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On 25 April the government of Saint Lucia announced that it wants to renew diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The move, initiated by Prime Minister John Compton, makes Saint Lucia the 25th country to recognise Taiwan. Thirteen of the 25 countries are in Latin America and the Caribbean. By contrast, some 170 countries recognise China, or the People's Republic of China (PRC), and see Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), as its breakaway province.

St. Lucia broke ties with Taiwan and recognized China in 1984 when Prime Minister Kenneth Anthony came to power. Saint Lucia's foreign minister, Rufus Bousquet, said that the government's decision to recognise Taiwan did not mean it wanted to break ties with Beijing, but China refuses to have relations with countries that have diplomatic ties to Taiwan, as they consider Taiwan a renegade province. The Taiwanese foreign minister, James Huang, visited Saint Lucia in December 2006 and March 2007, provoking fierce criticism from China.

"We have been very careful about making this decision, and now that we have taken it, we do not expect the Chinese will love us any more for it," Bousquet said. "But we expect that they will conduct themselves in a manner that is acceptable to our government." Bousquet said that the decision was based on which country could offer a better deal to St. Lucia, where 20% of the population lives in poverty. 

Chinese reaction
China, which has built a stadium and was finishing a psychiatric hospital here, called the move a "brutal interference in China's internal affairs." A statement carried by the official Xinhua News Agency on 1 May by Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said, "We express indignation and opposition."

Ties with China did not improve the lot of many St. Lucians. The last 10 years has seen a handful of Chinese businesses open on the island, mainly restaurants and shops. But St. Lucia has not seen the predicted influx of Chinese tourists. 

For its part, Taiwan propagated new strains of fruits and vegetables and introduced agricultural techniques during its time here. Bousquet said Taiwan has agreed to help St. Lucia diversify its agriculture sector, boost tourism, develop livestock and create information technology learning centers, all of which fit into the government's plans to combat poverty. 

• Suriname
  Producers on Suriname's state-owned Suriname Television Foundation (STVS) pulled the plug on a live broadcast of a news programme on 10 May after the country's vice-president, Ram Sardjoe, asked them to cut interviews on the China-Taiwan issue to avoid offending Beijing. "I regret that the producers are claiming that they were being censored, but as the government we have to look after the national interest of the country.
  

*** TURKS & CAICOS CORRUPTION.  The British parliament's foreign affairs committee has produced a report describing “corruption and a climate of fear" in the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), saying that Chief Minister Michael Misick is at the centre of the alleged corruption. The essence of the allegations is that Misick and fellow government ministers have “enriched themselves by selling off Crown land to property developers for their own personal gain". TCI Governor Richard Tauwhare has appointed a commission to investigate the charges. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is also investigating Misick for allegedly raping a Puerto Rican woman earlier this year. The Commission of Inquiry is expected to last four months.

*** TRINIDAD VISA THREAT.  The UK's Home Office has said that it is likely to impose new visa restrictions on visitors from Trinidad & Tobago along with 10 other countries including Venezuela, Brazil, and Bolivia from the Western Hemisphere. The UK revealed in early July that it intends to introduce visa requirements for short-term visitors from these countries unless they significantly reduce the risk they pose to the UK by the end of the year.  Trinidad's opposition leader Basdeo Panday said that the move was “a sad indication" of the state of the country […] when people are afraid to associate" with local people.
 
*** TRINIDAD TO LOSE GSP STATUS. On 30 June, US President George Bush wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to say that Trinidad & Tobago was to be removed from the trade programme known as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because it has become a high income country. Bush said: “I am terminating the designation of that country as a beneficiary developing country for the purpose of the GSP effective January 1, 2010."

*** ST LUCIA CONSIDERS PETROCARIBE. St Lucia's Prime Minister Stephenson King told parliament on 9 July that he was giving “serious consideration" to joining Venezuela's Petrocaribe scheme of supplying oil on preferential terms. Opposition leader Dr Kenny Anthony supports the move. On 14 July, however, St Lucia's Trade and Industry Minister Rufus Bousquet said that St Lucia would have to consider its long-standing trading relationship with Trinidad before signing up to Petrocaribe. He said: “In making that decision we owe it to Caricom partner Trinidad & Tobago to bear in mind the long-standing trading relationship we have with them as they have been St Lucia's traditional supplier of petroleum products." 

A study based on data taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2009, found that Costa Rica was the world's fourth most important exporter of high technology products. The World Bank estimates that 45% of Costa Rica's exports are high-tech. Only The Philippines (54%), Malaysia (52%) and Singapore (46%) had a higher proportion of high-technology products in their export mix. The main such exports are integrated circuits and medical equipment (such as intravenous-drip sets, implants and orthopaedic products). One common thread shared by all four countries is that Intel, a microchip manufacturer, has factories in each. The Promociones de la Coalición Costarricense de Iniciativas de Desarrollo (Cinde), which produced the report found that  of Costa Rica's US$6.22bn in manufactured exports US$2.78bn were high technology products. Cinde points out that 67% of the country's high tech exports are produced in free zones.

In January 2011 the consumer price index fell by 0.15%, bringing the 12 month rate down to 8.02%, according to the central bank. The January figure bucks the regional trend and is considerably lower than the CPI rate for December 2010 (0.64%) and January 2010 (0.97%).

The central bank said that the CPI fell because of a decrease in the prices of foods and non-alcoholic drinks and recreation and entertainment which more than compensated for rises in fuel prices, utility prices and healthcare and rent prices.

In 2010 Nicaragua had an inflation rate of 9.23%. This was the highest in Central America. In 2009 the inflation rate was 0.9%, the lowest ever. In 2008 however, inflation was 13.8%.

The government is budgeting on a single figure inflation rate (and GDP growth of 4%) for 2011, an election year. The government expects exports and remittances to increase in 2011. It is also confident that tourism will increase this year. The government claims that GDP growth in 2010 was also 4%, though it maintains that it is not as interested in GDP numbers as whether this produced more jobs and helped to reduce poverty.

FDI: The government expects foreign direct investment to double this year to over US$1bn. In 2010 FDI increased by 15% to US$500m according to preliminary figures from the investment promotion agency, ProNicaragua.

The biggest single project is likely to be the US$250m Guacalito tourism project which is backed by the Grupo Pellas. The government expects that FDI will come to US$1.03bn in 2011. This is almost twice the US$600m forecast by ProNicaragua. ProNicaragua's executive director Jorge Chamorro explains the discrepancy as the result of the fact that ProNicaragua does not include projects financed under the Venezuela's regional initiative, Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Alba) as FDI, while the government does. The government claims that Alba will finance at least 38% of the FDI in 2011.

The big Alba project is the El Supremo Sueño de Bolí­var oil refinery. Alba is also financing renewable energy, port infrastructure and forestry projects. The government is forecasting that US$363m will be invested in electricity projects this year. Another major Alba project is the new port at Bilwi, at a cost of US$22.5m. Alba is also investing US$18m in fishing and US$6m in a forestry project to help indigenous people process timber from trees which had been blown down by Hurricane Félix three years ago. César Zamora, general manager of AEI Energy and head of the US Chamber of Commerce in Nicaragua, (Amcham), said that this figure was optimistic, but noted that investors in the sector were more confident because the government had signed a deal with Gas Natural, a Spanish company, to build a distribution network.

Zamora added that it was still possible that the economy may have to face electricity shortages this year, despite the plethora of geo-thermal hydro and wind power projects under construction. The big two projects in the sector are Tumarí­n (hydro) and Eolo (wind). The private sector is more optimistic than the government about the potential for investment in free zones. The government expects investment of just US$60m in free zones, but Álvaro Baltodano, executive director of the Corporación Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF) reckons that investment could top US$600m and create 90,000 new jobs. He is especially bullish about the textile industry. This bullishness looks misplaced, given the rise in the international prices of wool and cotton.

