2022. But the country’s proven reserves have jumped significantly from 2.2m tonnes to 19m tonnes, the USGS says. Together with Bolivia and Chile, the three countries account for 56% of the total proven reserves. 

Not surprisingly, the leading producers are now eyeing to get their hands on mining rights in Argentina. First among them is China, which boasts six of the 10 largest electric vehicle battery manufacturers. Ganfeng Lithium spent nearly US$1bn to buy Lithea Inc last year for its rights to the Mariana project near the Salar de Llullaillaco and the border with Chile.

In the same year Melbourne-based mining giant Rio Tinto spent US$850m to acquire the Rincon Lithium project, also in Salta province. Other big-name players include South Korea’s Posco, which is investing over US$1bn to set up a lithium hydroxide plant in Argentina.

One of the reasons that Argentina has emerged as a major lithium player is because it offers relatively attractive tax and royalty levels, and less government intervention than its neighbours. In Chile and Bolivia, foreign investors often have to comply with onerous contractual obligations.

But there are also obstacles in Argentina that could cause a slower-than-expected development of the nascent industry. Many of them originate in Argentina’s federalist system, which gives provinces the authority over mining in their respective territories. That means that each province may have different rules on everything from taxation to procurement, making it difficult to design a national strategy for the country. Provinces also may not have the resources to provide incentives or fund research and development to obtain more benefits from mining.

Then there are political rivalries between the federal and state governments, particularly when authorities are from opposing political parties. Efforts in 2022 between Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile to create a type of lithium cartel along the lines of Opec have faced opposition by the governments of Salta, Jujuy, and Catamarca, the three Andean provinces that harbour the bulk of Argentina’s lithium reserves.

“We are not going to allow lithium to go into the hands of those who are not the rightful owner. We have that wealth, we are going to share it obviously, but it is up to us,” Ricardo Villada, government minister from Salta, said at the time.

Argentina’s political and macroeconomic climate also isn’t exactly the most favourable. Vice President Cristina Fernández narrowly escaped an assassination attempt on 1 September last year and public sparring between her and President Alberto Fernández over politics and economics is the norm rather than the exception. Budget and investment planning in a country with close to 100% inflation and more than a dozen different currency exchange rates is also no small feat. Argentina ranks 129th out of 190 economies in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, one spot ahead of Iran and behind countries like Senegal and Lesotho.

Finally, there have been considerable environmental concerns over the large extraction of groundwater in the process of lithium production, which is based on evaporating brine in large open-air pools in highland plains of the Andes as well as the Atacama desert in Chile.

“We have to focus on the issue of water and not lose sight of that discussion: brine is also part of the water resources. From the production point of view, it has no other potential utility, but its ecological role must not be ignored,” Walter Díaz Paz, from the UNSM’s institute of non-conventional energy research (Inenco), said at the October lithium conference.

New technologies are available that filter out lithium and allow the saltwater to be pumped back into the ground, but these are still untested at a large scale. In Chile, courts have found that lithium production from brine endangers the ground water. Argentina too faces the risk of lengthy legal battles over water rights and environmental protection.

Risk of legal obstacles

Victoria Arias Mahiques of Fundar warned of the risk of legal battles. “In Argentina, the driver of changes in environmental governance is usually not good will: there is a marked tendency to judicialize conflicts to promote these changes,” she said.

Guyana’s oil-and-gas fuelled economic boom is still in full swing, with first half GDP growth reaching a massive 49.7% compared to the same period last year. This makes it the fastest-growing economy in the Western Hemisphere.

President Irfaan Ali welcomed the news; the government said that in the light of the latest data, it is now raising its full-year GDP forecast by ten percentage points to 42.3%. International bodies are a little more cautious, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) saying GDP will rise this year by 33.9%, while the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) projects 29.2% growth.

The oil and gas sector is clearly the engine of Guyana’s economic boom. During the course of this year crude oil production is expected to surge by 60% to 228m barrels. In November last year Guyana took delivery of ‘Prospera’, its third floating production storage and offloading vessel (FPSO) which has allowed an increase in output to 624,000 barrels per day (bpd). The price of Brent crude averaged US$84 a barrel in the first half, up by 5.2% on the same period last year. The increase in output means Guyana is on track to overtake Venezuela as South America’s second-largest oil producer, after Brazil.

One measure of success is whether oil and gas growth can spill-over and lift the non-oil economy in a sustainable manner. President Ali was optimistic, noting that in the first half non-oil GDP grew by 12.6%. Since 2022 the finance ministry has been following a plan to use oil revenues to invest in agriculture, transport infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and labour force training. The government has high hopes of benefiting from business process outsourcing (BPO) and has built two campuses for BPO call centres. Sugar cane and gold output dropped because of a drought, but there were double digit percentage increases in sectors such as fisheries, mining, manufacturing, and construction.