• Remittances

Nicaragua's central bank (BCN) reported that remittances for 2010 reached US$823m, 7% up on 2009. In its monthly report for January, the BCN is forecasting a further 5.1% increase in remittances for 2011, most of which come from the US and Costa Rica.

President Nicanor Duarte is living up to his reputation as the most progressive head of state in Paraguay's history. On 25 September, Duarte's government signed an agreement with landless peasants promising 13,000 hectares of land in six departments in the west of Paraguay.

Land reform has always been a thorny issue in Paraguay to which successive governments have turned a blind eye. It has burst onto the political agenda anew over the course of the last three months with peasants invading landowners' properties and accusing Duarte of reneging on electoral promises to address agrarian reform. They invaded 18 farms on 21 September.

The government promised to provide 13,000 hectares of land in the departments of Alto Paraná, San Pedro, Caaguazú, Amambay, Misiones and Caazapá within a month. 'I know full well that if more Paraguayans have work and land of their own, the country will be better off. In our negotiations we have kept these issues in mind to find the best solution to an old problem,' Duarte told the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs days earlier. 

In return, peasants from the Frente Nacional por la Soberaní­a y la Vida promised to leave landowners' properties within two weeks and to conduct a peaceable dialogue with the government. Luis Aguayo, the leader of the coordinating table of national peasant organisations (MCNOC), which forms part of the Frente, said that the peasants would honour their agreements with the government to 'work together for the development of the country'. The government also acceded to another demand from the Frente, namely to supervise the law that prohibits the indiscriminate use of chemical products in farming. The MCNOC blames big soya producers for environmental damage and water pollution.

* Paraguay has put in an extradition request for former dictator Alfredo Stroessner from Brazil. A judge has called for Stroessner, who ruled from 1954 and 1989, to be sent back to Paraguay to face charges of collusion in Operation Condor - a covert intelligence-sharing network between military dictatorships in the Southern cone in the 1970s which targeted left-wing dissidents.

When President Lula da Silva came to power in January 2003 he was the poster boy of the much-publicised leftwards swing in Latin America. Today, he cuts a solitary figure in the region, outmanoeuvred by his fellow leftists and disbelieved by radicals at home. Through a combination of poor judgement and bad luck, Lula's, and Brazil's, influence in Latin America is on the wane.

A promising start

Lula's current isolation is a far cry from 2003. The world keenly awaited Lula's accession, wondering what the first leftwing leader to take charge of Brazil since democracy was restored would do. The markets, initially panicked, were soon impressed by the orthodox economic policies of Antonio Palocci.

Given Brazil's size and importance, it is a natural leader in Latin America, and Lula's first year in office made sure his government lived up to that reputation. Despite claiming good relations with Washington, Lula stood up to the US on a number of issues, most notably at the World Trade Organization (WTO) summit in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003.

In Cancún, Lula was a driving force behind the G20 group of developing nations from Latin America, Asia, and Africa which prevented the Doha round of WTO negotiations from succeeding in protest at the agricultural policies of the world's economic superpowers, notably the US and the EU.

Two months later, in November 2003, Lula was again a thorn in the US's side, this time during negotiations in Miami over the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas. Washington and Brazil had very different ideas as to what the FTAA should look like, and once Lula's administration had made plain its objections to the US version, the Bush administration embarked on a strategy of building up a network of bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs) and FTAs with smaller regional blocs.

Lula sparred again with the US at the Summit of the Americas in Mexico in January 2004 when the Brazilian president only agreed to attend if it solely dealt with economic and social problems in the Americas and provided no reference to the FTAA. The US, however, insisted on mentioning the FTAA and managed to include on the final document a date (1 January 2005) for the ending of negotiations. President Bush made a speech defending the FTAA, affirming that the best way to eradicate poverty is through commerce.

The two governments clashed soon afterwards when the US tightened immigration controls at its airports, forcing Brazilian visitors to languish in queues for hours before letting them through. Lula's government responded in kind, making Americans undergo special checks when they arrive at Brazilian airports. The measures remain in place in both countries.

Mid-term drift

The promising start to Lula's diplomatic career soon ran out of steam, however. His relationship with Mercosur, and Argentina in particular, became an unhappy focus for the Brazilian president's foreign policy. At the same time, he was unwisely wooed by China's wealth. Relations between Lula and his Argentine counterpart, fellow leftist Néstor Kirchner, started promisingly enough, and in October 2003 the pair signed the Buenos Aires consensus which promised to take regional integration within Mercosur to unprecedented levels. However, it became clear than the Lula-Kirchner axis would be vulnerable to, and undermined by, the traditional Argentina-Brazil rivalry. 

Much of the subsequent problems between Lula and Kirchner were down to economics: the Argentine president felt that Brazilian factories were pricing Argentine producers out of Argentina's domestic market, thereby inhibiting Argentina's recovery from the horrors of 2001/02. Kirchner wanted to impose restrictions on Brazilian imports such as shoes and white goods; Lula pointed out that such restrictions would contravene the free-trade ethos behind Mercosur not to mention violate the recently signed Buenos Aires consensus.

But the falling-out between Kirchner and Lula was also due to a clash of personalities. Kirchner felt that Lula was getting too big for his boots following his success in Cancún. The Argentine president was irked at Lula's belief that Brazil should have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and that the Brazilians should take up senior positions in the WTO and the Organization of American States. "They even wanted a Brazilian pope," Kirchner once quipped.

Also, in 2004 Lula welcomed the Chinese with open arms. When President Hu Jintao visited in November of that year promising investment worth as much as US$9bn in Brazil's infrastructure, Lula fell over himself to offer China market economy status, thereby casting aside much of the protection Brazil might have used to protect its domestic producers from a flood of cheap Chinese goods. This was not a shrewd move. Chinese investment has been much slower in getting to Brazil than its exports, and Brazilian industry is suffering the consequences. Lula's love-in with the Chinese was as brief as it is regretted.

One positive development in 2004 was a conference of leftwing parties held in São Paulo in November. The meeting, organised by Lula's Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) reaffirmed Brazil's ideological credentials by bringing together the most powerful leftwing parties from Venezuela, Mexico, Uruguay, El Salvador, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Colombia and Nicaragua.

Fizzling out

Over the course of 2005, Lula's stock fell both at home and abroad. Corruption scandals within the PT tarnished the ruling party and the government, and Brazil's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council and Lula's desire to represent the developing world both faded. The president attracted criticism for doing a large amount of travelling for little reward; a trip to Africa during which Lula apologised for the ills of slavery was a case in point. Brazil's leadership of the UN mission to Haiti following the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was given only a cautious welcome, though it has since proven itself.

As Lula's influence has waned, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez has taken a lead role in the region. His political clout boosted by the high cost of oil, Chávez has gone about his task as self-appointed spokesman for Latin America with a good deal more panache than Lula ever mustered, eclipsing his Brazilian counterpart along the way.

Lula was anonymous at November's Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata and attracted little attention at the Latin America-European Union summit in Vienna in May. The Vienna meeting followed after the defining moment of Lula's decline when Bolivia's new president, Evo Morales, nationalised his country's hydrocarbons sector, leaving Brazil's Petrobras in the cold.

Chávez backed Morales not only because (or so some commentators claim) the Venezuelan president wants to squeeze Petrobras out of Bolivia and put the Venezuelan PDVSA in its place, but also because he wants to diminish Brazil's influence in the region as a whole. With Kirchner showing great interest in allying himself to Venezuela and Brazil's other Mercosur partners profoundly uninterested, there is every chance Chávez will achieve his aim. The prospects for Lula playing a major role in Latin American, let alone global, politics during a second term in office appear remote.

With just over a month until the presidential contest, recent victories for President Néstor Kirchner in provincial elections have been overshadowed by accusations of fraud and demands for voting recounts. Despite the seemingly insuperable position of his wife and presidential candidate Cristina Fernández in the polls, clashes in two provinces as well as Duhalde's announcement of his return to politics, suggests complications ahead for the Kirchners.

On 16 September, provincial elections took place in Chabut, with an easy victory for Mario Das Nueves of Kirchner's Frente para la Victoria (FPV), who was re-elected with around 70% of the vote. His main challenger, Raúl Berneche of the opposition Unión Cí­vica Radical (UCR), won just 14%. Nevertheless, Das Neves reiterated his intention to run for president in 2011, a promise which might yet see him fall foul of the Kirchners: either Néstor or Cristina is likely to run in that election. 

The contest in the province of Chaco on the same day however proved much more controversial: Jorge Capitanich, who ran for one of Kirchner's "plural coalitions" of Peronists and others - Frente Chaco Merece Más - won by a mere 2,000 votes, less than half a percentage point, against Angel Rozas, of the Unión Cí­vica Radical (UCR), which had held the province for the last 12 years. Consequently Rozas also proclaimed himself winner and demanded a recount which was granted, with the final results expected to be announced by the end of this week.

As well as the polemic over the Chaco elections, a dispute over the provincial contest which took place on 2 September in the province of Córdoba rumbles on; Juan Schiaretti, an ally of Kirchner defeated the candidate for the Frente Cí­vico y Social, Luis Juez, by just 1.1% of the vote. This had proven the narrowest victory margin for gubernatorial provincial elections since the country's return to democracy in 1983. Juez protested fraud and requested a complete vote-by-vote recount which was initially turned down. However the electoral judge of Córdoba, Marta Vidal, subsequently ruled that 205 of the total 6,152 ballot boxes be re-opened following specific challenges from the Frente Civico y Social that they had been tampered with. The magistrate also declared void the results from six polling stations, although she has yet to announce whether this means that voters will re-submit their votes in those stations. 

The Córdoba fiasco also coincided with a defeat for Kirchner in Santa Fe, the second most important province in the country in which Hermes Binner, a socialist representing a loose coalition known as Frente Progresista, Cí­vico y Social (FCS) scored an emphatic victory over Rafael Bielsa, who stood for Kirchner's FPV, winning 48.6% of the vote, a 10-point margin over Bielsa. While Kirchner hailed the 16 September election results as a sign that Argentina was backing the "process of transformation and change", presidential candidates 

Elisa Carrió of the Coalición Cí­vica, former economy minister Roberto Lavagna (UNA) and Ricardo López Murphy of the Recrear coalition all seized on the uncertainty surrounding the Córdoba and Chaco elections to express fears over possible fraud for the 28 October presidential contest. Carrió and Lavagna requested international observers from the Organisation of American States (OAS) to oversee the presidential elections. However, the electoral judges have refused to grant the request, arguing that this issue was not accounted for in national legislation. Instead "experts" from other countries would be called on to oversee the elections, who would effectively have less power.

National newspaper, la Nacion, also reported that two of the electoral judges based in Buenos Aires (which accounts for 38% of the total electorate) anticipate complications over the vote on 28 October, in a similar vein to the events which unfolded in Córdoba and Chaco. The judges, Leopoldo Schiffrin and Manuel Humberto Blanco attributed possible difficulties to two factors; the similarity of symbols appearing on ballot papers which could lead to challenges and the unprecedented increase in the number of voters able to vote. In Buenos Aires, some 340,000 more people are expected to vote than in the 2005 elections, representing an increase of nearly 3.5%. 

As well as concerns over possible fraud and complications in the electoral procedure, two incidents of unrest have proved a further headache for the Kirchners; a rally by Fernández in Tierra del Fuego ended in violence on 17 September, a reminder that she is not popular throughout Argentina despite her position in the opinion polls. The government's vulnerability in Tierra del Fuego was initially exposed in June when its candidate for governor, Hugo Cóccarro, was defeated by radical opponent Fabiana Rí­os. Cristina was already off-stage when the unrest began in the sports hall where she was speaking. The violence was between rival sectors of a lorry drivers union who then turned on police who tried to intervene. Two people were injured in the violence.

There have also been social protests in Kirchner's native province of Santa Cruz, where he ruled as governor for 12 years before passing on power to proxies. While only accounting for 0.5% of the national electorate, the symbolic importance of Santa Cruz for Kirchner is underlined by the fact that he keeps returning. The most recent protests by state workers and teachers produced the fourth violent clash in as many months and began hours before Kirchner arrived to take part in a political rally in the provincial capital, Rí­o Gallegos. 

The participation of heterogeneous social sectors also belied the governments' claims that the protests are being carried out solely by the teachers' union, supported by the radical left fringe opposing Kirchnerismo. Teachers were out-numbered in the protest. The last time Kirchner visited Santa Cruz on 17 August, accompanied by Fernández, workers also staged a protest. Daniel Varizat, a former aide of Kirchner's, ploughed his car through a hostile crowd, hitting 17 people and seriously injuring five, an episode which led to the resignation of the chief of police in Santa Cruz, Wilfredo Roque. Santa Cruz will also hold provincial elections on 28 October: Kirchner is backing the incumbent, Daniel Peralta, the third governor in one term since Kirchner left office.

Duhalde announces his return to politics

The other less-than-welcome news for the Kirchners was the announcement by former president Eduardo Duhalde that he intends to return to politics after 10 December, when Kirchner hands over power. There is a clear motive behind Duhalde's decision: to reconstruct and assume the leadership of the moribund Partido Justicialista (PJ). Such a move would pit him against Kirchner given that one of the reasons he is believed to be stepping aside for his wife is precisely to assume the leadership of the PJ and to create his own political space, by means of his cross-party coalition Concertación Plural, around it. 

Duhalde stabilised the country after the crisis of 2001 and handed over to President Néstor Kirchner in 2003. At the time, Duhalde said that he would support the Kirchner government. Now, according to Duhalde's allies, Duhalde has said: "I always said that my support and my silence was for this government not for another: this government ends on 10 December." His powerbase is in Buenos Aires, where Kirchner's support is thin. In June Kirchner's candidate for mayor of Buenos Aires was trounced by a rightwing businessman, Mauricio Macri. However, Duhalde's problem is that he has been out of the game so long. Macri recently said that he had assumed Duhalde had retired.

• DNU
  President Néstor Kirchner has passed more "decrees of necessity and urgency" (DNU) than congress has laws over the course of the last four years. According to a study by the Centro de Estudios para Polí­ticas Públicas Aplicadas (Ceppa) Kirchner passed 249 decrees while sending only 176 bills to congress during this period. "The superpowers plus the DNUs mean congress has ceased to exist," Delia Ferreira Rubio, the head of Ceppa, said.

The ruling Frente Amplio (FA) coalition celebrated its 38th anniversary in February. There was not much cause for celebration. After sweeping to power in 2002, becoming the first party in Uruguay's history to secure a congressional majority, and facing a weak opposition, it is suddenly in danger of hitting the self-destruct button. Finding a successor to the hugely popular President Tabaré Vázquez is fuelling acrimonious internal divisions, providing the opposition Blancos and Colorados with an unexpected lifeline.

José Mujica, the “official" pre-candidate for the ruling FA ahead of party primaries in June, had to cancel the start of his election campaign in Argentina in February after members of the party accused him of receiving campaign financing from “Kirchnerismo", the Argentine presidential couple's political movement. Tension between the factions of the FA loyal to Mujica and those who back his main rival, Danilo Astori, prompted a third candidate to enter the contest.

The setback to Mujica's campaign came when Uruguay's current affairs magazine, Búsqueda, quoted sources from within the FA as claiming that the Kirchnerista movement had printed thousands of flyers for Mujica ahead of his meeting in the University of Mar del Plata on 14 February, where he had hoped to attract some of the 400,000 Uruguayans living in Argentina.

Mujica, who days earlier had claimed he would not be employing an advertising team for his primary campaign, accused sectors within the FA of seeking to undermine his presidential bid. He cancelled the trip, but added that the episode had left “deep wounds". Despite concern from some quarters of the FA over his determination to draw closer to Argentina, Mujica said he would “keep the door open to all things Argentine, except coup-mongerers" (see sidebar).