The opposition People's National Congress Reform (PNCR)/A Partnership for National Unity (APNU) responded to the latest growth data with a warning that all may not be as positive as it sounds. Economic adviser to the opposition, Elson Low, said that despite high growth and rising oil output most Guyanese cannot see their own economic situation improving. He was cited by the local media as accusing the government of offering teachers an insufficient and “anaemic” salary increase. Low questioned whether the desired improvement in the non-oil economy is really happening. As he put it, “one must ask whether the non-oil economy should not be performing far better in terms of greater production, high productivity, more value-added and wider diversification”.

Criticisms

Economic adviser to the opposition, Elson Low, was also cited by the local media as saying that among additional measures, he wants to see easier access to credit, infrastructure investment targeted on improving productivity, and “simplified and depoliticised” access to land.             

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa has struck a deal with the indigenous party Pachakutik that will put him just one vote shy of a majority in the newly expanded 151-seat national assembly.

The new legislature, which takes up its seats on 14 May, will be Ecuador’s least fragmented in nearly two decades, with almost 90% of seats held by President Noboa’s centre-right Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN), on 66, and the left-wing opposition Revolución Ciudadana (RC), on 67. With RC’s defeated presidential candidate, Luisa González, still refusing to concede following last month’s election, the party is expected to doggedly oppose Noboa in congress. The deciding votes on key bills are therefore likely to be cast by Pachakutik’s nine legislators and by the conservative Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), the fourth-largest party in congress with just four lawmakers.

The minister for government, José de la Gasca, announced on 6 May that the Pachakutik legislators had agreed to enter an alliance with the government. Sharing a photograph of seven of the indigenous party’s nine representatives, he said that “the nine elected legislators from Pachakutik have joined this great accord, and along with the government are showing that, when we put our love for our country first, it’s possible to join forces and work together for everyone’s progress”. This “great accord” mentioned by De la Gasca is currently looking threadbare, although the government should be able to win the support of the PSC, which is broadly aligned with Noboa on issues of security and the economy, despite some previous disagreements over taxation.

Even if the PSC does join the Pachakutik legislators and come onboard, the government would still be left with a governing majority of just three votes. The five legislators from minor parties might provide Noboa with a further buffer against RC, but there is no room for the defections that have been commonplace in recent years.

The Pachakutik legislators can expect pressure from the wider indigenous movement to abandon their alliance with the government. Leonidas Iza, the president of the umbrella indigenous organisation Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Conaie), of which Pachakutik is the political arm, lambasted the nine deputies following De la Gasca’s announcement.

Iza, who bucked longstanding distrust between the indigenous movement and RC to back González in the election’s second round, said that the Pachakutik deputies’ decision to join forces with the government “not only constitutes a political mistake, but also a betrayal of the principles upon which our movement was founded”. Iza went on to say that “this is not just about a simple legislative agreement, but the selling of the dignity of our peoples in exchange for power quotas”.

The real test for Noboa’s alliance with Pachakutik will come if Conaie again convenes major anti-government protests, as it has done several times in recent years. Noboa’s energy policies present one potential flashpoint, with the government having triggered significant indigenous pushback with its efforts to boost private sector involvement in the oil and mineral sectors.

Whilst Noboa has not yet incurred massive indigenous protests of the sort that destabilised the governments of his predecessors, Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023) and Lenín Moreno (2017-2021), he has sparked smaller protests by Conaie over issues such as fuel subsidy cuts. He has also triggered localised indigenous protests over abandoned plans for a new maximum-security prison in Napo province [WR-24-50].

 Electoral court rejects fraud allegations

On 6 May Ecuador’s top electoral court (TCE) archived an appeal submitted by the left-wing opposition Revolución Ciudadana (RC) which disputed the official results of the 13 April presidential run-off election. Luisa González’s allegations of fraud, which are largely based on the discrepancy between pre-election polling and the actual result, have also been rejected by electoral observation missions from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union. The final results from the national electoral authority (CNE) gave President Noboa a substantial victory of 55.63%-44.37%.

The number of Salvadoreans living in extreme poverty increased from 588,917 to 610,272 year-on-year from 2023-2024, equivalent to a 3.63% increase, according to statistics from the national bank (BCR).

This means that 9.08% of Salvadorean households were living in extreme poverty in 2024, meaning that they couldn’t afford a basic basket of goods. On the other hand, the number of people living in poverty fell from 1.33m in 2023 to 1.20m in 2024. As a result, a further 18.9% of Salvadorean households were living in poverty in 2024, meaning that they couldn’t afford a wider basket of goods. This mixed picture will be a concern for President Nayib Bukele, who promised to boost the economy during his second term in office, which started in June 2024, but his government has struggled to get a handle on inflation and a rising cost of living, which have made it more difficult for people to afford basic necessities as salaries have lagged behind. 