Mujica was plunged into fresh controversy days later when the Uruguayan airline Pluna launched a promotional campaign featuring him. A photograph of Mujica with a speech bubble saying “Golden fares hit the mark: now you can fly to Buenos Aires for US$65 return" appeared as a colour page spread in Sunday editions of El Paí­s and La República. It was promoting special fares for over 65s. Mujica, who is 74, said Pluna had acted without his authorisation but that it was perfectly harmless as the company was merely exploiting his popularity.

The opposition demurred. It seized on Pluna's promotional campaign as a sign of the government twisting electoral laws ahead of the presidential and legislative elections in October. Pluna dropped the advertisements, but that Mujica should have appeared in any promotional campaign, let alone for cheap flights to Argentina, was potentially damaging for his credibility.

Astori attempted to take advantage of Mujica's gaffe by portraying himself as the safe pair of hands that the FA needs post-Vázquez. He is meeting with some success. The rump of the Partido Socialista (PS), decided to back his candidacy and drop its intention of backing the former industry minister, Daniel Martí­nez. Only a few months earlier Vázquez had quit the PS in protest after it refused to champion Astori, his chosen successor, and rallied behind Martí­nez.

The third man
The PS support for Astori means that little separates him from Mujica in the polls. The fear of an increasingly polarising campaign resulting in the loser becoming estranged and failing to back the victor in October's presidential elections, led the important Vertiente Artiguista faction of the FA to back a third candidate: Marcos Carámbula, the mayor of Canelones, the capital of the eponymous southern department. Various cabinet ministers and leaders of the Partido Comunista are also backing Carámbula.

Carámbula, 62, is, like Vázquez, a qualified doctor who has continued to practise medicine alongside politics. He is a former Communist-turned-independent member of the FA. He almost doubled the support received by Astori in the FA congress vote in December, but was seen as unlikely to appeal to the grassroots in June's primary elections.

• Mujica and Argentina
  José Mujica has long been pushing for a rapprochement with Argentina. He visited the Kirchners after President Vázquez vetoed Néstor Kirchner's candidacy for the presidency of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) because of his support for protests against Uruguay's building of a pulp mill on the banks of the River Uruguay. Mujica, who said it was “a personal problem" of Vázquez, has also expressed an interest in employing Roberto Lavagna - a former Argentine economy minister - as his economic adviser if he were elected.

• Opposition rift
  The crumb of comfort for the ruling Frente Amplio is that the main opposition Blancos are far from a model of unity themselves heading into party primaries of their own in June. Former president Luis Alberto Lacalle is neck-and-neck with Jorge Larrañaga, who lost the last elections to Tabaré Vázquez, in the opinion polls. There is notable friction between the two men.

After unexpectedly getting through to the second round of the presidential race, Brazil's main opposition Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) emerges from the 2010 campaign in better form than antipicated. It has retained substantial power at the state level, which will help compensate for a somewhat weaker position in parliament. Its main ally, Democratas (DEM), is battered but will also live to see another day. Meanwhile, the Partido Verde (PV), whose presidential candidate Marina Silva forced the run-off, hopes to capitalise on her unexpectedly strong showing to expand upon its 'third way' alternative for 2014, despite the PV having fared disappointingly overall in the general election.

The 2010 election results underline the fact that Brazil remains, to a large degree, politically divided along north-south (and income and education) lines. With a few exceptions, the PT still mostly dominates the lower income North and North East, while the PSDB is strongest in the wealthier and more developed South and South East. Overall, Dilma Rousseff will be able to count on the support of 16 of the 27 states (inclusive of the federal district) from 2011. The PT will directly govern five states, while its main coalition allies, the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) and the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) will govern four and six states respectively.

The PSDB will still control the rich South and South East, home to the populous industrial heartlands of the country and its largest two electoral districts - São Paulo and Minas Gerais. It has made much of the fact that it will have eight governors, more than any other party. Between them, these governors will manage states accounting for 55% of the Brazilian economy. Adding in the two DEM-governed states, the 10 opposition governors will administer some 52.3% of the Brazilian electorate (or 64.5m people).The defeated Serra described this as “a strategic victory" (see box for full list of state governors).

In parliament, where the PSDB will have a reduced 53 deputies (down from 59) and 11 senators (down from 16), it will look to the senator-elect and former state govenor of Minas Gerais, Aécio Neves, now the party's de facto leader, to take it forward. Although the defeated Serra declared that he was not saying goodbye but “see you later", it's clear that after two failed presidential bids his capacity to take the party forward is limited. The path now looks clear for Neves, Serra's main party rival, to take the reins. Neves, the PSDB's presumptive presidential nominee for 2014, immediately signalled that the party needed to clear out the dead wood, get its act together and step up so as not to allow the PT-led executive “to impose everything, as if this were a monarchy".

The PSDB has taken heart from the fact that Lula was ultimately unable to transfer his 83% approval rating to his chosen heir. Neves is confident that Dilma will quickly be exposed as a mere puppet of Lula's with no leadership skills or identity of her own and he is gearing up to make life difficult for her in parliament. In order for this new aggressive opposition strategy to work, however, the numerically inferior PSDB and its allies will need to hang together strongly - something they haven't always been good at in the past. However, on its assumption that Rousseff's presidency will be a disappointment, the opposition is newly optimistic for 2014.

GOVERNORS 2011

Region	Coalition states	Opposition states
SouthEast
São Paulo		Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB)
Minas Gerais		Antonio Anastasia (PSDB)
Rio de Janeiro	PMDB (Sergio Cabral)
Espí­ritu Santo	Renato Casagrande (PSB)
South
Paraná		Beto Rica (PSDB)
Santa Catarina		Raimundo Colombo (DEM)
Rio Grande do Sul	Tarso Genro (PT)
North
Acre	Tião Viana (PT)
Amazonas		Omar Aziz (PMN)
Rondônia	Confucio Moura (PMDB)
Tocantins		Siquiera Campos (PSDB)
Pará		Simão Jaetene (PSDB)
Roraima		Anchieta (PSDB)
Amapá	Camilo Capiberibe (PSB)
CentreWest
Matto Grosso	Sinval Barbosa (PMDB)
Matto Grosso do Sul	André Pucinelli (PMDB)
Goí­as		Marconi Perillo (PSDB)
(Distrito Federal Brasí­lia)	Agnelo Queiroz (PT)
NorthEast
Maranhão	Roseana Sarney (PMDB)
Piauí­	Wilson Martins (PSB)
Ceará	Cid Gomes (PSB)
Rio Grande do Norte		Rosabla Ciarlini (DEM)
Paraí­ba	Ricardo Coutinho (PSB)
Pernambuco	Eduardo Campos (PSB)
Alagoas		Teotonio Vilela (PSDB)
Sergipe	Deda (PT)
Bahia	Jacques Wagner (PT)

• The PV

Some in the PSDB have been floating the notion of an hook up between Neves and Marina Silva of the Partido Verde ahead of 2014. Serra tried - and failed - to woo Silva. Tactially, the PSDB would also need the likes of the PMDB to recover power.

Two major attacks by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) at the end February have intensified speculation that Colombia's largest rebel group is tired of running from the army and is ready to launch a major offensive against the government.

A twin blow for Uribe
On 1 February the Farc carried out its biggest attack against a military target since President Alvaro Uribe came to power in August 2002 when it attacked a naval infantry base at Iscuandé, in the southwestern department of Nariño. Sixteen soldiers were killed and 25 injured in the assault by the Farc group, Frente 29. The next day, the Farc killed eight soldiers and a civilian when it ambushed a convoy in Putumayo.

Uribe responded to the attacks by blaming the soldiers involved, saying in both instances they were negligent. Survivors from Iscuandé begged to differ, saying that a major attack by the Farc was only a matter of time since the rebels controlled the area. Such comments will have infuriated the president: not only has he stated time and again that the military controls Colombia in its entirety, but Iscuandé in particular has been emblematic of this confidence since security forces returned there in January 2004 after a four-year absence.

The Farc's ability to mount such attacks at a time when there are more troops in Nariño and Putumayo than ever before is deeply worrying for the government. The recent discovery of major arms shipments and caches of explosives indicated the Farc was gearing up to take the fight to the government; the attacks in February suggest their campaign is now underway.

The imminent expiry of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Atpdea), and stalled status of the US free trade agreements with Peru and Colombia, prompted the US government to take steps to renew the agreement. Atpdea was introduced to promote export diversification away from coca leaf production in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia by giving their exports preferential access to the US market. The Act is due to expire on 31 December 2006 with potentially disruptive consequences for all countries involved.

During a visit to Colombia on 24 October the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, announced that the US government would ask Congress to renew the act. On 2 November a group of 28 US legislators sent a letter to the House Speaker, Republican Dennis Hastert, asking him to move forward a bill that will "bridge the gap between the expiration of the Andean Trade Preference Act and the entry into force of the free trade agreements with Peru and Colombia." In their letter they argued that US investors would pull out of the region and move elsewhere if they didn't have the certainty that the trade benefits will continue, which would mean a loss of US influence with two staunch US allies in an "unpredictable region".

Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom a free trade agreement with the US is not on the cards, welcomed Burns' announcement. Bolivian vice-president Alvaro Garcí­a Linera attributed the decision to the Bolivian government's lobbying in Washington. The Ecuadorean trade minister, Tomás Peribonio, greeted the news with more caution; "It's positive, but in the end it is Congress who decides whether or not to renew Atpdea". The reaction in Peru and Colombia has been mixed. Their free trade agreements are currently languishing in the US Congress and will not be considered until it reconvenes for the "lame-duck session" after the mid-term elections on 7 November. The president of Peru's Asociación de Exportadores, Luis Vega, said that "if the Atpdea is extended, we run the risk that the FTA will be forgotten." Although the administration of President George W Bush strongly supports the agreements, members of the Democratic party have expressed concerns about the agreements' provisions for labour protection, so the agreements may have difficulty passing if the Democrats gain control of Congress in the mid-terms. 

Under Atpdea the Andean countries do not have to pay tariffs on key exports to the US. The Act has been successful in increasing exports from Andean countries to the US by as much as twenty-fold in Ecuador, ten-fold in Colombia, six-fold in Peru and four-fold in Bolivia. The preferential treatment from the US has stimulated the growth of many non-traditional export sectors. In Ecuador products such as flowers, tuna, ceramic products, wood, broccoli and mangoes have flourished under Atpdea. 

US Imports for Consumption under  Andean Trade Preference Act/ATPDEA,  by country 1997-2005 (US$m)
	Colombia	Peru	Ecuador	Bolivia
1997	600	500	230	35
1999	800	600	235	35
2001	750	750	230	30
2003	2,900	1,350	1,550	100
2005	4,650	2,350	3,900	155
source: US Department of Commerce

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has established a temporary presidential commission to conduct a "historic and scientific investigation" into the death of 'El Libertador', Simón Bolí­var, almost 180 years ago.

The decree creating the commission was made public via the Official Gazette of the Republic on 30 January. The commission is tasked with "reconstructing the historical facts" linked to Bolí­var's death and dispelling the "considerable doubts" which, Chávez says, surround it. He has speculated that 'El Libertador' may not, after all, have died of tuberculosis - as the history books claim - but rather have been assassinated. This, it seems, would make a more fitting ending - at least in Chavez's books - for the man the Official Gazette describes as "the most relevant independentist hero in the Americas".

Chávez 's decree stated that, given today's "technological and scientific progress", it would be possible to reveal details confirming the true circumstances of Bolí­var's death on 17 December 1830, in Santa Marta, Colombia. He announced that the time has come to open the coffin in the Panteón Nacional in Caracas, citing documents from 60 years ago in which Venezuelan doctors hypothesised that the remains contained therein may not actually belong to 'El Libertador' at all. Chávez made it clear that he will be counting on the assistance of both private and public institutions - particularly universities - to carry out the forensic investigations required to establish the identity and cause of death.

The commission comprises nine ministers, the attorney general, the director of cultural heritage, and will be led by Vice-President Ramón Carrizales. This high-profile team indicates the significance Chávez is attaching to the investigation. Not only does he hope it will distract attention away from his domestic troubles, but also that it might justify some of his wilder accusations against Colombia. Chávez claimed recently that the same "oligarchs" who run Colombia today are direct descendents of those who were behind Bolí­var's assassination in 1830.

In May, the economy returned to year-on-year growth, increasing by 0.46%. The Instituto Nacional de Estadí­stica e Informática (INEI) said that the resumption of growth, after the first year-on-year contraction for eight years in April, was due to stronger international demand for Peru's traditional exports. This means that for the first five months of 2009 the economy grew by an accumulated 0.83%. The rate for the 12 months to May 2009 was 5.65%. The best performing industrial sector was fishing, which is always highly volatile. It rose 26% year-on-year thanks to the ending of the close-season on anchovies at the end of April. Agriculture was up 8% thanks to greater acreage and decent weather. Mining and hydrocarbons rose 1.54%, amid a 21% increase in hydrocarbons output, thanks to the Camisea effect. The Camisea project started pumping gas to Lima and export markets in September 2008. Mining output was down fractionally, due to reduced production of all the base metals except copper. Gold production, however, was up by 6% and silver production was up by 5%.

Inflation: In June the consumer prices index fell by 0.34%. In May it had risen by 0.04%. In the first six months accumulated inflation was 0.3%. The annual rate in June was 3%, well down on the 6.7% recorded in calendar 2008.

Since former president Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) left office last August, allegations of corruption and the involvement in criminal activities by members of his administration have snowballed at an unprecedented rate. In the past month, however, these have escalated beyond mere allegations with some of the accused being convicted, and others formally charged, by the supreme court of justice (CSJ) and the attorney general's office.

Monday 21 February was undoubtedly the worst day for Uribe; in a 'double-whammy' the Colombian justice system moved against two of his closest associates: his second cousin, Mario Uribe Escobar, and his most loyal political protégé, Andrés Felipe Arias, who served as Uribe's agriculture and development minister in 2005-2009. The CSJ found the former guilty of aggravated conspiracy to commit a crime (concierto para delinquir agravado), sentencing him to seven years and six months in jail and ordering him to pay a penalty equivalent to 6,500 current minimum salaries, or Col$3.534bn (US$1.86m).

Almost simultaneously, the office of the attorney general announced it was formally charging seven former civil servants attached to the ministry of agriculture (and 15 beneficiaries) for the irregular allocation of rural development subsidies in relation to the Agro Ingreso Seguro scandal. The decision taken by Attorney General Vivianne Morales to charge Arias's subordinates could severely complicate his future political aspirations, because Morales's office has set aside his file, leaving the door open to a future case against the former minister.

The Parapolí­tico
Uribe's uncharacteristic silence on Twitter was testament to his discomfort, because in some ways both developments affected him personally. Uribe Escobar has been his unconditional ally for over 30 years, with the two cousins climbing up through the political ranks together, first in their native department of Antioquia and later at the national level. Their political alliance, first in the Partido Liberal's Sector Democrático and later in the movement Colombia Democrática, enabled them to displace, or at the very least successfully challenge, the political hegemony of the Valencia Cossio family in Antioquia. Alvaro Uribe's capture of the governorship of Antioquia eventually served as a springboard for him to capture the presidency in 2002.

Mario Uribe's conviction is without doubt the most important sentence the CSJ has handed down since the 'parapolitics' investigations began in 2006. Uribe Escobar is a historic political leader, serving as a representative in the lower chamber of congress (1986-1994) and in the senate (1994-2007), and though he is not the first congressman to be convicted, the unfavourable verdict against him has confirmed that President Juan Manuel Santos will abide by his declared campaign promise to respect the separation of powers and to allow the courts to move forth with sensitive investigations, come what may.