However, there are some signs that Bukele is taking action, with the 2026 budget proposal presented to congress in early October worth US$10.56bn, up 9.2% on this year. The education budget was up 6.9% to US$1.54bn, while the health budget was boosted by 12.3% to US$1.33bn, with extra funds for infrastructure and medication. There are also some measures designed to deal with the rising cost of living, including efforts to boost basic grain production via an agriculture bonus (for which US$46.6m has been assigned), while US$238.7m has been allocated to finance various subsidies including liquid petroleum gas (US$114.6m), public transport (US$60.0m), and electricity (US$64.1m).

It is not clear, however, whether the sums involved will enable the kind of far-reaching efforts needed to better support the poorest Salvadoreans. And these households are also under increasing pressure from a new 1% tax on remittances imposed by the US government in July, which will likely result in a reduction in the total value of remittances per year. In addition, US President Donald Trump has shut down the US Agency for International Development (Usaid), which supported various programmes designed to help the most vulnerable Salvadoreans. As a result, it is likely that more households will fall into extreme poverty as external sources of support are diminished and government spending struggles to make up for the shortfall.

“Bogotá ha elegido a un alcalde del proceso de paz de 1990 y de la constitución de 1991. Bogotá ha dicho ‘sí’ a la reconciliación y ‘sí’ a la paz.”

El nuevo alcalde de Bogotá, el ex guerrillero del M-19, Gustavo Petro.

“¡Chavidad ha llegado!”

El ministro de comunicaciones de Venezuela, Andrés Izarra, anunciando bonos de Navidad para funcionarios civiles y militares, con el neologismo ‘Chavidad’ que une las palabras Chávez, Navidad y Caridad.

“¿Cuánto pagamos para instalar un sistema de audio que no fabricamos, en un auto que no fabricamos, o por armas que no fabricamos; o por infraestructura que tenemos que rentar cuando la necesitamos?

El Presidente de Perú, Ollanta Humala, sobre la dependencia latinoamericana.

MEXICO | Electoral rubbish. On 27 February, Mexico City’s government reported that it had removed over 74 tonnes of electoral propaganda material from its streets. According to the authorities they have removed banners and campaign posters throughout the city that violate Mexico’s electoral laws. Despite the fact that Mexico’s main political parties have all already selected their presidential candidates, Mexico’s electoral body, IFE, has ruled that the official campaign period for the 1 July presidential elections will not officially begin until 30 March. In addition Mexico City is experiencing a barrage of political propaganda given that the city’s mayoral elections will also be held on 1 July.

MEXICO | Meat exports. Mexico’s ministry of agriculture reported this week that the country’s meat exports in 2011 were 210,325 tonnes (t) (valued at US$ 937m), a 41% increase on the previous year’s 149,136t. The ministry’s report highlights the fact that in 2011 Japan became Mexican meat’s biggest market, with 78,292t sold, for the first time overtaking the US, which imported 66,463t. Interestingly, Mexico’s second and third largest markets are also located in Asia: Russia and South Korea respectively. Despite the fact that Mexico has been suffering from a severe drought since last year, the ministry of agriculture said that the agricultural industry’s GDP posted a 2.45% year-on-year increase in 2011. 

• Senate reviews agreement with US

The Mexico-US oil and gas exploration and exploitation agreement of fields in shared waters of the Gulf of Mexico, signed by the two countries on 20 February, is currently under review in Mexico’s senate. The senate has announced that it must review the agreement in order to ensure that Mexico will maintain sovereignty over oil deposits within its territorial waters. Under Mexico’s constitution, all exploitation rights in Mexico’s territory are reserved for the state oil company Pemex. However, the senate has also recognised that the agreement is of the utmost importance given that without one the US could exploit these reserves unilaterally without having to consult Mexico beforehand. 

Development: On 9 April Interior Minister Eduardo Bonomi presented the official homicide figures for the first quarter to the council of ministers, which showed a year-on-year increase of 160% in the number of murders in the country.

Significance: In January, after a record 22 murders in just the first two weeks of the year, Bonomi said it was too early to speak of a new wave of violence. Yesterday however, he admitted to a new trend, which he said was indicative of the fact that society is “more intolerant” and prone to “resolving its differences in a violent manner”. He noted that murders are no longer mainly the result of petty theft or robberies but are used to settle everyday scores. The political opposition has called for stronger action; the Partido Colorado (PC) and the Partido Nacional (PN) are due to submit a congressional petition for a public consultation on a proposal to lower the age of criminal responsibility to 16 (from 18).

Key points:

• In the first quarter of 2012, 188 people were murdered, up from 34 in the same period last year. It was the highest number of homicides ever recorded for the period, and is close to half the overall total for 2011.

• Bonomi said that 13 deaths related to score settling; 11 resulted from domestic violence; 17 from “interpersonal spontaneous conflicts”; 13 owed to “petty theft or robbery”; six criminals were killed by their victims; five were categorised as “other motives”; and in 23 cases the motive remains undetermined, with drugs-related disputes the main suspicion.