The CSJ's investigation into Mario Uribe's links to the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), through an electoral deal with the AUC's second-in-command, Salvatore Mancuso, triggered the so-called 'chuzadas' - the illegal intelligence gathering scandal in which the Colombian intelligence agency (DAS) illegally spied on members of the CSJ, the opposition and journalists. According to a CSJ magistrate, César Julio Valencia Copete, when the CSJ decided to formally question Uribe Escobar in 2008, he received a phone call from the-then president, Uribe (Vélez), demanding an explanation for his cousin's investigation. It's commonly believed that this 'exchange' unleashed the 'chuzadas' against the CSJ and thus, Uribe Escobar's conviction also carried an implicit message for president Uribe that the courts hadn't been intimidated.

But while Mario Uribe's conviction was a shock to the system, the possibility of what may come next - an investigation against his cousin for crimes against humanity - is even more worrying for the former president. Uribe Escobar was investigated because of irregular voting patterns for him in some municipalities (Sahagún, Montelí­bano, Planeta Rica and Chinú) in the department of Córdoba in the 2002 election, where his support surged between 42% and 1,200%, depending on the municipality. The CSJ found that Uribe Escobar and another 2002 senatorial candidate, Eleonora Pineda (convicted for 'parapolitics' in 2007), had cut a deal with the AUC Bloque Norte, under Mancuso's command, to secure their election to the senate.   “The analysis of all the evidence allows the conclusion that the declarations made by Salvatore Mancuso and Eleonora Pineda, appraised historically, allow the assumption that Mario Uribe Escobar did enter pacts with the illegal organisation [AUC]", stated the ruling.

For former president Uribe, who still enjoys an unrivalled powerbase in Antioquia, the headaches may only just be starting. First, the CSJ's ruling confirms that the 'parapolitics' investigation has reached Antioquia and that closeness to the former president will not be a deterrent against prosecutions and convictions. Moreover, the increased predisposition of the US justice system to allow former paramilitaries serving jail sentences in the US to give their 'free version' of events to the Colombian justice system, in fulfilment of the requirements of their demobilisation (as stipulated in the 2005 Justice and Peace Law), could expose even more shady connections between political and economic sectors and the AUC.

The other problem is that in order to 'enforce' its directive that local residents should back Uribe Escobar and Pineda, the AUC had to resort to its customary use of violence. In other words, the electoral arrangement led to the death, torture, displacement and disappearance of voters from the aforementioned region, triggering massacres and the subsequent illegal seizure of lands owned by those killed. In fact, it is the devolution of lands obtained illegally by the AUC leaders and their political collaborators that President Santos has set as the main priority of his administration, as part of the so-called 'Victim's Law'.

The 'parapolitics' scandal could become even more compromising for those convicted if the CSJ decided to take a leap of faith and set a precedent by charging them with crimes against humanity, holding them legally responsible for partaking in an illegal political arrangement that led to the death of thousands.

Fake demobilisation?
Only two days after the revelation about Mario Uribe's conviction, the attorney general's office announced it was opening an investigation into whether the demobilisation of 66 members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc), in Alvarado (Tolima), on 7 March 2006, was staged by two army officers, General (ret.) Leilo Suárez and Colonel Jaime Joaquí­n Ariza, and the-then high commissioner for peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo.
Although the demobilisation process carried out during the Uribe administration has been criticised for several shortcomings, including the demobilisation of civilians posing as paramilitaries and the 'escape' of notorious paramilitaries who 'inherited' the businesses ran by the AUC and continued their criminal activities as part of the so-called emerging criminal bands (Bacrim), if its confirmed that members of the administration participated in fake demobilisations, the legitimacy of the entire process could be undermined.

According to two of the alleged Farc members that demobilised in Tolima, the army officers and Restrepo used Raúl Agudelo Medina ('Olivo Saldaña'), who had deserted the Farc in 2004 and was imprisoned in August of that year, to recruit unemployed, poor or low level criminal civilians to pose as guerrillas in the demobilisation process. One of the testimonies reproduced by the political weekly Semana reads: “The commissioner's role was important, he coordinated everything with 'Olivo Saldaña' from beginning to end to gather people for the demobilisation and in this way include them in the peace and justice law. [...] They knew that 'Olivo' arranged everything from jail, what they were looking for were not guerrillas, the commissioner knew that everything was a farce. He gave the order to collect the people, that's why the government knew that this demobilisation was a farce. Luis Carlos Restrepo coordinated everything with 'Olivo', everything about the training of the people."

• Pretelt Parapolí­tico?
  As a result of the 'free version' (testimony by demobilised paramilitaries) given by John Jairo Sánchez ('Centella') in the US, the attorney general has opened a preliminary investigation for parapolitics against the former minister of interior and justice in Alvaro Uribe's first government, Sabas Pretelt de la Vega (2004-2006). According to Sánchez, Pretelt allegedly held a clandestine meeting with Salvatore Mancuso and 'Jorge 40' (Rodrigo Tovar Pupo) in a rural estate near Valledupar, department of César, between April and May 2004 to seek AUC support for Alvaro Uribe's re-election bid. Pretelt has already been charged for allegedly bribing members of the congress to back a constitutional reform enabling Uribe to run for a second term.

 

• Wikileaks' 'chuzadas' revelations
  Adding to the accusation in a US diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks last December, stating that the director of the national police, General Oscar Naranjo, believed that Bernardo Moreno, former secretary of the presidency, and José Obdulio Gaviria, former advisor to Uribe, had ordered the 'chuzadas', a second cable released in late February by the Colombian daily El Espectador showed that a former director of the DAS, Andrés Peñate (2005-2007), shared Naranjo's opinion with regards to Gaviria's responsibility in the scandal. In response, Gaviria said: “I believed to have a friendship with him [Peñate], but I think he betrayed the government, [he] betrayed the president [Uribe] and he betrayed me."

Lula ofrece una 'alianza estratégica' en la cual ambos compartirán un liderazgo orientado a reemplazar al neoliberal Consenso Washington.

Pocos dí­as después que el Presidente Néstor Kirchner, de Argentina, hizo saber que no apoyarí­a el deseo de Brasil de un sitio en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, el Presidente Lula da Silva llegó a Buenos Aires, proponiendo que ambos asuman juntos el rol de liderazgo en Sudamérica, detrás de una estrategia trazada en el 'Consenso Buenos Aires'. El nombre fue deliberadamente elegido para dar la imagen de algo que se propone reemplazar el Consenso Washington -la serie de propuestas de polí­ticas que incluye el enfoque neoliberal para los problemas económicos de la región.

El enfoque se origina en la reciente experiencia de ambos paí­ses en el G-22, durante las conversaciones sobre comercio en Cancún, en la posición de Kirchner en sus negociaciones con el FMI y los acreedores externos de Argentina, y en las estrategias desarrolladas por los asesores de polí­tica exterior de Lula, que concibe a Brasil jugando un papel de liderazgo en la arena internacional, construido desde su entorno inmediato hacia el exterior.

Puntos destacados
Lo que sigue son pasajes del 'Consenso Buenos Aires' y del discurso de Lula ante el congreso de Argentina, que ilustran el rumbo principal de la 'alianza estratégica' en la que están embarcados los dos lí­deres.

•  '[Argentina y Brasil] tienen la responsabilidad de crear el embrión de una nación sudamericana [fortaleciendo primero el Mercosur] que debe ser no sólo una unión aduanera sino un espacio para la articulación de polí­ticas industriales, agrí­colas, cientí­ficas y tecnológicas que asuma una dimensión social, y garantice la libre circulación de las personas.'
  
•  'La alianza estratégica presente, aun con lo fuerte que puede verse, podrí­a no expresar la intensidad total de lo que debe ser la relación entre los dos paí­ses. Lo mejor serí­a una asociación en la cual no haya lugar para disputas de liderazgo. [Esto es crucial si el objetivo es estar] en los pocos años siguientes en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU.'
  
•  'La integración sudamericana debe ser promovida en interés de todos, con el objetivo de crear un modelo de desarrollo, en el cual el crecimiento, la justicia social y la dignidad de los ciudadanos estén vinculados.'
  
•  'La integración regional es una opción estratégica para fortalecer la inserción de nuestros paí­ses en el mundo, acrecentando la capacidad de negociación [...] Una mayor autonomí­a en la toma de decisiones nos permitirá confrontar con más efectividad los movimientos desestabilizadores del capital financiero especulativo y los competidores intereses de bloques más desarrollados.'
  
• '[Brasil y Argentina desean] continuar participando desde dentro de Mercosur en las negociaciones del Area de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA) con el objetivo de asegurar un acuerdo equilibrado que respete los intereses dispares de los participantes.'
  
• 'Los paí­ses desarrollados [son urgidos a] cooperar efectivamente [en las negociaciones de comercio multilaterales de la OCM] para consolidar un sistema abierto, sin distorsiones y sin discriminaciones.'
  
• 'La administración de la deuda pública debe tener como horizonte la creación de riquezas y empleos, la protección de los ahorros, la reducción de la pobreza, promoción de la educación y la salud, y la posibilidad de aplicar polí­ticas sustentables de desarrollo económico y social.'

Manos a la obra
Como muestra de que pretende ir más allá de las palabras, Lula ya ha lanzado la nueva asociación a la arena práctica, invitando a representantes del gobierno de Argentina a que acompañen al canciller brasileño, Celso Amorim, en su viaje a India, para sentar las bases de la visita de estado de Lula, programada para el año próximo. Ellos asistirán a un Seminario Brasil-India y a la reunión del Consejo de Comercio Brasil-India. Empresarios de paí­ses miembros de Mercosur también han sido invitados.

Este patrón será repetido en la planeada apertura de Brasil al mundo árabe, que se iniciará en noviembre.

Lo inesperado también ha intervenido, en la forma de una crisis polí­tica en Bolivia. Brasil y Argentina decidieron rápidamente actuar en conjunto, en un esfuerzo por mediar una solución -y como informamos en otra parte, parece que jugaron un rol importante en el resultado.

Aportes adicionales
Uno de los asesores cercanos de Lula, Theotonio dos Santos, profesor en la Universidad Fluminense, hizo aportes adicionales al pensamiento que dio forma al Consenso Buenos Aires. Hablando en la feria del libro en Monterrey, la semana pasada, dijo que el objetivo del nuevo consenso es 'lanzar una nueva fase para recuperar un crecimiento económico basado en el estado promotor de una polí­tica industrial -una fase que ubicará las economí­as nacionales dentro de la perspectiva de la integración latinoamericana [dándoles] capacidad negociadora en sus tratos con las organizaciones internacionales.'

Agregó que ese enfoque es apoyado por empresarios conscientes que las 'rí­gidas recetas del Consenso Washington fracasaron ': 'Los empresarios de América Latina que pretenden seguir siéndolo, y no convertirse en empleados de alguna corporación global, apoyan la promoción estatal de una polí­tica industrial.'

Dos Santos estaba en Monterrey presentando la edición en español de su último libro, La teorí­a de la dependencia: balance y perspectivas. Puede ser un buen libro para recomendar al Secretario de Estado Asistente de EU para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental. Roger Noriega, que en su discurso inaugural en el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales dijo: 'El gran debate entre autoritarios, teóricos de la dependencia, y marxistas recalcitrantes por un lado y defensores de la democracia y los mercados por el otro, ha terminado.'

'ALCA en 2005 es prioritario para EU'
Mientras en una orilla del Rí­o de la Plata se daba a conocer el Consenso Buenos Aires, en la otra, John Maisto, embajador de EU ante la OEA, decí­a a sus anfitriones uruguayos que la prioridad para EU es la conclusión del ALCA en la fecha fijada de 2005. La visita de Maisto será seguida esta semana por la del Representante de Comercio Asistente de EU, Peter Allgeier, para 'intercambiar puntos de vista' con funcionarios uruguayos sobre la reciente reunión de la OCM en Cancún. En la reunión, Uruguay quedó con el grupo Cairns, alejándose del G-22, en el cual Brasil, acompañado por Argentina, jugaron un rol central.

El Presidente Carlos Mesa espera que su reclutamiento de aliados para renovar el reclamo de Bolivia de una salida al mar [IL-03-50] genere suficiente apoyo para contrarrestar la insatisfacción sobre su lento ritmo para cumplir con lo que los manifestantes de octubre del año pasado estaban exigiendo.

El prometido referéndum sobre el uso futuro de las reservas de gas natural del paí­s es la única exigencia que tiene fecha: 28 de marzo. La razón de Mesa por el retraso es que el gobierno primero debe hacer una campaña para asegurar que el electorado esté bien informado de las opciones. Prometió, pero sin fecha, un esquema para conectar 200.000 hogares a la provisión de gas natural, someter al congreso una nueva ley de hidrocarburos que aumentará los impuestos a las compañí­as petroleras, desvincular los precios del gas del mercado internacional y otorgar al estatal YPFB un mayor rol en el desarrollo de proyectos del gas.

Será retrasada hasta 2005, o quizá 2006, la asamblea constituyente que se espera pueda reformar las instituciones polí­ticas -que lo llevarí­a muy cerca de las elecciones generales programadas para 2007. Dos cuestiones relacionadas que están en circulación son si las nuevas normas permitirán reelecciones sucesivas, y si será retroactiva para así­ beneficiar a Mesa.

Faltando sólo un mes y medio para las elecciones presidenciales, el Presidente Hipólito Mejí­a no avanzó lo suficiente para acortar la distancia con Leonel Fernández, que va adelante en las encuestas -incluso luego de una leve caí­da del apoyo a Fernández. Algunos encuestadores ya se atreven a predecir que una victoria de Fernández en la primera ronda es casi una certeza.

La encuesta más reciente de Penn, Schoen & Berland, muestra las intenciones de votos para Fernández en 63%, dos puntos menos que en enero. Mejí­a atrae sólo 19% de las preferencias, seis puntos más que en enero. Eduardo Estrella, del Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) aparece en tercer lugar, sin cambios, con 16%. Lo más interesante es que la encuesta muestra que sólo 2% de los entrevistados aún no han decidido su voto.

A pesar de estos datos, los encuestadores ahora examinan la posibilidad de una segunda ronda: en ese caso, Fernández ganarí­a 67 a 23 contra Mejí­a y 64 a 27 si fuera contra Estrella.

Un sondeo anterior de Hamilton Beattie & Staff da a Fernández un triunfo en la primera ronda, con 52% de los votos, Mejí­a 25% (y 17% para Estrella).

La encuesta de Hamilton muestra la popularidad de Fernández cayendo seis puntos desde febrero del año pasado, de 70% a 64%, y su tasa de rechazo en 35%, subiendo de 28% en febrero de 2003. La tasa de aprobación de Mejí­a ha caí­do de 39% a 32% y su tasa de rechazo en 67% (la más alta en tres años).

En cuanto a la popularidad, Penn, Schoen & Berland muestra a Fernández a la cabeza con 71% (cinco puntos menos que en febrero), seguido por Estrella, con 47%, y luego Mejí­a con 22% (subiendo nueve puntos desde enero).

La encuesta de Hamilton muestra que sólo 19% de los encuestados piensa que el paí­s va en la dirección correcta, mientras que 62% cree lo contrario. La negatividad del electorado con relación a la dirección del paí­s se ha elevado de 35% a 59% sobre las últimas encuestas hechas por la firma.