• On 12 April Deputy Gustavo Borsari (Partido Nacional, Unidad Nacional) and Senator Pedro Bordaberry (Partido Colorado, Vamos Uruguay) will give in a petition of some 5,000 signatures to the national committee for security to kick-start the public consultation process. A formal submission to the head of the congressional general assembly, Vice-President Danilo Astori, will take place early next week. In total, the two parties have secured 350,000 signatures in support of a referendum to lower the age of criminal responsibility.

Last week, Egypt’s new Muslim Brotherhood president, Muhammad Mursi, visited Saudi Arabia seeking a rapprochement under the combination of economic and US pressure.  Welcomed in the West, the signs of Mursi’s willingness to court Saudi Arabia were less well received in Egypt.  Saudi Arabia has been hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), concerned about the contagious effects of the Arab Spring, and suspicious of hints at better relations between an MB-ruled Egypt and Iran.

Mohammad Baraka, writing in the 13 July Egyptian daily al-Yawm as-Sabi, claimed to see insults and humiliation in the coverage of Mursi’s visit provided by Al-Sharq al-Awsat, a Saudi-owned newspaper.  He was particularly incensed by an old photograph of the founder of the MB, Hassan al-Banna, bowing and kissing the hand of Saudi King Abdelaziz Al Saud in 1936.  The publication of the photograph was seen as a deliberate insult to Mursi.

Moderate Egyptian Islamist Fahmi Houeidi, writing in the Qatari daily Asharq, argued that Mursi’s visit was humiliating given the general antipathy in the Gulf to the Muslim Brotherhood and particularly after the comments by Dubai Police Commander Dahi Khalfan that the Egyptian president “will come to the Gulf on his knees” because of Egypt’s economic weakness.

He went further still in the Cairo daily Ashuruq, expressing particular alarm at a reported statement by Mursi that “Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the protectors of moderate Islam”.  Houeidi reminded his readers that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is not hostile to Shia Islam and argued that Egypt must not be drawn into forming a “counter-coalition” to the perceived threat of an Iranian-led Shia crescent.

Referring to al-Azhar, the leading Egyptian Sunni centre of Islamic learning, Houedi warned: “Dr Mursi’s statements describing Egypt as a protector of moderate Sunni Islam to the exclusion of other schools amounts to a violation of al-Azhar’s traditional position and squanders that institution’s rich history in this regard...What the president has said is a step backward and not forward.”

As for the question of Iran, Houeidi said: “Political relations between Cairo and Tehran...remain hostage to the views of the old regime that managed these relations from the perspective of US interests.  And that requires these relations to change after revolutionary Egypt has tried to liberate Egypt’s will from any traces of US and Israeli hegemony.”  He added: “Shiite Iran is the major backer of Sunni Hamas, which is only described as extremist in the Israeli and American media.  This is just one item of evidence against using confessional considerations in political discourse.”

MÉXICO | Peña Nieto anuncia inversiones en infraestructura. El 20 de junio el Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto reveló que este año el gobierno invertiría M$310mm (US$23,1mm) para desarrollar la infraestructura del transporte de México.

Hablando en la reunión nacional sobre comunicaciones y transporte en Mérida, Yucatán, Peña Nieto dijo que el plan de inversión era parte del Plan de Desarrollo Nacional 2013-2018 del gobierno, que prevé la modernización y la expansión de la infraestructura del transporte de México a fin de mejorar la conectividad y la eficiencia del transporte a través del país. Señalando que, de acuerdo con la última clasificación del Foro Económico Mundial (FEM), la infraestructura de transporte de México figura en el puesto 68 entre 144 países, Peña Nieto dijo que "necesitamos acelerar el ritmo de construcción y desarrollo de más infraestructura para mejorar esa clasificación [para que] refleje la riqueza de nuestro país y la proyecte al mundo".

Según Peña Nieto los fondos, M$123mm de los cuales ya han sido desembolsados en lo que va del año, irán para el desarrollo de autopistas, carreteras rurales, trenes y puertos, así como también para proyectos en los sistemas nacionales de agua y energía. "Indudablemente, esta es una buena noticia para el sector y para la economía nacional", Peña Nieto dijo. Dirigiéndose a la audiencia, compuesta en su mayoría de miembros de la Cámara Mexicana de la Industria de la Construcción (CMIC), que se jacta de tener más de 10.000 firmas afiliadas, él agregó que su gobierno "respaldará decididamente el desarrollo de proyectos de infraestructura estratégicos en todas las regiones geográficas del país".

Todo esto fue con la intención de alentar a la CMIC para que analice la posibilidad de involucrarse en algunos de los proyectos que el gobierno está promoviendo y que Peña Nieto presentó brevemente durante su discurso. Estos incluyen la construcción de la autopista Oaxaca-Istmo, de M$9bn, que mejorará la conectividad del transporte en el Istmo de Tehuantepec, y para el cual el gobierno ya ha destinado M$1,4mm que serán gastados este año; y la ferrovía Trans-peninsular a través de la península de Yucatán, de la cual Peña Nieto dijo que ya había dado instrucciones al ministro de comunicaciones & transporte, Gerardo Ruiz Esparza, para que concluya todos los estudios técnicos pendientes a fin de comenzar el proceso de licitación pública para el contrato de construcción.

*** Bahrain’s Shia quit talks.  Following the detention on 17 April of leading Bahraini Shia figure Khalil al-Marzook, Shia Muslim groups have suspended reconciliation talks with the Sunni-led government.  Marzook, a former deputy speaker of parliament, has been arrested for instigating violence and will be held for 30 days for investigations. 

The Shia opposition began protests demanding better political representation in early 2011 in response to the Arab Spring, but little progress has been made in repeated rounds of political talks.

*** Iranian intelligence minister to speak on 2009 unrest.  Iran’s Minister of Intelligence Seyyed Mahmud Alavi was reported on 18 September as saying that he will make a comprehensive statement in due course about the disputed 2009 presidential election and the unrest that followed. 

In answer to a question about whether people involved in what the regime terms “sedition” have been included in the new government of President Hassan Rowhani, Alavi said: “I will talk about the issue comprehensively in the future”.  He then added: “You cannot paint all people with one brush.”

*** Israeli settler population growing.  In 2012, the number of Israelis in the West Bank increased by 5%, a much faster rate of growth than the country’s 1.9% growth.  There were 341,400 Jewish settlers in the West Bank at the end of 2012, up by 16,200 in 2011.  The growth was split between 11,100 births and 5,100 incomers.  However, the settler population represents only 4.2% of Israel’s population of 7.9m.

*** China to increase Three Dams security.  Without providing any particular reason, China has said that it is to increase significantly the security around the Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest hydroelectric project, from 1 October.

According to the official Xinhua news agency, “safety control zones” will be set up for the dam’s land area, water area, and airspace.  The flying of sky lanterns, hot air balloons, airships, paragliders, drones, light helicopters, and model aircrfat will be prohibited within the controlled airspace of the dam.  The dam was completed in 2009, and the water level of the dam reached its designed highest mark of 175 metres for the first time in 2010.  The new regulations were revealed last week by Premier Li Keqiang.

MEXICO | Pemex posts loss in 2013. On 27 February Mexico’s state-owned oil firm, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), presented its final 2013 financial figures which showed that the firm closed the year with a net loss of M$169.1bn (US$12.9bn) after posting net profits of M$2.6bn (US$200m) in 2012.

The negative result comes just as Mexico’s congress is in the process of drafting the secondary legislation needed to implement the energy reform plans promoted by the government of President Enrique Peña Nieto, which would open up the country’s energy sector to increased private participation. The changes would mean that Pemex would lose its complete monopoly over oil production in Mexico and for the first time come into competition with other firms.

The result was presented by Pemex’s financial director, Mario Alberto Beauregard, who said that the loss came about as a result of a 5.3% fall in Pemex’s crude oil exports and a 2% fall in the volume of fuels sold to the domestic market last year compared to 2012. According to Beauregard, the 2013 results were the consequence of “the fall in international reference prices for crude and its derivatives, as well as lower levels of sales of these products”.

Meanwhile Pemex’s average oil production for 2013 was 2.52m barrels per day (bdp), 1% lower than in 2012. However, commenting on the imminent implementation of the energy reform that will transform Pemex from a “decentralised public entity” to a “productive State firm”, Beauregard said that he expected that the energy reform will “change the direction of Mexico’s energy sector and with that Pemex”. In particular, Beauregard said that Pemex would in the future have to compete with other firms in areas such as “exploration, exploitation, transport, processing and distribution of hydrocarbons”.

In Beauregard’s view, all this will force Pemex to become “more efficient, competitive and profitable” as it will no longer be forced to take part in all oil-producing concessions and will be able to choose the concessions on which it wants to concentrate. In fact, as part of the reform Pemex is expected to submit a list of ‘priority’ production concessions and projects which it wants to continue being solely in charge of to the energy ministry by 21 March.

Argentina found itself involved in two rather different disputes over national sovereignty last week: in one, the familiar South Atlantic territorial dispute with Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas islands, a local judge sought to freeze oil company assets. In the other, domestic opposition parties questioned the terms of a deal allowing China to build a space observation station in Patagonia.

Tierra del Fuego-based judge Lilian Herráez ordered a freeze on the assets of five international oil companies, on the grounds that they are operating without authorisation in offshore waters around the Malvinas islands, as they are known in Argentina. The five firms are Premier Oil, Rockhopper Exploration and Falkland Oil and Gas (all UK registered); Noble Energy (US) and Edison S.p.A (Italy).