El ejército brasileño afronta lo que parece ser la primera instancia de 'desborde' militar del conflicto colombiano desde el lanzamiento del Plan Colombia. Una unidad cerca de la frontera fue reforzada luego que inteligencia verificada en el terreno sugerí­a que las guerrillas de las Farc estaban por atacarla, como parte de un vasto plan de atacar puestos de avanzada del ejército brasileño.

En mayo, la inteligencia de Colombia informó al comando militar amazónico, CMA, de Brasil, sobre una reunión de cuadros de las Farc de principios de ese mes en la ciudad de Montenegro, para discutir planes para atacar uno de los pelotones de avanzada en la frontera (PEF), estacionado en Querari, en el área de Cabeça do Cachorro -frente al sudeste de Colombia. Al parecer, las Farc decidieron tomar ese curso de acción a fin de acumular armas, municiones, medicinas y otras provisiones, pues sus habituales lí­neas de abastecimiento fueron severamente afectadas por la ofensiva del ejército colombiano.

Esto proveyó una oportunidad para probar la propia capacidad de Brasil para reunir inteligencia contra una amenaza real. El resultado fue el descubrimiento de una unidad de reconocimiento de las Farc moviéndose hacia la frontera brasileña (no se informó cómo se logró eso, pero pudo haber sido por medio de un avión de reconocimiento de alta tecnologí­a similar al usado el año pasado para localizar un campamento guerrillero en Perú). Luego, imágenes de satélite del sistema de vigilancia amazónica, Sivam, mostraron un campamento guerrillero en el área. Fuentes no identificadas revelaron más tarde que las Farc estaban estructurando una columna cerca de Yuruparí­ (que está sobre un rí­o que cruza la frontera).

El estado mayor del CMA anunció de inmediato que un contingente de 40 soldados del batallón de frontera de la infanterí­a de selva, de Rio Negro, serí­a desplegado en Querarí­ para reforzar el PEF de 70 hombres. Los militares se aseguraron que todo esto sea ampliamente difundido por los medios -un signo que prefieren la disuasión que el enfrentamiento armado.

Aguardando la ley de 'derribo'
Las fuerzas militares estacionadas en la región amazónica aguardan con ansiedad la implementación de la lei do abate, ley de 'derribo', que permitirí­a interceptar y destruir los vuelos ilegales sobre el área. Blancos especí­ficos son los aviones involucrados en el intercambio de armas por drogas entre las Farc y las bandas brasileñas como el Comando Vermelho. El gobierno ya anticipó que tendrí­a las regulaciones listas para aplicarlas en agosto; se espera que para entonces la Casa Blanca habrá emitido la orden presidencial requerida para permitir el uso de tecnologí­a de EU para derribar aviones.

La fuerza aérea de Sivam que dirige la fuerza de ataque del Amazonas espera encargar el primero de los 25 aviones ligeros de ataque Supertucano, adquiridos de Embraer, que cumplirá un rol clave en la intercepción de vuelos ilegales. La fuerza aérea informó que el año pasado detectó casi 3.000 vuelos irregulares, de los cuales 220 se sospechaba que estaban involucrados en tráfico de drogas o de armas. Colombia reasumió el derribo el año pasado luego de dos años de pausa; Perú aguarda la luz verde de Washington para hacer otro tanto.

Crecen en Rí­o las muertes causadas por la policí­a

El gobierno de Rí­o de Janeiro no sólo tiene a las cada vez más duras bandas de drogas para hacer frente; también confronta una implacable ola de lo que parece ser asesinatos de 'limpieza social' por su policí­a en las favelas de la capital del estado. En enero-mayo de este año 497 personas fueron muertas por la policí­a de Rí­o, ya superando la tasa registrada el año pasado (1.195 en todo el año), que fue casi 33% más elevada que la de 2002. La comisión de derechos humanos de la legislatura del estado de Rí­o, investiga a 32 oficiales policiales sospechados de matar a inocentes. Las ONG locales dicen que 83% fue muerto por la policí­a en 2003 en incidentes sin testigos; 65% no tení­a prontuario criminal; y 61% recibió disparos detrás de la cabeza. El secretario de seguridad de Rí­o, Anthony Garotinho, prosigue actualmente con los casos de seis personas muertas recientemente por la policí­a en tres incidentes separados -que ocurrieron frente a testigos.

CRECIMIENTO | Sube el consumo privado. En el segundo trimestre del año, el consumo privado se elevó 5,4% sobre igual periodo del año pasado, llevando el incremento acumulado en la primera mitad a 4,6%. Esta aceleración es un signo alentador, pues la demanda interna ha permanecido obstinadamente floja. Aun más alentador fue que el mayor incremento en el segundo trimestre fue en bienes duraderos (8,5%, comparado con 5,3% para no-duraderos).

La expansión de las exportaciones avanzó en el segundo trimestre, 14,4% más que un año antes, llevando el incremento del primer semestre a 12,4%.

COMERCIO | TLC con Japón. Durante su visita a México, la semana pasada, el primer ministro de Japón, Junichiro Koizumi, firmó con su anfitrión, Vicente Fox, un acuerdo de asociación económica construido en torno a un acuerdo de libre comercio -el primero de Japón con un paí­s latinoamericano y el segundo de México con uno asiático (el primero, con Singapur). El acuerdo tuvo un proceso de dos años, perolas expectativas generadas ya ha producido, este año, un 28% de aumento en el comercio entre ambos. Koizumi señaló que el acuerdo servirí­a de modelo a los que en su paí­s están buscando con Tailandia y Malasia.

SECTOR PETROLERO | Fusión de plantas petroquí­micas de Pemex. En una decisión que está en lí­nea con su nueva polí­tica de reformas acumulativas por partes en la industria del petróleo y gas, la administración Fox ha anunciado que durante los próximos 12 meses fusionará siete de los complejos petroquí­micos (Camargo, Cangrejera, Cosoleacaque, Escolí­n, Morelos, Pajaritos y Tula). Eso complementa el lanzamiento del proyecto Fénix, que conlleva establecer, con un socio privado, un nuevo complejo petroquí­mico, en Tamaulipas o Veracruz. El objetivo de esa iniciativa es revertir la incongruente dependencia de México de productos petroquí­micos importados.

ARGENTINA | Crecimiento y empleos. El Presidente Néstor Kirchner predijo la semana pasada que la economí­a crecerí­a este año 'en 8% o más'. Eso está más en lí­nea con el más reciente pronóstico del banco central que el del ministerio de economí­a, que lo ubica en 7%.
Kirchner también dijo que el año cerrarí­a con el desempleo bajando a 13%. Dijo que la cifra oficial para el cuarto trimestre (aún no divulgada por Indec) serí­a de 13,2%, cayendo de 14,8% en el tercer trimestre. La tasa de desempleo llegó a un pico de 21,5% en mayo de 2002. Aunque el presidente no lo explicó, las cifras que ha citado considera como empleados a los beneficiarios del subsidio de 'jefes de hogares'. Si estos se consideraran como desempleados la tasa del cuarto trimestre se elevarí­a a más de 18%.

BRASIL | Caí­da en la producción industrial. Luego del estancado setiembre, la producción industrial en octubre se contrajo en 0,4%, a un nivel 2,7% más que un año antes. La producción acumulada en los primeros 10 meses del año subió 8,3% sobre periodo comparable de 2003. La CNI, confederación nacional de industriales, informa que la utilización de la capacidad instalada en octubre alcanzó 84%, un record de todos los tiempos.
El empleo industrial en São Paulo, se elevó en 0,6% en octubre, llevando el incremento acumulado en los primeros 10 meses a poco menos de 4%.

BRASIL | Comercio agrí­cola. Las ganancias por exportaciones de productos agrí­colas en los primeros 11 meses del año totalizaron US$36bn, o 29,2% más que en igual periodo del año último y de la mayorí­a de las registradas para ese periodo y cualquier periodo anual desde que hay registro, desde 1989. El total de 11 meses fue casi 18% mayor que el de todo 2003, el record anual previo.