The court order seeks to freeze bank accounts, boats, and other assets worth an estimated US$156m. As none of the companies have operations in Argentina, the move appeared to be largely symbolic: theoretically Argentina could pursue the action through the international courts, but this would involve a long and costly legal process with an uncertain outcome. Despite that, Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman said he would formally ask London and New York stock exchange regulators to implement the order.

Some oil has been discovered, but it is not yet known if the deposits are large enough to merit full scale commercial development (or indeed what arrangements would need to be made to ship any oil and gas without support from the Argentine mainland).

None of the companies commented on the freeze, and news of it was said to have provoked no more than “mild turbulence” in their share prices. An adviser to Premier Oil was quoted as saying  “I think this is the fifth time in 15 months they have made threats… it is all just political noise”. British foreign secretary, Philip Hammond, called the move “an outrageous piece of bullying”.

Chinese space station

Meanwhile, the Argentine government’s agreement to allow China to build a space station in the Patagonian province of Neuquén continues to attract domestic criticism. Publicly, the government has said the deal, signed by President Cristina Fernández and her Chinese opposite number, Xi Jinping, last February, involves ceding a 200-hectare site in Bajada del Agrio some 50km from the border with Chile, where a US$50m space tracking station is being built. The station has been granted a 50-year tax exemption and will be operated by a company called China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC).

Investigative television journalist Jorge Lanata tried to visit the site, but said he had been turned away by Chinese officials who told him the area was “Chinese territory”. Lanata claimed work on the site started at least a year before the treaty was signed; and that the treaty had “secret clauses”. On his programme Periodismo para Todos (PPT), Lanata interviewed a security expert, Ricardo Runza, who said the site was being run by a Chinese “paramilitary agency” and that it was “a base with fundamentally military objectives… we are looking at a the quasi-concession of Argentine sovereignty to a foreign power”.

The government angrily denied these claims, with Fernández’s office describing Lanata’s claims as “fallacious and ill-intentioned”. Officials said the station has “exclusively scientific and civilian objectives” and that there were “no secret or reserved clauses” in the agreement.

• Falkland oil companies

All five companies have licences from the Falkland Islands authorities: Britain occupies the islands and claims sovereignty there. Ever since the military clash in 1982, when Argentine forces occupied the islands only to be evicted by a British task force, successive governments on both sides have maintained their mutually incompatible claims to sovereignty.

MEXICO | Veracruz-São Paulo ethanol cooperation. The agriculture ministry of Mexico’s Veracruz state has extended its technological cooperation agreement covering sugar cane-derived ethanol production with the government of Brazil’s São Paulo state.

In a statement the Veracruz agriculture ministry said that the technological transfer agreement is “fundamental for the development of sugar cane production [in Veracruz] and we want to apply the investigations carried out in São Paulo to promote our crop and stimulate our country’s energy matrix”.

Osiel Castro de la Rosa, the director of the Instituto Veracruzano de Bioenergéticos del Gobierno de Veracruz, explained that the goal is to take advantage of Brazilian technology, which for the past three decades has been at the cutting edge of sugar cane-derived ethanol production and its use as car fuel, to promote sugar cane production in Mexico in order to develop a steady supply of clean burning biofuels to create more resources and reduce pollution.

This cooperation has already resulted in the development of five sugar cane varieties specifically designed for Veracruz’s Caribbean climate, which has helped to increase sugar cane production by 50% in recent years. According to Veracruz’s agriculture ministry, the next step is to increase cooperation by creating a bilateral research institute and offering postgraduate courses in universities in the two states.

MEXICO | New Bimbo acquisition. Mexico’s multinational baker, Grupo Bimbo, has confirmed that it has reached a €190m (US$210m) deal with US asset management firm, Oaktree Capital Management, for the purchase of Spanish baker, Grupo Panrico. A Bimbo statement said that the deal would allow it to purchase 100% of Panrico’s shares and all of its assets in Spain and Portugal.

Pointing out that the deal has now been submitted to Spain’s national anti-trust commission (CNMC) for approval, the Bimbo statement added that “with this transaction, Grupo Bimbo reinforces its presence in Spain and Portugal, complementing its portfolio of products, plant capacity and distribution network”. Panrico is the leading baker in the Iberian Peninsula, with nine production plants and 2,000 employees; and the firm’s sales last year reached €280m (US$310m).

• Bimbo

Bimbo is already the largest baker in the world with 166 production plants and 1,600 points of sale spread across 22 countries in Latin America, Europe and Asia.

Early on 23 November, the opposition governor of Miranda state, Henrique Capriles Radonski, tweeted that the government led by President Nicolás Maduro had “abandoned” the new Vatican-mediated political dialogue in the country. The ostensible reason, Capriles said, was anger at the decision by the national assembly, controlled by the opposition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) coalition, to debate the case of the narco-sobrinos, in reference to the conviction in New York on 18 November of two nephews of the First Lady Cilia Flores for conspiring to traffic 800kg of cocaine into the US.

The secretary general of the MUD, Jesús ‘Chúo’ Torrealba, told journalists that “the government, in an irresponsible manner, froze the dialogue process by not showing up to two technical meetings” scheduled for the evening of 22 November. Earlier that day, the assembly had debated the narco-sobrinos case. “The government is using the debate as an excuse”, Capriles told journalists.

According to Capriles, the real reason for the government’s move was that it simply did not want to meet the initial agreements hammered out between the two sides. Announced on 11 November, these included efforts to ensure the supply of food and basic goods to Venezuela, including the opening of a ‘humanitarian corridor’ for the delivery of donations from abroad, the release of political detainees, a process to secure the removal by the supreme court of a contempt order hanging over the national assembly, and joint selection of two new magistrates for the national electoral court. “Maduro quit the ‘supposed’ dialogue table. He never followed through, it was evident to the whole world, and he even mocked the Pope,” Capriles tweeted.

Noting that over 100 political prisoners had still not been freed and a humanitarian corridor not been opened, Capriles continued: “The government prevents the arrival of boats and planes with food and medicine, but it allows planes with drugs to leave from the presidential hangar,” a reference to the allegation by US prosecutors that the narco-sobrinos had taken full advantage of their political connections to run their illicit business. In a subsequent press conference, Capriles declared that the future of the talks would depend on the government. Moreover, the talks could not be subject to official ‘blackmail’, he added.

The Colombian outlet Caracol Radio had a slightly different take on matters. It cited officials from the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) as insisting that while the 22 November working table meetings had been suspended, this was not in protest at the MUD’s assembly debate about the narco-sobrinos, but rather at its inaction under the accords. The PSUV sources complained about the MUD’s refusal to ‘formally’ remove from the national assembly three opposition deputies whose election has been questioned, and its failure to abide by a supreme court ruling annulling a political trial of President Maduro.

The MUD bench has in fact had the three deputies stand down, and it suspended the (largely symbolic) political trial after the court ruled it to be unconstitutional. However, the supreme court has now called on the assembly to formalise the removal of the three deputies.

Following Capriles’ remarks, the three former presidents acting as mediators on behalf of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), which along with the Vatican is supporting the dialogue effort, held meetings with the MUD and government officials. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the US State Department, Tom Shannon, was also on the ground in Caracas; it was unclear whether this was a scheduled visit.

The lead Unasur mediator, the former prime minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011), met Maduro at the Miraflores presidential palace for two hours, reportedly along with Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez and her brother and senior PSUV official, Jorge Rodríguez (also a Caracas municipal mayor). Maduro later declared the meeting “profound and positive” and said that the dialogue “continues to advance and make progress”. He noted that he had “expressed concern” to Rodríguez Zapatero that the MUD would break the accords signed to date.

It is hard to know whether this latest incident amounts to another move by the government to delay and drag its feet, or whether it is a tacit effort by the MUD to ‘get out’ of the failing talks with what is left of its tattered political reputation, amid severe internal tensions within the coalition between moderates and increasingly agitated radicals. What is clear is that both sides continue to behave provocatively, with brinkmanship, mutual recrimination and hostile acts ongoing, in clear contravention of the Church’s call for calm.

For its part, the Church has signalled some concern about the talks. Monsignor Diego Padrón, president of Venezuela’s Episcopal Conference (CEV), told the Venezuelan media outlet Globovisión in an interview recorded in Rome on 11 November that the country’s Catholic hierarchy, which has long had strained relations with the PSUV, was unhappy with the lack of progress.

Padrón called on the Maduro government to meet its end of the bargain and suggested that its attitude was unhelpful. “The way in which the government manifests its presence at the table gives the negative impression that it controls everything, and that it doesn’t recognise the efforts of the representative of Pope Francis,” he noted.

• Maduro’s birthday

President Nicolás Maduro turned 54 on 23 November. On Twitter, Henrique Capriles joked that he would gift Maduro a one-way ticket out of the country, “that he never comes back”.

• Narco-sobrinos

Henrique Capriles is now in trouble with Venezuelan authorities for ‘falsifying documents’, after he tweeted an image of two diplomatic passports, alleging that the narco-sobrinos had used them to avoid official checks while they moved around the region. Capriles claimed the images were from the US investigation file into the pair.

Growth: On 14 June, Peru’s central bank (BCRP) issued a report reducing the country’s economic forecast to 2.8% GDP growth for this year, down from the previous estimate of 3.5% GDP growth in March. Despite this lowered outlook, Peru’s recent growth figures are still above the regional average of 1.1% growth for 2017, according to a report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published on 19 May.

During a presentation on 16 June covered by local news site Gestión, the BCRP president Julio Velarde explained that the downgrade was due to major delays in major infrastructure projects and damage to production caused by the El Niño weather phenomenon, which will negatively impact the agricultural, construction, and mining sectors, the BCRP report found.

Infrastructure: Peru will invest PEN 5bn (US$1.5bn) in sporting infrastructure ahead of the 2019 Pan-American Games, according to a statement released by the organising committee (Copal) on 19 June. Of this, PEN 3bn (US$916.7m) will go towards building better roads and viaducts and the remaining PEN2bn will be used for developing sporting venues. Organisers expect to offset all these infrastructure costs using the profits made from the mega sporting event.

Oil & gas: On 7 May, the Peruvian government authorised state-owned oil and gas company Pertróleos de Perú (Petroperú) to sell up to US$2bn in global markets to help finance the development of its largest oil refinery, Talara, located in the northern state of Piura. However, Peru’s comptroller general (CGRP) warned that the bonds could be risky due to concerns about the company’s debts including an unpaid US$500m syndicated loan.

Central bank eases reserve requirements: The central bank (BCRP) has lowered the reserve requirements for dollar deposits in foreign currency held by banks operating in the country from 44% to 42% of its assets, starting in July. The move should free up around US$110m for lending purposes, according to the BCRP.

Argentines were treated to an unusual event on 14 September: a televised interview with former president Cristina Fernández (2007-2015), who is running for a seat in the federal senate representing the province of Buenos Aires in mid-term elections on 22 October. Fernández gave very few interviews during her two terms in power. The fact that she granted one now is suggestive of the need to reach beyond her support base, as is her frequent recourse to social media, with just one month to go before the elections.

The widely anticipated interview, which was conducted by the journalist Luis Novaresio for the Argentine news site Infobae, was broadcast live on four cable channels and on the programme Pamela a la tarde, on América TV, one of the country’s five national television channels. Novaresio’s opening gambit was to question Fernández not on domestic politics but on whether she felt there is currently “a dictatorship in Venezuela”.

Fernández deviated slightly from her prescribed text on Venezuela by saying that there was “no rule of law” in the country, although she qualified this by arguing that this was also the case in Argentina, while adding that “democracy is emerging in Latin America”. She also stressed that it was “misleading to treat Venezuela as a leading case as if democracy is functioning in the rest of the region,” while not focusing on countries like Mexico, “where there is institutional and physical violence, and forced disappearances”.

“Are there political prisoners in Venezuela? Yes. Are there political prisoners here? I think there are political prisoners and political persecution,” Fernández said. She singled out Milagro Sala, the Kirchnerista politician and indigenous activist, held in preventive detention in the north-western province of Jujuy since January last year, as evidence that in her view there is neither an “impartial” nor “reliable” justice system in Argentina. Fernández distanced herself, however, from one of the chants most often heard from her radical supporters comparing President Mauricio Macri with the country’s last dictatorship (1976-1983): “Macri, basura, vos sos la dictadura”.

Bullrich ahead?

Fernández, at the head of her new Unidad Ciudadana (UC) party, narrowly edged the primary election (Paso) in the province of Buenos Aires on 13 August over Esteban Bullrich, the senatorial candidate for the ruling centre-right Cambiemos coalition. Now, however, opinion polls suggest that Bullrich, the former education minister, may be pulling ahead of Fernández. A survey by Universidad Abierta Interamericana shows Bullrich in the lead with 40.9%, up by 6.8 percentage points on his performance in August. The same survey showed Fernández in second place with 37.7%, also up on August, but by a smaller 3.4 percentage points. The numbers suggested the “don’t knows” and those who supported other candidates in the Paso are swinging behind the two frontrunners, but that more of them are choosing Bullrich over Fernández.

A separate poll by Opinaia also puts Bullrich ahead with 39.8%, and Fernández second with 36% support. A third poll by Synopsis, which most accurately predicted the Paso result, gives Bullrich a decisive edge: 39.1% to 34.3%. It shows support for Deputy Felipe Massa, who is heading the senatorial list for his coalition 1País, and Florencio Randazzo, of the traditional Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists), being squeezed. The poll put Massa, who came third in the Paso, on 11.1%, down from 15%, and Randazzo on just 2.7%, down from 6%.

• Viewing figures

Cristina Fernández’s interview had an average viewing figure of ‘13 points’ taking into account the five channels on which it was aired, which equates to around 1m people tuning in to see her. This is impressive considering that the highest viewing figure for 2017 to date is ‘32.8 points’ for the Buenos Aires football derby between Boca Juniors and River Plate on 14 May. It also had nearly 1m viewings on Facebook and You Tube cumulatively. Fernández now says she would be prepared to take part in a debate with her rivals provided that it was organised by a university rather than a private television company, which would appear to rule out the televised debate being organised by TN. Cambiemos had conditioned Esteban Bullrich’s participation on Fernández taking part but has now relented.